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The Concept of Equity in Early-Modern Legal Scholarship 
In modern scholarship, the concept of equity is often assimilated with that of Aristotelian epieikeia, a 
process which serves to correct rules when, though their wording undoubtedly applies to a case, yet the 
outcome would be unjust, or the legislator would have never wanted the rule to be applied to such a case. 
My thesis deals with the early-modern origins of the association of equity and epieikeia in legal scholarship, 
and of its consequences for the doctrinal development of equity in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
I begin by showing that medieval legal writings on equity were almost completely unconcerned with 
epieikeia, and that the latter was only developed by philosophers and theologians. Legists and canonists 
developed a concept of equity that was unrelated – indeed mostly incompatible – with judicial discretion or 
the emendation of written rules. Thus, throughout the Middle Ages, there was almost no interaction 
between the writings of civil and canon lawyers on equity, and those of theologians on epieikeia. 
In the second chapter of my thesis, I show that the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship was the 
result of the influence of humanistic philology over the writings of humanist jurists, and argue that  it caused 
the majority of early-modern authors to depart from medieval scholarship on equity, re-modelling instead 
equity as a doctrine of interpretation of the law beyond its letter in accordance with the intentions of the 
legislator.  
The final part of my thesis argues that the development of equity as epieikeia in legal scholarship broke 
down the barrier that had hitherto divided theological and legal writings on equity. Indeed, from the late 
sixteenth century onwards, legal and theological writings on equity were connected to such an extent that 
many later authors treated these two branches of scholarship as belonging to one, equally authoritative body 
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Notes on the text 
The Latin is cited as it occurs in the sources referred to, but I have sought to modernise punctuation and 
spelling where it makes the text easier to read. When translations are provided, they are my own unless 
otherwise noted.  
I adopt square brackets when cross-referring to paragraphs within this thesis. Paragraph 2.2.1 would 
therefore be referred to as [2.2.1]. 
Below is a guide to the abbreviations I use to cite Roman law and medieval legal texts: 
 
D.1.1.1: Digest of Justinian, book 1, title 1, lex 1 
C.1.1.1:  Code of Justinian, book 1, title 1, lex 1 
I.1.1.1: Institutes of Justinian, book 1, title 1, lex 1 
Nov.:  Novels of Justinian 
Dist.1, c.1:  Decretum Gratiani, Distinctio 1, canon 1 
C.1, q.1, c.1:  Decretum Gratiani, Causa 1, quaestio 1, canon 1 
X.1.1.1:  Liber extra, book 1, title 1, canon 1 
VI.1.1.1:  Liber sextus, book 1, title 1, canon 1 
Clem.:  Constitutiones Clementis V, book 1, title 1, canon 1 























Equity is a concept of vast scholarly scope – it is one that has been studied across the humanities and in a 
wide variety of contexts. Most research on the subject has come from philosophical and theological 
scholarship, where it is often associated with the idea of epieikeia. Its development as such from Ancient 
Greece through the Middle Ages and beyond has been the object of a great number of studies.1  But though 
the development of equity as a philosophical and theological concept has relevance for the argument 
running through this thesis, it is important to narrow the focus of our attention down to the legal concept 
of equity – that is, the concept of equity as used by lawyers, or, more generally, in writings about law. 
 That said, the legal concept of equity too is one that has been studied in a bewilderingly wide range 
of contexts. Equity is a concept of living significance for lawyers. The important place that equity still 
occupies as a legal branch of law in many common law systems means that much of the available scholarship 
on equity has come from those jurisdictions,2 though similar studies from civil law jurisdictions, or indeed 
within the context of international law are also found.3 My focus in this thesis is, instead, on the legal 
historical development of that concept. From its role in biblical, Greek and Roman law all the way through 
its development in medieval and early modern legal scholarship on both the European Continent and 
England, the scholarly output has, here too, been plentiful.4 The purpose of this thesis is specifically to 
provide an account of the development of equity in the early modern period within what is usually referred 
to as the ius commune, that is, the legal writings of civil and canon lawyers. 
 Given the breadth of legal historical scholarship on equity, it is useful, before providing a more 
detailed summary of what the argument is and how it will be approached throughout this work, to spend a 
moment discussing the choice of topic and the reason for its adoption. This has to do, first, with the fact 
that there are good reasons to believe that the early modern period, specifically the period from 1508 
onwards, was a crucial one for the development of equity in legal scholarship. The second point is that this 
period, despite its importance has not been to date adequately covered. The third point is that providing an 
                                                    
1 See e.g. Karel Kupyers, ‘Recht Und Billigkeit Bei Aristoteles’, 5 Mnemosyne (1937) 289; Paulus Stoffels, Billijkheid in Het 
Oud-Griekse Recht (1954); Max Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory (1951); Francesco D’Agostino, 
Epieikeia - Il Tema Dell’Equità Nell’antichità Greca (1973); Francesco D’Agostino, La Tradizione Dell’epieikeia Nel Medioevo Latino 
(1976); Lawrence Joseph Riley, The History, Nature and Use of Epikeia in Moral Theology (1948). Many more sources can be 
found referred to in the helpful bibliography provided in Guido Kisch, Erasmus Und Die Jurisprudenz Seiner Zeit (1960), pp. 
529-38. 
2 It is an ongoing debate within these jurisdictions whether any connection can (or indeed should) be found between the 
role performed by the branch of law referred to as equity and any more general concept of equity, whether as epieikeia or in 
some other sense. See e.g. J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (2017), 1-002; Eric G Zahnd, ‘The Application of Universal Laws to 
Particular Cases: A Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law’ (1996) 59 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 263, 270-5; D. Klimchuk, ‘Is the Law of Equity Equitable in Aristotle’s Sense?’ (2011), unpublished manuscript 
(2011). For an example in the context of specific rules of equity, see Henry E Smith, ‘Equity and Administrative Behaviour’ 
in Peter G Turner (ed), Equity and Administration (2016), pp. 335-6. 
3 See e.g. RA Newman, ‘Equity in Comparative Law’ (1968) 17 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 807, pp. 
830-48; Thomas Franck, ‘Equity in International Law’ in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana (ed), Perspectives on international Law (1995), 
pp. 23-48. 
4 See e.g. David Daube, ‘Summum Ius-Summa Iniuria’ in D. Daube (ed), Studies in Biblical Law (1947), p. 190. A useful 
summary of modern scholarship on equity in Roman Law and Medieval legal scholarship is available in Hessel E Yntema, 
‘Equity in the civil law and the Common Law’ 15 The American Journal of Comparative Law 60, pp. 66-73. For the 
development of the concept of Equity in England see David Ibbetson, ‘A House Built on Sand’ in E Koops and WJ Zwalve 
(eds), Law & Equity (2014). 
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account of the early modern development of the concept of equity will not only be of benefit for historians 
of the ius commune but also for historians more broadly encountering equity in different contexts. 
 Let us consider the first point. It has been known for some years that the early modern period was 
one during which the concept of equity enjoyed a revival. The renewed interest in the concept of equity 
was not confined to legal scholarship – and historians have more generally identified it as a feature of 
Renaissance Humanism.5 An idea of the many and heterogeneous uses that were made of the concept of 
equity in early modern times in different contexts can be gathered from Mark Fortier’s recent work The 
Culture of Equity in Early Modern England, published in 2005. Though Fortier’s study was, as the title suggests, 
geographically confined to uses of equity by writers in England, it conveys a striking picture of equity as a 
multi-faceted and contested concept with no stable core, particularly resulting from the many and varied 
approaches that were taken to it by authors in different contexts, or indeed within the legal context itself.6 
The emergence of a peculiar interest in the concept of equity in early modern European legal scholarship 
was brought to light most explicitly and fully in Guido Kisch’s well-known work, Erasmus und die Jurisprudenz 
seiner Zeit, published in 1960. Kisch’s research showed how many among the early generation of so-called 
‘legal humanists’, in particular those who belonged within the intellectual network of Erasmus, were 
showing an amount of interest in the concept of equity that was unprecedented in legal scholarship.7 Since 
Kisch’s study, other authors including Vincenzo Piano Mortari, Clausdieter Schott and Jan Schröder have 
worked on the early modern development of the concept of equity and confirmed that the resurgence of 
interest in equity identified by Kisch lasted until well into the seventeenth century and even beyond.8  
 The second point is that, despite the importance of the early modern period for the development 
of equity as a legal doctrine, it is one that has been covered only erratically in available scholarship. Kisch’s 
study, the only monographical work on point, is rather narrow in focus – it identified the circle of scholars 
among whom ideas of equity as epieikeia were initially developed but it did not trace the development of 
equity as a legal doctrine more broadly, its impact on later civil lawyers and canonists or its relationship with 
early modern approaches to epieikeia within scholastic theology. The other studies available have been much 
briefer. Vincenzo Piano Mortari, in a short work entitled Aequitas e Ius Nell’ Umanesimo Giuridico Francese, 
confined his aim to providing a short review of the thought on aequitas of French legal humanists across 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The passages considered by Piano Mortari are usually rather 
short, and he made no attempt to engage with equity as a legal doctrine, or to identify its role as those jurists 
conceived it within the ius commune – this study is therefore of little value as a legal historical account of the 
development of equity in early modern legal scholarship. Two more helpful studies have recently been 
                                                    
5  For the debate among philosophers, see François Rigolot, ‘Nicomaque et La Règle de Plomb, Fictions Légitimes et 
Illégitimes de La Justice Montaignienne’ (2001) 8 Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne 87. For its use by Erasmus 
as a tool for biblical interpretation see Kathy Eden, ‘Equity and the Origin of Renaissance Historicism: The Case of Erasmus’ 
(1993) 5 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 137. 
6 Mark Fortier, The Culture of Equity in Early Modern England (2005). 
7  Kisch, Erasmus, passim 
8 Vincenzo Piano Mortari, ‘Aequitas E Ius nell’Umanesimo Giuridico Francese’ (1997) 9 Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei 
Lincei 141; Clausdieter Schott, ‘Aequitas Cerebrina’ in Hans Thieme (ed), Rechtshistorische Studien: Hans Thieme zum 70. 
Geburtstag (1977); Jan Schröder, ‘Aequitas Und Rechtsquellenlehre in Der Frühen Neuzeit’ (1997) 26 Quaderni Fiorentini 
265.   
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produced by Clausdieter Schott and Jan Schröder, both concerned with the concept of equity as developed 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century among early legal humanists and later civil lawyers, 
tracing its development into the treatises and commentaries of the Usus Modernus. Schröder has argued that 
in the early modern period equity became associated with unwritten law, and has shown that earlier 
humanists sometimes described equity itself as a source of unwritten law. Both have shown that this 
tendency declined and eventually disappeared through the later sixteenth and seventeenth century, as 
lawyers focussed more and more on the fact that judges should use equity together with written law in order 
to do justice, referring to the unbridled use of ‘unwritten’ equity as aequitas cerebrina. The latter concept and 
indeed the consistent resistance of civil and canon lawyers against notions of unwritten equity has instead 
been the main theme of Schotts’s work. Both these studies are helpful in illustrating the potential in carrying 
out a detailed analysis of the development of the concept of equity in early modern Europe – raising 
questions such as, what was the role of equity and its relationship with written or unwritten law? What 
doctrinal function – if any – did it perform? Was there a consensus about the role that equity ought to 
perform within the legal system and did the changes across the seventeenth century reflect a change in this 
consensus? Neither work covers the breadth of material necessary, or treats the writings of equity in 
sufficient detail, to provide an answer to these questions. 
 The third point is that providing a thorough account of the development of equity in early modern 
Europe would not only be beneficial to a better historical understanding of the development of the ius 
commune, but also to the study of other subjects where the legal concept of equity plays a central role. A few 
examples may be provided to give an idea of the extent to which this troublesome gap in legal history has 
been relevant for historians. One very important field of study where an account of early modern equity in 
Europe would have a beneficial impact is the legal historical study of the English concept of equity, and it 
would be of particular aid to those scholars seeking to reconstruct the early modern origin of the association 
of the concept of epieikeia with both statutory interpretation and the Court of Chancery. Recent research 
by David Ibbetson has shown that English early modern legal scholarship on the concept of equity cannot 
be understood in isolation from the contemporary development of equity among civil lawyers. Indeed, it 
seems that accounts of equity produced on the continent played an extremely important role in shaping 
English theories of equity as they were cited as authoritative sources by many English authors seeking to 
make sense of equity as a legal concept. A detailed understanding of the doctrinal development of equity in 
early modern legal scholarship is required in order to assess whether the civil law works cited by English 
lawyers were interpreted accurately or distorted and whether their juxtaposition as sources was warranted 
or whether they provided accounts of equity that were entirely inconsistent.9 Another field of study where 
a thorough account of the early modern legal concept of equity would be beneficial concerns the 
development of epieikeia as a theological doctrine among theologians. It has been known for some time that 
the early modern accounts of epieikeia by Cajetan, Soto and Suarez laid the foundations for the modern 
                                                    
9 David Ibbetson, ‘A House Built on Sand’, pp. 76-7. 
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theological concept of epieikeia.10 However, and while a number of scholars have already recognised to some 
extent the contact between early modern scholastics and contemporary legal scholarship on equity, a 
detailed understanding of the development of equity among lawyers would allow scholars to map to what 
extent the great focus on law of early modern scholastic theologians affected the way in which they 
developed Aquinas’ ideas about equity.11  The absence of a study of reference mapping the development of 
equity in legal scholarship in early modern times is problematic for historians more broadly. Equity is a 
term often encountered whether in the analysis of legal theory more generally, or specific doctrines. For 
instance, historians have encountered the early modern concept of equity when dealing with extraordinary 
jurisdictions. These are not limited to the English courts of equity mentioned above. Charles Donahue’s 
recent work on courts of merchants, and James Shaw’s study of the Chancery of Cosimo I de’ Medici are 
but two recent examples of other contexts to which equity is relevant.12  
Scholars encountering the early modern legal concept of equity have often found it more 
convenient to refer to the readily available scholarship on the medieval legal concept equity, thus referring 
to the available research on the works of legists, canonists and theologians on aequitas and epieikeia. This, 
however, can only be a helpful approach if one assumes that some kind of continuity existed between the 
medieval and early modern concept of equity.13 The difficulty with this view is that, as will be made clear 
throughout this thesis, the early modern period represented a clean break from the past for the development 
of equity in legal scholarship, and early modern authors often made it a point of their treatises to depart 
form the medieval ius commune on equity. Other authors have sought to fill the gap by reference to the 
better-known English concept of equity, but, as mentioned above, the problem becomes one of circularity, 
as it seems the English concept of equity itself was developed by reference to civilian early modern 
sources.14 In short, research providing the missing link between the medieval ius commune concept of equity 
and the modern one would be a very beneficial instalment in European legal history, not only for historians 
of civil law themselves, but for legal and political historians and indeed for scholars of intellectual history 
more broadly. 
I now turn to my work in this thesis. Its aim is to fill the gap in the literature identified above, 
providing a detailed account of the development of equity in early modern legal scholarship in the ius 
commune. My research builds on the work of Kisch and later authors to identify what caused the great 
resurgence of interest in equity in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century and what its significance was 
for the role (if any) that equity played as a legal doctrine. Before turning to the way in which I have structured 
                                                    
10 See Riley, Epiekeia, pp. 56-67. Angel Rodriguez Luño, ‘La Virtù Dell’ Epicheia. Teoria , Storia E Applicazione ( I ). Dalla 
Grecia Classica Fino a Suárez’ (1997) 6 Acta Philosophica 197. 
11 See Luño Rodriguez, ‘La Virtù dell’Epicheia’, pp. 23-4: ‘Suárez sembra tener presente soprattutto il diritto canonico. [...] 
c’è da osservare che nel libro VI Suárez si muove in un contesto giuridico, concedendo notevole attenzione alla tradizione 
canonistica.’  
12 See JE Shaw, ‘Writing to the Prince: Supplications, Equity and Absolutism in Sixteenth-Century Tuscany’ (2012) 215 Past 
& Present 51, p. 53, n. 10. Charles Donahue, ‘Equity in the Courts of Merchants’ (2004) 72 Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 1. 
13 See e.g. Luño Rodriguez, ‘La Virtù dell’Epicheia’, n. 5, where all the references provided are to medieval or modern equity. 
See also Ibbetson, ‘A House Built on Sand’, p. 57, n. 9.  
14 See e.g. Shaw, ‘Writing to the Prince’, p. 53, nn. 10, 15. And n. 12 above.  
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this work, I will outline the main arguments made throughout it. The main point I make, which corroborates 
the earlier intuition of Kisch, is that the early modern period was a critical moment for the development of 
the concept of equity, and there are broadly three arguments running through this thesis in support of that 
fundamental point. 
First, and this is the main argument running through the thesis, the early modern period was a time 
where equity changed its conceptual identity completely in the writings of lawyers, and this was the cause 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth-century revival of interest in that topic. The reason for that fundamental 
change was the acceptance by legal scholars of the identity between aequitas (or for some, more specifically, 
aequum et bonum) and epieikeia. Indeed, while equity and epieikeia had been treated as synonyms by 
philosophers and theologians since the writings of Thomas Aquinas, medieval legists and canonists had not 
drawn explicit links between equity and epieikeia, and certainly not explored the concept of equity by 
referring to the works of Aristotle or to those of theologians on the point. I make the argument that legal 
humanists introduced the equivalence of aequitas and epieikeia in legal scholarship by drawing on fifteenth-
century developments in humanistic philology, in particular on the novel translations of Aristotle produced 
in the Renaissance. Thus, the link to Aristotelian epieikeia, perhaps the most distinctive feature of the modern 
concept of equity, was explicitly accepted and recognised by lawyers only from the sixteenth century 
onwards.  
The second argument running through this work follows from the one above and has to do with the 
reaction of lawyers to the association of aequitas and epieikeia. Those early modern lawyers who sought to 
analyse the concept of aequitas in light of the available learning on Aristotelian epieikeia were soon to realise 
that this required a complete re-conceptualisation of the medieval approach to equity and to the way in 
which it had been used since the early writings on point of the first Glossators and Canonists – this therefore 
meant (i) that  the association of aequitas and epieikeia afforded many legal writers the opportunity to make 
a clean break with past ius commune scholarship and start their theories of equity anew, and (ii) that equity 
became a subject of debate among legal writers as they sought to settle a new consistent role for it within 
the structure of their theories of law. In the thesis, I examine writings of this nature to show that, as to (i) 
from the second half of the sixteenth-century onwards, most legal writers agreed that the medieval position 
on equity needed revisiting and, as to (ii) that though equity would never entirely stop being a contested 
concept, the debate about the nature of equity would eventually converge towards a consensus that its role 
as epieikeia should be that of a doctrine of  interpretation of the law beyond the letter. 
The third point has to do with the relationship between law and theology. Equity was a concept well 
known to theologians from the Middle Ages and, as mentioned above, it was developed in that context 
since the times of Aquinas as a doctrine of emendation of the letter of the law synonymous with Aristotelian 
epieikeia. The concept of aequitas of medieval legists and canonists was, instead, not closely related to epieikeia, 
and the theories of theologians did not have a visible effect on the development of aequitas among legal 
writers throughout the medieval period. However, the association of equity and epieikeia brought in by 
humanist jurists broke down the barrier that had separated theology and law in matters of equity. By the 
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mid-sixteenth century, theological and legal writings on equity as epieikeia were influencing one another 
noticeably, eventually becoming part of a single corpus of writings drawn on indiscriminately on either side. 
This aspect of my research is in line with a great number of recent studies exploring the interaction of late-
scholastic theology and early modern writings by civil and canon lawyers; equity was a subject where the 
effects of theological writings was particularly long-lasting, and I have traced those effects on the writings 
of legal writers well into the eighteenth century. 
These arguments may be easier to follow with the advantage of a breakdown of the structure of the 
thesis. The first chapter of the thesis provides an account of the development of the concept of equity as 
aequitas in medieval civil and canon law. It is based mostly on the available scholarship on point, though I 
also challenge the main arguments that have been made to the effect that the medieval legal concept of 
equity was in some way based on or related to epieikeia, a view which, I argue, is either grounded on a 
misunderstanding of the concept of epieikeia or simply not supported by the available sources. When dealing 
with the doctrinal development of equity, my focus is mainly on those passages where legists and canonists 
dealt with aequitas at greater length, namely the sources opposing equity and rigour. That said, I also deal 
briefly with uses of equity in other contexts, namely its use in the context of judgments ex aequo et bono, and 
in relation to interpretation. The main point which will emerge from the first chapter is that aequitas was, 
throughout the medieval period, a term broadly used to signify justice – it was a quality which laws, even 
written ones, could enjoy, and one which judges should strive to give effect to in their application and 
interpretation of laws. However, it was not developed as a doctrine related to Aristotelian epieikeia, i.e. as 
one of correction, amendment, or interpretation of the law. 
In the second chapter I discuss the introduction of the association of epieikeia and aequitas in legal 
scholarship and its effect on the development of the concept of equity among later legal writers. Like Kisch, 
I have not found any author making the association before Gulielmus Budaeus’ Annotationes in Pandectas of 
1508. In the first part of this chapter, I argue that Budaeus found the connection appealing as a result of 
developments in humanistic philology, and most probably because of the effect they had on the translations 
of Aristotle to which he had access. In the second and third part, I deal with the reaction of early legal 
humanists to the writings of Budaeus, dividing them respectively according to whether they chose to depart 
from or to stand by the medieval learning on aequitas as a result. In the final part of this chapter I show that, 
by the end of the 1500s, one view among the numerous approaches to equity produced in the course of 
the century was spreading and enjoying broader acceptance, that is, a theory of equity as a doctrine of 
interpretation of the law beyond the letter, first introduced by Marius Salamonius in 1525 and developed 
further by Franciscus Connanus and Franciscus Duarenus towards the mid-sixteenth century - I trace the 
diffusion of that theory well into the seventeenth century and provide some evidence of its influence in 
legal writings as late as the eighteenth century. 
Having identified the main features of the new, early modern concept of equity as epieikeia developed 
by lawyers, I deal in the third chapter with the contemporary development of equity among theologians. I 
start by looking at the theological doctrine of epieikeia developed by Aquinas and expanded upon by Cajetan 
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in the 1510s and highlight the main doctrinal differences between that approach and the one that was 
gaining ground among lawyers shortly after. I then move on to argue that later authors who followed on 
from Cajetan in developing Aquinas’ thoughts on epieikeia further, started to engage with the writings of 
lawyers on the same topic – often simply by adopting their language, but sometimes even substantively 
departing from Aquinas’ views in order to reconcile the theological and legal approaches to epieikeia.  
The third provides the foundation for the fourth and concluding chapter of this thesis. Having shown 
that theologians had begun, by the mid-sixteenth century, to treat legal writings on aequitas as being part of 
the same body of learning as the writings of their predecessors on epieikeia, this chapter examines the 
writings on equity of those later sixteenth and early seventeenth century legal writers who sought to find a 
more precise role for equity as epieikeia within the legal system by drawing on the doctrines of theologians 
on point. The argument here is that the main weakness of the concept of equity as interpretation developed 
by Salamonius and his followers earlier in the sixteenth century was its great overlap with existing theories 
of interpretation of the law beyond the letter. Drawing on theological writings on epieikeia, where it had a 
narrower, better defined purpose and scope, allowed the jurists examined in this section to find a more 
precise role for equity/epieikeia as interpretation. These scholars are divided in three main categories. The 
first category, represented most explicitly in Albertus Bolognetus, drew on theological writings only 
superficially, choosing instead to deprive equity of any substantive role as a doctrine of interpretation, 
assimilating it entirely with existing doctrines of interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva. The second category 
chose to draw on the theological writings substantively, either identifying interpretations by equity exactly 
with the scope found for it in the writings of theologians – such was, for instance, the approach of Hugo 
Grotius – or seeking to fit the theological approach within existing doctrines of interpretation, as a sub-
type of interpretatio restrictiva – this was the approach of Hugo Donellus. Finally, later theologians, and most 
importantly Franciscus Suarez sought to bring together the writings of lawyers and those of their 
predecessors on equity, to distinguish interpretations by equity from other existing kinds of interpretation 
within the ius commune. In conclusion, I assess the impact which these more detailed accounts of equity, with 
their roots in a blend of theology and ius commune scholarship, had on later legal writers on interpretation 












Chapter 1 – Background: Aequitas and epieikeia in the medieval ius commune 
My work in the later chapters of this thesis will be focussed on the development of the concept of aequitas 
in the early modern period. However, part of the argument is that the development of the concept of equity 
between 1508 and ca. 1550 represented a clean break from its previous conceptualisation and from the 
doctrines that surrounded it. This argument cannot be fully understood without first setting out how the 
concept of aequitas had been developed in medieval legal scholarship by legists and canonists. Fortunately, 
that aspect of the development of aequitas has been the object of a number of studies and is rather well-
documented. No comprehensive study of the development of equity in the Middle Ages exists, and I have 
not undertaken such a study myself. What follows is mostly based on existing accounts of the medieval 
development of equity, and on my own analysis of the sources cited in those accounts.   
Another important aspect of my argument is that, in legal writings from 1508 onwards, the concept 
of aequitas became clearly and unambiguously associated with the Aristotelian concept of epieikeia. This 
section will therefore also include a brief discussion of the development of the concept of epieikeia in the 
Middle Ages and of the arguments that have been made about whether it was seen by medieval legal writers 
as related to aequitas. The development of the concept of epieikeia has very deep roots in disparate disciplines, 
and a comprehensive account of its development will not be sought here. I have limited my study to those 
sources which have been seen by legal historians as the most likely candidates to have influenced medieval 
lawyers, in particular I have focussed on its development in medieval scholastic theology.   
The essential argument made in this section will be that equity, in the medieval ius commune, was 
developed as a concept synonymous with justice. It was used in this sense in many contexts and for many 
purposes. It was, for instance, associated with the duty of the judge to act in the pursuit of justice, and in 
relation to ‘courts of equity’ in the sense of courts unbound by rules. However, the majority of writings on 
equity were centred on two sources from Justinian’s Code, C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1, both concerned with the 
prevalence of equity over rigour. As will become clear, the doctrinal development of ‘equity’ in this context 
would remain focussed for the entirety of the medieval period around a distinction between ‘written’ equity 
(aequitas scripta) and ‘unwritten’ equity (aequitas non scripta), using equity as a quality (again, identified with 
justice) attributable to rules, and which could aid the judge in the selection of the rules appropriate to govern 
cases before him. Meanwhile, from the mid-thirteenth century onwards, equity began to be associated with 
epieikeia among scholastic theologians from Aquinas onwards. Already in Aquinas, equity as epieikeia had 
acquired a rather distinct doctrinal framework, centred on the avoidance of rules where the application of 
their letter would violate natural law or the common good. Certain scholars, including Norbert Horn and 
Pier Giovanni Caron have argued that the link identified by theologians between equity and epieikeia 
influenced the development of aequitas among medieval legists and canonists, respectively arguing that this 
can be seen in the development of equity by Baldus de Ubaldis (d. 1400) and by the canon lawyers as aequitas 
canonica. I engage with these arguments towards the end of the chapter to show that they are not consistent 
with the available evidence. The most that may be said is perhaps that an implicit influence of epieikeia can 
be identified in some aspects of the medieval use of equity in Baldus and perhaps other isolated sources – 
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however, the bulk of writings of equity, in particular those that focussed on the opposition of rigour and 
aequitas scripta, was incompatible with epieikeia and no explicit reference to a link between the two doctrines 
can be identified throughout medieval legal writings. This view is consistent with the fact, made clear in 
later chapters, that it was precisely the association of equity and epieikeia that led the majority of early modern 
legal writers on equity to abandon the medieval approach to it and start anew.  
 
1.1. Aequitas in the medieval ius commune 
1.1.1. The Glossators: Ius approbatum, Aequitas constituta and Aequitas rudis. 
A good amount of scholarship has in the past focussed on the concept of aequitas as developed by the 
glossators.15 In order to understand the meaning which aequitas assumed in the debates among the legists 
of the twelfth and thirteenth century, it is important to understand its relationship with the sources of law. 
Kantorowicz and Buckland have illuminated this step by pointing to two introductory compilations of 
glosses by Irnerius (d. c.1125) and Bulgarus (d. c.1165) known as Materiae or Exordia.16 It is in Irnerius and 
Bulgarus’ discussion of the subject matter of law that we find an early example of the distinction between 
aequitas nondum constituta or rudis17 and ius approbatum.18 From their discussion of the two, it appears that they 
understood aequitas rudis as the ideal source from which the legislator had to draw in order to enact positive 
law. Ius approbatum or ipsum ius is discussed as a concept coming close to what a modern jurist would call 
positive law, that which is recognized among the available sources of law.19 This distinction between aequitas 
nondum constituta and ius approbatum was followed by contemporary and later glossators.20 
It can be asserted with confidence that all the early glossators agreed that ipsum ius would not always 
be consistent with the requirements of aequitas rudis.21 The question which most commonly brought aequitas 
                                                    
15 Hermann Kantorowicz and William Warwick Buckland, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law (1969); Eduard Maurits 
Meijers, ‘Le Conflit Entre L’équité et La Loi Chez Les Premiers Glossateurs’ (1941) 17 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 
117; Marguerite Boulet-Sautel, ‘Equité Justice et Droit Chez Les Glossateurs Du XIIe Siècle’ (1951) 2 Recueil de Mémoires 
et Travaux de l’Université de Montpellier 1; Hermann Lange, ‘Ius Aequum Und Ius Strictum Bei Den Glossatoren’ (1954) 
71 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 319; Ennio Cortese, La Norma Giuridica, 
Vol. 2 (1964), pp. 331-355. 
16 For the nature of the Materiae as legal texts see Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, pp. 37-41. These sources 
have been edited in Kantorowicz and Buckland, ibid., pp. 283ff. 
17 The name aequitas rudis for aequitas nondum constituta seems to appear for the first time in the Summa Trecensis, before being 
adopted by all other authors. See Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, p. 119. 
18 To avoid confusion, I have not included a further category of law which some glossators called the voluntates which meant 
the ‘legal acts of persons, living or dead’. Meijers, ‘Le conflit’, p. 8. In any case, this third category is not relevant for the 
aequitas-rigor debate that would ensue. 
19 Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, pp. 45, 48. 
20 See Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, p. 9 where he refers to the Summa Trecensis, Exordium and Rogerius (d. c. 1170), Exordium Summae 
Codicis, both edited in Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, pp. 234, 282. See also Martinus (d. c. 1166), 
Exordium Institutionum in Giovanni Battista Palmieri, Bibliotheca Iuridica Medii Aevi, Scripta Anecdota Antiquissimorum Glossatorum, 
I (1914); Placentinus, Exordium Summae Codicis in Gustav Pescatore, Beiträge Zur Mittelalterliche Rechtsgeschichte Vol. 2 (1889), p. 
15; Johannes Bassianus (d. 1197), Materia Codicis, and the identical Summae Codicis of Azo (d. 1220), from MS. Naples 
Brancacciana IV D. 4 f. 26v. 
21 It is true that a handful of sources occasionally use aequitas constituta as a synonym of ipsum ius, either under the influence 
of Cicero (Topica, 9: ‘ius civile est aequitas constituta iis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas optinendas’) or, in the view of 
Kantorowicz and Buckland due to a misreading of a difficult passage in Irnerius. On the latter view see Kantorowicz and 
Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, p. 48, 234 but see contra Meijers, ‘Le conflit’, p. 8 arguing that Irnerius himself uses it in this 
sense. Whatever these early sources meant by aequitas constituta, it is clear that they did not consider all positive law to be ius 
aequum, and they engaged unproblematically with the debate about the conflict between ius aequum as opposed to ius strictum.  
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to the fore, and that which prompted glossators and later legists to think about the meaning and use of 
aequitas, was – predictably – a question centred on the reconciliation of conflicting Roman law sources. The 
question was what a jurist or a judge ought to do when aequitas rudis conflicted with the written ius. 
Fortunately for the medieval jurists, the question had been addressed in two points of Justinian’s Code. The 
bad news, however, was that the two rules provided seemed inconsistent with each other. The lex Placuit 
(C.3.1.8.), prescribed that a judge should always prefer equity to strictum ius, while the lex Inter aequitatem 
(C.1.14.1) reserved the power to resolve contradictions between law and equity to the Emperor.22  
According to a well-known story the glossators were divided into two school, one led by Bulgarus, 
and the other by Martinus Gosia (d. c. 1166) and on this issue – as on many others – they held different 
opinions. The opinion of Bulgarus and his students was that the conflict between the two rules could be 
resolved by appreciating the different sense in which each source used the word aequitas. It is important to 
appreciate fully the meaning of this view, for it is the one that would pose the foundations for the communis 
opinio among legists and canonists on this point for at least three centuries. Their position is representatively 
stated by Rogerius (d. c. 1170) in his Enodationes Quaestionum super Codice.23 Rogerius argued that the lex Inter 
aequitatem referred to aequitas in the sense of aequitas rudis (nondum constituta, as opposed to ius scriptum), he 
read it to mean that, where a written law – however strict - was applicable to a case, a judge would not be 
allowed to supplant it with a more equitable one from outside the written sources. On the other hand, the 
more permissive lex Placuit, referred to aequitas in the wider sense (larga significatione) of aequitas constituta 
(written equity, as opposed to ius strictum), i.e. a sense that included the ius scriptum introduced in response 
to equitable needs (ius scriptum quod equitatis ratione contra rigorem verborum iuris stricti regularisque sit introductum), 
thus, where two written sources were applicable to a case, the judge had to prefer the more equitable one.24 
This understanding of the solution effectively deprived aequitas of its role as a corrective tool in the hands 
of the judge, it introduced the idea of aequitas scripta,25 and reduced the tension between aequitas and rigor to 
one of priority among competing written sources of law. This view was incorporated in the Accursian gloss 
and was the starting point for the further theoretical additions of the post-glossators or commentators 
thereafter.26 As a testimony to the popularity of this view, by the times of Azo (d. 1230), an interlinear gloss 
over the Code started to circulate which added the word ‘scriptae’ over the main text of C.3.1.8, eventually 
                                                    
22 C.3.1.8: ‘Placuit in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse iustitiae aequitatisque quam stricti iuris rationem.’ C.1.14.1: ‘Inter 
aequitatem iusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet et licet inspicere.’ Other similarly conflicting sources 
included the lex prospexit D.40.9.12.1: ‘quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est’ (see n.553 below), and the 
regula iuris at D.50.17.90: ‘in omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in iure, aequitas spectanda est.’  
23 Rogerius’ text is edited in Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, pp. 281-284. See also Rogerius, Summa, 
Codicis, 1.1.7, 1.12.7-9, in Palmieri, Bibliotheca Iuridica, pp. 10, 14-15, though this text does not deal with the difference between 
aequitas rudis and consituta. 
24 Kantorowicz and Buckland, ibid., p. 282. 
25 The expression appears in Azo’s gloss to C.3.1.8 at iusticie: ‘non loquitur de ratione iusticie vel equitatis excogitate sed 
scripte.’ For the role of Azo in helping the hardening of this doctrine see Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 334, n.73. See also 
n.27 below. Azo’s remarks were then incorporated in the Accursian gloss ad ‘in omnibus rebus’, C.3.1.8, in Corpus Iuris Civilis 
(CICiv), Vol. 4 (1560), col. 364. 
26 See Lange, ‘Ius aequum’, p. 331. Though some of the different positions put forward by the glossators survived among 
the commentators on which see Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, pp. 352-3.  
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finding itself incorporated in the main text of C.3.1.8 in manuscript and printed editions of the Code – such 
editions of the Code survived well into the seventeenth century.27 
Martinus and his followers had a different understanding of the lex Inter aequitatem. As expressed in 
Martinus’ own glosses to C.1.14.1,28 he thought that the latter referred only to interpretations which were 
both necessary (i.e. binding, such as those of a judge deciding a case) and general (i.e. applicable in all cases, 
such as that given by a sovereign or by custom).29 Therefore, insofar as an interpretation is neither necessary 
nor general (as in the case of a jurist), or where it is necessary but not general (as in the case of a judge),30 
equity (constituta or not) should take precedence over the iniquitous written rule.31 In practice, this meant 
that Martinus was able to construe a number of actions that were not available by mere reference to the 
Roman sources.32 Although in his time Martinus was influential enough to sometimes influence papal 
decretals and canon law opinions,33 the prevailing opinion would, as mentioned above, ultimately be that 
of Bulgarus’ school.34  
There was also, as identified by Meijers and Cortese, a third approach to this issue, which depended 
on a different understanding ius scriptum. A minority of glossators, including Placentinus (d. 1192) and 
Carolus Siculus (fl. c. 1207-1215), argued that the extension of a rule (or, rather, of its ratio) by analogy (as 
the jurists put it, de similibus ad similia) to cases that did not fall within its words (e.g. the extension of a rule 
applicable to depositum to a case of commodatum) should not be seen as an applications of ius scriptum at all. A 
consequence of this was that, since the lex Placuit only referred to the fact that the ratio aequitatis should be 
preferred to the ratio stricti iuris, the rule must have referred only to cases where no written law was applicable 
and one had to proceed by analogy.35 This means that a rule de rigore immediately applicable to a set of facts 
would not have to give way in favour of an equitable one extended by analogy. This third view was never a 
                                                    
27 For an example of the interlinear gloss see Azo, Summa Codicis, ad C.3.1.8 (MS Paris BNF, lat. 4519, f. 49r). See for instance 
the reported text in the very well known edition of the Corpus Iuris Civilis by Hugues de la Porte (d. 1572), CICiv, Vol. 4 
(1560), col. 364. See also [2.3.1, 4] below. 
28 Quoted in Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, p. 121, referring to Paris BNF, MS Latin, 4523, f. 15v. 
29 For the meaning of interpretatio necessaria and generalis see Cortese, La Norma Giuridica, Vol. 2, pp. 364-368, n. 4.  
30 This distinction, while rejected insofar as it permitted the judge to dismiss written laws in favour of unwritten equity, was 
still being referred to in later times in order to explain why C.1.14.1 could not have been referring to cases of disagreement 
between aequitas scripta and rigor scriptum. See Bartolus, Super... Codicis Cum Additionibus (1509) ad C.1.14.1, ff. 31v-32r. 
31 Recent authors have tended to accept the tradition as truthful. See e.g.  Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, 
pp. 86-88; Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, p. 119. However, the traditional view attributing to Martinus the preference for aequitas rudis 
has been disputed. See Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 321, n. 42. Cortese himself has argued that Martinus, while arguably 
more liberal in the use of aequitas he admitted, still grounded the equitable powers of the judge in written law: ‘[Martino 
ammette] il ricorso a un’equità rude intesa non come criterio posto al di fuori dall’ordinamento, ma come una semplice 
‘equità non scritta’ [...] desumibile in via di extensio ad similia da una lex [scripta] equitativa’. See Cortese, ibid., pp. 324-8. 
32 See Charles Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs Du Juge En Droit Canonique (1938), pp. 175-176. See also Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, pp. 126-
128.  
33 Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 176. The solutions offered by Martinus were sometimes accepted and reached by the jurists of 
the rivalling school, but rationalised in terms consistent with adherence to the aequitas scripta or with the ratio or mens of 
written rules. Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’ pp. 133-134. Cortese has suggested that this sort of reasoning was that supported by 
Martinus in the first place. See n. 31 above. 
34 See Eduard Maurits Meijers, ‘Sommes, Lectures et Commentaires (1100 À 1250)’ (1933) 1 Atti del Congresso 
internazionale di diritto romano, p. 461. See also Kantorowicz and Buckland, Studies in the Glossators, p. 284. In the context 
of the debate the followers of Bulgarus mocked the use of aequitas rudis by referring to it as bursalis, or that devised ex ingenio 
or corde suo. See [2.5.5] below for references to equity in this sense as aequitas cerebrina, a practice that survived into early 
modern times. 
35 Meijers, ‘Le Conflit’, p. 125. Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 352, n. 108. Placentinus, Summula, in Pescatore, Beiträge, Vol. 2, 
p. 10. Karolus de Tocco, ad C.3.1.8 (Paris BNF, MS Latin, 4546, f. 11rb) cited by Meijers, ibid. 
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very popular one, the rapid spread and endurance of the idea that the lex Placuit referred to aequitas scripta 
and rigor scriptum despite its reference to ratio makes this clear. One can also easily infer from the use most 
legists made of aequitas to reconcile conflicting sources that they were happy for equitable rules to be 
extended analogically de similibus ad similia to supplant rules they looked upon as rigorous and immediately 
applicable to certain facts.36 Though it was a minority view, it still found some support among a few later 
commentators.37   
Having presented the view which was to become the communis opinio among the legists, it should be 
borne in mind that the substantive meaning of what aequitas implied, i.e. what it was about, a rule that made 
it aequa, was (and, as shall be shown, was to remain) largely under-theorised. It is clear that aequitas 
represented a quality of certain laws and rules, but it is not clear to which quality it refers.  Most times, 
aequitas appears broadly associated with the relaxation of harshness;38 it was at times associated with 
flexibility and the avoidance of legal niceties to fit the facts of each case, in this sense exceptions and bonae 
fidei iudicia were seen as equitable in nature;39 there are also some passages where it is sufficient for a rule to 
be more recent than another to be called equitable, presumably by virtue of its correction of an earlier rule.40 
When one adds to this that aequitas was not always contrasted with rigor but also with bonitas,41 and that the 
meaning of aequitas seems to oscillate between absolute and correlative with another rule,42 it becomes 
apparent that what the glossators left behind them was not the consistent doctrine it purported to be.   
 
1.1.2. Later developments among legists  
We have examined the root of the communis opinio and its genesis among the glossators. The later 
development of medieval scholarship around aequitas has not benefited from studies as detailed as those 
available for the earlier period. In any case, from what can be gathered by the later comments on C.1.14.1 
of Bartolus (d. 1357), Bartholomaeus de Saliceto (d. 1411) and Paulus Castrensis (d. 1441), as well as that 
over C.3.1.8 of Baldus (d. 1400), the understanding of aequitas mainly continued to revolve around the 
previously established dichotomy of aequitas scripta and aequitas non scripta.43  Some authors added a further 
distinction, that of species and genus. According to the rule that generi per speciem derogatur, whether aequitas 
scripta or rigor scriptum should apply would also depend on whether they were written in specie or in genere. 
Lefebvre traces this distinction back to Dinus Mugellanus (Dino Rossoni, d. c.1300).44 Thus, if aequitas was 
                                                    
36 The Accursian gloss is filled with a rather liberal use of this device, on which see Lange, ‘Ius Strictum’, pp. 334-341. 
37 Notably in Jacobus de Ravanis (Jacques de Révigny, d. 1296), see Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 352-353, n. 109. 
38 An example of this can be found in the Accursian gloss on the actio furti discussed in Lange, ‘Ius strictum’, p. 341. 
39 See Lange, ‘Ius Strictum’, pp. 323, 342. 
40 See Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 340, n. 83.  
41 See the ordinary gloss ad ‘bonum’, C.5.14.8, CICiv, Vol. 1, col. 874 where bonitas and aequitas are opposed to one another 
in a way not dissimilar from the aequitas-rigor opposition that has been dealt with.  
42 For instance, in the example provided above of priority in time. This is explored further by Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 
349. 
43 See Bartolus, Super... Codicis Cum Additionibus (1509) ad C.1.14.1, ff. 31v-32r; Bartholomaeus de Saliceto, Ad I, II, III et IIII 
Libri Codicis Commentarii (1560), ad C.1.14.1, ff. 34v-35v; Paulus Castrensis, In Primam Codicis partem Commentaria (1575), ad 
C.1.14.1, f. 24v; Baldus, Lectura Super Codice, Vol. 1 (c. 1490), ad C.3.1.8, ff 168v-169r. 
44 See Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 192. The rule that species derogat generi goes back to D.50.17.80, but is also found in the added 
title de regulis iuris of the Liber Sextus listed as regula 34 - it is perhaps no coincidence that Mugellanus was also the compiler 
of that title. See VI.5, De Regulis Juris, 34. See also Dinus Mugellanus, De Regulis Iuris (1484), reg. 2, ff. 4r-4v and Petrus de 
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written in specie and rigor in genere, then aequitas would prevail, and vice versa. What this meant was that rules 
that specifically pertained to a certain factual situation should be preferred to broad statements of principle. 
Not all writers made reference to the distinction initially,45 but it seems to have grown into wider acceptance 
over time. As mentioned earlier, a thorough examination of the position of later glossators and 
commentators is not available, but it seems that, apart from certain identifiable dissenting voices,46 the 
preferred position was generally that aequitas should ultimately prevail if rigor and aequitas were both written 
in specie (and thus, presumably, also if they were both written generally).47  
 
1.1.3. Aequitas in medieval canon law 
The term aequitas canonica is used in various senses to refer sometimes to the spirit of canon law rules, to the 
kind of justice that these rules try to achieve, and to a principle of interpretation of those rules in light of 
its Christian aims.48 My main concern in this paragraph is to provide a short account of how aequitas was 
discussed in the Middle Ages among canon lawyers and its relationship with the aequitas of civil lawyers as 
opposed to rigor or strictum ius, explored in the previous paragraph. As we shall see, while the development 
of aequitas had a rather distinctive history among canonists in the earlier period, in later medieval canon law 
the use of equity mirrored almost exactly that which we have observed among legists in the preceding 
paragraphs - it referred to written equity in the same sense and articulated the hierarchy against written 
rigour in the same way. 
 
1.1.3.1. Canonists and misericordia 
Cortese has in the past argued that ‘il confronto tra il pensiero esposto [nella scuola dei Glossatori] e [nella 
scuola dei Canonisti] si rivela oltremodo incerto, soprattutto per via delle profonde differenze dei rispettivi 
linguaggi e dei valori disparati attribuiti ai medesimi termini.’49 These words could not be more appropriate 
to the study of the early development of equity among canon lawyers, compared with its development 
among early glossators. The main difficulty when approaching the canonists’ sources is the complex 
interaction between the aequitas-rigor opposition as discussed by the legists, and its interaction with the 
                                                    
Bellapertica (Pierre de Bellperche, d. 1308) ad C.1.14.1 (in Cambridge Peterhouse MS. 34, f. 87v and Florence BML MS. Plut. 
6 Sin. 6, f. 43rb). It is later found in Baldus, Lectura Vol. 1, ad C.3.1.8 (1490), ff. 168v-169r as well as among fourteenth-
century canonists, 
45 For instance, Bartolus, ad C.1.14.1, ff. 31v-32r, makes no mention of it. 
46 As mentioned at n.37 above, some of the old disagreements among the glossators lived on, see e.g. Jacobus de Ravanis, 
Lectura Super Codice (1519) at f. 127v. Other views were rather disparate, for instance Cinus Pistoiensis (d. 1336) was more 
restrictive on the one hand, believing that the rigor scriptum that was later in time should prevail over a previous aequitas scripta, 
but, in his comment on C.3.1.8 he was also much more liberal, expressing the view that where rigor scriptus is expressed in 
uncertain terms, even aequitas non scripta can prevail over it. The diverging views are mentioned, albeit ambiguously, in Petrus 
De Ancarano (d. 1416), In Quinque Decretalium Libros Facundissima Commentaria (1581), ad X.1.36.1, n. 5, p. 326. For Cinus’ 
view see Cinus Pistoiensis, Lectura Super Codice (1493) ad C 1.14.1, f. 17r and 3.1.8. f. 129r.  Cinus’ view was shared later on 
by other authors such as Antonius de Butrio (d. 1408), Commentaria Super Secunda Parte Primi Decretalium (1578), f. 101v and 
Alexander Imolanus (Alessandro Tartagni, d. 1477), In Primam Codicis (1576) ad C.3.1.8, f. 60vb. See also Lefebvre, Les 
Pouvoirs, p. 192. 
47 See e.g. Petrus de Bellapertica (d. 1308), Lectura (Cambridge, Peterhouse MS. 34, f. 87v), Bartolus ad C.1.14.1, ff. 31v-32r; 
Baldus, Lectura Vol. 1, ad C.3.1.8, ff. 168v-169r. 
48 see e.g. Paolo Grossi, ‘Aequitas Canonica’ (1998) 27 Quaderni Fiorentini 379. 
49 Cortese, La Norma, Vol. 2, p. 335, n. 74. 
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canonists’ Christian tradition of opposition between misericordia-rigor.50 The easiest way to disentangle the 
canonists’ approach to aequitas from this difficulty is to spend a few words on the concept of misericordia, 
which the canonists inherited form patristic writings. The first generation of canonists were faced with a 
large corpus of discordant patristic, pontifical and conciliar texts which they had to harmonise. Among the 
principles of source-reconciliation that the canonists from Bernoldus Constantientis (Bernold von 
Konstanz, d. c.1100) to Gratian devised was that of misericordia.51 Misericordia was the quality which the 
canonists opposed to the rigor of a number of sources which prescribed more restrictive measures or harsher 
punishments, either by setting them aside, or by mitigating them in light of more moderate statements in 
different sources.52  
Up to the time of Gratian, this tension between misericordia and rigor did not carry any implications 
on the theme of aequitas, indeed the latter word itself was only seldom referred to, and then only loosely 
associated with justice, and never in opposition to rigor or strictum ius.53 Across the twelfth century, as the 
importance of the study of Roman law increased, a number of Summae show the influence of certain Roman 
law sources (such as the Brachylogus), where aequitas is discussed in opposition to the ius scriptum - the 
opposition was rather undertheorised and it is not clear what these Summae made of the distinction between 
aequitas and misericordia.54   By the end of the twelfth century, however, the proximity between the school of 
the glossators and that of the canonists, meant that the latter grew familiar with the tension between aequitas 
and rigor as debated by the glossators.55 Thus, a number of thirteenth-century canonists including Stephanus 
Tornacensis (d. 1203), Johannes Teutonicus (d. 1245), Bartholomaeus Brixiensis (d. 1258), Bernardus 
Parmensis (d. 1266) and Guidus de Baysio (d. 1313) started identifying the idea of misericordia, closely linked 
with mitigation and Christian commiseration, with aequitas. Tornacensis, a pupil of Bulgarus, is generally 
regarded as the earliest canonist mainly to have drawn misericordia and aequitas together.56 In the prologue to 
his Summa in decretum Gratiani, he addresses, like his predecessors, the issue of reconciling conflicting 
canonical rules, however, he does so distinguishing between canons given ex rigore and those given ex 
aequitate.57  That the Roman law sources used in similar context by the legists were influential on the 
                                                    
50 Some authors, such as Caron, have sought to also identify a third influence on their writing, that of epieikeia. This is an 
inference which can only be made with extreme caution from the sources and is discussed at n.132 below 
51 Aside from Constantiensis, other canonists involved in this were Ivo Carnutensis (Yves of Chartres, d. c.1115), Algerus 
Magister (Alger of Liège, d c. 1131) and Petrus Abaelardus (Pierre Abélard, d.  1142).  
52 Lefebvre explains this tension as the opposition which survived between the Gregorian sources – strict and authoritarian 
– and many earlier ones, more flexible and lax. Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 165. 
53 Aequitas appears only four times in the Gratian’s Decretum. See Peter Landau, ‘“Aequitas” in the “Corpus Iuris Canonici”’ 
(1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law, p. 98. See also Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 169 for the limited interest in 
aequitas in this period. 
54 Lefebvre argues that at this stage the equation of the two had not been made. Charles Lefebvre, ‘Equité’, Dictionnaire de 
Droit Canonique (1935-65), p. 398. See e.g. the Summa ‘Cum in tres partes’ (c. 1170), f. 19v: ‘Quod si aequitas iuri scripto contraria 
videatur, secundum eam iudicandum est.’ Probably referring to an analogous passage in the Brachylogus at 4.17.2, see 
Eduardus Böcking (ed.), Corpus Legum sive Brachylogus Iuris Civilis (1829), p. 156: ‘Sin vero aequitas iuri scripto contraria 
videatur, secundum ipsam iudicandum est’. 
55 See [1.1.1-2] above.  
56 See Landau, ‘Aequitas’, p. 102. 
57 See Landau, ‘Aequitas’, p. 99. That Tornacensis was familiar with the use of aequitas in the Roman law sources is clear 
from his letter to Pope Clement III (d. 1191) where he used C.1.14.1 to assert the Pope’s sole discretion in reconciling 
rigorous and equitable canons. See George Conklin, ‘Stephen of Tournai and the Development of Aequitas Canonica,’ 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (1988), p. 380, n. 19. 
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assimilation of misericordia and aequitas is unambiguous in Teutonicus’ gloss on Gratian’s Decretum. 
Teutonicus cites the lex Placuit (C.3.1.8 which prescribes that aequitas should prevail over rigor) as authority 
for the fact that potius debet iudex sequi misericordiam quam rigore.58  
The relationship between equity and misericordia was initially not uncontroversial, some authors 
more straightforwardly identified the function of one with that of the other, for instance, Parmensis said 
that: ‘aequitas rigorem mitigat. Unde aequitas intelligitur iuris relaxatio’.59 Huguccio (Uguccione da Pisa, d. 
1210) on the other hand argued that following aequitas meant simply to apply the ius.60 Without exploring 
the nature of this debate in greater detail, it can be said that around mid-century a via media was found by 
Hostiensis (Enrico da Segusio, d. 1271) who agreed with Huguccio that aequitas is ius, but also thought that 
‘rigor non est ius, sed est iuris excessus in austeritate’. Having said this, he defined aequitas as iustitia dulcore 
misericordiae temperata and motus rationabilis regens sententiam et rigorem.61 This definition of aequitas proved 
immensely popular among later canonists as well as legists62 and moral theologians63 as the general position 
of canonists about the relationship between aequitas and misericordia.64 Its meaning was very broad indeed, it 
came to stand for the guiding spirit of canon law as a whole, of the legislator seeking to develop the law, 
and of the jurist and judge in its interpretation.65  
The interaction between equity and misericordia among canon lawyers resulted in a double effect, 
the first one, which is discussed in the next paragraph, is that misericordia lost its role as a principle for the 
reconciliation of conflicting sources, and the legists’ doctrine centred on aequitas scripta came to be adopted 
on this point. The second effect is that later canonists identified the content of aequitas with that of 
misericordia. In this sense the aequitas of canon lawyers, if indistinguishable from that of legists in terms of 
its operation as opposed to rigor, developed, as far as its content is concerned, a particular link with ideas of 
moderation or relaxation of the harshness of rules in the name of Christian commiseration which many 
authors have seen as peculiar to canon law. Perhaps in this sense only (that is, when referring to the qualities 
related to misericordia that canon lawyers associated with equity and which they saw as underlying the system 
of rules of canon law more generally) one may meaningfully refer to a distinct idea of aequitas canonica.66 
 
 
                                                    
58 See the ordinary gloss ad ‘causae’, C. 1 q.7 c.17 in Corpus Iuris Canonici (CICan), Vol. 2 (1582), col. 802. 
59 Bernardus Parmensis, ad ‘rigorem’, X.5.39.32 in CICan, Vol. 2, col. 1903 . Cited in Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 182. For other 
uses of aequitas as misericordia in this period see Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, pp. 181-183. 
60 Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 183. Lefebvre argues that Uguccione had aequitas scripta in mind when making this point. But it 
may also be that aequitas undertook a more general meaning of law or justice when discussed in opposition to misericordia. 
61 See Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 182. Hostiensis attributes iustitia dulcore misericordiae temperata to Cyprian, but the attribution 
has been doubted, see Amedeo Giannini, ‘L’equità’ (1931) 105 Archivio Giuridico 205. 
62 See e.g. Baldus at n.97 below, as well as Lucas de Penna (d. 1390), Commentaria in Tres Libros Codiciis (1597), ad C.12.19.12, 
n. 31. Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 191.  
63 See [1.2.1.] below.  
64 See Pier Giovanni Caron, ‘Aequitas’ Romana, ‘Misericordia’ Patristica Ed ‘Epicheia’ Aristotelica Nella Dottrina dell’’Aequitas’ 
Canonica (1971), pp. 91-111. 
65 Landau, ‘Aequitas’, pp. 101-102. 
66 See [1.1.3.3] below. 
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1.1.3.2. Canonists and the aequitas of the legists 
As mentioned above, the assimilation of aequitas with misericordia caused the better developed principles of 
the glossators to take over the role that misericordia had served for the reconciliation of conflicting sources.  
There is strong evidence that, from the mid-thirteenth century onwards, canonists were aware of 
the debate among the glossators around the discordance between the lex Placuit and the lex Inter aequitatem, 
and they did not hesitate to engage with it and offer their views. This should not come as a surprise, by the 
times of Gratian canonists and legists were drawn closer together and, as Lefebvre puts it, by the fourteenth 
century, they worked on similar matters, studied the same writings, and were inspired by the same sources.67  
Canonists were aware of the debate about equity among glossators from the times of Tornacensis, 
when they started to adopt the language of aequitas.  We have already mentioned that the opinions of the 
glossator Martinus Gosia drew support among canon lawyers.68 Hostiensis already discussed the civilian 
distinction between aequitas rudis and scriptum ius, arguing that in certain circumstances (e.g. where what is at 
stake is the periculum animarum), aequitas rudis should be allowed to prevail over scriptum ius. We have already 
seen how Tornacensis and Parmensis started to use the language of aequitas interchangeably with misericordia 
in opposition to rigor in matters of source-reconciliation, and it is also clear that they were familiar with the 
issues raised by the civilians about the reconciliation of these conflicting Roman law sources.69 In his gloss 
to X.1.36.11, Parmensis refers to the tension between the rule that a judge must have ‘aequitas prae oculis 
semper’ with the contrary one that ‘ius sit praeferendum aequitati’ and that equitable interventions are 
confined to cases where ‘ius non invenitur expressum’. He follows the line of the legists by arguing that the 
two propositions refer to two different kinds of aequitas, the former proposition ‘poteris intelligere de 
aequitate scripta, quae debet praeferri rigori iuris’, while the latter is true ‘de aequitate non scripta, quae tunc 
solum servanda est cum ius deficit’.70 The better-theorised doctrine of source-reconciliation of the 
glossators soon put aside the role of misericordia.   
By the times of Iohannes Andreae (d. 1348),the restrictive doctrine of the legists had been fully 
absorbed by the canonists.71 Indeed, as mentioned above, the origin of the application of species derogat generi 
to writings on equity was attributed by Lefebvre to Mugellanus’s commentary on the Liber Sextus and, 
according to Charles Donahue, it was through the debates of canon lawyers that the popular view that a 
later rigorous written law could take precedence over an earlier equitable one emerged - the corpus of 
debates among commentators and canonists was perceived as forming one body of complementary 
commentary on aequitas.72 From the fourteenth century onwards, discussions of aequitas as opposed to rigor 
in canon law commentaries were indistinguishable from those of legists around C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1. Some 
scholars have argued that the position changed towards the end of the fifteenth century - in particular, Pier 
Giovanni Caron has suggested that some later canonists introduced the possibility that aequitas non scripta 
                                                    
67 Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 194. 
68 Ibid., p. 176. 
69 See nn.56-6 above.  
70 See Parmensis ad ‘aequitate’, X.1.36.11, CICan, Vol. 2, col. 453. See also Lange, ‘Ius Aequum’, p. 331.  
71 See Iohannes Andreae, In quinque Decretalium libros Novella Commentaria (1581), lib. 1, c. 1, n. 9.  
72 See n.44 above and Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants’, p. 15. 
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might prevail over ius scriptum. That, according to Caron is the effect of the words of Felinus Sandeus (d. 
1503) in his Commentaria, where he argues that licet aequitas non scripta non praeferatur rigori scripto that may 
happen in cases where pro aequitate non scripta concurrat praesumptio.73  
Not much research has been carried out on the later developments of the canonists’ doctrine 
surrounding aequitas scripta and non scripta after the second half of the fifteenth century, but if Sandeus’ 
position signified a change of direction, it was not one accepted by his contemporaries, or indeed by later 
authors. This can be gathered by looking at the later writings of Decius (Filippo Decio, d. c. 1535). In his 
comment to De Regulis Iuris, the position seems perfectly in line with the orthodox one reached by legists: 
‘Et quantum ad regulam hic quae dicit, quod aequitas praefertur rigori: primo regula intelligitur quando 
aequitas sit scripta: secus si scripta non sit: quia tunc rigor scriptus praefertur aequitati non scriptae: ut not. 
per glo. ubi Bar[tolus] et Salic[etus] per illum text[um] in [C.1.14.1] et idem glo. in [C.3.1.8] ubi Bal[dus] et 
Sali[cetus] per [D., 40, 9, 12, 1] et not. per glo. in [X.1.36.11] ubi Abb[as Panormitanus] et Imo[lanus] post 
alios. Secundo regula procedit in aequitate scripta in specie. Secus si esset scripta in genere: quia rigor 
scriptus in specie illi praefertur: ut no[tat] Cyn[us] Bal[dus] Ange[lus] et Sali[cetus] in [C.3.1.8] […] et Abb[as 
Panormitanus] in [X.1.36.11] ad hoc facit, quia species derogat generi’.74 This exposition of equity can be 
found in canon law works well into the early modern period, indeed restated as late as the 1550s in authors 
such as Petrus Paulus Parisius (d. 1545), Marcus Mantua Bonavitus (d. 1582) and Agostinus Beroius (d. 
1554).75   
 
1.1.3.3. Aequitas canonica 
By the fourteenth century the writings of canon lawyers on equity (usually found around X.1.36.11 and 
VI.de.reg.iur.90) and those of legists around C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1 were treated as one body of doctrine. 
However, we mentioned above that there was an aspect of equity that seems to have been peculiar to canon 
law, and it is often associated with the expression aequitas canonica. The idea behind aequitas canonica may have 
derived its originality from the historical links between the concept of aequitas and that of misericordia.76 
Lefebvre has shown that, by the time of Baldus, aequitas canonica was referred to most often as the body of 
canon law rules in the context of contrasting their peculiar ‘equity’ with that of the civil law.77  In this 
context, the meaning of the expression aequitas canonica was perfectly in line with the doctrine of equity as a 
                                                    
73 See Caron, ‘Aequitas’ Romana, p. 102. Caron attributes this to the influence of epieikeia, we return to this at n 132 below. 
74 Filippus Decius, In tit. ff. De Regulis Iuris (1556), ad reg. 90, p. 306. 
75 Petrus Paulus Parisius (d. 1545), Commentaria Super Capitulo in Presentia Nec Non (1522) ad X.2.19.11, ff. 25vb-26ra. Mantua 
Bonavitus (d. 1582), Isagogicus Perquam Brevis Modus Ad Tollendos Fere Quoscunque Licet Inexplicabiles Argumentorum Nodos (1544), 
pp. 201-205 ; Agostinus Beroius (d.1554), In Primam Partem Libri Secundi Commentarii (1578), ad X.2.19.11, p. 109. We shall 
return to this point when discussing the peculiar resistance of canon lawyers to the early modern association of aequitas 
and epieikeia. See [2.5.3].  
76 See [1.1.3.1] above. 
77 Lefebvre argues that Baldus was influential in distinguishing aequitas in naturalis, civilis, and canonica by reference to the 
system of rules from which the aequitas scripta was being applied. Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 191.About the meaning of the 
expression aequitas canonica, Lefebvre explains that, for Baldus, ‘il s’agit des dispositions canoniques elles-mêmes, de celles 
qui sont fondées sur les principes du droit canonique.’ Baldus may have been influential on the development of notions of 
aequitas naturalis a nd civilis among early modern authors. See [2.3.4.2] below. 
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ground for rule-reconciliation centred on aequitas scripta explored above.78  Aequitas canonica in the sense of 
iustitia dulcore misericordiae temperata, referred to the particular qualities of the justice that lay at the foundation 
of canon law – its aequitas non scripta – and at the same time to the peculiar qualities of those rules of canon 
law that counted as aequitas scripta. To cite Peter Landau on this point: ‘Canon law [...] gave another definition 
of aequitas scripta than the authors of Roman law. The association of aequitas with the special canonical 
concept of misericordia was upheld by the prevailing tradition among the canonists.’ 79  
The practical significance of this when it came to determine whether rules of canon law were to be 
preferred to civil law rules is not straightforward. First of all, it is not clear that medieval commentators 
always found rules of canon law to be actually imbued with such canonical equity and, when found rigorous, 
more equitable rules of civil law could prevail over them.80 Secondly, even when canonists found rules of 
canon law superior to rules of civil law on account of their canonical equity, this did not automatically mean 
that they should always be preferred over the civil law, Lefebvre points out that some canonists thought 
the rigour of the civil law could be discarded only in certain circumstances, e.g. in ecclesiastical matters, and 
matters concerning the minorum.81  
Pio Fedele has argued that ‘l’aequitas canonica racchiude in sé un concetto canonistico originale, senza 
alcun riscontro nel diritto romano o in altro ordinamento giuridico secolare’.82 Statements such as this can 
only be accepted if one accepts the narrow view of aequitas canonica advocated for here. Equity in canon law 
did not otherwise empower the judge with greater discretion than its civilian counterpart. 
 
1.1.4. The use of equity in broader context 
The discussion above has focussed on uses of equity in the context of its opposition to rigor, which – as has 
been shown – was the main focus of its development through medieval legal scholarship. However, equity 
in its more general meaning of justice was one of very broad application and was summoned in a number 
of other contexts. Helmut Coing has suggested that a way to understand the uses of aequitas  outside of the 
specific doctrines of rule-discrimination described above, is to regard it as a concept encompassing a set of 
‘ideas’ associated with justice, meekness and flexibility.83 We shall here focus on two more specific uses of 
equity within medieval legal scholarship that ought to be acknowledged. 
1.1.4.1. Equity as a principle of interpretation 
The main argument developed through this doctoral dissertation is that equity – through the influence of 
legal humanism - would become associated with epieikeia in early modern times, and – as a consequence of 
this – it would be re-shaped from a mere synonym of abstract justice and quality of the law, into a doctrine 
of interpretation inspired by Aristotle’s writings.  
                                                    
78 This is explained very clearly in Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, pp. 186-188.  
79 See Landau, ‘Aequitas’, pp. 99-103. 
80 See C. Lefebvre, G. Le Bras and J. Rambaud, L’Âge Classique 1140-1378. Sources et théorie du droit (1965) (Histoire du Droit et 
des Institutions de l’Église en Occident, ed. G. Le Bras, VII), p. 419. 
81 The meaning of minorum is not straightforward. Lefebvre, Les Pouvoirs, p. 187, translates this as ‘[les causes] des pauvres et 
autres personnes malheureuses’. 
82 Pio Fedele, Lo spirito del diritto canonico (1962), p. 245. 
83 Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht I (1985), p. 41. 
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This is not to say, however, that equity bore no relationship to interpretation in the writings of 
medieval lawyers. The point is that equity in its broadest sense of justice, meekness, laxity, was seen as the 
guiding principle of all judicial activity, including – of course – interpretation. We find it often mentioned 
in this sense. Baldus in particular claimed that equity is the foundation of the interpretation of laws and 
contracts.84 An analysis of the role of equity in this sense has been provided by Vincenzo Piano Mortari. 
Piano Mortari shows that the conception of equity as the foundation of all interpretation lived on in the 
first treatises on interpretation written across the fifteenth and sixteenth century of Matthaeus Matasellanis 
(fl. ca. 1410), Bartholomaeus Veronensis (Bartolomeo Cipolla, d. 1475), Lanfrancus de Ariadno (d. 1488), 
Constantius Rogerius (fl. ca. 1463), Petrus Andreas Gammarus (d. 1528), Stephanus de Phedericis (Stefano 
Federici, fl. ca. 1496), and Andreas Alciatus, (d. 1550). As late as the times of Gammarus’ de extensionibus, 
these authors did not associate equity with epieikeia or develop it as a substantive doctrine of interpretation.85 
Further, there is the occasional use of aequitas as a synonym for causa, mens or ratio legis. For instance 
at C.8.52(53).2, the Accursian gloss explains the meaning of rationem as rationabilem legem vel rationem, i.e. sive 
mentem sive aequitatem legis scriptae. Here the phrase aequitatem legis scriptae, (the ’equity’ of the written law) 
suggests that the ‘equity’ or justice underpinning the rule is identified with its scope, the reason why it was 
enacted (ratio) or the purpose it was meant to achieve within the legal system (mens).86  
Finally, the use of equity as justice which came closest to playing an operative role within doctrines 
of interpretation is found in the context of the doctrines of interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva. Generally 
speaking, these doctrines were meant to aid the interpreter in understanding the words of the law, where it 
was unclear whether the legislator meant them in their usual sense or in some narrower or broader improper 
sense – treatises on interpretation generally provided a number of arguments, founded on rhetorical and 
legal authorities, that could be run in order to demonstrate that the legislator meant the law to apply more 
extensively or restrictively than the plain meaning of the words gives away.87 Equity, in the sense of justice, 
is listed by some authors, for instance by Baldus as such an argument. If the plain meaning of the words 
would lead to an unjust result, this may be a valid argument to show that the legislator meant to use the 
words in an improper sense, either narrower or broader.88 That said, in this example as in all others of the 
use of equity in the medieval ius commune, equity is not itself a doctrine of interpretation – it remains a 
                                                    
84 See Baldus, Super Codicis Commentaria (1539), Vol. 3, ad C.6.55.9 (1539), ff. 179v-80r. 
85 Vincenzo Piano Mortari, Ricerche Sulla Teoria Dell’interpretazione Del Diritto Nel Secolo XVI (1956), passim. 
86 See the Accursian gloss ad ‘aut legem’, C.8.53[52].2, CICiv, col. 1695. For the use of aequitas in the sense of causa, ratio and 
mens see further Cortese, La Norma, Vol. I, pp. 268-271, 275-293, where similar examples are provided.  
87 I take this account of interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva from Stephanus de Phedericis’ De Interpretatione Legum of 1496. 
Piano Mortari describes it as the most thorough of the late ius commune, see Piano Mortari, Ricerche, pp. 12-3. See Stephanus 
de Phedericis, Tractatus de Interpretatione Legum (1577), p. 8, 16ff: ‘Aliquando [verba et mens legis] non invicem repugnant, sed 
se excedunt, quia aut plus vel minus scriptum est quam legislator voluerit. [...] Quo casu si quidem claris argumentis et 
rationibus comprehendi potest, plus vel minus esse intellectum quam scriptum tunc verba legis amplianda et restringenda 
sunt quatenus mente conceptum fuit.’ This practice continued in early modern times, see Jan Schröder, ‘The Concept and 
Means of Legal Interpretation in the 18th Century’, Interpretation of Law in the Age of the Enlightenment (2011), pp. 96-8.  
 
88 Such an argument is not found in the treatises of Rogerius and De Phedericiis, but see e.g. Baldus Lectura, Vol. 1, ad 
C.1.14.5, f. 60r: ‘Regula est quod stamus propriae significationi verborum [...]. Fallit si alia apparet mens legis, quae colligitur 
ex pluribus. Primo, si sensus proprius continet iniquitatem: et tunc intelligimus secundum improprium’.  
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synonym of justice, a quality of the outcome which raises a presumption as to the intentions of the 
legislator.89 The operative doctrine is the relevant interpretatio, whether restrictiva or extensiva, not equity itself. 
  
1.1.4.2. Proceeding and judging ex aequo et bono 
Another, perhaps more important context within which equity can be found is that concerned with so-
called proceedings de aequitate or ex aequo et bono. This was the expression that medieval lawyers adopted to 
describe proceedings by arbitration, by merchant courts, or other courts, broadly speaking, unbound by 
(any or some) rules. The number of studies concerned with this aspect of equity is limited – but a short 
study by Charles Donahue goes in some detail about how medieval lawyers thought about proceedings by 
equity. Specifically, Donahue points to passages in Bartolus’ and Baldus’ comments that connect passages 
in the Digest about apices iuris (e.g. D.17.1.29.4) with proceedings in courts where judgment is to be rendered 
ex aequo et bono such as the curia mercatorum.90 Bartolus essentially thought that proceedings ex aequitate would 
involve avoiding apices iuris, that is, rules qui veritatem negotii non tangunt, which Donahue understands to mean 
‘procedural requirements that did not go to the truth of the matter.’ Baldus similarly argued that in curia 
mercatorum dicitur quod negocia debent decidi de bona aequitate, omissis solennitatibus iuris.91 As explained by Baldus 
this does not mean that such courts are allowed to disregard civil law rules altogether. Instead, they can 
avoid the procedural niceties which do not touch directly on the matter at hand. The practical application 
of these principles is not always straightforward. For instance, Baldus and Bartolus add that an exceptio nudi 
pacti cannot be opposed to another party in a court merchant because in this case ius commune non intromittit 
se de detrahendo iurigentium, sed non adiicit et robur. This seems to suggest that the reason a pactum nudum will be 
upheld by a court proceeding de aequitate is that – while such a pact would not be binding at civil law – there 
is nothing in the ius commune specifically meant to take away its binding power under the ius gentium. Not all 
jurists agreed that it was sufficient for a court to be able to proceed de aequitate to uphold a naked pact,92 
but Donahue has shown that, following the opinion of those two doctors, arguing that proceedings were 
‘equitable’ (e.g. argued in a court merchant, or before arbitrators) became a viable argument to invalidate 
an exceptio nudi pacti  - though how much power such an argument actually had in practice remains unclear.93 
The reasoning in the case seems to imply that a more lenient approach to the introduction of aequitas non 
scripta – even in the form of ius gentium - would be permitted, since a normal court would not be able to 
treat the rules of ius commune regarding nudum pactum as silent. The use of equity in the context of proceedings 
de aequitate seems consistent with the use of equity discussed above – the general idea being that courts 
allowed to proceed by equity, i.e. by reference to justice itself, would be bound to a lesser extent by written 
                                                    
89 Other examples of uses of equity in a similar way within legal doctrines of interpretation are provided in Piano Mortari, 
Ricerche, pp. 30-1. 
90 See Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants, pp. 6-7. 
91 See Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants’, p. 9. 
92 For instance, Donahue cites Ludovicus Romanus (d. 1439) and Decius in favour of the view that only a court allowed to 
‘decide’ (as opposed to proceed) according to equity would have been able to avoid an exceptio nudi pacti. This leaves open 
the question of whether courts able to ‘decide’ according to equity were, in the view of these authors, bound by any rules at 
all and in what way. See Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants, p. 27. 
93 Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants’, p. 26. 
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law.94   The question of equitable courts and of how their powers differed from ordinary courts according 
to medieval and early modern jurists remains in need of further research, but is not central to the argument 
in this thesis – as will become clear, the majority of early modern writers associating equity and epieikeia saw 
equity as a doctrine concerning all judges, regardless of the extent to which they were bound by rules of 
law. 
By the times of Baldus, legal writers were increasingly aware of the multi-faceted nature of the 
concept of aequitas and at times attempted to disambiguate between its various meanings. Baldus identifies, 
referring (in a potentially corrupt passage)95 to Jacobus de Belviso’s (d. 1355) comment to the Libri Feudorum, 
five different meanings for aequitas:96 ‘Uno modo prout sumitur contra iniquitatem et dolum: ut [D.9.2.51, 
D.16.3.31]. Secundo modo dicitur equitas prout distinguit contra rigores et iuris civilis regulas, ut [C.6.2.20, 
D.45.1.91.3]. Tertio modo dicitur equitas ipsa mens et ratio legis, ut [D.27.1.13.2]. Quarto dicitur equitas 
ipsum ius et iusticia, ut [D.1.1.1], [X.1.36.11] et ibi Jo[hannes] An[dreae]. Quinto dicitur equitas temperantia 35F 
sive equalitas, ut [C.6.20.17, C.6.20.19], cum [Nov.18.4pr. i.f.] ibi posita et [C.6.20.20.1], et [C.7.51.6], et dic 
ut ibi, et dicit Archi[diaconus (i.e. Guidus de Baysio)] quod equitas est dulcior misericordia temperata [sic]’97 
he proceeds then to cite four Code passages and a novel. The first distinction is not perfectly clear, and the 
passages cited in the Digest not fully illuminating, but it is likely to refer to the use of aequitas in the context 
of a person’s state of mind or moral attitude.98 More importantly, Baldus was aware of the different juridical 
meanings that aequitas could acquire, and he distinguishes accordingly between aequitas as opposed to rigor, 
aequitas as ratio, and aequitas as encompassing all ius. His last distinction shows he also had to deal with the 
increasingly popular canonist definition of aequitas. 
 
1.2. Aequitas as epieikeia 
As mentioned above, the concept of epieikeia was popularised through Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics and Rhetoric. Aristotle developed a narrower idea from a broader one. In a broader sense a man who 
abides by epieikeia (i.e. a man who is epieikes) is ‘a person who does not insist on their full due; a decent 
person’,99 the classic example being that of the creditor who allows his debtor some extra time when 
insisting on his right to immediate payment would cause the other economic hardship. From this, Aristotle 
derives the narrower legal idea that the law may sometimes need to be adjusted to fit the circumstances of 
particular cases, because the law can only provide universal statements about a matter (nature) which, being 
                                                    
94 The idea does not seem related to epieikeia – and it does not seem that it was expected that an arbiter judging a case de 
aequitate would necessarily depart from a rigorous rule, see e.g. Iason de Maino, Lectura Insignis (1514), ad C.3.1.8, f. 116r 
where he lists among the exceptions to C.3.1.8, alongside cases of written rigour/unwritten equity and equity written in 
genere/rigour in specie, also cases of arbitrariis ‘i[n] q[uibus] iudex pot[est] seq[ui] rigore[m] scriptu[m] et non seq[ui] p[ro]ut 
libet’. 
95 See Donahue, 'Courts of Merchants’, pp. 15-16, n. 81.  
96 Baldus, Lectura ad Libri Feudorum (1552), ad L.F.2.53(54), f. 101r. See also Norbert Horn, Aequitas in Den Lehren Des Baldus 
(1968), pp. 11-12, 238. Jacobus de Belviso Commentarii in Authenticum et Consuetudines feudorum (1511), ad L.F. 2.53(54), f. 105r. 
97 The latter appears to be a (confusingly worded) reference to the definition of aequitas prevailing among canonists, i.e. that 
of iustitia dulcore misericordiae temperata. See n.61 above. 
98 Although D.16.3.31 is clearly broader. 
99 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics (2009), p. 98. See Leslie Brown’s note at p. 235. 
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indefinite, cannot be contained in those statements fully. For Aristotle, when a law fails the purpose 
envisaged by the legislator because of its application to circumstances unforeseen, the judge has to intervene 
and set it aside in accordance with what the legislator would have done if he had foreseen the situation. 
This achieves a ‘superior’ kind of justice than that achievable by the mere following of the law (which 
Aristotle sees as a kind of justice in itself, albeit lower). The latter idea is the one which impressed later 
theologians and early modern lawyers the most; indeed the example used by Aristotle to illustrate the duty 
of the judge, that of the leaden rule of the artificers of Lesbos (sometimes called the Regula Lesbia or Lesbian 
rule) which can be bent to fit the shape of every stone, just like the judge adapts the law to the facts of each 
case, was a common theme among medieval and early modern theologians when they referred to epieikeia. 
Legists and canonists were well acquainted with the works of Aristotle which they are known to 
have referred to and used to structure their arguments.100 This has prompted a number of scholars to argue 
that various aspects of the thought of legists and canonists were influenced by the concept of epieikeia.101  
In order to engage with the ways in which medieval lawyers could have grown acquainted with epieikeia, a 
word must be said about the transmission of the works of Aristotle that dealt with it through the Middle 
Ages. The first source that reported epieikeia in its legal sense was a mid-twelfth century fragmentary 
translation of the Ethics now attributed by many scholars to the jurist Burgundio Pisanus (Burgundione da 
Pisa, d. 1193), but it is not clear how widely it circulated. The rise in popularity of epieikeia among 
philosophers was mainly due to the revision of that translation by Robertus Grosseteste (d. 1253) produced 
in 1246-1247.102 Another event which may have increased its popularity was the appearance of the first 
Latin anonymous translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, both in the mid-thirteenth century, one from Arabic 
by Hermannus Alemannus (d. 1272) and another one from Greek, probably by Bartholomaeus de Messina 
(fl. 1258-66).103 
 That said, a very important point concerning the potential adoption of epieikeia by lawyers is that 
all the translations referred to above merely transliterated the word epieikeia into Latin characters. None 
identified explicitly a relationship between epieikeia and aequitas. The first theologian to famously link epieikeia 
with aequitas was Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) in his Summa IIaIIae.104 This means that the medieval tradition 
of moral theological studies on epieikeia as aequitas which carried on from the Medieval through the early 
modern period is the most plausible source for any link to be found in the medieval concept of aequitas as 
developed by medieval legists and canonists and Aristotelian epieikeia.  
                                                    
100 See e.g. Helmut Coing, ‘Zum Einfluß Der Philosophie Des Aristoteles Auf Die Entwicklung Des Römischen Rechts’ 
(1952) 69 Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 25. See also Norbert Horn, “Philosophie in der 
Jurisprudenz der Kommentatoren: Baldus philosophus” (1967) 1 Ius commune 104. 
101 For instance see Caron, ‘Aequitas’ Romana and Horn, Aequitas in Den Lehren des Baldus. See also Boulet-Sautel, ‘Equité, 
Justice et Droit’, p. 6. 
102 For the circulation of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in the medieval period see J. A. Poblete, ‘Itinerario de Las 
Traducciones Latinas de Ethica Nicomachea Durante El Siglo XIII’, Anales del Seminario de Historia de Filosofia 31 (2014) 
43. For a focus on the development of epieikeia see D’Agostino, La Tradizione Dell’Epieikeia Nel Medioevo Latino, p. 41.  
103 See B. Schneider, 'Praefatio', Rhetorica: Aristoteles Translatio Anonyma Sive Vetus et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. B. 
Schneider, Leiden, 1978. 
104 Aquinas, Summa IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1. I refer to the Leonine edition of the Summa, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae in Opera 
Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII edita (1888-1906), which is conveniently available online at www.corpusthomisticum.org 
(last accessed 07-04-2018). 
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To evaluate the likelihood of such an influence, I will first deal with the medieval development of 
equity as epieikeia by scholastic theologians from Aquinas onwards and then with the potential effect of 
those writings on the concept of equity found among canonists and legists in the medieval period discussed 
above. The conclusion will be that, despite some arguments to the contrary, it does not seem that the 
medieval concept of aequitas was influenced by that tradition. Arguments about the influence of theological 
epieikeia over aequitas may, at best, be confined to indirect influence over single authors. Towards the end, 
the argument will be made that the closest medieval legal doctrine got to bringing together equity and 
epieikeia is to be found in the specific approach of certain authors to interpretatio restrictiva examined above– 
and indeed that specific approach to restrictive interpretation would be revived and expanded by early 
modern authors who sought to reconcile medieval theories of aequitas with Aristotelian epieikeia. 
 
1.2.1. Epieikeia in Scholastic Moral Theology 
That epieikeia was an important concept within medieval scholastic moral theology is well known.105 The 
aim of this section is to glance over the uninterrupted tradition over epieikeia carried through the Middle-
Ages.  
 
1.2.1.1. Epieikeia in Aquinas  
In the third chapter I return to the theory of equity found in Aquinas in order to assess its revival within 
the early modern period among late-scholastic theologians. For our present purposes it is sufficient to 
appreciate what the main features of Aquinas’ theory of equity were, so that it can be usefully compared 
with the approach of lawyers.  
As mentioned above, the first work which truly popularised epieikeia and which also drew an 
equivalence between that concept and aequitas was Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae which started 
circulating between the mid-thirteenth century and the 1270s. Aquinas dealt in more than one place with 
the idea that harmful rules can be departed from.106 One such instance was discussed by Aquinas under 
quaestio 120 of the Summa IIaIIae, which discussed epieikeia, quae apud nos – as Aquinas said – dicitur aequitas.107 
Aquinas follows the traditional Aristotelian understanding of epieikeia as being required because it is 
impossible for a good-willing legislator to foresee every case. Some laws that the legislator framed to serve 
the common good in the most frequent and foreseeable cases will defeat the legislator’s intention in single 
unforeseen cases.  
An important point, to which we shall return in the third chapter of this thesis, is that Aquinas in 
his quaestio 120 stressed that epieikeia was distinct from interpretation. Interpretation deals with cases where 
the wording of the law is ambiguous and needs elucidation. Epieikeia deals, rather, with cases where the 
wording is perfectly clear, but it is also perfectly clear that its application would be harmful to the common 
                                                    
105 See generally, Riley, Epikeia, and D’Agostino, La Tradizione dell’Epieikeia. 
106 IaIIae, q.96, art. 6. 




good and to the presumed intention of the legislator to serve it. It is not clear what the exact boundaries of 
epieikeia are for Aquinas. He sometimes says that, in order to be justified, epieikeia must be a case of 
emergency, where the legislator cannot be consulted, but in other passages he seems to deny that, making 
it instead dependent on the degree of certainty with which one can predict that the law is going to cause 
injustice.108 Further, some passages suggest that he wished to confine its use to cases where the application 
of the law would violate natural law or harm the common good, some others seem to refer merely to the 
private good of citizens, and, finally others refer to all cases where it can be judged with prudence that the 
legislator would not have wanted his law applied to a case.109 These opaque issues are still the object of 
debate among theologians.110 
What is certain is that, to be legitimate, equity must not consist in departing from the just or from 
severity, and it would not pass a judgment upon the law (something forbidden by St Augustine) but merely 
on the single case.111  
 
1.2.1.2. Later medieval scholastic development of epieikeia in Egidius Romanus and Johannes Gerson 
It was not before the early modern period that Aquinas’ ideas on equity would be developed to a great 
extent, authors in the Middle Ages seem to have either developed epieikeia independently from Aquinas or 
to have re-stated his points without taking them further.112 
One of the earliest theologians to write about epieikeia after Aquinas was Egidius Romanus (d. 
1316), and he seems to have also been a rather influential author on this topic.113 Romanus argued that 
epieikeia is the means by which a judge fulfils the human need to show mercy (clementia) and piety (pietas). 
This is quite distinct from the idea of epieikeia developed by Aquinas. Guido Kisch has argued that this is 
due to Romanus’s greater focus on Aristotle’s Rhetoric rather than on the text of the Nichomachean Ethics that 
Aquinas relied upon. The Rhetoric stresses the moral character of epieikeia. This meant that, rather than 
focusing on the cases for which epieikeia is needed, which the legislator would not have foreseen, Romanus 
stresses instead the merciful attitude that a judge must show in everyday practice.114 Kisch also hypothesizes 
that, given the familiarity of Romanus with Roman and canon law concepts, and following Aquinas’ 
assimilation of aequitas and epieikeia, this may reflect an attempt by Romanus to bring the concept of epieikeia 
closer to the canon law definition of aequitas provided by Hostiensis as iustitia dulcore misericordiae temperata.115 
                                                    
108 I return to these difficulties at [3.2.1-2] below. See Riley, Epikeia, pp. 39-42. 
109 Aquinas, Summa IIaIIae, q. 60, art. 5 refers to natural law; Summa IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1 refers instead to equality and the 
common good. For the last of the three see Aquinas, Senentiae, 4, dist. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4, ad 3. I return to this at [3.2.1.] 
below. 
110 Riley, ibid.., pp. 46-51. 
111 Rodriguez Luño, ‘La Virtù dell’Epicheia’, para. 3. See also Riley, Epikeia 28-32. 
112 ibid., pp. 52-6. 
113 As a note for the English experience of epieikeia, it seems that Romanus inspired one of the first utterances of the concept 
by an English judge. See Fortescue CJ in his treatise De Natura Legis Naturae, 1,24 in Lord Clermont (ed.)  (1896), pp. 95-6. 
Egidius Romanus’s De Regimine Principum was very popular in England, where about sixty manuscripts of his De Regimine 
survive, for more see Charles F Briggs, Giles of Rome’s De Regimine Principum (1999). 
114 Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 414-416. 
115 See n.61 above. 
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Another medieval theologian writing about equity influentially after Aquinas was Johannes Gerson 
(d. 1429). Like Romanus, Gerson may have been concerned with linking his ideas about epieikeia with the 
contemporary writings of canon lawyers. Evidence for this may be found in the lectures he delivered as 
Chancellor of the University of Paris to canon law graduates, where he deplored the fact that epieikeia was 
not a principle generally recognised in their discipline. These lectures have been discussed by Zofia Rueger, 
who shows that Gerson criticized canon lawyers for treating the written law as the Gospel, and sought to 
encourage legal reform based on epieikeia.116 Gerson talked about epieikeia as an idea overlapping with 
dispensation, interpretation and good faith, as well as a ‘means of harmonizing the rigor of justice and the 
severity of discipline with the leniency of mercy (lenitate misericordiae) and propitious pardon.’117 Gerson was 
also aware of orthodox canon law definitions of aequitas, and probably sought to reconcile Hostiensis’ broad 
principle of tempering law by mercy with the specific concern of epieikeia with special circumstances when 
he redefined aequitas as ‘justice which, having considered all particular circumstances, is tempered by mercy’ 
(iustitia pensatis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, dulcore misericordiae temperata).118 It should be pointed out that 
Gerson was not entirely consistent in his attempts to reconcile epieikeia and aequitas. Indeed he argued 
elsewhere (probably more accurately) that what the scholastic theologians called epieikeia was in fact called 
‘dispensatio’ among the canonists.119 
Be that as it may, the writings of Romanus and Gerson, while very influential, did not raise any 
issues that moral theologians returned to and, 120 as discussed later on, there is no clear evidence that the 
attempts by Romanus and Gerson to talk about aequitas in terms more familiar to lawyers were successful 
in persuading canonists and legists to adopt (or indeed to engage significantly with) the moral-theological 
understanding of aequitas as epieikeia.121  
 
1.2.2. The influence of scholasticism on legists and canonists. 
Having looked at the works of Aquinas, Romanus and Gerson, and especially in light of the specific 
attempts to engage with the equity of canon lawyers by the latter two, one might expect that, from the later 
thirteenth century onwards, the medieval doctrine of aequitas came into contact and was to some extent 
influenced by theological epieikeia.  
                                                    
116  Rueger has also rightly noted that, in doing this, Gerson anticipated the epieikeia-inspired polemic writings of the first 
generation of legal humanists addressed to traditional legal learning. See Zofia Rueger, ‘Gerson’s Concept of Equity and 
Christopher St. German’ (1982) 3 History of Political Thought, pp. 8-10. Whether and how the writings of scholastic 
theologians such as Gerson influenced these views has not yet been established but Rueger has pointed out that Christian 
humanists such as Erasmus (d. 1536) ‘conceded that Gerson’s limitations were those of his times not of his mind’. See 
Rueger, ‘Gerson and St. German’, pp. 4-5. See [2.2] below. 
117 See Riley, Epikeia, p. 54, citing Johannes Gerson, De Vita et Aegritudine et Morte Animae Spirituali Lectiones Sex (1493), lect. 
5, f. 63v. 
118 For Gerson’s definition see Jean Gerson, Oeuvres, Vol. 9 (1961), pp. 95-96, quoted in Rueger, ‘Gerson and St. German’, 
p. 11.  
119 See Jean Gerson, Concerning Ecclesiastical Power (1417), edited and translated in Jill Krayer (ed.) Cambridge Translations of 
Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Vol. 2 (1997), p. 6. This seems consistent with the (rare) use of epieikeia by canonists, see e.g. 
Johannes Monachus at n. 123 below. See Gerson’s Tractatus de Potestate Ecclesiastica, in Paris BNF MS. Latin 4359, ff. 30r-30v. 
120 Luño, ‘La virtù dell’epicheia’, 4. For the views of humanist writers see [2.2-4] below. 
121 See [1.2.2] below. 
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 No comprehensive analysis of medieval legal writers referring to epieikeia has been undertaken to 
date, but there is at least one example of a discussion of epieikeia in a work of canon law, and that is the 
commentary to Rem non novam, a decretalis extravagans of Boniface VIII by Johannes Monachus (d. 1313), 
which became the ordinary gloss to that passage in the Extravagantes Communes. This was a decretal where 
the Pope held that a papal summons would be valid regardless of whether the defendant had been notified 
of it. In his gloss, Monachus deals with the question of whether one may proceed against a defendant 
without a summons, finding that it would be against natural law to permit it.122 The main point for our 
purposes was that Monachus discussed the relationship between the Pope and human law. In doing so, he 
mentioned the power of the Pope to prefer unwritten equity over written law, and his power to dispensate 
in cases of urgent necessity and obvious benefit to the Church (propter urgentem necessitatem vel evidentem 
utilitatem Ecclesiae), comparing it with Aristotle’s discussion of epieikeia, which, he argues, falls only within 
the powers of the Prince.123 Epieikeia in Monachus is not assimilated with aequitas – indeed aequitas is 
discussed consistently with its orthodox treatment along the lines of written and unwritten equity. Further, 
the fact that Monachus confines the exercise of epieikeia to the power of the legislator indicates that 
Monachus saw a narrower scope for it than Aquinas and other theologians. Thus, while Monachus’ use of 
epieikeia is evidence of some contact between legal writers and theological writers on epieikeia, and while it 
shows that the former could see the potential of that concept as a justification for legal doctrines, 
nevertheless it is evidence that it was not assimilated with equity. 
Attractive as it is, the argument that the association of equity and epieikeia had any influence  on 
the medieval development of aequitas among legists and canonist does not seem to be supported by the 
available evidence. Throughout our earlier discussion of the development of legal sources on equity, we 
have seen that no reference to epieikeia or to the arguments of theologians regarding it can be found up until 
the early modern period in civil and canon law writings on aequitas, and indeed well into that period for the 
canon lawyers.124 Further, the idea of aequitas scripta – describing equity as a quality of written law, rather 
than a process of emendation or correction of written law, seems utterly incompatible with the idea of 
epieikeia – indeed this idea would be among the first to be explicitly challenged by early modern lawyers 
                                                    
122 For a fuller argument see Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law 1200-1600 (1993), pp. 160-2. 
123 C. Lefebvre, ‘Natural Equity and Canonical Equity,’ Natural Law Forum, (1963), pp. 132-133. Johannes Monachus ad 
Extrav. Com., 2, 3, 1, non obstantibus, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 3, (1582), pp. 226-232: ‘Dic quod citatio est de pertinentibus 
ad iudiciarium ordinem. Iudiciarius autem ordo requirit, ut iudex quilibet ex aliquo iure procedat. Considerandum est primo, 
qualiter ad ius se habeat iudex, de quo nunc est sermo, videlicet Papa. [...] Circa primum sciendum est, [... quod] est quintuplex 
ius: scilicet aeternum, divinum, naturale, humanum derivatum a naturali ut conclusio ex principio, et humanum derivatum a 
naturali ut declaratio cuiusdam communis. [...] Supra nullam dictarum legum, et supra nullum dictorum iurium Papa potest, 
vel quicumque alter homo: quinto excepto [...] Nullus potest supra ius quod non condidit, sed conditum praesupponit, sed 
Papa vel purus homo nullum dicoturm iurium condidit [...] igitur supra nullum illorum potest. [...] [S]equitur ergo conclusio: 
scilicet quod Papa non potest nisi supra [...] ius pure positivum. Et sic patet primum principale. [...] Ad primum arg[umentum] 
in oppositum dic, quod Papa est supra ius in hoc quod ipse solus potest aequitatem non scriptam ex sui interpretatione 
praeferre iuri scripto [C.3.1.8 et C.1.14.1] unde ipse potest multa dispensando, quae non potest inferior [...], et si supra ius 
dispenset, hoc debet esse cum ratio postulat [...] utpote propter urgentem necessitatem vel evidentem utilitatem Ecclesiae 
[C.1, q. 7, cc. 15-7] non propter bursae repletionem illius cui providit [...] cum ex ipsius aequitate procedit iudicium: alias est 
dissipatio [...] non dispensatio [...]  si aequitas, quae movet ipsum movisset legislatorem, si casus nunc emergens esset sibi 
expositus, ut habetur [Aristotle, Ethics, lib. 5, 10] ubi optime ponitur in fine tractatus virtutum moralium de epykeia, quae 
praecipue soli principi competit [X.1.7.1].’  
124 See [1.1.3.2.] above. 
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once the link between aequitas and epieikeia had been explicitly drawn in later legal sources.125  The same 
seems to apply to uses of equity in the context of proceedings ex aequo et bono.126 
That said, two scholars – Norbert Horn and Pier Giovanni Caron - have famously sought to argue 
in favour of a link between legal aequitas and theological epieikeia.  Horn’s arguments to that effect concern 
specifically uses of aequitas to be found in Baldus.127 Horn argued that epieikeia-like reasoning 
(‘Epikiedenken’) could be identified in Baldus in relation to (what appear to be) two doctrines that Baldus 
calls aequitas specialis and rigorosa aequitas, both of which Horn interprets as doctrines permitting a judge to 
disobey a statute or a law for a good reason (such as the protection of the public good).128 The two doctrines 
are problematic because they are expressed by Baldus in ambiguous terms, and because they are at odds 
with the orthodox learning about aequitas scripta, which Baldus seems to accept without difficulty.129 Further, 
even if we accept Horn’s argument that those theories meant to solve epieikeia-like situations, the lack of 
both any explicit reference to Aristotle or epieikeia and the lack of any reasoning along the lines developed 
by the moral theologians weakens the argument that Baldus intended to put epieikeia specifically into action 
when introducing these doctrines.130 Be that as it may, it is not clear how many commentators followed 
Baldus’ development of these two peculiar doctrines, and the aforementioned lack of reference to epieikeia 
by medieval commentators and the strict adherence to the orthodoxy of aequitas scripta by other authors 
(including Baldus himself) throughout the period weighs against taking Horn’s argument too far.131  
Caron, on the other hand, has argued that the development of epieikeia by moral theologians 
indirectly influenced some developments within the doctrine of aequitas among canon lawyers. Caron seeks 
to identify this as an indirect influence on some aspects of the interaction between equity and rigour. For 
instance, he argues that the gap-filling role that aequitas non scripta played in cases where no written source 
governed a case could be linked to epieikeia. Caron argues that the same goes for the definition of canonical 
equity found in Hostiensis. Finally, he links the influence of epieikeia to the relaxation of the doctrine of 
aequitas non scripta in Felinus Sandeus, which we have mentioned above, allowing it to intervene where a 
presumption occurred against the written law.132 This does not take the argument very far. Aside from the 
lack of any explicit reference to epieikeia and the incompatibility of that doctrine with the canonists’ 
treatment of aequitas scripta, it also does not seem that any of the aspects of the doctrine of aequitas linked 
by Caron to epieikeia bear any particular relation to either the doctrine of Aristotle or that of moral 
theologians: the gap-filling role of aequitas non scripta and the statement of Hostiensis do not have much to 
do with any doctrine of emendation or correction of written law. Regarding the statements of Sandeus on 
                                                    
125 See [2.3.] below. 
126 See n.94 above. 
127 Horn, Aequitas in Den Lehren Des Baldus (1968). 
128 See Horn, Aequitas in den Lehren, pp. 32-52. 
129 Horn, ibid., p. 45. See also n.47 above. 
130 See Guido Kisch, Claudius Cantiuncula Ein Basler Jurist Und Humanist Des 16. Jahrhunderts (1970), 96. 
131 It should be noted that Baldus had a peculiar tendency to introduce original nomenclature in his arguments concerned 
with equity. Aside from the two ideas identified by Horn, one can also find  in Baldus’ comment to C.6.55.9 references to 
distinctions between disposita aequitas, disponenda aequitas , aequitas motiva, aequitas precisa and aequitas abusiva. Baldus, Super Codicis 
Commentaria, Vol. 3, ad C.6.55.9, ff. 179v-180r. 
132 See n.73 above. 
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the prevalence of aequitas non scripta over rigor scriptus in some circumstances, I have shown above that these 
do not seem to have been taken up by his contemporaries, and Sandeus does not seem to have sought to 
relate them to the writings of Aristotle or other theologians.133 
It goes beyond our present purposes to identify the reason for the distinction between equity and 
epieikeia among medieval legal writers. Perhaps the most plausible argument that can be made at this stage 
is that the development of aequitas by legists and canonists, focussed as it was on equity as justice, and as a 
quality of the law articulated in aequitas scripta and non scripta, preceded the diffusion of Aristotle’s ideas about 
epieikeia around Europe. By the time the latter became accessible, the comments on C.3.1.8, C.1.14.1 and 
related passages had settled in such a state of orthodoxy that they could not be upset by the newly-found 
equivalence of equity and epieikeia among theologians.134 Further research on uses of epieikeia (or lack 
thereof) among medieval legal writers might further illuminate this issue. Be that as it may, the tentative 
argument put forward here seems consistent with the upset of medieval theories of equity brought about 
with the rise of legal humanism – part of the reason why the early modern writers mentioned in later 
chapters chose to reconceptualise equity as epieikeia was their readiness to dismiss medieval legal orthodoxy. 
A clean break with the doctrine of aequitas scripta was indispensable to any writer wanting to successfully 
assimilate equity and epieikeia. 
As a final note, while there is no evidence of equity and epieikeia being assimilated in the doctrines 
of medieval legal writers, we have mentioned earlier a peculiar use of equity within a doctrine that came 
strikingly close to the epieikeia of theologians – that is, the role which equity played within Baldus’ exposition 
of interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva.135 In that case, the injustice resulting from the application of the words 
of the law understood according to their plain meaning, would raise a presumption regarding the intention 
of the legislator, which could be followed by the interpreter in order to read the words in an ‘improper’, 
narrower or broader meaning. Functionally, this is not epieikeia in its strictest, theological sense. It involves 
an interpretation of the words in one sense or another, rather than a case where their meaning is plain and 
unavoidably leads to injustice.136 But the kind of interpretation involved where equity is mentioned in this 
case is very close indeed to the Aristotelian idea of epieikeia – there is, if not a correction or emendation, at 
least an interpretation of written law which departs from the letter (to some extent) in accordance with the 
intention of the legislator. The author, Baldus, in whose account this use of interpretation is stated very 
explicitly, did not make the link with Aquinas’ or Aristotle’s epieikeia explicit, indeed no reference to the 
concept of epieikeia is found. However, the connection did not escape those later authors who linked equity 
and epieikeia. As we shall see in the course of the argument in the following chapters, by the later sixteenth 
                                                    
133 See nn.73-75 above. 
134 A similar point is made by Lefebvre, Lebras and Rambaud, L’Âge Classique, p. 411-412: ‘Toutefois, il ne saurait être 
question pour elle [i.e. l’epieikeia] de se substituer à l’équité canonique. La position de celle-ci est bien trop ancrée dans la 
tradition pour qu’elle [i.e. l’epieikeia] y parvienne.’ 
135 See n.84 above 
136 See [1.2.1.1] above. 
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century, some early modern legal writers explicitly associated these aspects of medieval doctrines of 































                                                    
137 The approach of Baldus, for instance, resembles that of Donellus see [4.2.3.3.] below. 
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Chapter 2 – The introduction and diffusion of epieikia in legal scholarship 
2.1. Introduction 
It has been known for some time, certainly since Guido Kisch’s seminal work on early modern humanistic 
writings on equity, that, if the legists and canonists of the medieval period failed to draw any explicit 
connection between the concept of aequitas and that of Aristotelian epieikeia, a very noticeable change 
occurred in the sixteenth century among early legal humanists, starting with Gulielmus Budaeus’ 
Annotationes In Pandectas, first published in 1508.138 Not many studies are available on the early modern 
changes brought within legal scholarship by the association of equity and epieikeia. One of the few available, 
that of Jan Schröder in a recent article, argued that one can observe a shift away from the medieval doctrine 
centred on aequitas scripta at an earlier stage, but that such a change was (i) of little significance for the role 
played by equity and (ii) reversed towards the seventeenth century, when later early modern jurists turned 
back to aequitas scripta as the model on which to centre their analysis of equity.139 This argument was not 
based on a detailed analysis of the origin and diffusion of equity as epieikeia among humanists, and other 
early modern legal writer. This chapter will examine the origins of the association of equity and epieikeia and 
its impact among the first generation of lawyers who adopted it, mostly legal writers influenced by 
humanism. As we shall see, Schröder’s arguments are defensible only in the sense that early modern lawyers 
never adopted a theory of equity which would allow a judge to simply ignore the written law and give force 
instead to their own views about justice –this aspect of early modern equity had also been the object of 
research by Clausdieter Schott – however, it is neither correct to say that the role of equity was unaffected 
by these changes, nor that later early modern lawyers reverted back to a focus on aequitas scripta, at least not 
in the medieval sense that we have analysed so far.140    
The questions that this chapter seeks to answer are as follows. First, can the legal humanists’ change 
of attitude with regard to aequitas be related to any particular influences or causes? Secondly, did this new 
approach to aequitas lead to an identifiable and consistent ‘doctrine’ of equity as epieikeia, or did it simply 
produce a constellation of irreconcilable arguments? Regarding the first question, it will become apparent 
from an analysis of the humanists’ approach to epieikeia that their theories were not – at least at the earliest 
stage - influenced by the development of epieikeia among medieval or contemporary theologians. Rather, I 
will argue that the reason behind the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship was the diffusion in early 
modern times of a new approach to Aristotle within humanistic circles. Indeed, the first writers to associate 
equity and epieikeia seem to have drawn on new, humanistic translations of Aristotle’s works into Latin, 
produced by humanist philologists in the course of the previous century. As we shall see, this led these early 
                                                    
138 See Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 177-226. Gulielmus Budaeus, Annotationes in Pandectas (1551). The renewed interest in equity was 
not limited to lawyers. For the debate among philosophers see François Rigolot, ‘Nicomaque et La Règle de Plomb, Fictions 
Légitimes et Illégitimes de La Justice Montaignienne’ (2001) 8 Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne 87. Epieikeia 
was referred to in many distinct areas, for instance, Bonifacius Amerbach used the notion of Lesbian rule in relation to 
religious matters, while Erasmus discussed it as a helpful skill for the historian. See respectively Myron P Gilmore, Humanists 
and Jurists (1963), p. 175 and Kathy Eden, ‘Equity and the Origin of Renaissance Historicism: The Case for Erasmus’ (1993) 
5 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 137.  
139 Schröder, ‘Aequitas Und Rechtsquellenlehre’, passim. 
140 See [2.5.5] below. 
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authors to develop their approach to epieikeia independently from medieval sources - comparing the text of 
Aristotle with references to aequitas in both the Corpus Iuris Civilis and classical sources. Occasional 
references to status theory in this context suggest that the humanists’ interest in rhetoric and dialectic may 
have also had an impact on their thoughts. The contact between this new approach to equity as epieikeia 
and the theories of theologians and the medieval ius commune occurred at a later stage, discussed in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. 
With regard to the second question, I shall argue that the thought of a significant number of legal 
humanists evolved towards a consistent doctrine, which departed from the medieval focus on aequitas scripta 
to form a new and original theory of equity as benign interpretation and amendment of the law. I will also 
look at the various approaches that were taken by those legal humanists who did not conform to that 
pattern, either developing other, ultimately less successful theories alternative to the medieval orthodoxy, 
or preferring to adhere more or less closely to the medieval ideas of aequitas scripta and non scripta.  
In the section that follows, I will analyse the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship by Budaeus 
and compare it with the philological developments among fifteenth-century translators of Aristotle. After 
this, I will set out the theory of epieikeia produced by authors after Budaeus who departed from the medieval 
orthodoxy, including those, eventually most successful, who conceptualised equity as a doctrine of 
interpretation. In the fourth section, I shall set out the thought of those legal humanists who did not reject 
the medieval orthodoxy and sought instead to either prefer it to or reconcile it with Budaeus’ philological 
points. In the fifth and final section I will look at the impact of the views of the humanists discussed above 
on later legal writers up until the early seventeenth century, to provide an outline of the spread of those 
ideas among later civil and canon lawyers. 
 
2.2. The introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship 
2.2.1. Gulielmus Budaeus and the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship 
Budaeus’ Annotationes in Pandectas, published in 1508, is the first legal work to acknowledge the equivalence 
of aequitas with epieikeia explicitly. In this work, Budaeus made the argument that ‘Aristoteles uno verbo 
epijces appellat quod nostri aequum et bonum dicunt et interdum aequitatem, ut Aristoteles epijcian.’141 
Budaeus’ views on aequitas were clearly influenced by those of Aristotle on epieikeia, and he argues that 
‘aequum et bonum ius est, non illud quidem lege comprehensum, id est, legitimum, sed legitimi iuris 
emendatio.’142  The amendment is required because ‘lex [...] in universum loquitur necessitate coacta, tametsi 
id recte fieri nequit.’143 
However, Budaeus does not provide a statement of great substance about the conclusions to be 
drawn from his views and it is not clear what exactly he thought his argument implied for the development 
                                                    
141 See Budaeus, Annotationes, pp. 9-10: ‘Hac igitur ratione, τό έπιεικές, ut Aristoteles vocat, id est aequum et bonum, 
emendatio est iuris scripti. [...] Quod autem epicaizare dicunt, latine dici debet ex aequo et bono statuere, ex bono et aequo 
arbitrari, censere, aestimare, constituere’. 
142 Budaeus, ibid., p. 10. 
143 Budaeus, ibid., p. 10 
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of legal doctrine. Budaeus mentioned in passing that he thought Aristoteles’ statements about epieikeia 
referred to supreme tribunals, but since Budaeus defines those courts as those quae praescripto iuris usquequaque 
non adstricta sunt – which seems to imply that they would have been allowed to prefer aequitas non scripta 
under the orthodox understanding of C.1.14.1 in any case – it is not clear whether this implied a significant 
departure from established doctrine. Budaeus does not engage with this at any length.144 As we have seen 
above, while the medieval orthodoxy was to consider aequitas a quality of law which could find expression 
in writing, thus distinguishing aequitas scripta from rigor scriptus, Budaeus implicitly argued that aequitas could 
not find expression in written law, since it consisted in its amendment. Unfortunately, Budaeus does not 
address head on the inconsistency of that argument with the medieval orthodoxy on equity, nor does he 
draw any conclusions as to what the duties of the judge, magistrate and legislator should be in light of this. 
As we shall see, it was only after a few decades that jurists started to develop these aspects of Budaeus’ 
argument and draw clearer conclusion as to what their implementation in legal practice implied.145  
The only point Budaeus makes which is worthy of note is that, since aequum et bonum is a binomial 
pair synonym of epieikeia, then it follows that aequitas and bonitas are not to be understood as meaning 
different things. This led Budaeus to conclude that the author of the ordinary gloss, Accursius, was wrong 
when he distinguished aequum from bonum.146 This is relevant in two respects. First of all, while for Accursius 
and later commentators ‘ius est ars boni et aequi’ meant that a legal system should balance rules which have 
aequitas with rules which, while rigorous (i.e. lacking aequitas) had to be upheld on account of their bonitas 
(something akin to public utility),147 Budaeus’ statement is incompatible with this view and seems to imply 
that epieikeia or aequitas alone is the hallmark of a legal system; this would not go unnoticed among later 
legal humanists.148  Secondly, this statement is relevant because, as we shall see, it reveals the source for 
Budaeus’ philological remarks; indeed, while the equivalence of aequitas and epieikeia had been pointed out 
in the thirteenth century by Aquinas, the translation of epieikeia as aequum et bonum was a feature of 
humanistic philological studies.149 
In fact, Budaeus seems to have been either unaware of or, more probably, unconcerned with the 
arguments that theologians had made about the role of aequitas as epieikeia. The conclusions that Budaeus 
draws with regard to the role of epieikeia or aequum et bonum and their relationship with the law have little in 
common with those that were first developed by Aquinas and which - as shown below – had  recently been 
elaborated upon by Cajetan.150 The scholastic theologians had been rather specific about the role of epieikeia, 
confining it to the function of preventing the law from sinning in its application, and giving considerable 
                                                    
144 Budaeus, ibid., p. 11. 
145 See below [2.3]. 
146 Budaeus, Annotationes, pp. 9-10: ‘Accursius hunc locum enarrans [i.e. D.1.1.1] aliud bonum esse censet, aliud aequum, nec 
satis hoc explicat [see Accursius ad ‘Bono publico’, D.41.3.1]. Nos vero rem animadversione dignam esse iudicantes 
explicandam latius censuimus. [Budaeus moves on to referring to the legal and non-legal sources using aequum et bonum as a 
binomial pair and, after explaining that the two are the Latin equivalent of epieikeia adds that] [m]ale igitur et inscite Accursius 
aequum et bonum distinxit.’ 
147 See n.41 above. 
148 See [2.4.3] below. 
149 [2.2] below. 
150 See [1.1.3] above and [3.2.] below. See also Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 177-226. 
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thought to whether or not the judge should consult with a superior before disapplying a rule of suspect 
application. None of those considerations can be found in Budaeus’ broad approach to epieikeia. 
Budaeus’ analysis is, instead, rather more concerned with making broad polemic points about the 
(as Budaeus understood it) rigorous and iniquitous approach to law that traditional jurists had developed. 
For instance, Budaeus refers to a passage in Cicero’s Pro Caecina, where the latter criticises his opponent’s 
insistence on the strict adherence to the letter of an interdict and adds that these words ‘appositissime refelli 
possunt iurisconsultorum recentiorum cavillamenta, qui huiusmodi verborum aucupiis argumenta 
validissima elicere se credunt ad nova quaedam iuris dogmata constituenda, quasi unaquaeque syllaba iuris 
et civilis et pontificii vim suam quandam certamque obtineat.[...] [S]i tam aequi bonique studiosi quam iuris 
summi fuissent nec magis se iuris quam iustitiae consultos videri et esse exoptassent, immensa illa et 
numerosa commentariorum iuris volumina haud quaquam reliquissent, materiem et fomitem 
accendendarum litium, quibus nunc vita passim flagrat incendio quidem vix unquam deflagraturo, quippe 
causidicorum calumniatorumque commentis quasi facibus in dies invalescentibus iudicumque indulgentia 
litigiosis non satis infensorum veluti aura quadam aspirante.’151 Elsewhere, he invites jurists and judges not 
to give in to summum ius, which he takes to be what rigor iuris or strictum ius was referred as by classical 
authors.152 It is unclear whether by summum ius Budaeus meant merely legal justice (as Aristotle did) or a 
perversely literal interpretation of rules. Budaeus generally invites lawyers to be prepared to adopt a looser 
approach to the rules, having an eye to the justice in each case. This approach to epieikeia was clearly much 
broader than that accepted by scholastic theologians writing on the same theme.  Indeed, while Budaeus 
was extremely influential over later civil lawyers writing about equity, they seem mostly to have referred to 
Budaeus in order to engage with his rejection of Accursius’ distinction between aequum and bonum, for his 
statement that epieikeia is a synonym for the two words, and to recycle his series of quotations from classical 
authors on aequitas and summum ius. 
One reason why Budaeus may not have been so interested in the arguments previously made by 
scholastic theologians and medieval commentators may be that, as mentioned above, his comment on 
D.1.1.1 was principally meant to correct the understanding of the text of the Digest in light of humanistic 
philological findings. In the next section, I will argue that this approach to the translation of aequum et bonum 
was the product of humanistic philological scholarship of the previous century. 
 
2.2.2. Humanistic Aristotelianism: Leonardus Aretinus and epieikeia as aequum et bonum 
The translation of epieikeia as aequum et bonum seems to have originated with the controversial Latin edition 
of Aristotle’s Ethics by the humanist Leonardus Aretinus (d. 1444). Aretinus’ approach was so influential 
                                                    
151 Budaeus, Annotationes, pp 12-3, where he refers to Cicero, Pro Caecina, 84.  
152 Budaeus’ use of summum ius would also become greatly influential among later writers, and became recognised as a 
synonym of what medieval authors referred to as rigor iuris or strictum ius. The use of summum ius comes from the aphorism 
summum ius summa iniuria, a citation found in a variety of classical sources including Cicero, De Officiis, 1.10.33 and Terence, 
Heautontimorumenos, IV, 5, and popularised by Erasmus (d. 1536) as one of his adages, see Desiderius Erasmus, Adagiorum 
Chiliades Tres (1508), n. 998, f. 103v. For more on it see Kisch, Erasmus, p. 190.  
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that, by the end of the fifteenth century, it was common practice in humanist translations of Aristotle’s 
texts to replace the medieval transliteration epieikeia with aequum et bonum.  
The rise of humanism in the late fourteenth century fostered a movement to replace the Latin 
translations of Greek philosophical works made available throughout the Middle Ages, which, humanists 
thought, failed to reproduce the agreeable style of the original works. Though humanists are often 
remembered for their focus on Platonism, they did, at the very least from the point of view of philology, 
contribute to the study of Aristotle.153 
Aretinus was an important contributor within this movement, producing a new translation of 
Aristotle’s Ethics in the early fifteenth century.154 In 1420, he published a treatise in defence of it, De 
interpretatione recta. This treatise works as a very helpful description of the aims that Aretinus had in mind as 
he embarked on this enterprise.155 The most important of those, for our purposes, was not to leave any 
Greek words untranslated.156  Among the many to which he objected, was the transliteration of επιεικεια as 
epieikeia, common to all previous translations of Aristotle. Instead, Aretinus decided to translate all 
references to epieikeia found in Aristotle’s fifth book of the Nichomachean Ethics as aequum et bonum. He 
defended his choice explaining that “‘Epiichia’ est iustitiae pars quam nostri iurisconsulti ‘ex bono et aequo’ 
appellant. ‘Ius scriptum sic habet – inquit iurisconsultus – debet tamen ex bono et aequo sic intelligi, et 
aliud ex rigore iuris, aliud ex aequitate.’ Et alibi inquit: ‘ius est ars boni et aequi.’ Cur tu ergo mihi ‘epiichiam’ 
relinquis in Graeco, verbum mihi ignotum, cum possis dicere ‘ex bono et aequo’, ut dicunt iurisconsulti 
nostri? Hoc non est interpretari, sed confundere, nec lucem rebus, sed caliginem adhibere.”157  
Aretinus’ translation enjoyed great popularity throughout the fifteenth century.158 And, though its 
currency had greatly diminished by the mid-sixteenth century, its translation of epieikeia into aequum et bonum 
had a lasting impact. It was followed by Iohannes Argyropoulos (d.1487), who produced probably the most 
popular early modern translation of the Ethics about half a century after Aretinus.159 The same can be said 
for the translation of epieikeia in other works: when Georgius Trapezuntius (d. 1472) produced a new 
                                                    
153 For a brief introduction to the transmission of Aristotle in this period, with particular reference to his Nichomachean Ethics, 
see Charles B Schmitt, ‘Aristotle’s Ethics in the Sixteenth Century: Some Preliminary Considerations’ in Walter Rüegg and 
Dieter Wuttke (eds), Ethik im Humanismus (1979). 
154 Leonardus Aretinus, Aristotelis Stragyritae Ethicorum in Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, Decem Librorum Moralium Aristotelis Tres 
Conversiones (1535), f. 141r-182r. 
155 Leonardus Aretinus, ‘De Interpretatione Recta’, in Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, MS Manoscritti 141. For a modern edition 
see Paolo Vitti, Sulla Perfetta Traduzione - Leonardo Bruni (2004). Alternatively, for convenience, see the Latin text available 
online at: https://la.wikisource.org/wiki/De_interpretatione_recta (last access 31/03/2018). On the humanistic approach 
to translation and Leonardus Aretinus see Paul Botley, Latin Translation in the Renaissance (2004). Latin translations of the 
Ethics continued to be an important genre through the sixteenth century, and at least seven other full translations were 
produced in the course of the sixteenth century. See Schmitt, ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’, pp. 102-3. 
156 Aretinus, ‘De Interpretatione Recta’, cap. 2: ‘Quid de verbis in Graeco relictis dicam, quae tam multa sunt, ut semigraeca 
quaedam eius interpretatio videatur? Atqui nihil Graece dictum est quod Latine dici non possit! [...] Enim vero, quorum 
optima habemus vocabula, ea in Graeco relinquere ignorantissimum est.’  
157 Aretinus, ‘De Interpretatione Recta’, cap. 2. 
158 Schmitt, ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’, pp. 98-9. 
159 See Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 475-6. See Johannes Argyropoulos, Aristotelis Ethicorum Libri Decem in Stapulensis, Decem Librorum 
Moralium Aristotelis Tres Conversiones.  
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translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in 1443 he also translated all references to epieikeia as aequum et bonum,160 
and Georgius Valla (d. 1500) in his translation of the Magna Moralia translated epieikeia as aequitas.161 
These developments in humanist philology may provide an explanation for the introduction of 
epieikeia in humanist legal writings from the early sixteenth century on. First, by the sixteenth century, the 
humanist translations of the Ethics, Rhetoric and Magna Moralia were in wide circulation, and these 
translations were likely to find favour with jurists of a similar inclination. Secondly, it is important to note 
that Aretinus himself thought that the main justification for adopting such a translation was the use of 
aequum et bonum by jurists, which, whether justified or not, may have made the connection all the more 
appealing to legal humanists. It may thus come as no surprise that a jurist such as Budaeus, concerned as 
he was more with philological and linguistic accuracy than legal doctrine in his exposition of the Roman 
sources, seized the occasion for introducing the popular juxtaposition of aequum et bonum to epieikeia in his 
commentary to Digest passages referring to those terms.162 
 
2.2.3. A new approach to aequitas 
Reading Budaeus’ argument as a mere acknowledgment of a change in philological scholarship may explain 
why his account of aequitas as epieikeia bears little resemblance to the ones found in the theological writings 
that had made a similar link since the  thirteenth century. 
First, while occasionally referring more generally to aequitas, Budaeus explicitly draws a link between 
epieikeia and the binomial pair aequum et bonum, mirroring the approach taken by Aretinus and 
Argyropoulos.163 As mentioned above, Budaeus took the use of aequum et bonum as a pair seriously, and this 
led him to his principal disagreement with the medieval understanding of D.1.1.1. While Accursius and all 
medieval jurists after him commenting on passages where these words appeared distinguished aequum from 
bonum, Budaeus thought this reflected an important misunderstanding of how these words were used and 
what they meant. Budaeus relied on a number of references from the Corpus Iuris Civilis and from classical 
sources to show that, among Roman jurists and classical authors, the two words were always used together 
to signify a single concept, and he identified that concept with epieikeia.164 
                                                    
160 Georgius Trapezuntius, Aristoteles Rhetoricorum Libri III (1523), f. 117r. Compare with the medieval translations of the 
rhetoric in Aristoteles Latinus: Rhetorica, Vol. 31, 1-2 (1978). For more information on the transmission of the rhetoric see 
Charles f. Briggs, ‘Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the Later Medieval Universities: A Reassessment’ (2007) 25 A Journal of the History 
of Rhetoric 243. 
161 For Valla see Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, Decem Librorum Moralium Aristotelis Tres Conversiones (1535), f. 127v. Compare with 
the medieval translation by Bartholomeus de Messina (d. before 1266) in Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Pal. 
Lat. 1011, f. 142r. 
162 It is perhaps telling that a book edited by Jacobus Faber Stapulensis (d. 1536) which included three translations of the 
Ethics (by Bruni, Argyropoulos, and Grosseteste), as well as Valla’s translation of the Magna Moralia, dedicated the latter part 
to Budaeus. See Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, Decem Librorum Moralium Aristotelis Tres Conversiones (1535), f. 116r (reference to 
Budaeus). Previous editions of the book, such as the Paris 1505 and 1497 editions also include the dedication to Budaeus, 
but the pages of the copies I have seen are not numbered. 
163 Budaeus’ description of epieikeia mirrors closely the wording preferred in Argyropoulos’ version: ‘Nam aequum et bonum 
iustum est [...] non autem lege: sed emendatio legitimi iusti.’ Budaeus has: ‘[aequum et bonum] ius est, non illud quidem lege 
comprehensum, id est, legitimum, sed legitimi iuris emendatio’. See Argyropoulos, Aristotelis Ethicorum, ff. 57v-58r. 
164 As far as Roman law sources are concerned, Budaeus refers to D.44.7.2.3, D.44.7.34, D.45.1.91.3, D.47.12.10, 
D.48.19.16.1. The classical sources used to make the same point are Cicero, Columella, Quintilian, Svetonius and Terence. 
See Budaeus, Annotationes, pp. 10-16. 
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To conclude, Budaeus’ lack of concern for the legal and philosophical consequences of his 
statement probably reflects his greater concern with correcting what he saw as important philological 
misgivings in the orthodox interpretation of Roman sources. His concern seems rather to show that the 
uses of bonum et aequum in Digest sources and classical authors are broadly consistent with Aristotle’s 
statements about epieikeia, as had been recognised by translators of the latter since the 1420s. His more 
general polemic points are typical of some other humanist legal writings, which sought to link the narrow 
scholastic approach taken by legal scholars to what they saw as the dire conditions of legal scholarship and 
practice.165 
Budaeus’ work was greatly influential among humanist legal authors in spreading the theoretical 
and philological points it introduced. Kisch has shown that Udalricus Zasius (Ulrich Zasius, d. 1536), 
Andreas Alciatus (Andrea Alciati, d. 1550), and Claudius Cantiuncula (Claude Chansonnette, d. 1549) drew 
on Budaeus’ Annotationes to identify aequitas with epieikeia.166 Piano Mortari has also shown that by the mid-
sixteenth century, it was commonplace for French jurists who were close to the movement of legal 
humanism to similarly assimilate aequitas and epieikeia.167 Confirming these findings, we shall see below that 
the vast majority of civil lawyers more generally, and not only French legal humanists, followed this view 
throughout the period.168  Unlike Budaeus, however, some of these later authors were more experienced 
lawyers, and they were more concerned than he was with the doctrinal consequences of assimilating the 
received learning on aequitas with Aristotelian epieikeia.  
What should be pointed out at this stage, is that the lack of an in-depth legal or philosophical 
analysis within Budaeus, as well as the absence of any references to the scholastic analysis of epieikeia, 
apparently left later jurists with a clean slate on which to develop their own thoughts on epieikeia and aequitas. 
And indeed, it seems that later legal writers drew on a variety of sources when developing Budaeus’ idea as 
a legal doctrine, including Aristotle, authors from Latin antiquity, the Corpus Iuris Civilis itself, and rhetoric 
theory. 
 
2.3. Aequitas in legal humanism I: Challenging the medieval orthodoxy 
In this section we shall look at the way in which later legal humanists, who added a concern for legal doctrine 
to Budaeus’ focus on philology, took forward the connection between aequum et bonum and epieikeia.  At this 
stage, it is useful to provide an outline of the range of ideas that sprung out of early writings which departed 
from the medieval understanding of equity. There are essentially four authors who wrote about equity 
                                                    
165 For a work written in a similar vein see e.g.  Juan Luis Vives, Aedes Legum (1519). On Vives’ work see Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 
69-89. 
166 See Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 280-343. 
167 Vincenzo Piano Mortari, ‘Aequitas E Ius nell’Umanesimo Giuridico Francese', pp. 141–279 finds references to it in 
Franciscus Connanus (François Connan, d. 1550) at pp. 176-177, Eguinarius Baro (Eguinaire Baron, d. 1550) at p. 181, 
Franciscus Duarenus (François le Douaren, d. 1559) at pp. 184-185, Franciscus Balduinus (François Baudouin, d. 1573) at 
p. 200, Johannes Corasius (Jean Coras, d. 1572) at p. 208, Jean Bodin (d. 1596) at pp. 214-215, and Charondas (Louis Le 
Caron, d. 1613) at p. 252. See also the reference to Regula Lesbia by Pierre Coustau in his Pegma cum narrationibus philosophicis 
(1555) discussed in Valérie Hayaert, Mens Emblematica, pp. 245-263. 
168 See [2.3] below. 
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significantly in the early period from 1525-1545, and we consider them chronologically.  The first author 
we will look at is the most important, that is, Marius Salamonius. Salamonius was the first author to write 
meaningfully about equity after Budaeus, and he was also the forefather of the most successful doctrinal 
tradition that the association of equity and epieikeia would engender – that is, that which re-conceptualised 
equity as a doctrine of interpretation of the law in accordance with the intention of the legislator.  After 
Salamonius we consider the writings of Claudius Cantiuncula (Claude Chansonnette, d. 1560), another early 
author whose original approach to equity/epieikeia did not enjoy the same success as Salamonius’. I then 
consider the theories of Philipp Melanchthon (d. 1560) and Johannes Oldendorpius (d. 1567), their 
approach can be seen as belonging to a peculiarly Lutheran tradition on equity which, though ultimately 
not as influential as that of Salamonius’s, lived on through the specific medium of legal dictionaries and 
reference works for several decades.  
Having looked at the theories of these early authors, we will then look at the consolidation, from 
the 1550s onwards, of the view of Salamonius in the hands of later writers – most influentially Franciscus 
Connanus (d. 1551) and Franciscus Duarenus (d. 1559) – and of its development into a theory of 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the wishes of the legislator. The main doctrinal features of this 
new approach to equity and the extent to which they were shared by later writers will be considered in 
conclusion. 
 
2.3.1. Marius Salamonius and aequitas as interpretation 
Marius Salamonius (Mario Salamoni degli Alberteschi, d. 1533/4) was a Roman humanist, political theorist 
and jurist of repute between the late fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth century.169 With his 
Commentarioli, first published in 1525, he was also the first legal scholar to develop a doctrine of equity 
drawing from Budaeus’ remarks in the Annotationes.  
Unsurprisingly, Salamonius’s considerations over the concept of aequitas are found within a 
commentary on D.1.1.1,  at the very beginning of his work, mirroring that found in Budaeus’ Annotationes, 
and indeed Salamonius seems to have been heavily influenced by Budaeus’ work. Salamonius follows 
Budaeus in his philological considerations, his argument is therefore focussed on the meaning of ‘ars boni 
et aequi’ and he criticises both Accursius and Bartolus for having distinguished aequum from bonum. He 
follows Budaeus in treating aequitas and aequum et bonum interchangeably.170 Like Budaeus, Salamonius 
adopts at the outset a rather general polemic tone, arguing that the true qualities of jurists lie in their capacity 
                                                    
169 For a few details on Salamonius’ life see  Paolo Carta, ‘Salamoni degli Alberteschi, Mario in Dizionario Biografico dei Giuristi 
Italiani (XII-XX secolo) (2013), pp. 1766-7. See also Lucio Biasiori, ‘Salamoni degli Alberteschi, Mario’, Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani (2017), available online at: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/salomoni-degli-alberteschi-mario_(Dizionario-
Biografico) (last accessed 31/03/2018); Vittorio Cian, Un Trattatista Del ‘Principe’ A Tempo Di N. Machiavelli (1900). 
170 Salamonius, Commentarioli in librum I Pandectarum (1525), p. 7: ‘Accursius putat aliud bonum et aliud aequum ius esse, quae 
Bar[tolus] ansam praebuit multa de, ‘Et’, coniunctiva dicere. Impertinenter sane et non suo loco labor susceptus, nam hae 
duae dictiones bonum et aequum unum eundemque significatum habere in omnibus iuris partibus videmus. Sic Aristoteles, 
sic oratores et scriptores omnes.’ See Budaeus at n.141, 163 above for treating aequum et bonum as aequitas. 
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to discern justice from injustice rather than to merely know the law.171 Unlike Budaeus, however, 
Salamonius goes on to discuss aequitas as a legal doctrine.172 We may summarise the points made by 
Salamonius under two headings. The first concerns the definition of equity, as we shall see, Salamonius 
thinks it is a branch of unwritten law. The second concerns how equity should operate, Salamonius 
distinguishes between its role as an interpretive tool in the hands of judges, and its role as a corrective tool 
in the hands of the legislator and magistrates with imperium.  
2.3.1.1. What equity as epieikeia is 
Referring to Aristotle, Salamonius argues that aequitas is one of two kinds of law (ius), the other kind being 
legitimum ius, i.e. that which is found in written laws and customs. Aequitas is rather law that is not found in 
writing. As he puts it: ‘Iuris vocabulum generale est, cuius species sunt ius legitimum, et id quod bonum et 
aequum est. Ideo Aristoteles dixit non idem esse simpliciter, nec aliud genere. Quando iuris vocabulum 
aequitati obiicitur, semper ius legitimum intelligitur id est in tabulis, aut moribus utentium expressum. 
Aequitatis autem verbo ius non legitimum significatur, et per hoc nullo scripto comprehensum. [...]. Est 
enim ius latissimum profundissimumque supra captum humanum.’173 
Salamonius sometimes describes aequitas as an unwritten source of law, but it seems that it would 
be more precise to say that aequitas is defined by its interaction with written law, it is perfect reason which 
‘scripto accedit, interpretando, emendando, molliendo, comprimendo, dilatando, ut rei natura exigit’.174 It 
seems that Salamonius sees its operation as limited to exceptional cases, for in most cases the law will 
straightforwardly apply to a set of facts without causing manifest injustice and the judge should in all those 
cases merely follow the written law.175 
This definition of aequitas requires Salamonius to deal with the medieval orthodoxy on aequitas 
scripta. Salamonius is rather ambiguous in its treatment. On the one hand he says that ‘vereor vera ne non 
sit illa distinctio de aequitate scripta et non scripta, quia improprium videtur aequitatis scripto contineri, 
quin in aliam speciem et nomen iuris transeat’.176 He takes this to be confirmed by D.1.2.2.5, where 
Pomponius explains that the law that jurists and judges devise from no writing is generally known, as soon 
as it is laid down, as ius civile. Rather, Salamonius sees aequitas as linked indissolubly with written law, for 
one may not exist without the other, indeed ‘antequam lex ulla scriberetur, nullum discrimen erat inter ius 
et aequitatem, et veluti dicimus ante servitutem manumissiones fuisse incognitas, sic ante ius scriptum, ius 
bonum et aequum incognitum’.177  
Salamonius does not, however, conclude from this that the distinction between law that is rigorous 
or equitable is useless. He argues that the reason an equitable law will trump a rigorous one is that two 
                                                    
171 Solomonius, ibid., p. 5: ‘de quibus rebus leges loquuntur non difficile est intelligere, sed iusta facere maius negotium est 
[...], Quintilianus [ait quod] quae scripta sunt, aut posita in more civitatis, nullam habent difficultatem, cognitionis sunt enim 
non inventionis. Ars itaque Iureconsulti idest boni et aequi viri in aequitate colenda consistit, quae nullo scripto, sed sola 
recta ratione continetur, et ingenio sapientis concipitur duce iustitia atque magistra.’ Inventio is discussed below at [2.3.6]. 
172 Salamonius, ibid., pp. 6-13. 
173 Salamonius, ibid., pp. 10-11. 
174 Salamonius, ibid.¸p. 13. 
175 Salamonius, ibid., p. 14: ‘Lex scribitur de iis quae frequenter accidunt. Aequitas exercetur etiam in iis, quae rarius.’  
176 Salamonius, ibid., p. 11.  
177 Salamonius, ibid., p. 11. 
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contrary laws may not co-exist, and the equitable one is taken to be an amendment of the rigorous.178 But 
that does not mean that a law which is equitable is ‘written equity’, nor does the fact that a law is rigorous 
or equitable have anything to do with its being written or not, it has rather to do with its interpretation and 
application to the case at hand.179 He refers to the legal issues of scriptum et voluntas as the kind of legal 
question where aequum et bonum and strictum ius will be at odds.180 So, for Salamonius, any question of strictum 
ius or of aequum et bonum is about interpreting a certain writing or saying, and just like interpretation comes 
from what is not in writing and ‘sicut interpretatio extrinsecus ex non scripto venit, sic ius strictum vel 
aequum dici non potest scriptum’.181 Salamonius distinguishes instances of strictum ius where one defends a 
narrow reading of the words of the law from those where one seeks to allege that the will of the drafter was 
that words be interpreted in an absurdly literal way – the distinction is not altogether transparent from 
Salamonius’ text,182 but he refers to Cicero to define the latter kind of over-subtle interpretation as a trickery 
(calumnia) and the epitome of the maxim summum ius summa iniuria.183 
This last aspect of Salamonius’ reasoning is not altogether consistent. If matters of aequitas and 
strictum ius depend on the application and interpretation of rules, then it is not clear in what sense equitable 
rules and rigorous rules may at any time be at odds. In any case, that statement aside, Salamonius’ view on 
the definition of equity seems incompatible with the medieval orthodoxy. If equity is about the 
interpretation or application of a law to a case, then it is impossible to define a rule as aequitas scripta by 
reference to its content alone. Salamonius is thus the first author to explicitly disown the medieval doctrine 
of aequitas scripta and to attempt a rationalisation of equity as epieikeia, i.e. as a doctrine determining how a 
law is to be interpreted or amended, rather than a mere quality of law, or justice.  
2.3.1.2. What equity does: equitable interpretation and emendation 
As outlined above, Salamonius regards aequitas as having two roles, the interpretation of the law and the 
amendment of the law; he also distinguishes between a general and particular equity, hinting at the fact that 
                                                    
178 Salamonius, ibid., pp. 11-2: ‘haud tamen inepte dicimus, haec lex est aequa, illa constitutio est ex bono et aequo, et quotiens 
duae sunt contrariae leges, scite distinguitur illa ex bono et aequo, haec stricto et duro. Veraque ac notatu digna illa Accursiis 
sententia, qua protulit eam legem praeferendam quae ex bono et aequo esset. Adiecitque quae aequitate vincit, alteram 
semper corrigere, quod [Alexander de] Imola monet observandum. Ratio in promptu, ut contrarie pugnantes altera alteram 
elidere.’ 
179 See Salamonius, ibid., p. 12, where he spends some time distinguishing the various manifestations of strictum ius, mainly 
distinguishing between literal interpretations of the law, or pretences of equity to fulfil one’s own purposes. 
180 Salamonius, Commentarioli, pp. 12-3 : ‘[Q]uotiens inter sese pugnant scriptum et voluntas, aut scripti tantum, aut voluntatis 
est quaestio. Alter ex bono et aequo voluntatem defendit, alter verborum aucupio, vel alias callida interpretatione deludit 
boni et aequi rationem sequendam, et strictum et versutum ius aspernandum.’ Salamonius also later discusses in greater 
detail the various ways in which issues may arise about the text, the will or their conflict.  
181 Salamonius, ibid., p. 13. 
182 He refers, through Cicero, to cases of agreements between parties where one seeks to enforce an absurdly narrow reading 
of the words – the distinction for Salamonius might lie in the fact that the deceiving party in those cases alleges that it was 
precisely their intention, as parties to the agreement, that the words be understood in such a narrow way. Thus, the cases 
don’t properly fit the category of cases where one opposes the letter to the intention of the drafter. 
183 Salamonius, ibid., p. 12 : ‘Prima stricti species est quae vocabulorum angustiis cohibetur, ad differentiam aequitatis, quae 
latius patet, et sicut illud strictae, exactaeque interpretationis est, ita hoc latioris benigniorisque est sensus, quod usu tum 
venit, cum de aliquo scripto interpretando incidunt quaestiones de bono et aequo, stricto et iniquo [...]. Alia stricti species 
iniqui, cavillatorii, quod summum ius veteres dixere pro suma iniuria summa malitia. Cicero [De Officiis, 1.33 :] ‘existunt etiam 
saepe iniuriae calumnia et nimis callida iuris interpretatione ex quo illud, summum ius summa iniuria, factum est iam tritum 
sermone proverbium.’ Haec species est perniciosor suprascripta, quoniam in illa solum scriptum defenditur, in hac quisque 
voluntatis se iactat assertorem. Alius lata et aperta aequitatis via, alius tortuosa incedit semita, et hypocrita defensione 
voluntati insidiatur, et quasi praestigiis quibusdam conatur eludere iudicantem, iniquum pro aequo suadendo’.  
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general equity ‘extends most widely’ (latissime patet) perhaps as an overall guiding principle or source, whereas 
particular equity is the one which actually governs the single cases of interpretation and amendment.184 It 
is worth pointing out at the outset, however, that Salamonius did not see aequitas as only applying to the 
interpretation and amendment of the law, and he made it clear that it applied to any document containing 
written rules, including wills and contracts.185  
Interpretation is, for Salamonius, the most frequent application of equity, because all matters that 
are said or written require interpretation.186 Salamonius thus has to reconcile his statement with C.1.14.1, 
which reserves interpretations between law and equity to the Emperor. Salamonius does specify that 
equitable interpretation is reserved to learned men, however, that clearly extends to the category of judges. 
Salamonius deals with this issue by arguing that C.1.14.1 only meant to refer to the amendment of the law, 
rather than its interpretation.187 For Salamonius, an equitable interpretation (interpretatio ex aequo et bono) is 
achieved ‘cum voluntatem potius quae scriptum, cum quod benignius est, sequemur, cum quod omissum 
est, suppletur, et generaliter quicquid recta dictat ratio, perficitur.’188 It is not clear whether these are three 
examples of equitable interpretation, or three sub-species of it. Regarding the case of adding words to a law 
which have been omitted, Salamonius specifies that one has to imply words which are either obvious or 
which the legislator would have added if he had been present. He relates all his points about interpretation 
to a number of passages in the Digest.189 In support of the point that one may only imply words by equitable 
interpretation that would have been added by the legislator, Salamonius interestingly juxtaposes the 
Accursian gloss to D.2.14.40.3 and Aristotle’s statements about epieikeia that a law must be corrected in 
light of what the legislator would have done if he had been present.190  
Salamonius’ description of equitable interpretation is not very clear. First of all, his selection of 
passages from the Corpus Iuris Civilis does not always match the points he wishes to make. Salamonius argues 
for instance that D.22.5.13 is an instance of an equitable interpretatio suppletiva.  The Digest passage is about 
whether it is a bad policy that individuals guilty of calumny should not be barred by statute from providing 
                                                    
184 Salomonii, ibid., p. 7: ‘Aequitas est perfecta ratio quae leges et omne scriptum dictumque interpretatur, emendat [...] 
quoniam aequitatis duae sunt partes interpretatio et emendatio, est praeterea quaedam generalis aequitas latissime patens, est 
et alia particularis ab ipsa generali descendens quae cuique negotio applicatur interpretando et emendando. » 
185 Salomonii, ibid.¸p. 9 (referring to its interpretive role): ‘Sola itaque aequitas est, quae scripta, dicta, factaque non solum in 
legibus, verum etiam testamentis, caeterisque hominum actibus recte interpretando aperit, distinguit, dilatat, cohibet, supplet, 
praeiudicat’. 
186 Salmonius, ibid., pp. 7-8: ‘Ab ipsa itaque interpretatione incipiamus quae frequentior est, nullum quippe est dictum neque 
scriptum quod ut primum in controversiam venit, quin indigeat interpretatione.’ 
187 Salamonius, ibid., p. 10: ‘[C.1.14.1] de interpretativa aequitate non loquitur, quia iuris prudentibus et iudicibus id munus 
creditum fuit.’  
188 Salamoniusus, ibid., p. 8.  
189 The first instance of preferring the will of the law to its words, is related to a case of purposive interpretation at 
D.27.1.13.2; The preference for more benign solutions finds support in D.50.17.56. Finally the latter point about adding 
words to the law is justified by referring among others to D.23.1.16, in which Ulpian interpreted a law preventing senators 
from marrying certain individuals as including a ban on betrothal. 
190 Salamonius, ibid., p. 8: ‘De tertio scilicet quod aequitatis sit interpretatione supplere, quod multifariam potest contingere, 
interdum suppletur verbum quod ad perfectionem orationis desideratur, et dictum non scriptum. Etiam si non probetur 
dictum et verisimile sit fuisse dictum [D.35.1.102]. Item quando verisimile est si cogitatum fuisset, aut casus accidisset eo 
tempore quo scribebatur, dictum fuisset [Accursius ad ‘exceptionem’ D.2.14.40.3, col. 299: ‘id esse de iure servandum licet 
non sit statutum, quod verisimile est statuendum fuisse si hoc quaesitum fuisset, ut [C.3.29.5] [D.29.7.11] [D.30.16.1]’] ubi 
eleganter Accursius conflando regulam, nota inquit de iure id esse servandum, licet statutum non sit, quod verisimile est, 
statutum fuisset, si quaesitum fuisset, Aristoteles, emendetur omissum quod et legislator ipse, si adesset, utique faceret.’ 
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evidence in criminal cases, and concludes that the judge’s own discretion in giving weight to each piece of 
evidence in light of the witness’ individual qualities remedies that omission. This source’s most natural 
reading has therefore hardly anything to do with statutory interpretation. Further, it is not clear whether 
preferring the will to the letter, the more benign solution, and implying words that the legislator would have 
added are all applications of the same principle, whether these aims could ever be at odds with each other, 
and what a judge should do in such a case.191  
In any case, as mentioned in the previous chapter, medieval jurists already often referred to equity 
as the source of interpretation. Salamonius himself includes two references to Baldus saying that no 
interpretation or extension of legal argument from one case to another can be accepted unless it is founded 
in equity.192 In the medieval period such references to aequitas were rarely expanded upon, and seem to have 
generally meant that one should seek to achieve justice when interpreting the law, there was no sense in 
which equity was perceived as being particularly related, as a doctrine, to the amendment or interpretation 
of law.193 Salamonius is thus the first author not only to devise a theory of aequitas intrinsically related to 
interpretation, but also to imply a connection between orthodox statements about interpretation found in 
the ius commune and Aristotle’s doctrine of epieikeia to devise a doctrine of equitable interpretation. 
As mentioned, the second function of aequitas, for Salamonius, is the amendment of the law, which 
may be either aimed at correcting (correctiva), or supplementing (suppletiva) the law.194 This kind of 
amendment is what Salamonius seems to identify most closely with Aristotle’s ‘emendatio boni et aequi’, 
and the justification for it is provided by juxtaposing Aristotle to a Digest source, both to the effect that not 
all matters may be encompassed by written law.195 A supplementing amendment seems to be, for 
Salamonius, one where the legislator enacts a new statute in order to remedy a gap in the law. The examples 
he has in mind accordingly concern the enactment of new constitutions by the Roman Emperor.196 The 
other type of amendment, which he describes as corrective takes place ‘cum aliquid legi additur, vel 
                                                    
191 At one point Salamonius explains that an equitable interpretation may lead to a harsher application of the law, it is not 
clear whether this suggests that the will of the law (or legislator) can trump the requirement to prefer a more benign solution, 
or whether by benign Salamonius merely means more favourable to the public good as the presumed aim of the legislator.  
192 The first is to Baldus, Super Codice, ad C.6.55.9, f. 180r: ‘Et nota quod equitas est fundamentum interpretandi leges et pacta 
[D.17.2.81]’. The second is to Baldus, Lectura ad Libri Feudorum, ad L.F.2.53(54), f. 77ra: ‘Item nota quod argumentum a simili 
desiderat equitatem, quae similes casus iungit unde statuta omnia extensivam interpretationem recipientia debent fundari in 
equitati’. 
193 See [1.1.4.1] above. 
194 Salamonius cites Cinus Pistoiensis for his definition of emendatio as ‘changing for the better’, see Cinus Pistoiensis, Lectura 
Super Codice (1493), ad C.2.1.3, f. 32rb: ‘emendare est illud, quod est male confectum melius reformare, hoc est defectum in 
forma supplere.’ Salamonius seemingly borrows the distinction between correcting and supplementing from [D.1.1.7.1], 
which describes the praetorian law as introduced ‘adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia propter utilitatem 
publicam’. 
195 Salomonius, Commentaroli, p. 9: ‘Haec est natura inquit [Aristoteles], boni et aequi emendatio [...] causa autem est quod 
talia quaedam sunt, ut de ispsi lex ferri non possit, itaque decreto opus est, haec Aristoteles. Iulianus [D.1.3.10] neque leges, 
neque S[enatus] C[onsulta] ita scribi possunt, ut omnes casus qui quandoque inciderint, comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea 
quae plerunque accidunt contineri.’ 
196 Salomonius, ibid.: ‘[D.1.3.11] et ideo de iis quae primo constituuntur aut interpretatione, aut constitutione optimi Principis 
esset ius statuendum. Ecce que liquidum est posse suppleri omissa per interpretationem [...] Suppletur etiam constitutione 
quando casus praeter legis considerationem accidunt [..]. Suppletur itaque aut interpretatione, si mens legislatoris concurrit, 
aut emendatione, id est constitutione si praeter mentem accidat.’ Note, however, that Salamonius specifies that the Princeps, 
must be an optimus princeps, because he needs to be furthering the public interest, rather than his own, as he exercises his 
powers of amendment. Ibid.: ‘et observa quod [D.1.3.11] ait de optimi principis, et non cuiusque principis constitutione, 
cuius naturale est ex bono et aequo et non ex suis commodis supplere.’  
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detrahitur ex bona causa’.197 Salamonius tells us little more about those, but presumably wishes to 
distinguish cases where a law is simply added in order to repair a lacuna, and a case where a law has to be 
modified.  
Cases where amendments are required differ from those to which equitable interpretation applies, 
indeed amendments are only required in cases where justice cannot be achieved by an equitable 
interpretation of the law.198 For this reason, equitable amendments fall outside the jurisdiction of judges, 
and are reserved for the lawgiver, or those officials to whom the latter has delegated his powers. He 
develops his reasoning as to why this is so from a number of sources. He refers to C.1.14.1, arguing that it 
refers to matters of amendment, and he adds that by ‘nobis solis’, the emperor wished to include those to 
whom he had delegated this task, such as the praetor. It seems that Salamonius also read this as consistent 
with Aristotle and with Roman sources. He refers to Aristotle’s Politics where the latter had argued that, in 
absolute monarchies ‘the law allows [magistrates] to introduce for themselves any amendment that 
experience leads them to think are better than [the law as it stands]’.199 This, for Salamonius, is consistent 
with the fact that the corrections by epieikeia described by Aristotle are done by decree, and he seems to 
believe that Paul in the Digest refers to a similar allocation of jurisdiction when he says at D.50.17.85.2 that 
matters of equity delayed by reason of uncertainty are to be settled by decree.200  
2.3.1.3 Concluding remarks on Salamonius 
Salamonius is the earliest author after Budaeus to have engaged with the concept of aequitas as epieikeia. As 
we shall see in the following sections his approach to equity would be mostly popularised through the 
writings of Connanus and Duarenus in the 1550s to become the most influential theory of equity among 
civil lawyers throughout our period. Salamonius also provides us with a good example of the sources which 
influenced this novel approach to aequitas as epieikeia. In various passages both the terminology he adopts 
and the doctrine he develops seem derived from the juxtaposition of passages from the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
ius commune doctrine on interpretation, and Aristotle’s works.201 Salamonius does also occasionally refer to 
language typical of rhetoric manuals, a point to which we shall return, when considering the extent of the 
influence of legal dialecticians over the early modern development of equity.202 
That said, between roughly 1529 and 1541, and before the broader spread of Salamonius’ approach 
to equity, there were other authors who – inspired by Budaeus - sought to develop their own original 
approaches to equity as epieikeia. The elements that set these alternative approaches apart from Salamonius’ 
                                                    
197 Ibid. 
198 See n.195 above. 
199 The translation is adapted from the Loeb edition of Aristotle’s Politics (1932), p. 265. The text quoted by Salamonius is 
from Aristotle, Politics, lib. 3, cap. 9, 1287a. 
200 Salamonius, ibid., p. 10. ‘quae utraque emendatio suppletiva et correctiva est principis et eorum quibus princeps, vel lex 
delegavit, de qua [C.1.14.1] ‘Inter ius, inquit, et aequitatem nobis solis et licet et oportet inspicere.’ ‘Nobis solis’, intelligo, et 
quibus nos vel lex delegaverit, ut Romae praetoribus [...] nimirum quod cum Imperio esse debet tam qui corrigit, quod qui 
leges condit et ideo Aristoteles in iis quae emendatione indigent, decreto opus esse dixit. [D.50.17.85.2] in ambiguis quotiens 
aequitatem desiderii naturalis ratio, aut dubitatio iuris moretur, iustis decretis res temperanda est, et idcirco Aristoteles [Politica 
lib. 3 c. 9] vult constitui certos magistratus qui emendandis legibus praesint.’ 
201 See e.g. nn.190, 200 above. 
202 See n.180 above and [2.3.6] below. 
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own and with the broader tradition inspired by him is that they (i) did not focus their theories on the 
interpretation and amendment of legal rules administered by judges and sovereign respectively, and (ii) 
tended to defend, rather than depart from, the medieval tradition relying on aequitas scripta. 
2.3.2. Claudius Cantiuncula – Universal and particular equity 
Claudius Cantiuncula’s peculiar approach to aequitas was set out in his De Officio Iudicis Libri Duo, completed 
by 1529, but only published in 1543.203  In the De Officio, Cantiuncula distinguishes two kinds of equity: 
universal and particular. Universal equity (universalis aequitas) seems to be, for Cantiuncula, perfect abstract 
justice, particular equity (aequitas particularis) overlaps instead completely with Aristotle’s epieikeia, it is an 
emendation of legal justice (iustus legitimus).204 Cantiuncula does not articulate how each operates in the most 
straightforward terms. He adopts the terminology of rhetoricians, with particular reference to Cicero and 
Quintilian, distinguishing thesis and hypothesis. To draw from Quintilian’s examples, one of the tools 
rhetoricians adopted to make speeches about ethical choices was to distinguish a universal or indeterminate 
moral statement (thesis), such as ‘should a man marry?’, from one which referred to a practical situation and 
a particular person (hypothesis), such as ‘should Cato marry?’. The two would operate in a form asking to a 
syllogism, where the first statement operated as the major premise which, read with a particular premise, 
would lead to the second statement – the hypothesis – as a conclusion.  
Dealing with universal equity, this is how Cantiuncula explains how it relates to written law and the 
role of the judge: ‘potest universalem aequitatem circa thesim infinite versari, at responsa prudentum, 
principum constitutiones aliasque iuris scripti species theticas quidem quaestiones, sed quadantenus finitas 
tractare, iudicis autem officium ad quaestionem finitam et hypothesim omnino pertinere, tametsi finitae 
quaestionis explicationem ex thesis aequitate petere oporteat.’205 Universal equity concerns abstract 
statements of justice, indeterminate propositions or, to follow Quintilian’s nomenclature, theses. The role of 
the judge is instead to deal with particular cases, he has to formulate hypotheses, and do so by reference to 
the thetical statements of universal equity. Written law is trickier. Cantiuncula seems to argue that it too, 
like universal equity, is about formulating thetical abstract propositions. However, while universal equity 
formulates them infinitely (circa thesim infinite versari), written law can only do so finitely (theticas quidem 
quaestionem, sed quadantenus finitas tractare), by which Cantiuncula seems to mean that they are not abstract 
statements that will be right whenever applied to a particular case. This is where particular equity fits in for 
Cantiuncula, amending written law in cases where it does not apply appropriately to particular cases – he 
therefore broadly identifies particular equity with Aristotle’s epieikeia. 
Particular equity may intervene in two ways, the first of which is by taking effect in the form of 
written rules, which Cantiuncula refers to as written equity, aequitas scripta. Cantiuncula identifies written 
equity with ‘quicquid prudentum responsis, vel senatusconsultis vel honorario iure vel principum 
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equity in Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 133-52, 260-303. 
204 See Cantiuncula, De Officio, Vol. 1, p. 51, 58-9. 




constitutionibus continetur.’206 It is not clear whether he sees these specific sources of law as written equity 
because of their relationship with other written sources, or whether he believes all written laws to be written 
equity. At one point he defines written equity as whatever either in the old or the new law has been benignly 
interpreted, responsum, edictum, decreed, known or constituted, and also proceeds to justify why he considers 
each source to qualify as aequitas scripta, seemingly by reference to their role as amending or interpreting 
earlier rules – thus for instance: ‘Responsa prudentum aequitatem scriptam appello ob id, quod idipsum, 
quod ex aequo bono responderunt, scripto comprehensum est. Nimis enim esse ridiculum videretur, legem 
aequam appellari ex bono et aequo propositam et ibi negare scriptam esse aequitatem. [...] Alia aequitatis 
scriptae portio est ius honorarium. Nam sicuri ius civile proprie sumprum aequitatem universalem ad id, 
quod naturae magis congruit, accomodat et responsis suis prudentes aut veteres leges ex regulis eiusdem 
aequi boni interpretati sunt aut casus ab illis omissos addiderunt, ita et praetorum edicta, iuris civilis et ipsa 
quoque responsa prudentum propius ad eandem aequitatis amusim reduxerunt, cuius praeter caeteros 
studiosi videntur extitisse praetores. Idem fundamentum habent senatusconsulta, idem etiam quae postea 
sequutae sunt constitutiones principum’.’207 If one understands written equity in this limited sense, a written 
rule only qualifies as aequitas scripta insofar as it is the product of an exercise in epieikeia – understood as 
emendation or interpretation – of a previous rule. Overall, however, it seems that Cantiuncula’s statements 
are not so limited and are in fact meant to encompass the entirety of written law as aequitas scripta. First, 
because in a passage he stresses that ‘[n]ihil emil [...] iniquius est quam leges, quae per aequum et bonum 
non spirant ac reguntur’. Secondly, because he stresses that, even though one may identify laws that seem 
harsh, ‘nihil efficit, quo minus isthic sit aequitas scripta. [...] Quamvis enim per  legislatores nihil nisi ex 
bono et aequo constituisse, non possumus tamen ubique divinare, quibus illi rationibus vel temporum vel 
personarum vel aliarum circunstantiarum adducti fuerint’.  In his definition of aequitas scripta, Cantiuncula 
therefore departs completely from the hierarchy of norms medieval writers adopted, including rigor scriptus 
and distinctions of norms in genere and in specie – he effectively deprives aequitas scripta of the substantive role 
it held among medieval jurists.208 
Cantiuncula tells us much less about the unwritten side of particular equity. From what can be 
gathered from his analysis, it seems to correspond to Aristotle’s epieikeia more closely; it is the device by 
which the judge interprets, directs or amends the law.209 Cantiuncula does not say much about the degree 
of leeway which this should leave to the judge, but, like Salamonius, he explicitly limits the operation of 
unwritten particular equity to cases where one is acting in accordance with the intention of the law (mens 
legis) because acting against it would amount to correcting the law, which, Cantiuncula thinks is reserved to 
the Prince, Senate or Praetor.210 In line with all his contemporaries, Cantiuncula stresses that the judge is 
                                                    
206 Cantiuncula, ibid., p. 60. 
207 Cantiuncula, ibid., p. 61. 
208 Cantiuncula, ibid., pp. 61, 66. 
209 Cantiuncula, ibid., p. 66. 
210 Cantiuncula, ibid: ‘Alteram ergo species est aequitatis particularis, non scripta quidem, sed ad iudices et ad respondentes 
de iure tota pertinens pendensque ex illo iuris altero genere, quod interpretatio dicitur seu, ut Aristoteles ait [Ethics, 1137b], 
legitimi iusti directio vel emendatio. Quicquid enim lege omissum est, hac ratione suppletur (modo non contra legis mentem; 
id enim esset corrigere legem, quod principi, senatui, ac praetori diximus supra reservatum esse).’ 
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not at liberty to draw on his own sense of justice to provide a remedy. His intervention must be tied to the 
purpose of the rule in front of him, though it is not clear in Cantiuncula’s analysis by what means the judge 
may gather what the intention of the law is. 
Cantiuncula’s theory does not acknowledge Salamonius’ writings explicitly, and it is not clear 
whether he expressly intended to engage with it. If read alongside Salamonius’ statements, Cantiuncula’s 
view on aequitas scripta seems like a counter-argument to Salamonius’ rejection of the medieval language on 
point – as mentioned above, not to describe written rules introduced ex bono et aequo as written equity is, for 
Cantiuncula, ‘ridiculous’.211 Cantiuncula’s views on unwritten equity are better aligned with Salamonius’ 
own. The judge should act in accordance with the intention of the law, and in some passages this 
intervention is described specifically as an interpretation – with the language of emendation and direction 
referred instead to Aristotle.212 Where such an intention cannot be gathered the judge will, as we have seen, 
presume that the legislator had equity as their aim, and give effect to the rule as aequitas scripta – a view 
consistent with Salamonius’ reading of C.1.14.1.213 What Salamonius calls emendations of the law, and 
which he reserves for the legislator, seem also well aligned with what Cantiuncula describes as corrections.214  
 
2.3.3 Lutheran jurists on equity 
As mentioned above, another peculiar branch of thought on equity which ought to be mentioned is that 
which spread among some early Lutheran theologians and jurists. The thoughts of these authors on equity 
have in the past been discussed by Harold J. Berman and John Witte as part of their broader work on the 
impact of the protestant reformation on legal thought.215 Berman and Witte did not have the advantage of 
a broader view of the development of the concept of equity in early modern times or of the traditional 
development of equity as a juridical concept in the Middle Ages. It is therefore useful to return to these 
authors to understand how these theories fit within the broader development of early modern legal 
scholarship on equity.  
The two main authors who adopted this peculiarly Lutheran approach to equity were Philipp 
Melanchthon (d. 1560) and – developing it in its most complete form - Johannes Oldendorpius (d. 1567). 
As we shall see, the approaches adopted by these two authors had enough in common to be regarded as a 
tradition in their own right, and indeed it seems to have influenced some writers linked to Oldendorpius in 
the later sixteenth century, with the clearest example in Arnold Holsteinus (d. 1599). This take on equity  
would not, however, overcome that set up by Salamonius in terms of popularity – which would be preferred 
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by the majority of later early modern jurists, seemingly irrespective of religious confession, indeed even 
including Lutheran scholars from the circle of Oldendorpius and Melanchthon themselves.216 
2.3.3.1. Philipp Melanchthon  
Philipp Melanchthon (d. 1560) was a very well known humanist in his time and a central figure of the 
Lutheran reformation.217 He dealt with equity in a number of writings, including orations and works on 
rhetoric. However, the bulk of Melanchthon’s writings on equity, and those where he developed at length 
his idea of equity as epieikeia belonged to his commentaries on Aristotle. These works are mainly 
philosophical in nature, and they do not engage directly with legal scholarship. The references Melanchthon 
uses in them are mostly confined to theological works and classical texts. The most specific work on equity 
is found in his philosophical commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics. 218   
2.3.3.1.1. Melanchthon’s summum ius  
Melanchthon’s thinking on equity fits within a broader early modern movement of influential thinkers 
linked to humanism, including Erasmus,Juan Luis Vives, as well as Martin Luther himself who – while 
falling short of developing a philosophical or juridical stance on equity as epieikeia -had assimilated the two 
and contrasted them with the maxim of summum ius summa iniuria in a number of their works.219 More 
specifically, however, Melanchthon seems to also have been familiar and keen to engage with the approach 
to equity as epieikeia of the contemporary lawyers Budaeus and Salamonius and the more specifically legal 
meaning of the opposition between strict law and equity. Indeed, having explained that equity and epieikeia 
are synonyms and often opposed to summum ius, Melanchthon starts the substantive part of his analysis by 
explaining that summum ius does not necessarily involve a calumniosa interpretatio of the law – summum ius is 
merely the law applied in accordance with its letter, without regard for the circumstances of a particular 
case. Such an application may or may not amount to a calumniosa interpretatio depending on the facts.220 
                                                    
216 See ch. 4 below.. For intance compare the account of the Catholic Cardinal Albertus Bolognetus, De Lege, Iure et Aequitate 
Disputationes (1570), capp. 29-30, 34 with that of Calvinist Hugo Donellus, Commentariorum de Iure Civili Libri Viginti Octo 
(1610), pp. 31-47, with that of Leopoldus Hackelmann (d. 1619), a professor of law in the Lutheran centre of the University 
of Jena in his Disputatio Iuris Civilis Prima De Principiis Iuris (1593), titt. 33-6. On these three authors see respectively Gaspare 
De Caro, ‘Bolognetus, Alberto’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 2 (1969) <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alberto-
Bolognetus_(Dizionario-Biografico)/>; L Pfister, ‘Hughes Doneau’ in Patrick Arabeyre, Jean-Louis Halpérin and Jacques 
Krynen (eds), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français XIIe - XXe siècle (2015) and Carlo Augusto Cannata, ‘Systématique et 
Dogmatique Dans Les Commentarii Iuris Civilis de Hugo Donellus’ in Bruno Schmidlin and Alfred Dufour (eds), Jacques 
Godefroy et l’humanisme juridique à Genève. Actes du colloque Jacques Godefroy, Basel (1991), pp. 217-30; Albert Teichmann, 
‘Hackelmann, Leopold’ in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 10 (1879), p. 294. For the influence of Oldendorpius on 
Hackelmann see n. 727 below. 
217 The literature on Melanchthon is vast, for biographical information see Karl Hartfelder, Philipp Melanchthon Als Praeceptor 
Germaniae (1889, repr. 1964); Wilhelm Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon Zwischen Humanismus Und Reformation (1967-69).  
218 Philipp Melanchthon, ‘Scripta Philippi Melancthoni Ad Ethicen et Politcen Spectantia’, Corpus Reformatorum, Vol. 16 (CR 
16) (1850). I rely here principally on his Scripta ad Ethicen, but many similar arguments are put forward in his Enarratio Libri 
Quinti Ethicorum (1562), pp. 208-24.  
219 See nn.138, 165 above. For Luther’s writings on equity see M Arnold, ‘La Notion D’epieikeia Chez Martin Luther’ (1999) 
79 Revue D’Histoire Et de Philosophie Religieuses, pp. 187-208, 315-25. While epieikeia was not a central concept for Luther 
and he never developed a fully thought out approach to it, he did from the late 1510s onwards deal with the concept in a 
number of texts including commentaries on Scripture, preachings,  and table talks.   
220 Melanchthon, CR 16, coll. 73-4: ‘Summum ius non est calumniosa interpretatio iuris [...]. Est autem summum ius cum 
leges severe sine mitigatione retinentur, etiamsi qua circumstantia admittit mitigationem, ut si iudex furem adolescentem et 
lapsum aliquo casu egestasis, sine insigni atrocitate, aut petulantia, afficiat capitali supplicio.’ See also Philipp Melanchthon, 
Enarratio Libri Quinti Ethicorum (1562), pp. 210-1: ‘Etsi [...] interdum observatio summi iuris est calumniosa, sed tamen in 
aliis casibus saepe iusta est’. 
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Salamonius had instead explicitly referred to Cicero’s identification of summum ius with calumniosa interpretatio, 
and Melanchthon’s argument may have been intended as a criticism of that approach.221 That said, the 
difference between Melanchthon’s approach to summum ius and that of Salamonius seems mostly semantic. 
Salamonius himself included calumniosa interpretatio within a broader category of strict law, which 
encompassed more generally cases of adherence to the words of the law.222 
 
2.3.3.1.2. Melanchthon’s defence of aequitas scripta 
Where Melanchthon’s approach to equity as epieikeia is most strikingly different from that of Salamonius, is 
in its way of dealing with aequitas scripta. Salamonius thought that since both equity and summum ius are 
interpretive approaches to the law, and thus unwritten, the idea of written equity was not straightforwardly 
defensible.223 Instead, having identified summum ius with laws applied in accordance with their words, 
Melanchthon explained that, whenever these laws were meant to decide the case before them, they would 
amount to ‘written equity’ and call for no further tinkering. In support of this argument he relied on the 
text of C.3.1.8 as popularised in the medieval tradition, including the word ‘scriptae’ in the main text224 – 
the message in that law was that in cases meant to be governed by a written rule,that which is written is 
equity, and there is no reason why the judge should refer to anything but the letter of the law in applying 
it.225 Under this view, a rule would be aequitas scripta depending on how well it happened to suit the case at 
hand – this approach clearly has little in common with the medieval approach to written equity as opposed 
to written rigour, which sometimes gave priority to ‘rigour’ precisely because it suited the facts of a case 
and was written in specie.226  
However, Melanchthon’s approach to written equity was not so straightforward. Recognising, like 
Salamonius, that the idea of aequitas scripta might be only counter-intuitively identified with epieikeia (given 
that Aristotle thought the latter operated precisely to avoid application of the letter of the law), he argued 
that Aristotle had never specified through what medium epieikeia could amend written rules. Thus, a rule 
would have the quality of being ‘equitable’ whenever it was itself working as a correction, extension or 
restriction of another rule.227 These two explanations of written equity seem to be rather distinct. A rule 
may very well be enacted to amend another one, and therefore count as written equity under the second 
test, but not be perfectly suited to the facts of a certain case, and thus fail under the first one, being in need 
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223 See n.176 above. 
224 See n.27 above. 
225 Melanchthon, CR 16 col. 79: ‘quaestio est, utrum, ubi extat ius scriptum, iudex potius iuxta scriptum, an iuxta aequitatem, 
hoc est, rationem privatam omisso scripto iure pronuntiare debeat. De hac quaestione sunt prolixae disputationes de rigore, 
et de aequitate. [...] Regulariter ex scripto iure pronuntiandum est, praesertim in iis casibus, de quibus lex principaliter 
loquitur. [...] Ergo non licet discedere a scripta lege. [...] Ideo recte inquit textus Codicis [C.3.1.8]: Placuit in omnibus rebus 
praecipuam esse iustitiae aequitatisquae scriptae quam stricti iuris, rationem. Hic textus vetat as scripto discedi, et monet 
illud ipsum, quod scriptum est, aequitatem esse.’ 
226 See [1.1.2] above. 
227 Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 79: ‘Aristoteles generaliter aequitatem vocat mitigationem legis, sive scriptam, sive non scriptam. 
Ut enim nunc plurimae mitigationes extant scriptae in ipsis legum textibus, et in commentariis interpretum: sic Athenis leges 
mitigabantur, declarabantur, inflectebantur, aut exasperabantur decretis’. 
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of further (unwritten) equitable emendation. Conversely, a rule may be perfectly suited to the facts of a 
specific case, but not enacted to alter any existing rule – thus failing the second, but passing the first test 
for aequitas scripta.  
That said, Melanchthon was clearly committed to this reading of C.3.1.8 and continued to write 
orations in defence of aequitas scripta even when, through the 1530s, 40s and 50s, Salamonius’ argument that 
equity could not be properly said to be written gained ground among other early modern jurists.228 As late 
as 1554, at a time when – as we shall see – the view had gained prominence that the insertion of ‘scripta’ in 
C.3.1.8 was a medieval corruption, Melanchthon still held fast to his reading of it despite knowing 
‘reprehendi a quibusdam, quod hic nominat lex aequitatem scriptam: cum tamen apud Aristotelem epieikeia 
nominetur scripti correctio, omissa inscriptione legis, ut cum iudex mitigat poenam homini modesto, qui 
non petulantia aut naturae perversitate, sed fame motus, furatus est cibos’.229 
The main purpose of C.3.1.8’s reference to aequitas scripta was for Melanchthon to ensure that 
judges refrain from altering written rules at their whim when they would be clearly suited to be applied to 
a case. It is therefore probable that the main aspect that would make a rule ‘written equity’ for Melanchthon 
was its clear applicability to a certain case, and that his reference mentioned earlier to rules being ‘equitable’ 
in the sense of their extension, restriction or interpretation of other rules was merely an attempt to reconcile 
‘written equity’ with Aristotle’s understanding of epieikeia, without necessarily playing much of a substantial 
role beyond that. 
 
2.3.3.1.3 Melanchthon’s unwritten equity  
Aside from the specific role of aequitas scripta, Melanchthon generally defined the role of equity, and 
therefore of unwritten equity, as that of relieving the rigour of strict law when there is some probable reason 
to do so on account of the particular circumstances of a case.230 Like Salamonius, Melanchthon thought 
that (unwritten) equity could be used both by the ruler and by judges - however, his analysis of it was much 
looser than that found in the account of Salamonius and, from his writings, it is hard to understand exactly 
when Melanchthon thought that it should apply. 
It should be pointed out at the outset that, unlike Salamonius, Melanchthon was unwilling to pin 
the role of equity to one specific effect on the law. For instance, while Salamonius distinguished the 
interpretive role of equity in the hands of the judge from its corrective role in the hands of the sovereign, 
Melanchthon refers to what equity does when applied to the law variously as dispensatio, mitigatio or 
interpretatio, seemingly interchangeably and regardless of who administers it.231  
                                                    
228 See e.g. Philipp Melanchthon, Oratio de Scripto Iure (1539); Philipp Melanchthon, Oratio de Lege Placuit (1554). Other writings 
to a similar effect can be found in Kisch, Melanchthons Rechts- und Soziallehre (1967), pp. 240ff. 
229 Melanchthon, Oratio de Lege Placuit, in Kisch, Melanchthon, p. 286. 
230 Melanchthon, CR 21, col. 1090: ‘[Epieikeia] est virtus leniens severitas stricti iuris propter probabilem rationem’. 
231 Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 75-6: ‘Ideo dicitur [epieikeia] esse legum interpres, et haec mitigatio non caret rationem, sed 
aliquam superiorem legem sequitur.[...] Semper quaerenda est principalis sententia, de qua lex loquitur, deinde ubi 
circumstantiae diversae sunt, quaerenda est dispensatio.’ Though Melanchthon talks about mitigation, he clearly also has in 
mind cases where the court would make the law harsher, see ibid., col. 75: ‘Cum autem tanta sit varietas casuum et 
negotiorum, ut non possit de omnibus eodem modo pronuntiari, sed interdum propter circumstantias opus sit, aut 
exacerbatione aliqua, aut mitigatione, diligenter haec doctrina de epieikeia consideranda est’ (my emphasis). 
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That said, Melanchthon did see a distinction between the use of epieikeia by a judge and by the 
sovereign. As mentioned above, Melanchthon was quite concerned about judicial freedom to upset legal 
rules, and a judge would therefore only be able to perform such a dispensatio, mitigatio or interpretatio in cases 
where the reason calling for it is clear and probable (perspicua et probabilis ratio) – whereas all other cases 
would have to be decided by the Prince, who can make use of equity whenever he sees fit.232  
Starting with exercises of equity by judges, the main issue is that it is not clear what Melanchthon 
thought would amount to a clear and probable reason calling for the intervention of epieikeia. While for 
Salamonius these would be cases where one would be able to infer with confidence that the will of the 
legislator differed from the result that would follow an application of the letter of the law, Melanchthon’s 
approach seems to be much broader and vaguer. He tells us that, generally, these would be cases where the 
rule before the judge does not principally deal with the case at hand (in casu de quo non principaliter loquitur).233 
The stock example provided is that of a law providing for the strangulation of thieves, which meant to deal, 
however, principally with thieves animated by evil (atroci consilio) – a judge should instead make use of equity 
and apply a softer sentence to one stealing out of hunger.234  Melanchthon’s definition is not much tighter 
than that, and one can only attempt to infer what kinds of particular circumstances would call for the 
intervention of equity by looking at the cases he lists as examples. Clearly Melanchthon thought equity 
should intervene in (i) cases where following the law would violate a higher law, such as natural law - these 
resemble those that Aquinas and later scholastic theologians had in mind for the intervention of epieikeia,235 
and  (ii) cases where one seeks to fulfil the purpose for which the law was introduced.236 However, some 
cases listed by Melanchthon seem to fit under a much broader and ill-defined category, which can only be 
described as cases where an application of the law – while seemingly in line with natural law and the purpose 
of the law - would have seemed harsh because of some other justifying ground. These include the example 
above excusing a thief stealing out of hunger, or the case of a murder committed in response to a great 
wrong committed by the deceased.237 Melanchthon does not make much of an effort to systematise this 
broad third category, or indeed the former two. It is not clear, for instance, whether they would be ranked 
in a particular order were they to come into conflict. 
                                                    
232 Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 81: ‘tamen modus est eius rei [i.e. legis mitigatio] ubi est perspicua et probabilis ratio: ideo 
Imperator in obscuris materiis iusiit legum et aequitatis diiudicationem ad se referri.’  
233 Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 74: ‘Verum [epieikeia] est moderatio legis in aliqua circumstantia, praesertim in casu, de quo non 
lex principaliter loquitur, ut cum lex iubet strangulari furem, loquitur de eo, cuius aetas est firmior, et quo petulanter furatur.’  
234 Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 80: ‘Sed incidunt interdum casus, de quibus lex non principaliter loquitur, ac honesta ratio 
flagitat moderationem, propter aliquam circumstantiam perspicuam. Hic etiamsi deest scripta aequitas, tamen iudex adhibere 
mitigationem debet, ut lex de fure strangulando loquitur principaliter de eo, qui atroci consilio fecit furtum, non loquitur 
principaliter de homine modesto, impulso fame ad furandum.’  
235 For instance, Melanchthon gives the example of the deposited sword from Aquinas, as well as a number of examples 
from Scripture. See Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 75. For Aquinas’ view see [1.2.1] above and [3.2.1] below. 
236 See e.g. Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 75: ‘magis cernitur epieikeia in casu Machabeorum, qui praeliabantur in sabbato (1 Macc. 
2.41). [...] Et Machabei hoc officio servabant finem huius legis. Non enim hoc agebant, ut his exemplis abolerent sabbatum, 
sed ut ministerium verbi et sabbatum propugnarent et defenderent.’ 
237 Melanchthon takes the example of the woman who murdered her husband and son in retaliation for their murder of 
another son of hers, see Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, Vol. II (1927), 12.7. Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 76: ‘Apud Gellium [Attic 
Nights, 12.7] Aeropagitae liberant mulierem Smyrneam, quae veneno maritum et eius filium necaverat, qui tamen prius 
occiderant mulieris filium, natum in priori coniugio [... ita] remittunt poenam propter iustum matris dolorem.’ 
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Melanchthon tells us even less about exercises of equity by the Prince. It seems from the passage 
referred to above that he thought law-givers would be able to alter legal rules regardless of whether there 
was a clear and probable reason to do so – which seems to suggest any exercise of power over existing rules 
may be an exercise of equity. However, it seems Melanchthon’s view of this aspect of equity was even 
broader, and that he did not necessarily regard equity as having to do with the amendment of written rules 
or with the amendment of anything at all. Some of the cases Melanchthon lists as exercises of equity seem 
to be mere exercises of discretion by people with authority that achieve justice in particular cases, suggesting 
that one could exercise equity even when there is no strict law to interpret, moderate or dispense from.238 
Once more, Melanchthon does not distinguish these very clearly, and his reference to examples and 
authorities from classical texts on this point is so abstract that it is hard to understand whether he had 
noticed this difficulty at all. 
2.3.3.1.4.  Melanchthon’s original theory of equity 
Harold Berman has in the past described Melanchthon’s approach to equity as ‘address[ing] the problem in 
the manner of the scholastic jurists.’239 It is unclear whom Berman had in mind when he referred to 
‘scholastic jurists’, whether the lawyers or the theologians, but neither seems a good fit.  Regarding the 
medieval lawyers, Melanchthon did make reference to the passages in the Code that (he believed) referred 
to aequitas scripta, but aside from sharing the references to those passages, his theory had almost nothing in 
common with that of medieval legists and canonists. Like medieval theologians, Melanchthon assimilated 
epieikeia and equity, and he did occasionally refer to the works of Aquinas,240 but he does not seem to follow 
their rather doctrinally specific approach to epieikeia. His idea of assimilating equity and epieikeia seems rather 
part of the broader humanist movement to read Aristotle’s epieikeia as aequum et bonum and oppose it to the 
adage summum ius summa iniuria. In fact, Melanchthon’s approach to equity seems to be only loosely 
influenced by other writers, be they scholastic theologians, medieval legists and canonists or early modern 
humanist jurists. His theory was original, but remained overall doctrinally underdeveloped, perhaps a sign 
that Melanchthon – unlike Salamonius – did not envisage to be writing specifically for lawyers.   
 
2.3.3.2.  Johannes Oldendorpius 
Johannes Oldendorpius (d. 1567) was, like Melanchthon, a figure at the centre of the Lutheran reformation. 
He was also the most prolific writer about equity among Lutheran scholars, and indeed perhaps among 
sixteenth-century legal writers in general. Oldendorpius’ first work dealing with the subject was a short 
treatise written and published in German241 entitled Wat Byllich unn Recht Ys in 1529, a work that 
Oldendorpius later reworked and expanded into a Latin edition which represents his most complete 
                                                    
238 This seems to be the case with Melanchthon’s reference to the capital punishment inflicted on the Capuan Senators by 
Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, which he saw as an exercise of epieikeia. This is discussed in Livy, History of Rome (1943), 26.14-6. 
Melanchthon, CR 16, col. 74. 
239 Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 91.  
240 See n. 235 above. 
241 The work does include a gloss in Latin providing references (mostly from legal sources, but sometimes from theological 
or classical sources) for Oldendorpius’ statements. 
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statement on the matter.242 Oldendorpius dealt with equity also in a number of other works, including his 
own annotations on D.1.1.1 and his Actionum Iuris Civilis Loci Communes of 1539.243 
 
2.3.3.2.1. Wat Byllich unn Recht Ys  
The reason for dealing with Oldendorpius and Melanchthon together does not simply have to do 
with their close links and religious affinities, but most importantly with the content of their theories of 
equity, which shows they belong to a common tradition. However, it is only Oldendorpius’ later exposition 
of equity that became influenced by the thought of Melanchthon quite clearly. It is useful first to deal with 
Oldendorpius’ earliest work on equity, Wat Byllich unn Recht Ys. It was published in 1529, like Melanchthon’s 
commentary on equity in Aristotle’s Ethics – the two must therefore have worked on the topic around the 
same time. The analysis of equity in this book bears little resemblance to the latter’s work, except insofar 
as it provides an original analysis of equity. 
Like the other humanist-inspired legal writers about equity we have examined above, Oldendorpius 
was convinced by Budaeus’ juxtaposition of epieikeia and the maxim summum ius summa iniuria.244 However, 
his analysis of it in 1529 differed from both the account given by Melanchthon around the same time, and 
from that given by Salamonius in 1525. At a very general level, the account of equity that comes closest to 
that of Oldendorpius would be that of Aquinas, but any influence would be indirect, as Oldendorpius 
clearly does not make it a point of his doctrine to align himself with scholastic thought. 
First of all, unlike Melanchthon, Oldendorpius was not particularly concerned in this first work on 
defending aequitas scripta. While he discusses it as a potential category of equity, he then goes on to argue 
that one may not properly be said to write down equity, like Salamonius had.245 The reason may lie in that 
he seems to have been relying on (and indeed refers to) an edition of the Code which did not feature the 
interpolation of the word ‘scriptae’.246  Oldendorpius also provides his own explanation for C.1.14.1, i.e. 
that it was meant to only reserve to the Emperor cases where one sought to provide a permanent 
interpretation of the law – otherwise, for Oldendorpius, one must always make use of equity.247 
However, while resembling Salamonius’ account in its dismissal of written equity, Oldendorpius 
did not think that equity had anything in particular to do with the intention of the legislator or the proper 
understanding of the law. In Wat Byllich he describes the proper selection, reading and interpretation of the 
                                                    
242 Johannes Oldendorpius, Wat byllich unn recht ys (1529), published in modern German (as Was Billig und Recht ist ) by Erik 
Wolf, Quellenbuch Zur Geschichte Der Deutschen Rechtswissenschaft (1950), pp. 51-68. Johannes Oldendorpius, De Iure et Aequitate 
Forensis Disputatio (1541). 
243 The comment to D.1.1.1 is published in Johannes Oldendorpius, Opera Omnia (1559), pp. 5-7, while the Actionum Iuris 
Civilis were re-edited in Johannes Oldendorpius, Variarum Lectionum, (1541), p. 125.  
244 Oldendorpius refers in Byllich unn Recht to the maxim as ‘scharp recht ys scharp unrecht. See Oldendorp, Byllich unn Recht, 
p. 12. The influence of Budaeus is also acknowledged explicitly at pp. 4, 11-2. See also Kisch, Erasmus, pp. 235-242. See also 
n.221 above. 
245 Oldendorpius, Wat Byllich unn Recht, p. 16: ‘Nyr fallet nun nedder eyne distinctie edder underscheydinges [Accursius et 
Jason de Mayno ad C.3.1.8] so de rechts lerer gemeyntlich yngefört hebben ane grundt als scholde tmyerleye byllicheit syn 
de eyne beschreuen de ander unverschreuen. Denn ydt ys ytzunder unde och vorhen beweret dat men de byllicheyt nicht 
fan egentlich ynn schryfft vorfaten als wol ander gesette under berr illinghe der minsche’.  
246 See the gloss ad ‘Dem’ in Oldendorpius, Byllich unn Recht, p. 16. See n.27 above. 




law as a stage earlier to equity.248 Equity, for Oldendorpius as for Aquinas, has rather to do with whether 
the law, once applied, is going to be compatible with some forms of higher justice. If the law clashes with 
these forms of higher justice, then judges ought to give effect to it in a way that satisfies them. Oldendorpius 
therefore defined equity as a ‘judgment of Natural reason, which tempers human law and aligns it to a 
rightful life’ and ‘a judgment [that takes place] in the soul or conscience, that provides you with all the 
defects of the order or action, so that you can verify whether applying it would be contrary to  good custom 
and [leading a] righteous life’. Oldendorpius may have been influenced by Baldus’ definition of equity, 
which he cites as a source for this, Baldus’s own definitions of aequitas specialis was of an ‘applicatio animi 
seu iudicium in quo circumscripta iuris regula aliquid de mente singulari ex propria ratione statuitur’.249  
Oldendorpius therefore provides a list of how this form of justice he refers to as equity may be 
found. He develops some kind of hierarchy, referring to five rules for the recognition of equity. The first 
consideration should be the law of God, anything that violates it will be inequitable and should be set aside 
– regardless of whether it is the will of the lawmaker. A striking example of this comes from Oldendorpius’ 
analysis of the law of tithes. It is clearly the will of the popes who passed the written laws relating to tithes 
that they be paid. However, they are in conflict with God’s word, for Christ had banished all business 
dealing from his temple. With this provocative example, Oldendorpius makes it clear that equity will allow 
a judge who regards divine law to be in conflict with human law to simply depart from it – no matter how 
incompatible with its words or the intention of the legislator that reading of the law may be.250 The second 
rule Oldendorpius provides is that of fulfilling the common good. The third rule is that one ought to look 
closely at all the circumstances of person, time and place. The fourth rule is that it is equitable to seek that 
which benefits one party without doing any harm to the other - Oldendorpius seems to be inspired by 
Aristotle saying it is equitable not to insist on one’s legal right where waiving it would give an advantage to 
another, and involve no harm for the right-holder. The fifth rule is that, where the solution to a case is 
clear, the judge should not let himself be persuaded by the crafty use of the letter of the law or other over-
subtle arguments put forward by either party.251 
If the application of a law clashes with equity – in this sense understood as justice – then the judge 
should not follow it. The main difference between Aquinas’ way of dealing with epieikeia and Oldendorpius’ 
is that in his 1529 work the latter does not talk about the process of disapplying the law as epieikeia – like 
Aquinas does – but rather talks about equity as the higher standard of justice itself, which if violated then 
causes the law to be applied differently. The theory is therefore a rather unique blend of the medieval 
concept of equity as justice and the scholastic epieikeia idea that laws should not be applied when violating 
that higher justice.  
                                                    
248 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 46-50. 
249 See Oldendorp, ibid., p. 12: ‘Billicheyt ys eyn gerichte der natürlichen vornufft wor dorch wertlich gesette gelyndert und 
thom ördentlicken leuende gestellet werth. [...] Also geschüth eyn gerichte ynn dynem gemöthe edder conscientien de dy 
allegebrechte der ordeninge edder hande le so du vorhanden heffst egentlich nawyset esst dar under ytwes den guden seden 
unde ördentlischen leuende entygen befunden werde.’ For Baldus’ concept of equity see Baldus ad D.1.1.1pr, n.5. 
250 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 19-24. 
251 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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2.3.3.2.2. The influence of Melanchthon on Oldendorpius’ theory in the Disputatio of 1541 
By the 1540s, when Oldendorpius published the Disputatio, his most complete statement on equity, he had 
clearly come under the influence of some of the arguments Melanchthon had made.252 
There are three noticeable signs of Melanchthon’s influence. The first is Oldendorpius’ definition 
of summum ius, which, in the manner peculiar to Melanchthon, he sought to distinguish from calumnia.253 
Like Melanchthon, Oldendorpius sees the difference between summum ius and equity in that the former is 
the provision of a general rule for a category of cases generally defined,254 whereas equity, ‘cum factum iam 
evenit, circumspicit quale sit, et confert cum huiusmodi praeceptis legum, ac eligit inter multas bonas leges 
optimam, hoc est, propositio negocio convenientissimam: reliquas suis relinquens temporibus et factis’.255 
The second sign of Melanchthon’s influence can be identified in Oldendorpius’ attempt to 
reconcile epieikeia and aequitas scripta, departing from his earlier scepticism about written equity.256 Indeed, 
while in his previous work he seemed to rely on a version of the Code that did not feature the (interpolated) 
word ‘scriptae’, he clearly saw that interpolation as genuine by the times of the Disputatio, perhaps – again 
– influenced by Melanchthon’s own defence of it. Thus, in Oldendorpius’ own attempt to reconcile C.3.1.8 
and C.1.14.1, Oldendorpius refers to references of aequitas scripta in the former text.257  His approach to 
written equity is, however, not exactly the same as Melanchthon’s. While Melanchthon thought written 
equity would be the quality of whatever rule was perfectly adapted to a case, Oldendorpius sees it as the 
process of identifying such a rule; this process has much in common with the one he dealt with in his earlier 
work as the stage preceding that of doing equity, i.e. that of identifying rules applicable to a certain case and 
interpreting them properly.258 The link to equity, for Oldendorpius, seems to be that, during such an exercise 
one seeks to find out what ‘equity’ moved the lawgiver in writing a certain law. Oldendorpius’ example is 
that of a shoemaker who makes many shoes, and then with equity is able, upon seeing the foot of a 
purchaser and their status, to choose the size and shape best suited to it.259 Oldendorpius incorporated in 
this Melanchthon’s language, referring to laws as laid down in writing as summum ius, which, if properly 
selected, may become a certain case’s aequitas scripta.260  
                                                    
252 Witte reports that ‘[i]n 1539, Oldendorpius came into personal contact with Melanchthon.’ Witte, Protetestantism, p. 156. 
He also claims  that Oldendorpius dedicated the 1541 edition of his Disputatio to Melanchthon, but the Cologne 1541 edition 
is instead dedicated to Thielemannus a Fossa, the notary to the chapter of the Cathedral of Cologne. Melanchthon is, 
however, mentioned in the epistle alongside Budaeus, Cantiuncula, Zasius and other humanist jurists. 
253 See [2.3.3.1.1] above.  
254 Oldendorpius adopts Melanchthon’s distinction between summum ius and calumniosa interpretatio. Oldendorpius, Disputatio, 
p. 24: ‘Improprie autem summum ius appellatur, quod praedura interpretatione trahitur ad species factorum inconvenientes: 
Vel quod simulatis quibusdam argumentis colligitur sophisticos in fraudem legis [...]. Secundum hanc significationem recte 
dici potest, SUMMUM IUS, SUMMA INIURIA’.  
255 Oldendorpius, Disputatio, p. 19. 
256 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 74-5: ‘Potest aequitas, tum in scholis, tum in foro duplici modo exerceri. Altero [...] scriptam 
aequitatem recte dixerimus. Altero modo [...] non scriptam aequitatem vocare possumus’. cf with n.245ff above. 
257 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 94-5: ‘In summa. [C.3.1.8] loquitur de iudiciis, in quibus exercetur aequitas per leges iam scriptas. 
[C.1.14.1] tractat potestatem constituendi iuris, quae aequitatem quidem requirit, sed authoritatem praeterea summam: ne 
inconstantia legum mutandarum conquasset Rempublicam.’ 
258 See n.248 above 
259 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 19: ‘Quemadmodum sutor, primum multas sibi comparat et varias formas calceorum. Deinde, cum 
videt emptorem, inspicit qualitatem pedis, et personae dignitatem: sicque formam eligit aptissimam. 
260 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 72-5: ‘[Aequitas scripta exercetur] ut diligenter consideremus, quo ordine Iureconsulti et 
Imperatores Romani observarint aequitatem in describendis legibus et praeiudiciis humanorum negociorum [...]. Eam ob 
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Thirdly, Oldendorpius refined his earlier view of unwritten equity, seemingly aligning it with that 
of Melanchthon. Melanchthon had suggested that the exercise of unwritten equity was required where a 
law applied to a case for which it was not specifically designed (de quo non principaliter loquitur),261 similarly 
Oldendorpius said that exercising unwritten equity is required ‘in his facti speciebus, quae nunc eveniunt, 
nec habent praeiudicium in legibus scriptis ex omni parte respondens: ut nos secundum circumstantias 
earum applicatis axiomatibus summi iuris, iudicemus, quid diffiniri oporteat.’262 It is called an exercise in 
unwritten equity ‘non quasi liceat sine scripti iuris observatione illam aestimare, ut supra ostendimus: sed 
quod aliquanto longius a scriptis thesibus recedit: sicut ius civile a iure naturali distinguitur [D.1.1.6].’263 This 
is a significant departure from Oldendorpius’ earlier theory, centred rather on checking the compatibility 
of the law with rules of higher justice, which instead relates the application of equity to the circumstances 
of particular cases, just as Melanchthon had done. This is clear from the definition of equity that 
Oldendorpius offered in his Disputatio. Equity is a ‘iudicium animi, ex vera ratione petitum: de circumstantiis 
rerum, ad honestatem vitae pertinentium, cum incidunt, recte discernens, quid fieri aut non fieri oporteat’.264 
This definition, with its focus on equity’s relationship with the circumstances of each case seems similar to 
that given by Melanchthon – i.e. a doctrine that allows a judge to depart from a rule when particular 
circumstances take a case outside its scope. However, Oldendorpius was also concerned to link this focus 
on the circumstances of each case with his earlier argument that equity had to do with the compatibility of 
laws with higher principles of justice. In this sense, the circumstances affecting the applicability of the rule 
must ‘pertain to moral character’. Again, like Aquinas, Oldendorpius’ focus is on whether the particular 
circumstances of the case cause the law to do injustice, rather than on whether they comply with the 
intention of the legislator – though, as mentioned earlier, Oldendorpius invites jurists to assume that 
legislators are always moved by a certain ‘equity’ when passing laws.265 In the Disputatio he refers to these 
principles of justice as gradi honestatis, and their resemblance to the principles listed in Wat Byllick unn Recht 
Ys is unmistakable. We find them again listed in the following order: the need to preserve religion,266 the 
                                                    
rem in explicandis legibus, quae factum diffiniunt, semper rationem dubitandi (sic enim vocant) et decidendi ostendere 
debemus: nedum ponere simpliciter casum, ut vulgo faciunt. Hoc est, oportet primum regula summi iuris unam aut plures 
indicare, quarum ductu diversum videretur dicendum. Deinde demonstranda est aequitas ex qualitatibus facti, quae talem 
diffinitionem postulaverint.’ 
261 See nn.249-2 above 
262 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 75. 
263 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 75-6. 
264 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 13. Berman and Witte report in their 1989 article (and also in their respective monographs) indicunt 
for incidunt, and omit recte discernens entirely. Oddly, Berman and Witte seem to be aware of the correct reading of this passage, 
which they report having read in Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, but choose to depart from it 
unexplainedly. That the incidunt and recte discernens are part of Oldendorpius’s citation is made even clearer from the fact that 
Oldendorpius moves on to provide an explanation for each part of his definition, dividing it in segments which include 
incidunt and recte discernens. See Oldendorpius, Disputatio, p. 18-20. See Berman and Witte, ‘Transformation’, p. 1642, n. 196.  
 265 See n.259 above. 
266 That is, the avoidance of sin and fulfilment of God’s will. Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 79: ‘quoties de negocio incidente plures 
concurrerent sententiae: semper praeferretur illa, quae religioni propius accederet, hoc est, pietati et iuste erga DEUM 
functioni pro nostro munere.’ 
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public good,267 equality between private parties,268 finding a middle-way between two polar opposite 
solutions,269 to require parties to do that which profits one  without causing any loss to the other, to favour 
family ties and, rather circularly, to do that which is less iniquitous.270 As in the previous work, it appears 
that they are ranked in order of priority.271 The only one missing seems to be, predictably, that of looking 
to the circumstances of the case – as it is now, as in the theory of Melanchthon, a broader principle 
encompassing all applications of equity.  
Finally, the last point of contact with Melanchthon’s theory is that Oldendorpius, like 
Melanchthon, is reluctant to pin down the intervention of equity to a specific doctrinal exercise.272 In fact, 
Oldendorpius does not even seem to engage, as Melanchthon did, in distinguishing exercises of equity by 
judges from those by lawgivers. Equity in Oldendorpius is so broadly defined as to encompass any exercise 
of judicial power aimed at taking the circumstances of a case into account and doing justice – regardless of 
whether this was achieved by extending or restricting existing laws,273 departing from laws entirely on 
account of their clash with one of the gradi honestatis described above,274 or without any interpretive or 
corrective relation to written law at all. Regarding the latter aspect (perhaps the most surprising), it 
concerned cases where the written law specifically provides the decision-maker with discretion. No matter 
that the written law is in need of neither interpretation nor correction in these cases – Oldendorpius seems 
to regard them as equity simply for the reason that they do justice in light of the circumstances of a particular 
case. A great proportion of the Disputatio is precisely aimed, not at detailing the circumstances warranting 
interpretations and corrections of rules, but rather at explaining what kinds of rules an equitable legal system 
would include,275 arguing they should be few, and leave room for judicial discretion, contrasting this with 
                                                    
267 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 78: ‘Reipublicae proxima est ratio: ut semper existimemus fore aequius, quod ad publicam utilitatem 
propius accedit.’ 
268 This resolves itself under the principle that ‘the same rule which anyone maintains against another is to be applied to him’ 
found at D.2.2.0. Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 82: ‘Postremus gradus est rerum privatarum, in quibus semper imitari oportet 
antesignanum illum aequitatis Praetorem Romanum, longa certe experientia prudentem qui secutus est huius artis 
absolutissimum compendium istud: Quod quisque iuris in alterum statuit, uti ipse eodem iure utatur’. 
269 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 84: ‘Quoties facti extrema ad regulas iuris collata, non admittunt diffinitionem commodam: quia 
sensus elicitur nimis durus in utranque partem: toties ex media quadam via oportet aequitatem colligere. [...] Haec enim est 
aequitas, quae sic vult rem per medium temperari.’ 
270 They are discussed at Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 84-9. 
271 See also Oldendorpius, ibid.p. 83: ‘Ubi multae iuris rationes ad easdem facti circumstantias concurrunt, et aliquo modo 
respondere videntur: ibi conferenda est aequitas cum aequitate, ut superior cedat inferiori, secundum gradus supra dictos.’ 
272 See n.231 above. 
273 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 98: ‘nihil aliud est aequitas, quam collatio similitudinis et dissimilitudinis, inter casum evenientem, 
ac praeiudicia legum. Quare Iulianus ibidem [i.e. in D.1.3.12] vocat, Ad similia procedere. Ulpianus appellat, Interpretatione 
vel iurisdictione supplere [i.e. in D.1.3.13]. Paulus dicit, Producere ad consequentias [i.e. in D.1.3.14]’ 
274 This is clear, for instance, in a passage where Oldendorpius deals with the interpretation of the interdict quod vi aut clam 
dealt with under D.43.24. He argues that it is possible to depart form that interdict if it would be against the public interest 
not to do so or for some other obvious reason (presumably referring to the criteria offered earlier). Oldendorpius, Disputatio, 
pp. 100-1: ‘I. Si tali restitutione posset laedi causa Reipublicae. Eam enim praeferri oportet aliis utilitatibus, ut supra probatum 
est. II. Si ostenderetur statim evidens ratio, quare supersedendum esset nec protinus decernenda restitutio. [...] Et si qua tam 
evidens sit, ut facile repellat agentem: debere possessorem absolui. [...] [Vide X.2.13.13] ubi Innoncentius Pontifex Romanus 
ex circumstantiis negat restitutionem petitam. Quoniam (inquit) omne, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est: et quicquid fit 
contra conscientiam, aedificat ad gehennam: frustra in tali casu adiudicaretur restitutio spoliato: quum contra DEUM non 
debeat in hoc iudici obedire’.  
275 See Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 107-51. This discussion includes (at pp. 142-51) Oldendorpius’ analysis of the well-known 
juridical question regarding whether a judge ought to follow rules of evidence or his own conscience in cases where he has 
been himself a witness of a crime in which he is judge – in which Oldendorpius departs from the general view that he should 
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the approach of medieval Commentators.276 The point, for Oldendorpius is that written laws are necessary, 
but need to be written in moderation (intra mediocritatem). Oldendorpius deals, for instance, with the kind of 
rules one ought to devise to regulate the type of care required of a usufructuary in the management of the 
subject matter of the usufruct, or to assess the reliability of a witness, arguing that it is useless to try and 
define these matters through written law, and they should rather be left to the discretion of the judge.277 
Thus, Oldendorpius criticises those commentators who ‘ambitione atque stulticia ducti tentarent id, quod 
natura negat, ut istas species in formulas redigerent: regulis, ampliationibus, limitationibus, aliisquae 
praestigiis omnem boni et aequi artem obscurarunt.’278 The definition of unwritten equity is thus even 
broader than the (already very broad) definition found in Melanchthon.  It is thus very loosely identified 
with the exercise of discretion – interpretive or otherwise – required to achieve justice in a particular case, 
but Oldendorpius does not distinguish clearly between directions to legislators regarding where a judge 
should be afforded discretion, and directions to judges regarding when, despite not having been granted 
discretion, they should nevertheless break free from written rules.  
With its contrast between summum ius and the circumstances of each case, defence of aequitas scripta 
and broad approach to unwritten equity, Oldendorpius’ theory of equity in the Disputatio clearly belongs to 
the same tradition (for want of a better term) as Melanchthon’s. It therefore seems that Witte and Berman’s 
statement that Oldendorpius ‘took a very different approach [to that of Melanchthon] by insisting that 
every application of a legal rule required a judge to apply equity’ underestimate the similarity between those 
two theories and – even more – the differences from the three other traditions existing at the time, 
Salamonius’ idea of equity as interpretation, the medieval learning on written and unwritten equity, and 
Aquinas’ theological concept of epieikeia.279 Further, the idea that Melanchthon insisted more than 
Oldendorpius on the application of written law seems to be based on a misreading of both theories – both 
authors agreed that equity could be achieved by applying written rules to particular cases, as long as these 
were meant to deal with the particular circumstances of the case.280 Both Oldendorpius and Melanchthon 
defended the importance of aequitas scripta against the attack of legal humanists and therefore both 
emphasised the importance of following or at least using written laws for the proper functioning of a legal 
system, they would both have agreed that ‘the equitable method would [in some cases] yield a strict 
                                                    
be bound by evidence. The medieval background of this debate is well covered in legal history, see for instance K.W. Nörr, 
Zur Stellung des Richters im Gelehrten Prozess der Fruehzeit: Iudex secundum allegata non secundum conscientiam iudicat (1967).  
276 Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 19-20. See also, ibid., p. 72: ‘Nam aequitas ex scripto iure constat. Siquidem leges propterea sunt 
literis commendatae, ne quis pro suo arbitratu ab eis discederet. Quamobrem Athenienses, qui certas habebant intra 
mediocritate descriptas legum formulas, ad quas exigerent aequitatem incidentium negociorum: praeferendi sunt 
Lacedaemoniis, qui committebant omnia non scriptis moribus, quibus saepenumero gliscentibus, perniciose admodum 
errabant.’    
277 Oldendorpius refers to many Digest passages where matters are left to the discretion of the judge to illustrate this point. 
Oldendorpius, ibid., pp. 98-9. 
278 Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 97. 
279 Witte, Protestantism, p. 165. Berman, Revolution II, p. 91. 
280 Oldendorpius does seem to argue that equity is always required in a rather confusing statement, where he explains that 
whether all equity is unwritten or written is a matter of perspective. Oldendorpius, ibid., p. 76: ‘In summa. Si aequitatem 
consideremus habitu et generaliter: omnis aequitas censebitur scripta, nec distat a iure scripto [...]. Sin autem actu et specialiter 
perpendamus aequitatem: certe nulla est scripta. Nam de casibus hodie incidentibus, nulla scribi potuit diffinitio specialis 
ante, quam evenirent.’ 
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application of the rule. In some other cases, it would compel the judge to suspend a legal rule, to interpret 
it favourably towards one of the parties, to give special solicitude to a civil litigant or criminal defendant 
who was poor, orphaned, widowed or abused, or to reform and improve the rule and thus create a basis 
for its future equitable application in a comparable case.’281  
 
2.3.3.2.3. Later Jurists inspired by Oldendorpius and Melanchthon 
Oldendorpius’ writings on equity were among the most popular works on equity of the early modern period, 
and they are still among the best known and most studied by legal historians.282 However, as mentioned 
above, insofar as Melanchthon and Oldendorpius can be seen as writing about equity within roughly the 
same conceptual framework, their works on equity would not establish a particularly recognisable or durable 
‘tradition’ among later writers, and that seemingly regardless of confession.283 One cannot therefore 
attribute to them the creation of a peculiarly Lutheran approach to the concept of equity, nor would their 
humanistic take on equity prove particularly influential on later humanist-inspired jurists. As we shall see 
below, a notable exception were legal dictionaries and similar reference works, where the impact of 
Melanchthon and Oldendorpius would be felt over a very long term.284 Further, among equity treatise-
writers, one can identify at least one exception in a jurist who seems to have studied under, or was otherwise 
close, to Oldendorpius. That jurist is Arnoldus Holsteinus (fl. ca. 1566), who discussed equity in a treatise 
of 1566 prefaced by Oldendorpius himself.285 
The influence of Oldendorpius, in particular of Oldendorpius’ Disputatio and of Melanchthon, on 
Holsteinus is not transparent, but the most visible aspect of it is Holsteinus’s reliance on aequitas scripta to 
explain the value of basing one’s judgment on written laws. These arguments are very close to those of 
Melanchthon and may have been influenced by those near-contemporary orations that Melanchthon had 
given in defence of written law,286 and throughout his treatise Holsteinus displays a concern for protecting 
the value of written law against the intrusion of untamed equity.287 For Holsteinus, written equity is that 
which one extracts from written law, by interpreting its intention.288 This matches exactly neither 
Melanchthon’s nor Oldendorpius’ use of written equity. As mentioned above, the former saw written equity 
as the quality of laws perfectly suited to the facts of a case, including its circumstances, and Oldendorpius 
thought that it was the selective process by which one found and interpreted the law applicable to a certain 
                                                    
281 Witte, Protestantism, p. 167. 
282 The modern re-edition of Oldendorpius’ Wat Byllich by Erik Wolf alongside other milestones of German legal thought is 
a testimony to this. See n.242 above 
283 See n.216 above. 
284 See [2.5.1.] below.  
285 Arnoldus Holsteinus, De Aequitate Iuris (1566), pp. 3-4. Oldendorpius’ letter is mostly focussed on praising Holsteinus’ 
account of equity and criticising contemporary commentators for talking about – rather than doing – equity. 
286 See n.228 above. 
287 Holsteinus, ibid., p. 61: ‘A scripto iure non erit recedendum propter verborum structuram, quam nulla ratio suadet 
immutari, ubi vero de aequitate dicitur, est de interna orationis vi, et anima legis, quae ratio dicitur, et verba ad se trahit.[...] 
Est itaque quam diligentissime servandum, ne a verborum vi temere discedatur, ubi res manifesta est, id enim fieri liceret, 
iam nihil tam tutum in tota rerum humanarum natura haberemus, quod non sophistarum ac cavillatorum subtilitatibus 
subiectum esset’ See also ibid., p. 63. 
288 Holsteinus, ibid., pp. 104-8.  
63 
 
case. Holsteinus may have been wishing to refer to the latter exercise, but it is interesting to note that the 
terms used by him to do so – his references to the mens legis – seem to be drawing on the language of the 
increasingly popular theory of Salamonius, which viewed equity essentially as interpretation of the intention 
of the legislator. Aside from written equity, the only other sign of Holsteinus’ reliance on Oldendorpius 
and Melanchthon is his broad take on equity, which, like Oldendorpius, he seems to believe encompasses 
exercises of discretion as well as interpretation of rules.289 The rest of Holsteinus’ treatise is rather concerned 
with drawing examples from the law to show how different rules are created to accommodate the 
circumstances of different cases.290 There are not many others substantive points to be found about the use 
of equity in Holsteinus’ treatise, but his writings are the closest I have found to that of Oldendorpius and 
Melanchthon among later treatise writers on equity. Stylistically, the work seems quite closely linked to 
Melanchthon’s commentaries, in that Holsteinus’ is a work of very strong humanist influence, favouring 
flourishes of learning and references to classical authors rather than to legal doctrine or the ius commune.  
 
2.3.4. The consolidation of Salamonius’ theory in Connanus and Duarenus 
In this last section we deal with the theories of civil law writers who wrote between 1541 and 1550s. What 
is noticeable in this period is a resurgence of the theories of Salamonius in the writings of Franciscus 
Connanus and Franciscus Duarenus. These two authors picked up Salamonius’ theory of equity as epieikeia 
and took it further, in particular for what concerned its rejection of the medieval orthodoxy and 
development of equity as a doctrine of interpretation in accordance with the intention of the legislator. 
Connanus did so in his sole work, the Commentariorum Iuris Civilis, written probably around the late 1540s 
and first published in 1553,291 Duarenus in both his commentaries on the Digest first published in 1542, and 
in the second volume of his Disputationes Anniversariae, also published in 1553.292 Connanus and Duarenus’ 
adaptation of Salamonius’ approach would be followed by the majority of later civil lawyers and form the 
basis of most later approaches to equity.293 
 
2.3.4.1. Aequitas as interpretation in Connanus and Duarenus 
In their works, Connanus and Duarenus both stressed that aequitas had to be classified as a branch of 
unwritten law, and echoed Budaeus and Salamonius in relating it to epieikeia and aequum et bonum. They 
defined it sometimes as an amendment of the law, or a more benign and more humane interpretation of 
the written law, which is required because of the impossibility for written laws to anticipate all cases.294 
                                                    
289 Ibid., pp. 103-111. 
290 Holsteinus, ibid., pp. 63-103. 
291 Franciscus Connanus, Commentariorum Iuris Civilis Libri X (1553). See Laurent Pfilster, ‘François Connan’, Dictionnaire 
historique des juristes français XIIe - XXe siècle (2007), pp. 199-200. A treatment of Connanus’ discussion of equity can also be 
found in Vittor Ivo Comparato, ‘Il Regolo Lesbio Tra Volontà E Ragione: Da Connan a Muratori’, Alessandro Giuliani: 
L’esperienza giuridica fra logica ed etica (2012). 
292 These can be found in  Franciscus Duarenus, Opera Omnia (1558), pp. 19-29, 84-5, (commentary on the Digest) 492-3 
(Disputationes Anniversariae Vol. 2). 
293 See [2.5.1-3] below. 
294 Connanus, Commentariorum, f. 44r. 
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Duarenus also followed Salamonius in explaining that that interpretation also applies to wills and 
contracts.295  
Connanus was at pains to stress that the existence of civil law was necessary to the existence of 
aequitas, ‘nec ulla aequitas est, quae non sit alicuius legis aequitas: et lex nulla quae non alicuius aequitatis, ut 
sic dicam, lex sit [...]. Sicut autem pater non est, nisi quia filii pater est, et non est filius, nisi quia patris filius, 
ut unum si tollas, non consistat alterum: item de aequitate et lege dici debet’.296 He went to great length to 
further discredit the medieval understanding of aequitas scripta, repeating Salamonius’ points, and indeed his 
metaphor of the slave and master, to make the point that, as soon as enshrined into writing, any rule – no 
matter if derived from an equitable interpretation or amendment of another rule – would cease to be 
aequa.297 As he puts it, ‘‘Quid ergo? Si quod legis aequitas suadet, lege ipsum describatur? Desinet esse 
aequitas quoad ipsius nominis proprietatem appellationemque res ipsa quamvis eadem maneat. Non minus 
inquam bonum est et iustum neque vero aliud quam erat antea, sed non est aequum [...] ut Titius qui servum 
habet Stichum, servi Stichi dominus est, et Stichus Titii domini servus. Sticho mortuo manet Titius, si 
hominis naturam spectes, idem qui antea: sin ad domini nomen et naturam attendas, qua sola cum servo 
comparatur, non est idem, imo prorsus esse desiit, quia dominus non est, quanquam homo sit et Titius. [...] 
ius pretorium quamquam omne ducitur ex equo et bono, tamen adhuc ipsum indiget aequa benignaque, 
expositione. Adeo nihil tam diserte et aperte scribi potest, ut non sit ab eius verbis plerunque recedendum.’ 
However, Connanus was aware that certain editions of the Justinianic Code reported C.3.1.8 as reading 
‘aequitatisque scriptae’. In one passage he tried to explain away this reference to written equity as one to 
‘quae scriptis legibus interpretandis consumitur’, but soon moved on to suggest that ‘qui correctiores sunt 
codices, non habent, scriptae, verbum. Nam aequitas scripta esse non potest, ut dixi’.298 It was instead 
Franciscus Duarenus who gave this reading of C.3.1.8 its coup de grâce exposing the addition of the word 
‘scriptae’ as a medieval corruption, which, he argued, had been furtively inserted by medieval jurists 
incapable of reconciling C.3.1.8 with C.1.14.1.  He explained that ‘in vetustis codicibus verbum, scriptae, 
non est, nec dubito quin additum sit ab iis qui vim aequitatis non intelligentes, conciliare illud rescriptum 
[i.e. C.3.1.8] cum [C.1.14.1] non poterant. Nec vero ignoramus, quae alii non solum Iureconsulti, sed etiam 
Philosophi ac Theologi comminiscantur, tuendi huius erroris causa. Et extat oratio cuiusdam valde eruditi 
hominis, de scripto iure, et de dignitate veterum interpretum Iuris, in qua vulgare dictum de scripta aequitate 
excusat, et interpretatur. Sed quam frustra se torqueant, hinc satis perspicuum est.’ 299 It is not unlikely that 
the reference to the contemporary oratio defending  aequitas scripta was addressed to one of Melanchthon’s 
own orations noted above, a sign that they were growing rather popular and contentious among humanist 
legal scholars by mid-century.300 
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296 Connanus, ibid.ff. 46r-v.  
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2.3.4.2 Natural equity and civil equity in Connanus and Duarenus 
Both Connanus and Duarenus introduce a distinction which does not seem to have been acknowledged by 
Salamonius, and which would prove quite influential among later authors on equity - that between natural 
equity and civil equity.301 They did not explain the distinction in the same terms and Duarenus’ approach 
would ultimately prove the more successful one. 
Connanus’ use of natural equity and civil equity is not very clear. Perhaps it was meant to match 
the two ways in which aequitas interacts with ius in Salamonius. He did not go into much detail regarding 
what civil equity involved, but discussed it by reference to D.47.4.1, where Ulpian talks about an action 
introduced in the Praetor’s Edict meant to remedy certain instances of fraud by a slave directed to be freed 
in a will. Ulpian said this action had more natural than civil equity. For Connanus, the reason for this 
statement is that no interpretation of the civil law as it stood before the introduction of that action would 
have been able to provide a solution – a new rule entirely had to be devised, drawn from natural equity. 
Natural equity, unlike civil equity, cannot take effect through the powers of the judge, because that equity 
does not amend the words of the law but ‘earum sententiam et voluntatem, ut quod in iis dees perficiatur, 
naturalis nominanda est, et nova lege debet constitui’. That amendment of the law is supposed to add what 
the legislator omitted by their own negligence but, had they been present, it is likely that they would have 
done the same.302 The latter remark seems to blur the line between interpretation and amendment for 
indeed, civil equity, as described by Connanus was, too, supposed to give effect to the intentions of the 
legislator, but it seems that Connanus saw a difference between guessing what the legislator may have meant 
by adopting certain words, and going entirely beyond the words to find an intention utterly incompatible 
with them but which the legislator, or perhaps an ideal legislator, would have had, had he been present. 
Like Salamonius, Connanus argues that these powers of amendment of the law lie with the legislator, 
supreme tribunals or other officials appointed for that purpose.303 
Duarenus talks about the same distinction, but his description of it seems to be made on an entirely 
different basis, and arguably at odds with his overall theory of aequitas as epieikeia. In his commentary on the 
Digest title de pactis, Duarenus explains that equity ‘partim naturalis est, partim civilis’.304. His definition of 
natural equity is ‘iudicium quoddam rationis, ac veluti legem de iustis, atque iniustis, a natura omnium 
hominum mentibus inscriptam, cui sponte sua homines, etiam imperiti, sine ulla probationes, aut doctrina, 
assentiuntur’, that equity does not require knowledge of a special kind to be appreciated, it is the type of 
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seen the distinction between natural equity and civil equity mentioned by Baldus n.77 above. 
302 Connanus, Commentariorum, f. 47v. 
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equity to which the rules not to harm anyone, to give each one their own, to keep one’s promises and to 
love the deserving belong.305 Civil equity, instead, ‘probabilis quaedam ratio est, non omnibus hominibus 
naturaliter cognita, sed paucis tantum, qui prudentia, usu, doctrina, praediti didicerunt, quae ad societatis 
humanae conservationem sunt necessaria’.306 Equity in this context, for Duarenus, seems to  be used in the 
looser sense of natural law, in the case of natural equity, and of the public good in the case of civil law. 
Thus, he identifies usucapio with civil equity, and the rules against enrichment at the expense of another as 
natural equity – a distinction that resonates with that found by medieval jurists when distinguishing rules ex 
aequitate and ex rigore as belonging respectively to aequitas and bonitas.307 It is not easy to square this view of 
natural and civil equity with Duarenus’ exposition of equity as epieikeia in his other writings, but it may have 
been inspired by the way in which certain medieval authors, like Baldus, had interpreted the distinction, 
referring it to the source of the justice inspiring the rules.308 
 
2.3.4.3. The application of interpretatio ex aequo et bono in Connanus and Duarenus 
Regardless of their different approach to civil and natural equity, both authors acknowledged that, in the 
hands of the judge, aequitas functioned as a more humane or benign interpretation of the law. Connanus 
made it clear that such an interpretation of the law was distinct from clementia. Clementia is a principle that 
contrasts severitatem and is to be applied by supreme tribunals and legislators only, whenever they see fit. 
Equity has nothing to do with this, as it is tied to the will of the legislator, however harsh that will may 
be.309 It seems clear therefore that the meaning attributed by these authors, and perhaps implied by 
Salamonius, to benignitas and humanitas had little to do with avoiding harshness per se.  Rather, for Connanus, 
an equitable interpretation is one that goes beyond the words of the law, in a way that furthers the utility of 
men.310  
Connanus and Duarenus made three main points, drawing on Salamonius, which would then form 
the basis of later theories adopting the approach of equity as interpretation. The first is that equitable 
interpretations may be applied to all laws. This, Connanus thinks, is warranted by D.1.3.25 which requires 
that ‘measures introduced to favour men’s interests should [not] be extended through a sterner mode of 
interpretation [....] against those very interests’,311  Connanus thinks this passage was meant to refer to the 
interpretation of all written laws, because they are all introduced to further the advantage of men, and 
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306 Duarenus, ibid.. 
307 Duarenus, ibid..: ‘Non enim naturali aequitati conveniens est, ut quisquam locupletior fiat cum incommodo alieno. [...] 
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310 Connanus, Commentariorum, f. 45r. Interestingly, at times Connanus compares following the intention of the law through 
equitable interpretation to accommodating a rule to the law of nature. This is similar to the approach to epieikeia developed 
by late scholastic theologians from Cajetan onwards, who were increasingly assimilating common good, mens legislatoris and 
natural law. See Connanus, Commentariorum, ff.46v-47r. 
311 This translation is adapted from the English edition of the Digest in The Digest of Justinian, A. Watson (ed.) (1985).  
67 
 
indeed no law may be so written as never to require equity to intervene, ‘nihil tam enucleate dici potest aut 
scribi, nihil tam plane et definite, quod non multa aequitate saepe sit aut temperandum, aut supplendum’.312  
Secondly, they argue that, as long as the intention or meaning of a law is clear, the equitable 
interpretation required to give it effect can be performed by all judges. In making this point, they, like 
Salamonius, had to deal with C.1.14.1. Mostly in line with Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus argued that 
this referred only to cases where the law had to be amended because it is ambiguous and what it means 
cannot be understood from the words of the law; in such cases a judge should go to the prince, who shall 
interpret it and, if necessary, declare a new law out of his own volition.313 As long as the intention of the 
law is clear, even judges in the lowest courts should be able to go past the law’s words and follow it in 
unforeseen cases. Indeed, they both went on to argue that to deny a judge the opportunity to interpret the 
law equitably would be equivalent to allowing him to decide contra leges whenever unforeseen cases occur, 
and referred to many passages in the Corpus Iuris Civilis which made it clear that failing to follow the will of 
the law would not be within the powers of the judge.314  However, as mentioned above, whenever the 
meaning itself of the law is ambiguous, which includes a case of a law the usage of which has been confirmed 
by long custom, but which becomes of ambiguous application faced with an unprecedented set of facts, 
the judge has no powers to resort to equitable interpretation, and should go back to the legislator. 
Finally, they made the point that an equitable interpretation can be used both for the restriction 
and the extension of laws in accordance with the intention of the legislator.315 Indeed for Duarenus, ‘[n]on 
possumus commodius exemplum requirere de interpretatione huius aequitatis, quam quod vidimus de 
interpretatione albi corrupti in [D.2.1.7].’ The Digest passage in question is one where a rule granting an 
action against anyone who obliterates anything from an official notice is extended to those who do the 
same to a notice before it has been put up.316 The issue of whether the role of equity as epieikeia should also 
be that of performing extensive interpretations was contentious among contemporary theologians, to 
whom we turn in the next chapter, and would become the object of debate among later civil lawyers too 
over the next few decades.317 
 
2.3.5. Concluding remarks – equity as epieikeia among early legal humanists 
This section has sought to trace the origins of a novel approach to equity that spread among humanist-
inspired jurists in the first part of the sixteenth century, which recognised a role for unwritten equity within 
the legal system, departing from medieval theories of equity focussed on the opposition of written equitable 
rules and written rigorous ones. 
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A great ferment of ideas seems to have followed the publication of Budaeus’ Annotationes, with the 
accounts of Salamonius, Cantiuncula and those of Melanchthon and Oldendorpius being produced in rapid 
succession, all offering a different approach to how equity and epieikeia should be brought together.  
The theory that would ultimately be most successful, that of equity as interpretation or interpretatio 
ex aequo et bono seems to have originated with Salamonius. The novel focus of this approach to equity did 
not lie – as Jan Schröder has argued318 -  in the recognition  of aequitas non scripta as a source of law. That 
equity, as justice, could act as a source of law was already well recognised. Glossators and commentators 
had no difficulties arguing that aequitas, even unwritten, ought to have been a source of law in certain cases, 
for instance, it ought to have been used by a judge to fill the gaps in the law whenever neither rigor scriptus 
nor aequitas scripta could cover a case.319 Rather, it seems that the novelty of the approach that Salamonius 
and many after him took to aequitas lies in the assimilation of aequitas as epieikeia to a doctrine of 
interpretation and amendment of the law. Under this view, the role of epieikeia was to provide a judge with 
the means of departing from the words of the law in unforeseen cases to give effect to its intention, and to 
give legislators the power to amend rules when there was no room for the interpretation of the intention 
of the law. 
It is interesting to note that, while this understanding of aequitas as epieikeia may at first sight look 
similar to that developed by moral theologians from the thirteenth century onwards, it differed from it in 
some important respects. We will return to this point in the next chapter, but the most important features 
should be briefly mentioned at this stage.320 First is the assimilation of interpretation and epieikeia, which 
scholastic theologians, especially contemporaries of Salamonius like Cajetan, thought were entirely distinct. 
Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus came short of recognising for the judge himself a power to amend 
the law; all that was permissible was to interpret the law according to the legislator’s intention. Secondly, 
the recognition of a role for epieikeia to extend laws, rather than simply restrict them, was explicitly rejected 
by theologians from Cajetan onwards. Thirdly, the distinctions emphasised by some of these jurists between 
natural equity and civil equity, or general and particular equity, were unknown to the moral theologians. It 
is thus very likely that the first generation of legal humanists developed their theory of equity independently 
from moral theology, and were rather influenced by their reading Aristotle alongside the use of aequitas 
within the Corpus Iuris Civilis and compared the uses of epieikeia and aequum et bonum in those sources with 
that found in statements from classical authors. 
There was one main problem for the view of epieikeia as interpretation advocated by Salamonius 
and his followers. None of them sought to make it clear whether they thought their statements were 
contributing something substantive to the powers of the judge and lawmaker, or whether they were simply 
re-stating established doctrine under the banner of aequitas and epieikeia. Indeed, even though all of the legal 
writers we have examined were at pains to reject aequitas scripta in favour of epieikeia, none of the statements 
that the introduction of epieikeia led them to seem to have been inconsistent with the views of medieval 
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commentators and glossators on legal interpretation. It was rather trite that when interpreting the law a 
judge had to follow the intention of the legislator and, although it had not been addressed in terms of 
epieikeia, interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva were extremely well entrenched within the medieval ius commune – 
indeed we have already seen that some accounts of these doctrines came very close to performing the 
function of epieikeia.321 Furthermore, no medieval jurist would have objected to the idea that a lawmaker 
had the power to abrogate and correct laws to better achieve justice, indeed, this is exactly the meaning that 
they attributed to C.1.14.1.322  
These difficulties led some of the later writers on equity to further refine the approach of 
Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus, by breaking the wall which had hitherto divided scholastic theology 
and legal writings on equity. We deal with these in the fourth chapter of this thesis.   
 
2.3.6. A note on the influence of rhetoric 
What the theories explored above have in common is that they all explored the potential for unwritten 
equity to be identified with epieikeia, departing from the medieval orthodoxy resolving interventions of 
equity as oppositions of equity and rigour. What is striking is that, despite drawing on Aristotle’s epieikeia, 
none of these legal writers sought to refer (at least not explicitly) to the learning of theologians on epieikeia. 
It would only be among the later generation of writers on equity that civil and canon lawyers would seek to 
merge the understanding of equity of the earlier humanist-inspired jurists with that of scholastic 
theologians.323 Instead, the only body of learning which all the authors examined so far seem to have drawn 
on seems to have been that of rhetorical education. In particular, equity is related to the tension between 
the sententia or intention of the law (or legislator) and the words of the law – these issues were known among 
rhetoricians as a sententia contra scriptum. It is therefore worthwhile examining the impact of rhetoric theory 
and its potential influence on the thought of these early writers about equity. As we shall see, it seems that 
rhetorical theory provided a useful background of learning for the writings of the authors examined above 
on equity, but it is not the case that authors in the tradition known as ‘legal dialectics’ had a particular 
interest in equity, and the influence was therefore mostly indirect. 
With the rise of humanism, studies of rhetoric began to incorporate the accounts of Latin and 
Greek writers, especially Cicero, Quintilian and Hermogenes, the latter in particular through the works of 
Trapezuntius (George of Trebizond d. 1473).324 These works were, broadly speaking, focussed on providing 
the reader with a specific structure to address, and a number of practical devices to successfully argue, any 
sort of question. Two important rhetorical devices that rhetoricians used to better grasp and deal with each 
question were the theory of status or ‘issue’325 and that of topica or loci communes often translated as that of 
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‘commonplaces’.326 Both were parts of the branch of rhetoric known as inventio, through which the 
rhetorician identified the kind of speech required and the ways in which to make it persuasive.327 Theories 
of issues ‘sought to classify the different kinds of dispute with which speakers have to deal, and to develop 
effective strategies of argument for handling each kind’.328 Once the issue had been identified, the 
commonplaces then provided the rhetorician with a set of ready-made points to be made in argument 
whichever side they stood on.329   
What legal writers were almost always concerned with were ‘legal’ issues, i.e. those issues which 
tried to establish whether a certain event was lawful or not. Though it would be pointless to go in detail 
about the theory of issues in this section, suffice it to say that issues were generally divided into four main 
types, proceeding in logical order. First, the issue of conjecture, where the factual occurrence of an event is 
ascertained. Second, the issue of definition, where an event is attributed to a certain category. Third, the 
issue of quality, where the event is judged upon in terms of morality or legality. There was sometimes a 
fourth issue of objection which assessed the procedure by which the preceding arguments were brought. 
Legal issues, according to Hermogenes and Trapezuntius were a sub-species of the third heading. Roughly 
following Hermogenes,330 Trapezuntius explained that legal issues had to arise ex scripto, that is, they had to 
be about a legal written document whether it be a law, contract or will.331 The number of possible legal 
issues varied across rhetoricians, but Trapezuntius thought there were four categories.332 These were the 
issues of letter and intent (scriptum et voluntas), contrary laws (leges contrariae), ambiguity (ambiguum), and 
analogy (ratiocinatio).  
Aequitas, as such does not feature prominently in the works of classical rhetoricians. It appears, 
however, occasionally within the issue of letter and intent, i.e. the issue where one party seeks to adhere to 
the letter of the law, and the other seeks to follow its intention or purpose. This issue could be related to 
two sets of commonplaces, those falling under the title a scripto, defending the authority of the letter, and 
those falling under the title a sententia contra scriptum, arguing the opposite point.333 Aequitas or aequum et bonum 
appeared as commonplaces for the latter argument, empowering the will of the law over its letter.  However, 
when the classical authors used aequitas in that context, it seems to have had little to do with epieikeia. It was 
generally used to make the point that if there were justice (aequitas) in a case requiring a departure from the 
letter of the law, a judge would have been more inclined to do it.334   
By the sixteenth century, some legal writers sought to relate rhetoric theory to legal sources in order 
to empower lawyers either with a method to improve the teaching of law, a clear structure within which to 
frame legal questions, or a series of commonplaces readily referable to legal sources to improve their 
                                                    
326 On the latter see Piano Mortari, ‘Dialettica e Giurisprudenza’, 310-57. 
327 Heath, Hermogenes., pp. 10-11 
328 Ibid., p. 11 
329 Piano Mortari, ‘Dialettica e Giurisprudenza’, pp. 311-2. 
330 Hermogenes’ approach was slightly different, see Heath, Hermogenes, p. 34. 
331 Trapezuntius, Rhetoricorum, pp. 78, 82. 
332 Ibid. 
333 See for instance Cicero, De Inventione (1949), II, pp. 136-40. Anon., Rhetorica Ad Herennium (1954), pp. 80-5. 
334 See e.g. Cicero, Ibid. 
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arguments in court. These belong to a genre known as legal dialectics, one in which the authors through 
‘strong reliance on dialectical models’ sought to achieve ‘the formal systematization of legal arguments’.335 
While the writings of these legal scholars were not greatly influential in the long run (their works were re-
published only in a handful of editions), the importance of rhetoric for the better study of jurisprudence 
was appreciated across the board by humanist-influenced authors.336 
It should be pointed out at the outset that, among the works strictly falling under the description 
of legal dialectics, only one, Claudius Cantiuncula’s Topica Legalia mentions aequitas and, even then, does not 
relate it to epieikeia or discuss it along the lines of interpretation.337 Nicolaus Everardus (Nicolaas Everaerts, 
d.1532), one of the main writers in this field, did not engage at all in his Topica with the loci of a scripto and a 
sententia contra scriptum, and, even in those loci which do approach issues related to aequitas, such as those 
supporting the preference of a law’s ratio extensiva over its stricta ratio, no mention of aequitas or aequum et 
bonum can be found.338 The same goes for Christophorus Hegendorfius (d. 1540) who, while mentioning 
the locus a sententia contra scriptum in his Dialecticae legalis libri quinque did not mention aequitas at all;339 Petrus 
Gammarus (d.1528) mentioned that interpretations ought to follow the mens legislatoris in his Legalis Dialectica, 
but no mention of aequitas or epieikeia accompanied this consideration.340 The same goes for the Lutheran 
Johannes Apelius (d. 1536),341 as well as Nicolas Vigelius (d. 1600),342 Johannes Mercer (fl. ca. 1592),343 and 
Johannes de Reberteria (fl. ca. 1580-90)344. It is unlikely therefore that, taken as a whole, the movement of 
legal dialecticians had a particular interest in aequitas. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are various instances where legal humanists referred to 
rhetoric theory in their explanation of equitable interpretation, and it is possible to conjecture that some of 
them assimilated the situations where one would require some form of aequitas to intervene either by 
interpretation or amendment with the various legal issues familiar to rhetoricians. We have seen that 
Salamonius, for instance, argued that cases which did not require aequitas were mere cases of cognitio, whereas 
cases involving interpretation were cases of inventio, also explaining that the cases in which equity and rigour 
would have come into conflict overlapped with the legal issues of ambiguum and scriptum et voluntas.345 
Similarly, Claudius Cantiuncula in his De Officio briefly mentioned at the outset that a judgment ex aequo et 
                                                    
335 Hanns Hohmann, ‘Legal Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Renaissance: Topica Legalia and Status Legales’, Proceedings of the 
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (1998). 
336 See Peter Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380-1620, p. 281 and generally Vincenzo Piano Mortari, ‘Dialettica E 
Giurisprudenza’ (1957) 1 Annali di Storia del Diritto 293. 
337 Claudius Cantiuncula, Topica Legalia (1520). Aequitas is mentioned in this work in the context of the commonplaces for 
a sententia contra scriptum, and, despite a brief acknowledgement of Budaeus’ Annotationes, only reflect the use of it in Cicero.  
338 Nicolaus Everardi, Topicorum Seu Locorum Legalium Centuria (1516), pp. 164-74. When aequitas happens to be mentioned in 
this work, the reference seems merely to be either to a quality of the law as fair or just, such as at p. 208 or in opposition to 
absurdum, such as at p. 85  His Loci Argumentorum Legales (1581) seem to contain no meaningful mention either. 
339 See Christophorus Hegendorfius, Dialecticae Legalis Libri Quinque (1531), pp. 123-4.  
340 Petrus Gamarus, Legalis Dialectica (1507), ff. 6r-7v. 
341 Johannes Apelius, Methodica Dialectices Ratio (1535). 
342 Nicolaus Vigelius, Dialectices Iuris Civilis Libri III (1573). 
343  Johannes Mercer, Opinionum et Observationum (1575). 
344 Johannes de Reberteria, Topicοn (1575). 
345 He also seems to have thought that cases of leges contraries could be resolved by identifying one law as equitable and 
another as rigorous. See n.178 above. 
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bono would have been required in legal issues of letter and intent, ambiguity and analogy.346 The overlap that 
these writers saw between legal issues and instances requiring aequitas may have played a role in shaping the 
function they thought the latter should perform, such as departing from the letter of the law to follow the 
law’s intentions (a sententia contra scriptum), extending laws to similar cases (ratiocinatio) and resolving 
ambiguities within the words of the law (ambiguum). On the other hand, it may well be that these authors 
merely mentioned legal issues as explanatory examples to clarify the role they had independently devised 
for aequitas. Be that as it may, the references to rhetoric are overall rather in the background of the legal 




2.4. Aequitas in legal humanism II: Reconciling epieikeia with aequitas scripta 
2.4.1. The hazards of equity 
Within the circle of early legal humanists not all embraced the assimilation of aequitas with epieikeia and the 
consequent rejection of aequitas scripta with the same enthusiasm as the authors we have considered above. 
Many jurists seem, on the contrary, to have considered this approach threatening to the integrity of the legal 
system.347 This may seem puzzling, given that the doctrines we looked at above did little to explicitly add 
much to the powers of the judge – but the potential for expansion suggested by Aristotle’s doctrine seems 
to have led some authors to reject it. 
Reiterating the concerns that early medieval jurists displayed when they confined the application 
of C.3.1.8 to ‘written’ equity, a substantial number of jurists seem to have thought that rejecting aequitas 
scripta in favour of epieikeia introduced once more the risk of unbridled judicial discretion. In reply to a letter 
of Bonifacius Amerbach (d. 1562) exalting the virtue of epieikeia as a guiding principle of law as opposed to 
the countless juridical commentaries,348 the Dutch jurist Viglius (Wigle Aytta van Zwichem d. 1577) 
criticised his friend’s views on the grounds that epieikeia would effectively leave all decisions of law to the 
good sense of judges, which approach ‘would have been tolerable if judges were always, as they ought to 
be, good men: but how often won’t you find that to be the case on account of either favour, ambition or 
greed?’ The law ought, instead for Viglius, to be governed by rules, equity may inspire those rules, but they 
must be written so as to be certain and predictable.349 The concerns manifested by Viglius seem to have 
been at the heart of many legal humanists’ reluctance to reject the notion of aequitas scripta.  
                                                    
346 See Cantiuncula De Officio, p. 51. 
347 We have seen similar concerns already in Philipp Melanchthon, which he expressed in his defence of aequitas scripta – but 
without shying away from finding a role for unwritten equity too. See [2.3.3.1.2] above. 
348 Alfred Hartmann, Die Amerbachkorrespondenz, Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 120-1. 
349 Hartman, ibid., pp. 143-5: ‘Et periculosum est in qualiscunque seu cuiuslibet judicis manu omnia ponere [...]. Tolerabile 
esset, si iudices semper essent tales, quales esse debent, id est viri boni; sed quotumquemque reperias non expositum vel 
gratiae vel ambitioni vel avariciae? [...] Affectus itaque judicum necessarium fuit refrenare, ut non ex sua cupiditate sed juris 
prescriptione sententiam ferant et populus sciat, quid servandum sit, ne semper iudicium accipere cogatur, si in voluntate 
iudicis stabit aequi et iniqui diffinitio. Curandum tamen, ut, quod legis nomine prescribitur, maxime sit aequum; aequitatem 
autem ex prudentissimi atque optimi viri iudicio constitui oportere non est dubium.’. Viglius did add, however, that the 
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It seems that it is possible to divide those jurists in two categories. The former includes those who 
did not accept, either implicitly or explicitly, Budaeus’ philological argument stating the equivalence of 
aequum et bonum with epieikeia. The second category was comprised of those authors who, while accepting 
the theoretical premises of Budaeus’ argument, found ways to reconcile it with confining the judge to the 
use of aequitas scripta. 
 
2.4.2. Disregarding or challenging Budaeus 
As we have seen above, Budaeus’ philological statements were accepted by the overwhelming majority of 
legal humanists, probably because they reflected the well established practice among humanist philologists 
at the time to translate epieikeia as aequum et bonum. However some humanist legal scholars nevertheless 
preferred either the medieval orthodoxy or a different solution to Budaeus’ claims. As we shall see below, 
Johannes Sichardus, a humanist jurist of repute, made a conscious choice to ignore the points made by 
Budaeus, basing his work entirely on the medieval orthodoxy of aequitas. Andreas Alciatus, instead, chose 
more boldly to challenge Budaeus’ philological statements and introduce his own, ultimately less popular, 
approach to translating aequum et bonum in D.1.1.1. 
Johannes Sichardus350 (d. 1552) in his Praelectiones, published around mid-century, comments on 
C.3.1.8 in entirely orthodox terms, referring to medieval sources from Accursius to Panormitanus to 
support the understanding of that source in terms of aequitas scripta, and warning of the dangers which 
would ensue if one left a case to the judge’s ‘own’ equity.351 He makes a number of points which are clearly 
designed to contribute to the arguments that were being had among medieval legists and canonists, and 
does not consider aequitas as having anything to do with benign interpretation or with judicial correction of 
the law.352 Sichardus refers to works which make the identity of aequitas and epieikeia quite explicit, such as 
Melanchthon’s commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, but evidently made a conscious choice not to acknowledge 
that aspect of those works.  . Sichardus does not seem to have expressly wanted to challenge the learning 
of other humanist jurists, but his writings are evidence that, even among legal scholars with a humanist 
inclination, by mid-century, the new learning of epieikeia had not yet been unanimously accepted.353 
Andreas Alciatus provides us, albeit only in a short passage of one of his works, with a more explicit 
rejection of Budaeus’ arguments about aequum et bonum. In his Parergon Iuris, published in 1538, he offered 
his own philological interpretation of D.1.1.1, quite distinct from that of Budaeus as well as that of humanist 
                                                    
objective of commentaries would have been the proper interpretation of laws and allowing them to fulfil the intention of 
the legislator, he did not seem to think, as other jurists in his time did, that this had anything to do with epieikeia. 
350 On Sichardus more generally see Hans Erich Feine, ‘Johann Sichard. Humanist, Professor Des Roemischen Rechts Und 
Herzoglicher Rat 1499-1552’, Schwaebische Lebensbilder, V (1950) and Guido Kisch, Johannes Sichardus Als Basler Rechtshistoriker 
(1952). 
351 Johannes Sichardus, Praelectiones (1565), ad C.3.1.8, pp. 300-2: This approach is consistent throughout the Praelectiones. 
When commenting on other parts of the Digest, Sichardus  considers aequitas in the context of a law having aequitas ‘correcting’ 
another law having rigorem, see e.g. Sichard, Praelectiones, ad C.6.29.2. 
352Sichardus, ibid., pp. 301-2. 
353 He also refers to strictum ius as summum ius, which suggests he must have been familiar with the works of Budaeus, Zasius 
and many others who all drew the link between aequitas and epieikeia. See Sichard, Praelectiones, p. 300. 
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translations of Aristotle’s Ethics.354 In chapter 30 of this work, he criticised those literatores who accused 
Ulpian of defining ius wrongly when he said it was the ars boni et aequi.355 For Alciatus, aequum et bonum are 
separate words, just as Accursius had recognised them to be. Interestingly Alciatus did think that aequitas is 
Latin for epieikeia, but he thought bonum was a distinct term, Latin for dikaion.356 Alciatus’ reasoning is not 
entirely transparent from this text, but he seems to have concluded that the component of bonum within ius 
is that which prevented the abolition of all laws in favour of epieikeia.  Since epieikeia cannot be written down, 
Alciatus argued,357 translating aequum et bonum at D.1.1.1 as a binomial pair into epieikeia would effectively 
amount to defining ius as the art of epieikeia, thus implicitly calling for the abolition of all written laws.358 
His point seems to be that bonitas is the principle by which aequitas is reduced into writing. Alciatus does 
not go into great detail explaining either the arguments he opposes nor, for that matter, his own. Overall, 
his analysis resembles that of medieval jurists, who understood bonitas as that quality which requires a certain 
degree of rigour on account of public utility, and it is possible that he sought to give a credible philological 
foundation to the Accursian approach to aequum et bonum.359  Alciatus seems to have been the only one, 
however, to develop this understanding of aequitas and no other legal humanist seems to have accepted or 
repeated it. He was also not altogether consistent in his views. In the fifth book of the same Parergon Iuris, 
Alciatus argued, referring to D.45.1.91.3 that the reference to aequum et bonum in that passage is to be 
understood as epieikeia.360 Further, in his comment on C.2.1.4 he states that when the application of a law 
would be iniquitous ‘propter rei qualitatem, vel aliud accidens’, one ought to depart from the law and make 
use instead of epieikeia.361 
 
                                                    
354 Andreas Alciatus, Parergon Iuris, in Opera Omnia Vol. 2 (1546) coll. 198-200. 
355 Alciatus, ibid., col. 198: ‘Inclamant in nos iidem literatores, et ius inepte Ulpianum definisse aiunt, cum dixit esse artem 
boni et aequi: quem tamen si recte intellexissent, non arbitror tam temere damnassent.’ It is unclear whom Alciatus is 
targeting with this statement. The early modern glossary Du Cange reports the meaning of literator as teacher of letters or 
grammar ‘qui Grammaticus Graece dicitur’. Du Cange is easily available online at http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/ (last 
accessed 04-04-2018). This suggests Alciatus may have meant to refer to those scholars who, like Budaeus, had philology as 
their focus in their analysis of the Corpus  Iuris Civilis. However, Budaeus and those who followed him had attacked Accursius’ 
understanding of bonum et aequum – they said nothing about Ulpian’s definition itself. See [2.2.1, 2.3.1] above. 
356 See Alciatus, ibid., col. 198: ‘Igitur sciendum id latine aequum dicit, quod Aristoteles [to epieikes] vocat [...] bonum etiam 
id significet, quod in quacunque civitate utile est, tametsi non semper cum aequitate concordet, videturque Graece [dikaion] 
dictum’. 
357 Alciatus, ibid.: ‘[epieikeia est] naturalis quaedam moderatio, quae in pectoribus hominum residet nec satis lege praescribi 
potest.’ 
358 Alciatus, ibid.: ‘Quod [i.e. the abolition of written laws] [...] etiamnum declamatores aliquos, quibus maxime arrideat ; 
quorum in iureconsultis (ut apparet) eadem sunt vota, quae libitinariorum in medicis. Sublato enim iure scripto quid aliud 
supererit, quam ut omnes pro stultitiae suae captu iudicent sententiasque in cuiusque gratiam vel odium arbitratu suo ferant 
universaque litium trichis involuant?’ 
359 See n.41 above. 
360 Andreas Alciatus, ibid., col. 222: ‘‘Igitur apparet purgationem morae hac ex aequitate inductam fuisse, et ideo existimarem, 
etiam Iudaeo concedendum, ut tali beneficio uti possit quia licet cum eis summo iure agendum sit, non tamen ab hac 
aequitate summovendi sunt, quam epieikeian vocant: cum nihil aliud sit ius, quam haec aequitas in artem redacta, ut supra a 
nobis declaratum est’. 
361 Andreas Alciatus ad C.2.1.4 in Opera Omnia Vol. 3, (1547), p. 270.  
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2.4.3. Reconciling epieikeia with aequitas scripta 
As we have said, most legal humanists received favourably Budaeus’ analysis of aequum et bonum as Latin for 
epieikeia. A great number of them, however, refused to conclude from this that there was no place for the 
medieval learning on aequitas scripta and decided instead to make it fit the philological change.362  
2.4.3.1. Udalricus Zasius and aequitas scripta as civil law 
The writings on aequitas by Udalricus Zasius exemplify rather well this approach. He seems to have 
found the arguments taken up by Budaeus linking aequitas and epieikeia through aequum et bonum very 
persuasive.363 In his commentary to D.1.1.1, after quoting the arguments made in the gloss about usucapio 
being an institution of bonitas as opposed to aequitas, Zasius added that, whatever the gloss might say ‘tu 
tene intrepide contrarium. Nam quod Graeci [epieikes] dicunt, hoc nos aequum et bonum interpretamur.’  
Zasius was also entirely persuaded by Budaeus’ polemic tirade against the rigor iuris, strictum ius, or as the 
humanists now referred to it, summum ius; he argued that strict law had no room in a legal system, identifying 
it with a perverse adherence to words and with wicked over-reliance to the letter of the law. 364 
However, Zasius did not conclude that, in a strictly Aristotelian sense, a judge should be 
empowered to amend the law in cases where adherence to the letter would cause injustice. In fact, Zasius’ 
position on the powers of a judge faced with written rules is no different than that of medieval 
commentators, except insofar as it contains no mention of written rigour. A judge would have to adhere to 
the written rule, and Zasius insists that sources such as C.3.1.8 only meant to refer to aequitas scripta. 365 
Zasius argued that medieval jurists had wrongly confused two types of equity, natural equity and civil equity. 
Natural equity for Zasius is founded on natural reason and, unlike epieikeia, has nothing to do with the 
correction of defective rules. And indeed it would be impossible for it to do so, Zasius tells us, for natural 
equity is rather concerned with making universal statements than with the details of cases.366 These broad 
statements, such as to worship God, to love one’s parents and country, and not to do wrong to others in 
order to enrich oneself are principles which inspire all law making, but do not empower a judge to correct 
the law. For Zasius, all the references to aequitas in the edicts of Praetors were to that natural equity, as an 
inspiring principle of justice.367 Written rules of law are, however, free to disagree from those broad 
principles. C.3.1.8, for Zasius, does not refer to natural equity when it says that equity should be preferred.368 
Zasius could thus at the same time reject the role of rigour within the legal system and explain away all rules 
                                                    
362 I have not include Cantiuncula, Melanchthon and Oldendorpius among these authors because, despite recognising some 
validity to aequitas scripta, he also found a role for epieikeia as a doctrine of interpretation and amendment. See [2.3.2-3] above. 
363 Ulrich Zasius ad D.1.1.1, in Opera Omnia Vol. 1, (1590), p. 100. Zasius defined epieikeia also as ‘temperance’. 
364 Ibid, p. 102. See also Zasius ad D. 12.6.13.1 in Omnia Vol. 1, pp. 438ff where he makes a similar point. 
365 E.g. Zasius, ad C.3.1.8 in Opera Omnia Vol. 4 (1590), pp. 114-5: ‘Aequitas quae ad speciem tendit, si est scripta iuri scripto 
semper praeponderat, et praefertur ut est hic [C.3.1.8]’; ‘Si iuris decisio clara sit, et non sit e diverso scripta aequitas, tunc 
standum est iuri, etiam si durum sit. [D.40.9.12.1], [D.17.1.26.6].’ Regarding the latter reference, though the Digest itself does 
not mention rigor scriptus it is clear that commentators often associated it to it. See e.g. Bartolus ad ‘Non omnia’ D.17.1.26.6. 
(1602), f. 104v. These points too are resstated in Zasius ad D. 12.6.13.1, pp. 438ff.  
366 Zasius ad C3.1.8, p. 115.  
367 Ibid. 
368 Zasius ad D.12.4.3.1.5 in Omnia Vol. 1, p. 405.  Compare the use of aequitas naturalis in Duarenus at [2.3.4.2] above. 
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which had been identified by medieval jurists as rigor scriptus (usually explained as rigor scriptus in specie, such 
as usucapio and prescriptio) as instances of written ‘civil’ equity.369 
This may seem puzzling given that Zasius, as mentioned earlier, identified equity with epieikeia. The 
exercise of following written rules seems to have little to do with epieikeia. Zasius’ answer is not entirely 
satisfactory. He answers, on the one hand, by limiting the role of epieikeia to a principle of lawmaking, 
arguing that epieikeia is what legislators and jurists use to temper primitive law and adapt it to a greater 
variety of facts and situations, thus making it equitable. In this context, aequitas scripta is such written law 
that has been formed by the process of epieikeia, tempering older rigorous laws to provide justice that is 
closer to the facts of each case. However, on the other hand, Zasius seems to trivialise this view by arguing 
that the entirety of Roman law, having been subjected to this process of temperament over a very long 
period, is equitable to the highest degree.370 This means, for Zasius, that within the system of Roman law, 
a judge would be bound by the written rules of the Corpus Iuris Civilis as civil equity. 
There is a difficult passage in Zasius which seems to recognise a role for unwritten equity. At one 
point he argues that ‘nulla tamen lex est ita rigide scripta, quin iudex ex loco tempore, causis, personis, 
rebus, quantitate, contractu, et caeteris id genus circunstantiis temperare possit aequitate quadam rigorem 
iuris: quae aequitas eo casu inter easdem personas etiam si scripta non sit, iuri praefertur’, but he adds 
immediately after that ‘nottissimum est iudicem posse procedere de similib[us] ad similia’, which, if it was 
meant to be a qualification of the previous statement, suggests that the judge will in any case be confined 
to referring to orthodox rules of interpretation in order to temper the rigor of those cases. In some passages 
Zasius expresses the point more broadly, saying that ‘lex quae careret aequitate, et quae non haberet unde 
excusaretur, ista est fugienda, quam olim veteres nominabant summum ius, nos vero strictum dicimus 
ius.’371 The latter statement is not qualified in any way, and it remains unclear how free, in Zasius’ view, a 
judge should be to determine whether the application of a rule in a certain case is unjust.  
Regardless of whether the remarks adduced in conclusion were meant to depart in any way from 
ius commune orthodoxy, it seems that Zasius’ attempt to reconcile epieikeia with the ius commune makes him 
one of the first authors to see equity both (i) as Aristotle’s epieikeia, the power given to judge or lawmaker 
to interpret, amend and direct rules, and (ii) in its medieval sense of a quality that rules may enjoy as aequitas 
scripta or lack as summum ius. The two are linked in that it is precisely the lack of ‘equity’ (as a quality) in a 
rule that triggers the power of a judge to do ‘equity’ (in the sense of epieikeia). This rather confusing approach 
– which stems from the incompatibility of epieikeia with the medieval concept of equity as justice – is also 
found in later authors seeking to square the role of equity as epieikeia with the orthodox understanding.372 
                                                    
369 Zasius, ad C.3.1.8 in Omnia Vol. 4, p. 115,: ‘Licet ergo lex scripta aliqando deroget naturali aequitati in unum finem, 
nihilominus aequitatem habet alio fine’.   
370 In doing so, he agrees with Budaeus and disagrees with medieval doctrine that aequum and bonum are different things. He 
thinks that they cannot be distinguished and that the virtues that make laws bonae in the medieval doctrine must necessarily 
make them aequae. For instance, the reason usucapio is bonum is that it makes property more certain, that quality of making 
property more certain is, however, for Zasius, precisely what makes usucapio also the ratio aequitatis which justifies the law’s 
aequitas. Zasius ad D.1.1.1 in Omnia Vol. 1, p. 100. 
371 Zasius ad C.3.1.8 in Omnia Vol. 4, p. 115. 
372 See for instance equity used in a similar way in Donellus at [4.2.3.3] below. 
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All in all, Zasius’ theory of equity may have caused more problems than it solved, but some aspects 
of his views are found in other authors. Aspects of his explanation for aequitas scripta are in Oldendorpius, 
Melanchthon, and Cantiuncula, and his definition of natural and civil equity is similar to that of Duarenus, 
which, proved itself influential among later authors.373  
2.4.3.2. Conrad Lagus – aequitas scripta as a formal cause of law 
Some other humanist-inspired jurists were content with a less elaborate effort to reconcile aequitas scripta 
with epieikeia, simply reading epieikeia as a synonym of aequitas scripta and rigor scriptus as a synonym of summum 
ius, ignoring Budaeus’ criticisms of the latter. A clear statement of this view appears in Conrad Lagus’ Iuris 
utriusque traditio methodica, published in 1543, a work meant to provide an accessible structure of Roman law 
as a teaching tool.374 
A useful representation of Lagus’ thought on point can be found in the simplified re-edition of the 
Tratidio Methodica in Ramist style by Thomas Freigius. From Freigius’ work we get a very clear graphical 
representation of Lagus’ classification of laws. Laws (iura) may be distinguished in various categories, which 
categories are structured around the four Aristotelian causes. From the point of view of their formal cause, 
laws fall under the category of either (i) rigidum, strictum, akribodikaion, or (ii) bonum et aequum, epieikeia. Freigius 
goes on to explain that this distinction only applies to rigore scripto and aequitate scripta, ‘nam aequitas non 
scripta, dicitur a I[ure]C[onsulti] naturalis aequitas’.375 For Lagus, this difference, i.e. whether a law belongs 
to the category of equitable or rigorous, is relevant to the issue of when a law, though valid, should be 
binding. In the course of explaining how natural (i.e. unwritten) equity may moderate civil law, he explains 
that, while it would be desirable in principle for this to happen, and while a dispensatio by a superior may 
achieve that effect, ‘non satis tutum est, propter iudicum imperitiam et humanarum etiam mentium 
caliginem, in quam facile propter affectuum impetum deducuntur, [...] ut quoties ipsis videatur leges 
aequitate naturali moderentur’.376 This is the reason why the moderation of law is subject to rules 
establishing the priority of written aequitas and rigor,377 the only case in which it is possible for the office of 
the judge to appeal directly to natural equity will be, for Lagus, a case where neither rigor nor aequitas is 
found in writing and it is not possible to extend the ratio legis of another rule to cover the case at hand, then 
‘nobile iudicis officium imploratur tanquam subsidiarium et extraordinarium iudicis auxilium, quo 
petentibus aequitas ministratur’.378 Lagus seems to identify in his work at least one specific role for epieikeia 
as understood by Aristotle, when he explains that it provides the justification for legal fictions – in saying 
                                                    
373 See [2.3.2, 2.3.3.1.2, 2.3.3.2.2, 2.3.4.2]. The fact that all these works were written around the same time makes it difficult 
to tell who was the main influence within this group of humanist jurists. Cantiuncula, Melanchthon and Oldendorpius were 
all writing about equity since the second half of the 1520s, Zasius published his commentaries around the 1530s and 
Duarenus’ works on point were published through the 1540s. 
374 Conradus Lagus, Methodica Iuris Utriusque Traditio (1543). Thomasius Freigius, Partitiones Iuris Utriusque (1571). 
375 See e.g. Freigius, Partitiones, f. 3r. Lagus is less explicit but treats naturalis aequitas as a synonym of justice and natural law 
throughout his treatise. 
376 Lagus, Traditio, p. 9. Freigius, Partitiones, f. 3v. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Lagus, ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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this he drew on medieval statements that fictions are grounded upon equity, but this does not seem to have 
had any substantive effect on his analysis of fictions.379  
A number of other works seem to have taken an approach similar to Lagus. For instance, 
Sebastianus Derrerus380 (Sebastian Derrer d. 1541) in his Jurisprudentiae liber primus published in 1540 made 
it clear that he was aware that aequum et bonum was a synonym for epieikeia,381 and added that ‘de Legibus, 
dum constituuntur iudicari ac consultari posse, nemo dubitat. Sed postquam constitutae, promulgatae, et 
moribus utentium comprobatae sunt, secundum illas erit iudicandum [D.1.3.2] [C.1.14.3] [D.4 c.3] [...]. 
Adeo, ut nullus inferior a Principe Magistratus, propter aequitatem non scriptam, possit a scripto iure 
discedere: etiam si rigorem continet.’’382 Derrer then carries on by stating the familiar hierarchy between 
rigor scriptus and aequitas scripta.383 This approach is also that found in Andreas Tiraquellus’ (d. 1558) Retrait 
lignager, where he discusses the meaning of that custom being of ‘strict law’ (d’estroicz droit).384 
 
2.5. The diffusion of equity as epieikeia in later legal scholarship 
In the paragraphs above, the early development of equity by early humanist jurists in the first half of the 
sixteenth century was laid down. In this earlier period views covered a broad spectrum, they ranged from 
those emphasising the role of unwritten equity as epieikeia to justify the interpretation of legal rules ex aequo 
et bono, to those where the association of equity and epieikeia was rejected altogether. 
 In this section, I will give a brief outline of the spread of the ideas explored above among later 
authors. As we shall see, two main authors seem to have had the greatest impact over later writers. Johannes 
Oldendorpius had a very noticeable impact over reference works, such as legal dictionaries. On the other 
hand, the view of equity as interpretatio ex aequo et bono of Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus, would have 
a greater, more general impact on civil law writers generally writing about equity. That is not to say that 
reference to these works was exclusive, in fact, most works strived to rely on the broadest range of sources 
possible, often selecting passages in a way to avoid obvious inconsistencies – though not always 
successfully. That said, my focus is here more on the main arguments made about the nature of equity in 
the works cited, rather than on the range of sources used – my objective is to provide an outline of the 
diffusion of the ideas about equity explored above, rather than accounting for the spread of specific works 
on equity among civil lawyers. 
 In the last section we will look at the peculiar development, up until the early seventeenth century, 
of canon law. We have seen in the previous section that canon lawyers adopted, over the course of the 
Middle Ages, an approach to equity that was rather similar to that of civil lawyers, focussed as it was on 
written and unwritten equity and ranking sources against each other on the basis of their qualities as 
                                                    
379 Lagus, ibid., pp. 38-9.  
380 Derrerus was a friend of Erasmus and Ulrich Zasius, he succeeded to Zasius to his chair of law in 1535. See the entry for 
‘Sebastian DERRER’, in P Bietenholz and T Deutscher (eds), Contemporaries of Erasmus (2003). 
381 Sebastianus Derrerus, Jurisprudentiae Liber Primus (1540), p. 10. 
382 Derrerus, Jurisprudentiae, pp. 46-7. 
383 Ibid.,: ‘Ubi tamen utrunque, et rigor et aequitas scripta inveniuntur, regulariter aequitas rigori praeferenda est. [C.3.1.8]’ 
384 Andreas Tiraquellus, De Utroque Retractu Municipali et Conventionali (1618), pp. 497-504. 
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equitable or rigorous.385 The main point made below is that canon lawyers were extremely conservative 
when it came to engaging with the views of humanist or humanist-inspired jurists. Their views, as we shall 
see, remained anchored to the traditional distinction of written and unwritten equity until well into the 
seventeenth century. 
 
2.5.1. Legal Dictionaries 
Discussing the diffusion of the concept of equity as epieikeia among legal writers in our period, it is useful 
to begin with works that would have been the most immediate medium for its popularisation – reference 
works and legal dictionaries. One of the earliest reference works referring to equity in this sense seems to 
have been the Lexicon Iuris Civilis of Jakobus de Speculis (d. 1547), first published in 1538, and referring to 
equity by reference to Budaeus and Salamonius.  This work preceded the publication of Oldendorpius’ 
Disputatio and indeed of his own Lexicon Iuris in 1548, where he restated the views expressed in the Disputatio 
under the entry for ‘aequitas’.386 It is interesting to note that from the publication of Oldendorpius’s Lexicon 
Iuris onwards, Oldendorpius became one of the most popular sources among legal dictionaries for entries 
on equity.  Already in later, posthumous editions of de Speculis’ Lexicon, starting from 1549, we find the 
writings of Oldendorpius on the topic incorporated alongside the other sources.387  Another important 
source referring to Oldendorpius’ entries in the Lexicon was the Lexicon Iuris of Simon Schardius (d. 1573) 
published in 1582,388 which became itself a popular reference for later legal dictionaries, for instance 
Johannes Calvinus’ (Johann Kahl, d. 1614) Lexicon juridicum, first published in 1600.389  
That said, one may also find, even following the publication of Oldendorpius’ Lexicon, some legal 
reference works being instead exclusively influenced by the views of Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus 
- for example Barnabas Brissonius’ (d. 1591) De Verborum Significatione published in 1559, an extremely 
popular legal glossary, the entry for which at aequum et bonum draws on the theory of Duarenus and 
Connanus to describe equity as a benign interpretation which is called epieikeia in Greek, associated with 
D.1.1.1, and D.50.17.90, also distinguishing between ‘natural’ and ‘civil’ equity as Duarenus did.390 Finally, 
some other works of this sort made use of material from both traditions indiscriminately, such as 
                                                    
385 See [1.1.3] above 
386 See Johannes Oldendorpius, Lexicon Iuris (1548), pp. 27-30. For Oldendorpius’ approach see [2.3.3.2] above. 
387 Jacobus de Speculis, Lexicon Iuris Civilis (1538), p. 12. Compare with the same author’s Lexicon Iuris Civilis (1549), p. 32. It 
is perhaps not a coincidence that later editions of de Speculis’ Lexicon from the 1549 edition onwards include Oldendorpius’ 
In Verba Legum XII Tabularum Scholia as an appendix. The 1549 edition, but not later ones, also included a number of other 
works in appendix – among these was also Melanchthon’s Oratio de Scripto Iure where he outlined some of his arguments 
about equity. See n.229 above. De Speculis was a student of Zasius, see Steven Rowan, Ulrich Zasius. A Jurist of the German 
Renaissance, 1461-1535 (1987), pp. 222-3.  
388 See Simon Schardius, Lexicon Iuris (1600), p. 59. 
389 Johannes Calvinus, Lexicon Juridicum Juris Caesarei Simul, et Canonici: Feudalis Item, Civilis, Criminalis, Theoretici, Ac Practici. 
(1622), coll. 147-8. 
390 Barnabas Brissonius, De Verborum Quae Ad Ius Civile Pertinent Significatione. Libri XIX (1559), col. 24-5: ‘‘Aequum et Bonum 
coniungi solent [D.1.1.1, D.1.1.10, D.2.11.2.8, D.12.1.32] et alias fere semper. Significatur autem his verbis humanior et 
benignior iuris interpretatio, quae grecae [epieikeia] dicitur. [...] Est autem duplex aequitas, naturalis et civilis. Naturalis ex 
naturali ratione hominum mentibus insita. Civilis vero ex civilibus praeceptis aestimanda est [D.2.14.1pr].’ For more on 
Brissonius’ life and work see Eva Jakab, ‘Brissonius in Context: De Formulis et Solennibus Populi Romani Verbis’ in Paul J 
du Plessis and John W Cairns (eds), Reassessing Legal Humanism and its Claims (2016), passim.   
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Pardulphus Prateius’ (d. 1570) Lexicon Iuris Civilis et Canonici first published in 1567.391 Prateius’ work 
featured a lengthy entry on aequitas explaining that ‘[a]equitas variis in iure modis significatur. Adpellatur 
enim saepissime aequum et bonum [...]. Unde a Salo[monio ad D.1.1.1pr] recte definita est’, moving on to 
describe it echoing Salamonius and Duarenus as humanior et benignior iuris interpretatio as well as ‘perfecta ratio, 
quae leges et omne scriptum, dictumque interpretatur, et emendat’. Interestingly Prateius echoed Duarenus’ 
point that the word ‘scriptae’ is absent from the old manuscripts of Justinian’s Code at C.3.1.8, while at the 
same time referring to Oldendorpius’ analysis of aequitas scripta and non scripta as having to do with the proper 
application of written law and departure from it respectively.392 He also refers to Schardius’ entry to provide 
the four causes of equity: ‘Aequitatis causa efficiens est Deus, qui naturam humani generis sic condidit, ut 
omnia quidem de futuris negotiis certo praescribere non posset ullo modo [...]. Aequitatis causa materialis 
est ius naturae, Ius Civile, boni mores. Nam ex his sit pulchra quaedam ac Reipublicae salutaris mixtura, per 
iudicium animi incorruptum. [...] Aequitatis causa formalis est, ut conferantur diligenter facta iam incidentia 
cum circumstantiis suis (pertinentibus inquam) ad formulas iuris. [...] Aequitatis causa finalis, seu effectus 
est, us serveretur aequalitas humanarum rerum, quae maxime inter se sunt dissimiles’.393 
While entries in legal dictionaries did not elaborate in any detail on the role of equity within the 
legal system, and indeed referred to inconsistent approaches to that concept unpoblematically, their 
approach shows that the medieval doctrine of equity had almost394 entirely lost its influence by the mid-
sixteenth century among legal scholars, and that – whether by reference to Oldendorpius, to Budaeus or to 
Salamonius – the overwhelming majority of reference works would have led their reader towards epieikeia 
and the interpretation or amendment of legal rules as the basis for any understanding of the nature of 
equity.  
 
2.5.2. Civil law 
I turn now to writings by civil lawyers more generally. From the 1550s onwards, a great number of works 
emerged which adopted the basic points made by Salamonius, Duarenus and Connanus. These works cited 
the approach of equity as interpretation unproblematically, without seeking to resolve the problems 
surrounding the specific role – if any – to be played by a doctrine of equitable interpretation or correction 
of the law within the legal system. The works I refer to here therefore show the long-lasting impact that the 
general approach to equity as interpretation introduced by Salamonius had in the long term. In the fourth 
chapter of this thesis I shall instead deal with those works that sought to bring together the approach of 
                                                    
391 Pardulphus Prateius, Lexicon Iuris Civilis et Canonici (1567), ff. 11rb-vb. 
392 Prateius, Lexicon, f. 11rb-va: ‘Dicitur et humanior, et benignior iuris interpretatio. [...] Aequitas duplex est, scripta et non 
scripta. Potest enim aequitas, tum in scholis, tum in foro duplici modo exerceri. Altero, ut diligenter consideremus, quo 
ordine Iurisconsulti et Imperatores Romani observarint aequitatem in describendis, ponendisque legibus et praeiudiciis 
humanorum negotiorum. [...] Quamobrem merito non scriptam aequitatem vocare possumus, non quasi liceat sine scripti 
iuris observatione illam aestimare: Sed quod aliquanto longius a scriptis thesibus recedit.’ Compare with n.263 above 
393 Prateius, Lexicon, f. 11va. 
394 Cf e.g. Augustinus Barbosa (d. 1649), Thesaurum Locorum Communum Iurisprudentiae: Ex Axiomatibus (1652), pp. 86-7, which 
reports equity purely by reference to the medieval understanding of written and unwritten equity. 
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Salamonius and scholastic theology in order to define equity more precisely, and will discuss the long-term 
impact which those more detailed approaches to equity had.395 
The examples of civil law works following the approach of equity as interpretation are plentiful. 
They are found among legal writers across Europe spanning the entirety of our period. First of all, we find 
the idea of equity as interpretation repeated, predictably, among legal writers producing works of a 
recognisably humanistic nature such as Ludovicus Russardus (d. 1567), who produced a glossed and 
updated edition of the Code, and the systematiser Johannes Corasius (d. 1572).396 Secondly and most 
importantly, we find this view expressed almost ubiquitously when it comes to sixteenth and early 
seventeenth-century commentaries on civil law. An important example is found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis of 
Dionysus Gothofredus (d. 1622), first published in 1583. In his comment to C.3.1.8, Gothofredus makes 
it clear that he did not regard it as a source concerned in any way with written equity or rigour, or indeed 
as a source concerned with the reconciliation of conflicting laws. He instead explained it entirely as one 
having to do with interpretation. As he puts it: ‘Aequitas [...] iuris scripti duritiem et asperitatem, habita 
ratione circumstantiarum mitigat. Qua via? Veluti si depraehendens neque plus aut minus in facto esse quam 
in lege scripta, dicas scriptam legem facto controverso proprie convenire: si tamen legislatoris mentem 
attentius consideres et ipsam facti controversiam non convenit. Hucque spectat ars boni et aequi 
[D.1.1.1pr].’397 At C.1.14.1 Gothofredus also follows the Salamonius line of interpretation of that law as 
concerned with how clearly a certain case is defined by a written rule of law, also hinting at the fact that the 
nature of a certain rule, for instance, whether a Roman law rule is of ancient origin or an imperial 
constitution, can inform the interpreter about how harshly the legislator would have wished that we 
interpret it.398 Gothofredus is one of few authors maintaining his discussion of equity centred around 
C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1 – most other early modern commentaries on civil law hold their main discussion of 
equity around chapters concerned with either the interpretation of the law, or the first principles of law, or 
around the 90th regula in D.50.17, which says that equity should be favoured in all matters, and especially so 
in law. Discussions of equity in this sense are found, for instance, in the comments on the Institutes of Justinian 
of Franciscus Balduinus (d. 1573) and Hermannus Vultejus (d. 1634), in the commentaries on the Digest of 
Petrus Faber (Pierre du Faur de Saint Jory, d. 1600), Hubertus Giphanius (d. 1604), Petrus Gudelinus (d. 
1619) and Reinhardus Bachovius ab Echt (Reiner Bachoff von Echt, d. 1640), as well as in the Paratitla of 
Matthaeus Wesenbecius (d. 1586), the Pandectes of Charondas (Louis Le Caron, d. 1613), the Disputationes of 
Georgius Obrechtus (d. 1612), the Exercitationes of Dominicus Arumaeus (d. 1637), and the Jurisprudentia 
                                                    
395 See ch. 4 below. 
396 See Ludovicus Russardus, Ius Civile (1561), ad ‘scriptae’ in C.3.1.8, p. 63. Russardus adds a gloss to C.3.1.8 repeating 
Duarenus’ definition of equity. Johannes Corasius, De Iuris Arte Libellus (1560), pp. 50-1: ‘[Bonum et aequum g]raeci uno verbo 
dicunt [epieikeia], id est convenientiam et aequalitatem [...]. p. 251.  
397 Dionysus Gothofredus, ad ‘aequitatisque’, C.3.1.8 (1583), col. 192. See also Gothodredus ad ‘stricti’, C.3.1.8, col. 192. 
398 Dionysus Gothofredus, ad 'solis' C.1.14.1 (1583), col. 88: ‘Sensus est, ubi lex negotium quaesitum palam definiit, iudex 
eam sequi debet, quantumvis dura sit: solius principis est eam mitigare [...]. Ubi vero lex scripta palam negotium non definit, 
iudex potest ex duarum vel diversarum legum sententia, et collectione, una scilicet stricti iuris, altera aequitatis plena 
argumentum ad facti controversi decisionem ducere, et hanc illi praeferre. Huc etiam refer, quod de iuris et constitutionum 
differentia utiliter scripsit Cuiacius [Observationum, lib. 7, cap. 19]’. See also Gothofredus ad D.50.17.90 (1583), col. 1770. 
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Romano-Canonica of Henningus Rennemannus (d. 1646).399 Similar views on equity are also found expressed 
in treatises written on more general themes of civil law where equity is encountered such as the De 
Iurisdictione et Imperio by Antonius de Quintanadueña (d. 1628) and – predictably – treatises written 
specifically to treat the theme of equity, such as Andreas Ludovicus Schopperus’ (d. 1643) Dissertationem 
Inauguralem de Aequitate of 1621.400 While I have in this study focussed only on works published through the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the concept of equity as interpretation clearly had an impact well 
into the eighteenth century. One can find the views of Salamonius and his followers still cited without much 
in the way of change in civil law treatises concerning equity and interpretation such as Andreas Weiss’ (d. 
1792) De Usu Aequitatis in Interpretatione Legum published in 1737.401  
 
2.5.3. Canon Law 
Early modern writings on equity within canon law, by which I mean within commentaries on the Corpus 
Iuris Canonici or treatises dealing specifically with canon law doctrine, deserves a separate discussion entirely. 
The main reason for this is that canon law seems to have been much more resistant to change in its 
treatment of equity than civil law. We have mentioned in the first chapter that, in the period going up to 
1550 canon law commentaries continued to feature the traditional exposition of aequitas centred on the 
concept of aequitas scripta.402 And that, even among authors who were themselves otherwise influenced by 
legal humanism.403   
The first authors to write works of canon law which adopted the concept of equity as interpretation 
that was spreading around Europe belonged to the circle of early modern scholastic theology. In particular 
we owe the earliest examples to Martin de Azpilcueta (d. 1586) and his pupil Didacus Covarrubias (d. 1577). 
We do not have very much from Covarrubias. His comments on equity feature in a commentary on a Regula 
of the added title De Regulis Iuris of the Liber Sextus published in 1558. However, Martin de Azpilcueta’s (d. 
1586) commentary on X.1.2., includes a rather detailed analysis of equity, and one perfectly consistent with 
those of Salamonius and his followers.404 These works are of a rather exceptional nature: both authors being 
scholastic theologians would have been aware of the revival of epieikeia that occurred among early modern 
                                                    
399 Franciscus Balduinus, Commentarii In Institutionum (1556), pp. 23-5. For Vultejus see Hermannus Vulteius, Institutiones Iuris 
Civilis a Iustiniano Compositas Commentarius (1598), pp. 8-9, he also mentions it briefly in his Jurisprudentiae Romanae a Iustiniano 
Compositae Libri II (1590). Petrus Faber, Ad Titulum De Diversis Regulis Iuris Antiqui (1590), pp. 233-8. Hubertus Giphanius, 
Commentarii in Titulum Digestorum de Diversis Regulis Iuris (1606), p. 409. Petrus Gudelinus, Commentariorum de Jure Novissimo Libri 
Sex (1620), p. 225. Reinhardus Bachovius ab Echt, Commentarii in Primam Partem Pandectarum (1630), pp. 69ff. Matthaeus 
Wesenbeck, In Pandectas Iuris Civilis [...] Paratitla (1629), p. 24. Louis Charondas, Pandectes Ou Digestes Du Droit François (1597), 
p. 45. Georgius Obrechtus, Disputationes Ex Variis Iuris Civilis (1603), pp. 5-6. Dominicus Arumaeus, Exercitationes Iustinianeae 
(1604), pp. 4-5. I discuss Rennemannus below in the context of later authors, which Schröder has argued departed from this 
view, see [2.5.5] below.  
400 Quintanadueña should not be confused with another Antonio de Quintanadueñas (d. 1651), a contemporary theologian 
and canonist. See Nicolás Antonio, Bibliotheca hispana nova (1783), p. 156. Antonius de Quintanadueña, De Iurisdictione et Imperio 
(1598), pp. 238-44. Andreas Ludovicus Schopperus, Disputatio inauguralis de aequitate (1621), paras 68-70, 98-108.  
401 Andreas Weiss, De Usu Aequitatis in Interpretatione Legum (1737), pp. 10-2. 
402 See n.75 above. 
403 Bonavitus, for instance, (cited at n.75 above) was such an author, and though he displayed an awareness of the concept 
of benigna interpretatio developed by humanists, did not associate it with aequitas, which he discusses along the orthodox lines 
of scripta and non scripta. 
404 See [3.3.2.2] below. 
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Thomists more generally from the 1510s onwards. Azpilcueta in particular engaged in his texts with the 
writings of theologians and sought to reconcile the learning of civil lawyers on equity with the writings of 
Aquinas, Cajetan and Domingo de Soto. My concern in this section is to trace the spread of equity in works 
of canon law of a more orthodox nature, and I therefore return to Azpilcueta and Covarrubias in the next 
chapter, dedicated to the theological concept of equity. 
Aside from writings by theologians, the earliest canon lawyer to deal with equity as epieikeia seems 
to have been Hyppolytus Bonacossa (d. 1591) in his De Aequitate Canonica, published in the 1570s.405 
Bonacossa does not spend much time discussing the point, but does mention Budaeus and Salamonius’ 
writings on equity and makes it clear that he is aware of a connection between equity and epieikeia.406 
However, and despite mentioning humanist sources, Bonacossa’s text soon reverts to discussing aequitas at 
length in the orthodox terms of aequitas scripta and non scripta. In fact, Bonacossa’s text moves on to deal 
with aequitas canonica precisely in the way medieval authors intended. His treatise shifts from dealing with 
the nature of equity itself, into listing rules of canon law, seemingly on account of the ‘equity’ which 
distinguishes them from the civil law, and would warrant their being favoured as aequitas scripta.407 That said, 
though Bonacossa’s treatise lacks any precise analytical direction in its exposition of aequitas, and while it 
does little more than provide a list of definitions of equity as found in various sources available at his time, 
it clearly shows that - by the end of the sixteenth century - canon lawyers were growing increasingly aware 
of the literature on equity as epieikeia as developed by contemporary humanists and theologians. Thus, as 
late as the 1570s, and aside from the existence of canon law works by scholastic theologians, there is little 
evidence that canon lawyers adopted the early modern concept of equity in their commentaries on the 
Corpus Iuris Canonici.  
There were not a great number of canon law treatises that dealt with equity in the period from the 
1570s to about the mid-seventeenth century. Evidence that canon lawyers were influenced, around this 
period, by the theory of equity as interpretation is therefore sparse. Some evidence can be found in more 
general legal treatises written by canon lawyers. I have mentioned above briefly the treatise De Iurisdictione 
et Imperio published in 1598 by Antonio de Quintanadueñas, which did deal with equity in terms perfectly 
consistent with Salamonius and his followers.408 That Quintanadueñas was also a canon lawyer seems 
evidenced by the fact he was also the author of a treatise on ecclesiastical benefices published in the 1590s.409 
But I have not found throughout this period any commentaries on canon law beside the two works by 
scholastic theologians identified above dealing with equity. 
Examples of canon law commentaries dealing with equity can be found almost a century after 
Bonacossa, in the mid-seventeenth century. Emanuel Gonzalez Tellez’s (d. 1649) commentary to the 
                                                    
405 Ippolito Bonacossa, De Aequitate Canonica Tractatus, (1575). 
406 Bonacossa, Aequitate Canonica, p. 6. 
407 For the medieval understanding of aequitas canonica see [1.1.3] above. 
408 See n.400 above. 
409 Antonius de Quintanduenas, Ecclesiasticon Libri IV (1592). 
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decretals, written not long before his death in 1649 and published posthumously is a striking example.410  
In it, Tellez comments specifically on the passage in the Liber Extra where the ordinary gloss and many 
canon lawyers thereafter had articulated their theory of aequitas scripta – X.1.36.11.411 Tellez, however, 
completely eliminates from his commentary any reference to aequitas scripta, focussing instead entirely on 
the meaning of equity as a doctrine of interpretation, and making specific reference to the works of civil 
lawyers listed above. After this time, many examples can be found of canon lawyers discussing equity in 
terms of interpretation. Some are, like those of Tellez, adopting the approach of Salamonius to 
interpretation, such as the commentaries on the decretals of Ludwig Engel (d. 1694), where at X, 1, 2 he 
assimilates interpreting laws by a benigna interpretatione which is iuxta verisimilem mentem legislatoris with equity,412 
and we can find works published well into the 18th century, for instance in Placidus Böcken’s (d. 1752) 
Commentarius in Ius Canonicum Universum where equity is discussed under X.1.2 and is used as a synonym of 
epieikeia and benigna interpretatio.413  The majority of canon lawyers after the 1650s continued to adopt the 
theory of Salamonius and his followers as the basis of their approach to equity, though – as we shall see in 
the fourth chapter of this thesis – some, mostly under the influence of Franciscus  Suarez (d. 1617) – also 
incorporated the approach of early modern scholastic theologians.414 
 
2.5.4. Surviving plurality of views 
While the discussion above is meant to provide a broad-brush picture of the diffusion of ideas of equity as 
epieikeia among early modern legal writers, it should not be taken to mean either that all authors after the 
writings of Connanus and Duarenus accepted Salamonius’ points about equity as interpretation, nor that 
the authors that did accept it all discussed equity in precisely the same terms.  
 Regarding the second point, while authors that followed Salamonius did share the common 
denominator of regarding equity as a doctrine of interpretation entrusted with all judges, some individual 
authors could contribute minor variations when it came to working out the detail. For instance, 
Wesembecius restated the idea of equity as an instrument of interpretation in terms perfectly consistent 
with those of Salamonius and Connanus, recognising its role for interpreting rules extensively and 
restrictively. However, he also added that equity could perform an additional role, ‘ut in his quae nec de 
sententia legis, nec ratiocinationis argumento definiri possunt, pro regula iudicii atque iuris valeat.’415 This 
                                                    
410 Emanuel González Tellez (d. 1649), Commentaria Perpetua in... Decretalium (1673), ad X.1.36.11, p. 680: ‘Ubi enim ius 
apertum est, et verborum legis, vel sententiae nulla pugna est, etiamsi quod statutum est, perdurum sit, observandum est, et 
tantum Princeps potest aequitatem interpretari, [D.26.7.24.1]. […] Quod si aliud verba legis significant, aliud ex mente, et 
sententia eius deducatur, tunc iudex neglecto summo iure aequitatem servare debet [C.3.1.8] […]. Cum enim innumera sint 
negotia, nec omnia quotidie emergentia legibus comprehendi possint [D.1.3.10] [D.1.3.12] tunc iudex supplere debet partem 
aequitatis, ubi legislator deficit.’ 
411 See n.70 above and the references in Decius at n.74 above. 
412 Ludwig Engel, Collegium Universi Juris Canonici, (1700), pp. 44-5: ‘Juxta verosimilem mentem legislatoris leges universales, 
vel admodum rigorosae nonnunquam benignam aliquam interpretatione secundum bonum et aequum explicandae sunt [...] 
que ista interpretatio secundum bonum et aequum, Epickia, aut praesumpta mens Legislatoris vocatur. Huc etiam pertinet 
textus in [C.3.1.8]’. 
413 See Placidus Böcken, Commentarius in Ius Canonicum Universum (1735), pp. 127-8.  
414 See [4.2.4.1] below. 
415 See Wesembeck, Paratitla, coll. 23-4. 
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broad statement could be read as providing more room for judicial discretion, but the sources provided to 
support it – D.39.3.2.5 and the sixth and  Panormitanus’s comment to X.1.36.11, n. 7 – can be construed 
as referring only to cases where no rule of law at all is applicable, limiting this third function of equity to a 
gap-filling role, one in line with the role of unwritten equity as recognised by medieval legal writers. More 
authors applying minor variations on the main points put forward by Salamonius and his followers could 
be listed by treating them individually, but such a study is beyond the purpose of this chapter. 
Regarding the first point, there are also a number of examples that show that Salamonius’ theory 
never enjoyed universal acceptance. To make this point we may turn to Joachim Hopperus’ (d. 1576) De 
Iuris Arte Libellus, published in 1553. Hopperus was clearly influenced by humanist writers on equity, and 
in the section of his work dealing with different kinds of laws, he explicitly sought to deal with the difference 
between aequum et bonum and summum ius.416 However, the distinction found by Hopperus between aequum 
et bonum and summum ius has little in common with that we have analysed so far. The main point is that 
Hopperus does not identify aequum et bonum with epieikeia in the sense of interpretation of the words of the 
law in accordance with the intention of the legislator. Instead, he seems to understand aequum et bonum in a 
way which is more similar to Melanchthon’s and Oldendorpius’ approach, as the justice which takes into 
account the circumstances of a particular case. It seems clear Hopperus does not mean this to work as an 
interpretive approach to the law of general application, and he confined cases in which strictum ius and bonum 
et aequum will be in conflict to two categories.417 The first such case ‘est cum res subiecta tam obscuros et 
difficiles habet explicatus, ut secundum communes iuris regulas nihil possit constitui, quod non falsum 
confestim reperiatur [D.35.2.88pr] tunc enim ad exitum inveniendum necessarium est, ut aequi et boni ratio 
ineatur: quemadmodum usu venit in iis, quae insolubilia, in se redeuntia praepostera, asystata, intricata vulgo 
dicuntur.’418 The example Hopperus offers of such a situation is D.35.2.88pr, that is a case where a man 
possessed of 400 gold coins made legacies for three quarters and left the remaining quarter to his heir 
provided that the lex Falcidia applies to his will. Since the lex Falcidia only applies to a will where less than a 
quarter is left for the testator’s heir, this case poses the kind of logical problem medieval philosophers called 
insolubilia, akin to that posed by the liar’s paradox, where whatever solution is adopted will lead to a 
contradiction.419 Hopperus therefore thinks interventions of equity will be required where the legal system 
could simply offer no solution, and a judge would have had to step outside of rules of law to provide a new 
solution.  The second situation is ‘cum negotium Iure quidem consistit, et definiri potest: sed ob causam 
aliquam id sit ponderosius quod aequum bonum est, quam quod iustum, veluti in Publiciana [I.4.6.4], 
                                                    
416 Joachim Hopperus, De Iuris Arte (1555), p.17: ‘Et ultima in hoc ordine descriptio est, ut aliud strictum ius dicatur, aliud 
bonum et aequum.’ 
417 Hopperus, ibid., p. 17: ‘Nam regulariter certe tanta tenentur inter sese coniuncitione, ut alterum ab altero ne nomine 
quidem seiungatur, et omne quod iustum est, idem quoque simul aequum et e contrario quod aequum idem quoque iustum 
dicatur. Sed existunt nonnunquam causae quae faciunt ut aliud in iure esse videatur, aliud in benignitate: quae quidem in 
universum sunt duae.’ 
418 Hopperus, ibid., pp. 17-8. 
419 An authoritative and accessible description of these problems can be found in Paul Vincent Spade and Stephen Read, 
‘Insolubles’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) available at  
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/insolubles (last accessed 09-04-2018). For a modern example of such 
a problem in a legal context see  Nurdin & Peacock v DB Ramsden & Co [1999] 1 WLR 1249, 1273-4. 
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Serviana [I.4.6.7], et aliis eiusdem exempli.’.420 Here, Hopperus gives us the example of the actio Publiciana 
and of the actio Serviana in Roman law. What these actions have in common is that they stemmed from the 
Praetor’s jurisdiction, an official who – for a certain period in Roman times - had the power to introduce 
new remedies in the Roman legal system when he deemed existing ones inadequate. Again, the examples 
provided by Hopperus are not of interpretation beyond the letter of the law, but rather of providing a 
solution to a legal problem by drawing on justice, setting aside existing rules or simply introducing a new 
one. It may be that Hopperus was influenced by the meaning with judging ex aequo et bono had acquired in 
the medieval period.421 Examples of original statements of equity, departing from the view of equity as 
interpretation can also be found as late as the end of the seventeenth century. A good example is Jean 
Domat (d. 1696). In his Les Lois Civiles dans Leur Ordre Naturel, published in 1689, while seeing equity as 
related to interpretation, Domat did not think it was related to interpreting the will of the legislator – indeed 
he discusses interpretations of the legislator’s will separately,  and described equitable interpretation in a 
very general sense as interpretation of a rule by reference to ‘l’équité naturelle, qui étant l’esprit universel de 
la justice, fait toutes les règles, et donne à chacune son usage propre’. Equity features neither as epieikeia nor 
as interpretatio extensiva, restrictiva or otherwise.422  
Hopperus and Domat are useful examples of how, following the second half of the sixteenth 
century, at a time when civil law views of equity were coalescing towards the idea of equity as interpretation, 
original views on the point were still on offer. There is also evidence, however, that some authors continued 
to use, often alongside the concept of equity as interpretation, the medieval references to written and 
unwritten equity. An example of this is found in Forcatulus’ (Etienne Forcadel, d. 1573) commentary on 
the title De Iustitia et Iure of the Digest.423 
 
2.5.5. Aequitas cerebrina – decline of equity in later sources? 
One last point should be addressed. Jan Schröder, drawing also on research by Clausdieter Schott, has in 
the past put forward the argument that equity as a doctrine finding a role for unwritten equity lost most of 
its appeal from the mid-seventeenth century onwards. The idea behind the argument is, broadly stated, that 
in the early stages of its development, the association of aequitas with epieikeia, led sixteenth-century jurists 
to re-conceptualise it as an unwritten source of law.424 However – the argument goes – by the mid-
seventeenth century, the view was increasingly gaining ground that equity could not be separated form 
written sources, Schröder describes this as a return to aequitas scripta in later writers such as Henning 
                                                    
420 Hopperus, ibid., p. 18. 
421 Hopperus hints at a number of circumstances where he thinks it would be appropriate to depart from law in favour of 
aequum et bonum, but it is not clear whether he believes this should be a prerogative of princes or a power extended to judges 
and, if the latter, he does not explain how this would interact with existing rules of ius commune limiting judicial discretion. 
See Hopperus, ibid., p. 18. For judging ex aequo et bono see [1.1.4.2] above. 
422 Jean Domat, Les Lois Civiles Dans Leur Ordre Naturel (1689), pp. 14-6. It should be noted, however, that Domat does 
mention the example used by Aquinas of a madman depositing a sword. See n.235 above. 
423 Forcatulus, Commentarius in Titulum Digestorum de Iustitia et Iure in Opera (1595), p. 5. 
424 Schröder, ‘Aequitas’, pp. 270-3. 
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Rennemannus (d. 1646) who – for Schröder – ‘will die Aequitas als geschriebenes Recht einordnen’.425 He 
seems to derive this view from the argument in Rennemannus, put forward in his Jurisprudentia Romano-
Germanica of  1651, that equity ‘ut ex iure scribto prodit, tanquam effectum ex causa sua, ita etiam scribti 
iuris qualitatem tenet, et cum eo, ex quo depromitur, ius scriptum est et manet’.426 However, to argue that 
this statement represented anything like a departure from the doctrine of equity as interpretation does not 
seem to be supported in any way by the substance and function of equity as put forward by Rennemannus 
in the same work.427  
Rennemannus’ substantial explanation of how equity operates seems entirely consistent with those 
of Salamonius and his followers – he discusses equity in his chapter on interpretation, specifically dealing 
with the features of interpretatio aequa, equating it with epieikeia, and describing it as one that ‘ex ratione iuris, 
in dubio, sententiam rigori iuris benigniorem et humaniorem ita obponit: ut illa quandoque plus vel minus 
vel aliud quam nudo verborum cortice continetur, expromat’.428 Indeed, Rennemannus moves on to explain 
exactly what he thinks the connection between equity and writing is in a note on the following Disputatio – 
he explains that ‘[e]st [textus] in [D.35.1.16] in quo interpretationis species proponit Caiius duas, unam cuius 
usus esse debeat in dubitationibus ex ipso testamento ortis: alteram in his, si quae extra testamentum 
incurrant. Illas esse secundum scribti iuris rationes expediendas, has vero ex aequo et bono interpretationem 
capturas. Quo in textu, cum non obponatur ius scribtum iuri non-scribto: sed illi quod ex aequo et bono 
interpretamur: hinc manifestum est, aequitati obponi interpretationem strictam: cuius usus sit in verbis 
testamenti explicandis: Ut statuamus in casu dubio, secundum id, quod scribtum est verbis expressis, 
voluntatem Testatoris regulariter definiendam. Extra vero Testamenti verba si casus incurrat dubius: illum 
ex aequo et bono, quod scribti iuris evidens Ratio subpeditabit, esse interpretandum. [...] Ergo si ius 
scribtum est id, quod verbis iuris scribti continetur: etiam hoc ius scribtum erit: quod ex sententia eiusdem 
iuris profluit.’429 This statement, though identifying interpretations ex aequo et bono with those ex sententia iuris 
rather than from the intention of the legislator, is broadly in line with the understanding of interpretatio ex 
aequo et bono espoused continuously by the majority of writers from the 1550s onwards. 
The real concern for Rennemannus seems to be that equity should not be disjointed from written 
law, that is, it should be based on an interpretation of the intention of the law, rather than entrusted entirely 
to the discretion of the judge.430 In many treatises, the latter idea is referred to disparagingly as aequitas 
cerebrina, the equity, that is, springing out of the mind of an individual, rather than based on an interpretation 
of the law.431   
                                                    
425 Schröder, ‘Aequitas’, p. 273.  
426 Henning Rennemannus, Jurisprudentia Romano-Germanica (1651), p. 170: ‘Quae in iure Romano Benignitas et Humanitas: 
[...] Aequum et bonum [...] vocari solet: Graecis [epieikeia].’ 
427 Schröder, ‘Aequitas’, p. 273. 
428 Rennemannus, ibid., p. 164. 
429 Rennemannus, ibid., p. 170-1. Rennemannus makes similar points with the legislator and the law as the subject, rather 
than the testator, within the same passage. 
430 See Rennemannus, ibid., pp. 171-2.  
431 See Schott, ‘Aequitas Cerebrina’, passim. 
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What we find taking a closer look at Rennemannus seems to be true also of the other authors that 
Schröder cites in support of his argument for a seventeenth-century change of tide. He refers to Arnold 
Vinnius (d. 1657), Amadeus Eckolt (d. 1623), Nicolaus Christoph Lyncker (d. 1635), Johannes Strauch (d. 
1679), and Georg Adam Struve (d. 1692).  I will refer briefly to these authors to make it unambiguous that 
their statements are consistent with the analysis above.  
Vinnius tells us about equity that ‘In specie autem, et proprie accepta aequitas iuri opponitur, non 
scripto, ut male nonnulli, sed stricto. Haec Graecis [epieikeia] dicitur, nostris etiam aequum et bonum, 
humanitas, benignitas [...]. Cuius usus elucet, cum in verbis legis ex sententia extendendis, et ad casus similes 
producendis, ubi lex minus scripsit, plus voluit; tum in verbis restringendis, ubi ex sententia constat, plus 
scripsisse legislatorem, minus voluisse: maxime vero in benigna interpretatione, earumque ad singulas facti 
species accomodationes; tali tamen, quae ab expressa et manifesta legislatoris voluntate non recedeat. [...] 
Atque hinc etiam peti potest conciliatio [C.3.1.8] cum [C.1.14.1] et [D40.9.12.1].432  This paragraph of 
Vinnius is the source for the passage in Eckolt cited by Schröder.433 Similarly, we find Lyncker’s 
commentaries dealing with equity in the passage cited by Schröder in the paragraph entitled De recta, Leges 
etiam interpretandi ratione – where Lyncker says that ‘[u]bique pro scopo interpres aequitatem habere debet. 
Accipitur vero aequitas aut (1) late: pro eo quod iustum, seu aequum et bonum est, et hac ratione aequitas 
etiam scripta datur. (2) stricte prout versatur circa rationem iuris [...] Graecis [epieikeia][...] iterumque scripta 
est: saltim virtualiter, seu implicite. Hanc tum suppletoriam esse dicunt: quam respicit Interpretatio 
extensiva; tum correctoriam: quam restrictiva’.434 Strauch may tell us that ‘[c]um ergo ius non scriptum hic 
intelligatur, quod ab initio suo non est habile per scripturam publicari, constat ejus speciem neque esse 
aequitatem’, but he does not hesitate to add that ‘aequitas in actu signato omnino scribi nescit. Est emin [...] 
temperatio et mitigatio iuris positivi, seu legitimi.’435  Struve is even more explicit about the role of equity 
in interpretation – which Schröder himself acknowledged in note. Struve discusses equity in a paragraph 
entirely dedicated to interpretation and, like Lyncker, he specifies that ‘[s]umitur autem aequitas vel absolute, 
et est idem quod justitia, et aequum est quod in genere iustum. Vel relate, ut notat legis ad certum et 
specialem casum aequam accommodationem: Qua duplici observata acceptione vulgata bene dici potest 
quaestio: an detur aequitas scripta secundum legibus sancita? Priori namque sensu omnis lex bona est aequa, et ita 
datur aequitas scripta. Posteriori sensu nulla aequitas est scripta [...]. Est vero posterior significatio huius 
loci, in qua ab Aristotele [Ethics, lib. 5, cap.  10] his describitur verbis: [epieikeia...] est correctio iuris legitimi, ea 
parte, qua deficit ob universale non secundum legem.’436 
Schröder refers in support of his argument to Schott’s research on the use by early modern lawyers 
of the concept of aequitas cerebrina. Schott made the argument that, throughout the early modern period, 
                                                    
432 Arnoldus Vinnius, In Quatuor Libros Institutionum (1665), p. 20.   
433 Schröder refers to Amadeus Eckolt, Compendiaria Pandectarum Tractatio (1680), p. 20. The passage referred to seems to be 
an annotation by Bartholomaeus Leonhard Svevendoerffer on Eckolt’s text. 
434 (Nicolaus Christoph Lyncker), Commentaria Lynckeriana in Jus Civile Universum (1698), pp. 69-70. 
435 Johannes Strauch, Dissertationes ad Iustinianeum (1718), p. 12. 
436 Goerg Adam Struve, Syntagma juris civilis (1672), p. 69. The latter part of the definition resonates strongly with that adopted 
by late scholastic theologians, see chapter 3 below. 
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legal writers rejected the idea that a judge may be able to draw on unwritten equity. However, and without 
the need to go through the sources in detail, it is clear that the authors referred to by Schott dealt with 
equity in a way entirely consistent with what we have observed above. An illustrative example found in 
Schott of an early modern author referring to that concept is that of Juan Garcia de Saavedra’s (fl. ca. 1599) 
De Expensis et Meliorationibus, published in 1599. The passage seized upon is rather colourful. Saavedra tells 
us that ‘non [...] subvertendas esse leges [...] sub specie aequitatis; nam quae aequitas sine jure, sine lege, 
quae scripta non est, sed capitose arrepta, pestilentissimum virus est.’437 Saavedra’s statements have much 
in common with those of Rennemannus and he too emphasises the role of ‘written natural equity’. Having 
said that, just like Rennemannus, Saavedra has no problem directing the reader – for a better view of how 
equity works – to Franciscus Connanus’ writings on point. It emerges clearly from the text that, just like 
Rennemannus, Saavedra conceptualises written equity as the interpretation of civil law.438  
The idea that the association of equity and epieikeia should entitle any judge to ignore the law was, 
as we have seen, a concern for many even among the humanist jurists in the earlier sixteenth century, but 
it never seems to have been very popular among legal writers – in particular because it seems to bear no 
relation to Aristotelian epieikeia. This explains why Schröder, while finding some sixteenth-century lawyers 
classifying equity as an unwritten source of law, does not find any statements to the effect that the judge 
can in some cases rule unbound by rules, and finds all roles of correction of the law confined – consistently 
with Salamonius’ approach – to interventions by the legislator.439  The rejection of aequitas cerebrina, i.e. of 
the judge unbound by rules, in the later seventeenth century seems however to have been interpreted by 
Schröder as a reaction to the writings of earlier humanists because the latter classified equity as a branch of 
unwritten law. As we have seen, and regardless of taxonomy, those earlier authors did not only share, but 
indeed were the first to establish, the idea that equity as epieikeia was intrinsically linked to written law, as 
its interpretation ex aequo et bono.440 
 
2.5.6. Conclusion 
From the analysis above, it seems clear that the identification of equity as epieikeia saw a speedy spread 
among legal writers across the sixteenth and seventeenth century around Europe. Except for the peculiar 
effect noted of Oldendorpius and Melanchthon’s theories over reference works, civil and canon law 
commentaries and treatises seem to have overwhelmingly preferred the view, first introduced by 
Salamonius, of equity as a doctrine of interpretation. The general features of that theory, which formed the 
common denominator for the overwhelming majority of writers dealing with equity, were: (i) a rejection of 
the medieval understanding of equity centred on ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ equity, (ii) a reconceptualisation 
                                                    
437 Joannes Garcia de Saavedra, De Expensis et Meliorationibus (1599), pp. 19-21. 
438 Saavedra, De Expensis, p. 20: ‘Refert Franciscus Connanus [Commentarius Iuris Civilis, lib. 1, cap. 11, n. 7] ubi latissime et 
elegantissime de aequitate et quatenus sit accipienda. [...] Vigeat ergo ius, abeat aequitas non scripta, naturalis autem aequitas 
scripta. Omnia moderetur instituta civitatis. Omnes temperet ex iure scripto leges.’  
439 The most that he finds is a statement among some that the judge may do so in cases not governed by any rule. A role for 
aequitas non scripta that medieval lawyers had long acknowledged. See Schröder, ‘Aequitas’, p. 275.  
440 See Schröder, ’Aequitas’, pp. 278-82.  
90 
 
of equity/epieikeia as a theory of interpretation of the law in accordance with the intention of the legislator, 
which power they thought should be entrusted to all judges, (iii) a restriction of the scope of this doctrine 
to cases where the intention of the legislator is clear – leaving cases of uncertainty or of legal correction and 
emendation to the legislator alone. 
As mentioned above, I have not here set out to deal in detail with minor variations in each author’s 
approach to equity as interpretation – though there were a number.441 My focus in the following chapter 
will, instead, be on those legal authors that set out to develop extensively the doctrine of equity as 
interpretation, to identify its precise role alongside other kinds of interpretation. Indeed, the overwhelming 
majority of authors referring to equity as interpretation in this period did not engage at all with what, if 
anything, interpretatio ex aequo et bono was meant to add to the theories of interpretation of the law in 
accordance with the intention for the legislator that had been known since the Middle Ages. In other words, 
they failed to explicitly engage with the question of how equitable interpretation related to interpretation in 
general, and in particular with interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva. All of them left it unclear whether equity 
was going to be a broader category encompassing and justifying all interpretations of laws beyond their 
words, or whether it was going to be a narrower, more specific type of interpretation of this sort. 
Those authors who did seek to identify more clearly the role of equity in interpretation found a 
valuable source in the writings of early modern scholastic theologians on equity. Theological writings on 
epieikeia had long been kept separate from the approach of lawyers to equity.442 With the diffusion of 
Budaeus’ assimilation of equity and epieikeia, we instead find that these two branches of scholarship came 
into contact with one another. In the following chapter, I argue that, from the 1550s onwards, the influence 
of legal writings assimilating equity and interpretation was being felt in contemporary theological writings 
on epieikeia, as writers like Domingo de Soto adopted the language of interpretatio ex aequo et bono to describe 
the role performed by Aquinas’ epieikeia, and other writers such as Martin de Azpilcueta abandoned Aquinas’ 
theory wholesale in favour of the legal approach to equity. Having appreciated the differences between the 
theological and legal concepts of equity, it will then be possible, in the fourth chapter, to deal meaningfully 
with those writers who sought to find a more precise role for the doctrine of equitable interpretation among 
other doctrines of interpretation by seeking a middle ground between the theological and legal branch of 








                                                    
441 See [2.5.4] above. 
442 See [1.2.] above. 
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Chapter 3 – Aequitas and Epieikeia among early modern scholastic writers. 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have seen that early modern humanist jurists, influenced by humanistic 
philology, developed a novel approach to the legal concept of aequitas, moving away from the medieval  
theory of equity developed by canonists and legists and re-conceptualising it as an aspect of interpretation 
and emendation of the law closely related to Aristotelian epieikeia.443 We have also seen that the first 
generation of humanist writers from Budaeus to Connanus do not seem to have been influenced by the 
medieval approaches of scholastic theologians to epieikeia, and insofar as later approaches to equity in civil 
and canon law followed the earlier humanists, they were equally independent from the writings of 
theologians.444 Interestingly, however, while interest in epieikeia remained rather scant among theologians 
following the writings of Aquinas,445  writings on epieikeia saw a resurgence in the early modern period 
among that generation of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Thomists who are known to have been 
particularly interested in juridical concepts.446  
The concept of epieikeia as first articulated by Aquinas and later developed by Cajetan had little in 
common with that developed by Salamonius and his followers in the first half of the sixteenth century. As 
we shall see, it was neither assimilated to interpretation, nor focussed on giving effect to the intention of 
the legislator. This chapter therefore deals, first, with exposing in more detail what equity as epieikeia meant 
for Aquinas and Cajetan, and how it differed from the equity of civil lawyers, and secondly on the extent 
to which later theologians from the 1550s onwards were themselves influenced by the concept of equity as 
interpretation that was gaining ground among lawyers. Within that last point, we shall see, first, that the 
majority of theologians, starting from Dominicus de Soto (d. 1560), were only influenced by the equity of 
civil lawyers as a matter of form – describing equity as an aspect of legal interpretation and drawing on the 
medieval ius commune on interpretation to provide examples of its operation, without changing its role as a 
doctrine of correction substantively. Secondly, we will look at those theologians who were more directly 
engaged with writing works of a more recognisably legal sort, and (perhaps consequently) felt the influence 
of the equity of civil lawyers much more strongly - challenging (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly) 
                                                    
443 See [2.2] above. 
444 See [2.3] above.  
445 See [1.2.1.2].  Riley only identifies Henry of Hesse (d. 1397), Gerson and Antoninus Florentinus (d. 1459) as writers on 
the topic. We have also dealt with Egidius Romanus above. None of these authors followed Aquinas very closely in their 
accounts of epieikeia and none seem to have developed it substantially. See Riley, Epikeia, pp. 52-6. 
446 This movement is often collectively identified with the name of ‘School of Salamanca’, ‘second scholasticism’ or ‘late 
scholasticism’. For the School in general see, among many others, Miguel Anxo Pena González, La Escuela de Salamanca. De 
La Monarquía Hispánica Al Orbe Católico (2009). The literature on the contributions of the School of Salamanca to juridical 
thought is extremely vast, a general treatment of the subject can be found in Jan Schröder, Recht Als Wissenschaft. Geschichte 
Der Juristischen Methode Vom Humanismus Bis Zur Historischen Schule (1500-1850), p. 201 or, in English, in James Gordley, The 
Jurists: A Critical History, 2013, pp. 82-110. For an extensive bibliography on this subject, a useful and easily accessible resource 
is the working paper by Thomas Duve and others, The School of Salamanca: A Digital Collection of Sources and a Dictionary of Its 
Juridical-Political Language: The Basic Objectives and Structure of a Research Project, 2014. Also conveniently available at 
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/opus4/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/32402/file/SvSal_WP_2014-01.pdf 
(accessed on 04/04/2018). 
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the approach to equity of Soto in order to fully adopt the idea of equity/epieikeia as an interpretation of the 
law in light of the intentions of the legislator. 
 
3.2. The theological concept of epieikeia 
3.2.1. Epieikeia in Aquinas 
Aquinas’ account of epieikeia was mentioned in the first chapter of this study when we compared it to the 
use that medieval lawyers made of aequitas in the same period.447 We will now look at the thought of Aquinas 
in greater detail and consider its impact on early modern theologians. The main source for the later writings 
of theologians was Aquinas’ Summa, rather than his commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics, and I will therefore 
not discuss the latter in this section.448 
For Aquinas, as for early modern jurists, the central issue equity was meant to determine concerned 
whether and when subjects of the law, including judges, should be allowed to depart from the words of the 
law. One important aspect of Aquinas’ discussion, however, and one at the centre of a great divide between 
the humanist and theological concept of equity, is that, for Aquinas, epieikeia may only intervene to prevent 
human law from applying in cases where such an application would exceed the power of human law and, 
therefore, that of the legislator. Generally, Aquinas identifies these cases either as those where human law 
contradicts higher law, such as natural law, or with those where human law does not fulfil its end of 
benefitting the common good.449  The intentions of the legislator, central to the thought of the jurists from 
the previous chapter we identified, are only important for Aquinas insofar as the legislator can be presumed 
not to intend to violate natural law or on the basis that the legislator would be better placed to assess what 
would accord with the public good.450 
In order to better appreciate the thought of Aquinas on equity it will be best to deal with the two 
quaestiones where he expresses his thoughts on the issue of whether and when a subject should be able to 
depart from the words of the law. Aquinas does so both in quaestio 96 of the IaIIae and quaestio 120 of the 
IIaIIae (from now on, I shall simply refer to those as quaestio 96 and quaestio 120). It is not clear that Aquinas 
meant, in both of those, to talk about equity, and only one of the two contains any reference to equity, but 
                                                    
447 [1.2.1.1] above. 
448 Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics can be conveniently found on www.corpusthomisticum.com (last accessed 
04-04-2018). While they do not seem to have wandered far from Aristotle’s text, the commentaries went through their own 
interesting developments in the early modern period, as they were either added to, or modified in light of, Aretinus’ 
translation of the Ethics. As I have found no evidence that the commentaries themselves were relied upon by either Humanist 
jurists or early modern scholastic theologians, I will not examine them in this chapter. For a general discussion of the 
transmission of Aquinas in the early modern period and its interaction with the Aretinus translation of Aristotle see F 
Edward Cranz, ‘The Publishing History of the Aristotle Commentaries of Thomas Aquinas’ (1978) 34 Traditio 157. 
449 See Aquinas, IIaIIae, q. 60, art. 1: ‘si Scriptura legis contineat aliquid contra ius naturale, iniusta est, nec habet vim obligandi 
[...]. Et ideo nec tales Scripturae leges dicuntur, sed potius legis corruptiones, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo secundum eas non 
est iudicandum. [...] [I]ta etiam leges quae sunt recte positae in aliquibus casibus deficiunt, in quibus si servarentur, esset 
contra ius naturale. Et ideo in talibus non est secundum litteram legis iudicandum, sed recurrendum ad aequitatem, quam 
intendit legislator.’ As well as Aquinas, IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1: ‘in aliquibus casibus [legem] servare est contra aequalitatem 
iustitiae, et contra bonum commune, quod lex intendit [...]. Et ad hoc ordinatur epieikeia, quae apud nos dicitur aequitas.’ 
450 See n. 453 below. 
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as both would become key sources for the early modern theological doctrine of equity, it is important to 
look at them in some detail.  
 
3.2.1.1. Quaestio 96 
Quaestio 96 is generally concerned with the power of human law. In article 6, Aquinas addresses the question 
of whether a subject should in certain circumstances be allowed to disregard the letter of the law and instead 
interpret the intention of the legislator. He contrasts the opinions of Hilarius (Hilary of Poitier, d. c. 367) 
and Augustine on the point, the former arguing in favour of such an interpretation, whereas the latter 
authority voiced the objection that only the legislator should be allowed to interpret his own laws. Aquinas 
resolved this question as follows: since the end of human law is to promote the public good, a law that 
harms the public good should not be followed.451 On the other hand, the person best qualified to judge 
whether a law is going to be harmful to the public good is the legislator, he should therefore be consulted 
whenever possible so that he may provide a dispensation.452 If it is clear that applying the law would harm 
the public good, and there is no time to consult the legislator, then the necessity to protect the public good 
will provide a dispensation itself, and a subject should not follow the law.453  
Within this quaestio, Aquinas unhelpfully alternates references to the common good with references 
to the will of the legislator as the central consideration when acting against the words of the law.454 It seems 
clear, however, that the legislator’s intention is only relevant insofar as one presumes the legislator would 
intend his law to further the common good, so that the legislator’s will never exceeds his power. If we 
assume that Aquinas saw public good and (at least the presumed) will of the legislator as always coinciding, 
the reasoning in quaestio 96 can be summed up as follows: in a case where the words of the law lead to a 
result which seems to be in conflict with the public good, the starting point is that one should consult the 
legislator. If there is no time to consult the legislator, one should apply the words of the law, unless it be so 
plain that the application of the law would violate the public good, that the necessity of avoiding harm itself 
provides a dispensation from the law.  
 
                                                    
451 See Aquinas, IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinatur ad communem 
hominum salutem, et intantum obtinet vim et rationem legis; secundum vero quod ab hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non 
habet. Unde iurisperitus dicit quod nulla iuris ratio aut aequitatis benignitas patitur ut quae salubriter pro utilitate hominum 
introducuntur, saluti, non est observanda.’ 
452 Aquinas, Summa IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6: ‘ed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod si observatio legis secundum verba non 
habeat subitum periculum, cui oportet statim occurri, non pertinet ad quemlibet ut interpretetur quid sit utile civitati et quid 
inutile, sed hoc solum pertinet ad principes, qui propter huiusmodi casus habent auctoritatem in legibus dispensandi.’ 
453 Aquinas, Summa IaIIae, q.96, art. 6: ‘Si vero sit subitum periculum, non patiens tantam moram ut ad superiorem recurri 
possit, ipsa necessitas dispensationem habet annexam, quia necessitas non subditur legi […], ille qui sequitur intentionem 
legislatoris, non interpretatur legem simpliciter, sed in casu in qui manifestum est per evidentiam documenti legislatorem 
aliud intendisse. Si enim dubium sit, debet, vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiorem consulere’ 
454 Confront the reference to commune salute at n.451 above and quid sit utile civitati in n.452 above with the reference to 
intentionem legislatoris at n.453 above. 
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3.2.1.2. Quaestio 120 
Aquinas made no mention of epieikeia or aequitas in his quaestio 96.455 Epieikeia is instead explicitly addressed 
briefly in quaestio 60 of the IIaIIae and at length in quaestio 120. In quaestio 60, the discussion features under 
article 5, which states that equity applies whenever the application of human law in certain cases would be 
contrary to natural law.456 The discussion in quaestio 120 is much lengthier and has a lot in common with 
the one under quaestio 96. Here too Aquinas asks whether a subject should in certain cases be allowed to 
interpret the intentions of the legislator rather than the words of the law, and once more opposes to it the 
objection, this time supported by C.1.14.1, that only the legislator should be able to interpret between equity 
and law.457  
That said, the reasoning in quaestio 120 is slightly different from the one above: the focus shifts to 
equity rather than dispensation. Aquinas argues this time that epieikeia will be sufficient to entitle a subject 
not to follow the law in such a case because, while interpretation should indeed be the sovereign’s 
prerogative only, epieikeia requires no interpretation of the law at all and would not be captured by the 
objection in C.1.14.1.458 The reason Aquinas gave for this is that epieikeia does not involve the resolution of 
any ambiguity about the meaning of the law. It applies to cases where the meaning of the law is plain and 
it is plain that following the law would be unjust (e.g. upsetting the public good or natural law), simply 
recognising that the rule has lost its binding power.459 Aquinas did not make any mention of the requirement 
to consult a superior in this quaestio, which may be related to the fact that epieikeia, rather than a dispensation, 
is here summoned to resolve the issue. 
 
3.2.1.3. Ambiguities in Aquinas’ theory of equity 
Having looked at these passages, two issues are left unresolved. The most important issue is the relationship 
between quaestio 96 and quaestio 120: while both seem to answer the same question, the reasoning and answer 
seem to be different in each and – most importantly – only one of them seems to be focussed on epieikeia. 
This first point will – as we shall see – be addressed by Cajetan. The second issue left unresolved is what 
role the intentions of the legislator are playing within Aquinas’ theory. In both quaestiones Aquinas sees the 
right to disobey the words of the law as permissible only when the law would harm the public good or 
violate natural or divine law. Aquinas also mentions, however, that one would also in those cases be giving 
effect to the intentions of the legislator. It is therefore unclear whether the focus of Aquinas is on the will 
or the power of the legislator. On the one hand, a legislator passing a law with the intent of upsetting the 
                                                    
455 The only reference to aequitas occurs in the context of quoting D.1.3.25, where equity is the principle opposed to the 
common good, and thus to be rejected. See Aquinas IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6. 
456 See n.449 above.  
457 Once more, and like in quaestio 96, he placed this objection alongside the authority of Augustine. 
458 Aquinas, Summa IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1: ‘Praetera ad epieikeiam videtur pertinere ut attendat ad intentionem legislatoris, ut 
philosophus dicit [i.e. Aristotle, Ethics, lib. 5, cap. 10]. Sed interpretari intentionem legislatoris ad solum principem pertinet, 
unde imperator dicit [C.1.14.1] inter aequitatem iusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet et licet inspicere. 
Ergo actus epieikeiae est illicitus. […]Ad tertium [i.e the preceding statement] dicendum quod interpretatio locum habet in 
dubiis, in quibus non licet absque determinatione  principis a verbis legis recedere, sed in manifestis non est opus 
interpretatione sed executione’  
459 See nn.449, 458 above 
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public good or natural law would, in Aquinas’ view, be passing no law at all – no need for epieikeia to resolve 
such a case.460 But what of a case where one has hard evidence that the legislator did not wish the rule to 
apply to a certain case, and yet following the words of the law would not upset either the public good or 
laws of a higher order? This ambiguous use of language, assimilating will and power of the legislator 
(perhaps encouraged by Aristotle’s discussion of epieikeia, where the intention of the legislator is key) would 
characterise theological writings on equity up until the time of Franciscus Suarez.461 
 
3.2.2. Cajetan’s commentary 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Aquinas’ theory was not substantively developed in the course of the 
Middle Ages.462 However, greater interest in Aquinas’ writings on equity emerged in the course of the 
sixteenth century, starting with the commentary of Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio, d.1534) and then throughout 
the next two centuries in the writings of early modern Thomists. Cajetan began to work on his comment 
to the Summa in the early 1500s, completing his comment on the Primam Partem by 1507, and those on the 
IaIIae and IIaIIae by 1511 and 1517 respectively.463 Unsurprisingly, most of his discussion on epieikeia centres 
on Aquinas’ quaestio 96, article 6, in the IaIIae, and on Aquinas’ quaestio 120 in the IIaIIae.464  
In many respects, Cajetan follows Aquinas closely, in particular in referring interchangeably to the 
will of the legislator and the common good as the triggers for epieikeia. As will appear below, however, 
Cajetan made it much clearer that epieikeia was a doctrine concerned with the limits of human law, rather 
than with interpreting the intentions of the legislator and, working from this premise, derived the key 
principles of the theological concept of equity. These principles are relevant for our purposes insofar as 
they highlight the great difference between this approach to equity, which would be the starting point for 
almost all early modern theologians, and the one that would be developed shortly thereafter by humanist 
jurists such as Salamonius.465 The main aspects of Cajetan’s theory of equity, and the ones that clash most 
obviously with its humanist counterpart may be narrowed down to three. 
The first elaboration on Aquinas that Cajetan introduced related epieikeia much more clearly to the 
limits on the power of the legislator. Aquinas had mentioned that, for equity to intervene, the law ought 
either to violate natural law or the public good – Cajetan stated the rule more broadly, saying that epieikeia 
should apply whenever following the words of the law would cause one to do wrong (to act inique). Cajetan 
specifies, in this context, that the mere fact that the reason why a law was passed (ratio) does not apply to a 
certain case is not enough to justify the intervention of epieikeia as long as following the words does not 
                                                    
460 See n. 449 above. 
461 See [4.2.4] below. 
462 See n. 445 and [1.2.1.2] above. 
463 Eckehart Stöve, ‘De Vio, Tommaso’, Treccani - Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani (1991). 
464 I refer throughout to Thomas Aquinas and Thomas De Vio, Divi Thomae Aquinatis... Primam Secundae et Secundam Secundae 
Summae Theologiae. Cum Commentariis... Thomae de Vio (1593). 
465 There is no evidence that Cajetan was aware of developments among humanists, or that he was familiar with the take on 
epieikeia developed in Budaeus’ Annotationes in Pandectas, the only Humanist work dealing with aequitas before the publication 
of Cajetan’s comment on the IaIIae and IIaIIae. 
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cause any injustice. 466 Cajetan labels cases which cause injustice as cases where the reason of the law (ratio 
legis) fails obliquely (defectu obliquitatis).467 Clearly therefore, for Cajetan, the avoidance of injustice, rather 
than giving effect to the ratio legis or intentions of the legislator is the core function of epieikeia. 
From this narrower focus followed another principle of epieikeia, only implicit in Aquinas’ analysis. 
If the role of epieikeia is simply to allow subjects not to follow the law where it has no power to bind, rather 
than give effect to the intentions of the legislator or ratio legis, then, for Cajetan, it can only serve to disapply 
broadly framed rules in certain particular cases where they happen to do injustice, rather than to extend the 
application of rules from one case to another. Cajetan supported this view by reading Aquinas’ quaestio 120 
in conjunction with Aristotle’s own discussion of epieikeia in the Ethics, where the latter described epieikeia 
as a correction or direction of the law where it is defective on account of its universality.468  
The final point made by Cajetan concerned how certain one should be of the injustice that would 
follow applying the words of the law and whether and when one should consult a superior before resorting 
to epieikeia. In order to answer this question, Cajetan had to resolve the ambiguous relationship between 
quaestio 96 and quaestio 120 mentioned above.469 The problem, for Cajetan, was that the two rules seemed 
inconsistent with each other. In quaestio 96, Aquinas seemed to require both certitude that injustice or harm 
would follow (evidentiam nocumenti) and an imminent danger (subitum periculum), only in the presence of both 
requirements would a dispensation from following the law arise, one should consult a legislator or follow 
the words of the law in all other cases.  Instead, in quaestio 120, Aquinas seemed simply to require certainty 
that injustice or harm would follow (locum habet in manifestis), without any reference to imminent danger or 
consulting a superior. If both passages referred to epieikeia, they would be incompatible. Cajetan, however, 
avoided this difficulty by divorcing more clearly equity from interpretation. The point in both questions 
was that subjects are not allowed to interpret the law. However, Aquinas explained that epieikeia properly 
understood did not involve any exercise of interpretation at all.470 For Cajetan, this meant that quaestio 120 
was the only one of the two that concerned epieikeia, since it required such a degree of certainty that injustice 
                                                    
466 De Vio, Thomae Aquinatis, ad IiaIIae, art. 1, f. 284r: ‘Dupliciter namque contingit deficere legem propter universale. Sive 
negative vel contrarie. Deficit siquidem lex propter universale negative tantum quando accidit casus, in quo cessat ratio legis, 
ac propter hoc videtur, quod lex in illo casu non obliget. Si tamen servetur lex, nihil mali, nihil inordinati committitur.’ 
467 De Vio, ibid., f. 284r: ‘Diligentissime quoque notandum est quod non de quocunque defectu legis, propter universale, est 
sermo in hac distinctione Aristotelis, sed de defectu obliquitatis. […] Contrarie autem deficit lex propter universale, quando 
evenit casus, in quo non solum cessat ratio legis, sed inique ageretur, servando legem’. Cajetan justifies this by referring, 
among others, to Scripture, to the definition of equity as a part of justice, as well as to a reductio ad absurdum by pointing to 
the various objectionable acts which epieikeia would render permissible if its application were broader. See De Vio, Thomae 
Aquinatis, f. 284r. 
468 De Vio, ibid.: ‘In quaestio 120 nota primo quod quid est epiiciae, seu aequitatis, ut Latine loquamur in lingua Latina. Ut 
enim ex [Aristotelis, Ethicorum, lib. 5] patet, aequitas est directio legis ubi deficit propter universale […] Dicitur propter 
universale, quia causa defectus eius ad hoc, ut aequitas habeat locum, non est quaecumque, sed sola ista, scilicet si propter 
universale deficit, hoc est, si ideo deficit, quia quod universaliter statutum esse in hoc particulari casu deficit. […] Nam si 
deficeret lex in casu aliquo propter privilegium aliter praecipiens, quam lex communis, non spectat directio actuum privilegii 
ad aequitatem: quam non deficit tunc lex propterea quia erat universalis, sed quia legislator derogavit legi quo ad hos 
privilegiatos: et simile est si ex quacumque alia causa lex deficiat. Nunquam enim spectat directio ad aequitatem nisi deficiat 
propter universale.’ 
469 See [3.2.1.3] above. 
470 See Aquinas, IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1: ‘ad epieikeiam videtur pertinere ut attendat ad intentionem legislatoris […] sed 




would follow as to avoid any need to interpret the law.471 What about quaestio 96? For Cajetan, quaestio 96 
concerned cases where the degree of certitude was not such as would obviate the need for interpretation 
(and thus trigger epieikeia), but where it was reasonably foreseeable (rationabile) that harm would ensue; in 
these cases interpretation would still be required, and a superior should be consulted whenever possible, 
but a subitum periculum may provide a dispensation from the rule despite the need for interpretation.472 
To conclude, in Cajetan’s analysis, epieikeia properly understood applies in cases where one is 
confronted with a generally framed rule, and it is so certain that applying the words of this general rule to 
a particular case would result in injustice that no interpretation is required to know it has no binding 
power.473 
Cajetan’s approach provides an interesting starting point for early modern theologians precisely 
because it is so different from the theory of equity that would soon be developed by early modern humanist 
jurists.  The latter saw equity as (i) a doctrine of interpretation that (ii) gave effect to the intentions of the 
legislator and (iii) would serve both to narrow general rules and to broaden narrow ones.474 Cajetan instead 
settled the theologians’ theory of equity by (i) distinguishing it from interpretation, (ii) centering it on the 
recognition of the legislator’s inability, rather than unwillingness, to bind in a certain case and (iii) confining 
its scope to the restriction of broadly framed rules. The effect of the emerging humanistic approach on the 
accounts of equity of early modern theologians will be the focus of the following section. 
 
3.3. The approach of sixteenth-century Thomist theologians and jurists 
Cajetan’s theory of equity was produced at a time when the concept of epieikeia had not yet been 
incorporated in the accounts of aequitas by legal writers in either civil or canon law. As was considered in 
the previous chapter, the only legal writer who, by 1517 (the date of completion of Cajetan’s commentary), 
had discussed in print the concept of epieikeia assimilating it to aequitas was Gulielmus Budaeus in his 
Annotationes in Pandectas, but the latter’s account was rather vague and bore little relation to the writings of 
legists and canonists on aequitas.475 In contrast, this section will deal with those early modern theologians 
                                                    
471 See De Vio, Thomae Aquinatis, ad IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6, f. 209v: ‘[Occurrere potest casus in quo] manifestus [sit quod 
observatio legis secundum verba sit damnosa communi saluti] sed sustinens moram [i.e. where there is no subitum periculum], 
et tunc duce gnome et epieichia sine superioris consultatione praetermittuntur verba legis, et servatur intentio eius: quia in 
manifestis non est opus interpretatione, quae spectat ad superiorem, sed executionem, ut in [IIaIIae, q. 120] author dicit. [...] 
Quod ergo in litera [i.e. IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6] dicitur, quod extra subitum periculum, non pertinet ad quemlibet interpretari, in 
casu dubio est sermo. [...]  Si [namque] de manifestis [est sermo] contradicit dictis ex [IIaIIae, q. 120] quod in manifestis extra 
casum necessitatis, non est opus interpretatione, sed virtus epieicheia sufficit. [...] Et quod mens authoris sit ista, patet ex 
hoc, quod dicit, scilicet, quod necessitas habet dispensationem annexam. Constat enim, quod dispensatio ex interpretatione 
legis procedit. Interpretatio autem locum non habet in manifestis. De ambiguis igitur [...] intendit.’ 
472 De Vio, ibid., f. 209v: ‘[I]n ambiguis datur latitudo. Nam quaedam sic occurrunt ambigua, ut in sua ambiguitate remaneant. 
Quaedam vero sic sunt ambigua, ut rationabile sit, quod si legislator adesset, hanc proculdubio partem determinaret nunc, 
hic servandam. Sermo ergo literae [i.e. IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6] de ambiguis et de eis universaliter docet, quod interpretatio spectat 
ad superiores, quando potest ad eos recurri: quando vero non potest recurri, si sunt ambigua secundo modo [i.e. ut rationabile 
sit etc.], necessitas habet dispensationem annexam. Si vero sunt ambigua primo modo, tunc secundum verba legis agendum 
est.’ 
473 De Vio, Thomae Aquinatis, ad IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1, f. 284r: ‘Non nam aequitatis est interpretari, an in hoc casu servanda sit 
lex, sed ubi manifeste lex deficit propter universale, dirigere.’ 
474 See [2.3.1], [2.3.4] and [2.5] above. 
475 See [2.2.1] above. 
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who had developed Cajetan’s and Aquinas’ theory of epieikeia at a time where, under the influence of 
humanist jurists such as Salamonius, Duarenus and Connanus, the concepts of epieikeia and aequitas were 
being drawn together by legal writers and associated with a doctrine of legal interpretation focussed on the 
intentions of the legislator. The works examined in this section will be divided into two categories, because 
they interacted with the humanist concept of equity very differently. The first category consists of works of 
a straightforwardly theological nature, the main example of which is Soto’s De Iustitia et Iure, providing the 
main source for theologians up until the times of Franciscus Suarez. In works of this nature, the impact of 
the civil law concept of equity as interpretation was negligible in terms of substance, but seemingly 
influenced the way in which certain concepts were expressed, most obviously in the way epieikeia and 
interpretation were brought together. The second category are works of a more legal nature, such as 
commentaries on the Liber Extra, or discussions of legal points within theological works. Here, the impact 
of the humanist concept of equity is unmistakable as the authors of these works draw mainly from legal or 
humanist sources in the course of their discussion, either ignoring or departing from the position of Cajetan 
and Soto. The latter works are consistent with the argument of the second chapter – as the views of 
Salamonius, Connanus and Duarenus on equity spread among later civil lawyers, those theologians who 
drew on civil law writings to inform their ideas about equity inevitably came into contact with them. 
 
3.3.1. Development of the early modern theological concept of equity: Dominicus de Soto 
3.3.1.1. Soto’s concept of equity 
Soto dealt with equity mainly in the first book of his De Iustitia et Iure, written around 1553-4,476 and 
specifically under the eighth article of the sixth quaestio. The title of the article is ‘whether subjects are 
entitled to act beyond the words of the law’, the same as that of Aquinas’ quaestio 96, article 6 in the IaIIae, 
and Soto’s discussion is essentially a commentary on it.  
Soto’s approach to epieikeia remains, like that of Cajetan and Aquinas, focussed on the theological 
question of the binding power of human law. Soto refers to Aquinas’ position about the availability of 
epieikeia on the basis that a law which is harmful to the public good ought not to be followed and extends 
the meaning of public good to cases where applying the words of the law would result in the death of an 
individual.477 Thus, for Soto as for Cajetan, epieikeia allows one to depart from the law in cases where the 
law simply loses its power to bind on account of the harm that its application would cause. This is all the 
more clear from the distinction that Soto sees between the legal maxim cessante ratione legis cessat lex and the 
role of epieikeia. Soto follows Cajetan in specifying that epieikeia only has a role where the application of the 
law results in such harm as to overstep the boundaries of human law. Simply finding that the ratio of the 
law did not contemplate the case at hand will not be enough for a subject to make use of epieikeia – though 
                                                    
476 For a brief history of the genre see Wim Decock, Theologians and Contract Law (2013), pp. 65-8. 
477 Dominicus de Soto, De Iustitia et Iure Vol. 1 (1556), q. 6, art. 8: ‘Videtur enim sactus Thomas nimium illam stringere, dum 
ait illo praeciso casu quo legis observatio in exitium vergeret communis salutis, non esse servandam, cum tamen neque in 
privatam interniciem sit servanda. Etenim ille cui palam esset, osbservationem legis esse sibi lethalem, constaretque, ex natura 
legis non esse eius mentem in tantum periculum adigere subditos, neutiquam tenetur legem custodire.’ 
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it may very well provide a sound ground for a superior to grant a dispensation. This is explained in a passage 
where Soto says that epieikeia explains why a subject in a certain case is not bound by the law, whereas a 
dispensation is instead a declaration that the ratio of a law does not apply to a certain case, and the latter is 
only the prerogative of a superior. As Soto puts it, for the law to lose its binding power it is necessary that 
its application contravene reason, which is not the same as saying that the reason of the law would be 
missing for that particular person or case.478 The examples Soto gives of the application of a law violating 
reason clearly match the instances described above of a law resulting in either harm to the public good or 
in the risk of death for an individual, and have nothing to do with the ratio legis: if a rule commanding one 
to abstain from eating meat will cause one to die, epieikeia is available to avoid the application of the rule; 
however, the mere fact that one does not need the mortification of the flesh on account of which fasting 
is required is not enough to invoke epieikeia to avoid it.479 Similarly, if a law forbids low-borns and disgraced 
individuals (ignobiles homines et infames) from getting on horses, epieikeia will only allow them to do so in order 
to escape from the enemy (and presumably save their lives), but not simply because it would be useful to 
them in battle.480 
Another set of cases that would have been obviously falling within the scope of epieikeia if its 
purpose had been to give effect to the intentions of the legislator would be those where a subject of the 
law is endeavouring to adhere to the written words of a rule while clearly intending to subvert its aim. Soto 
does recognise that this attitude to the law ‘iniquitas est, epieikeiae e regione adversa’,481 but does not 
explicitly recognise that these are cases which epieikeia is meant to remedy by allowing for a different 
interpretation of the rule in question. Soto’s example is of a situation where a law prohibits that one institute 
as heir a child born out of wedlock (adulter filium spurium), and a subject nominates as heir another individual 
on the understanding that he is to then pass the inherited property onto the bastard son. Soto merely makes 
the point that this approach to the law would amount to a prevaricatio legis and refers to D.1.3.29 to make 
the point that it would be prohibited.482 
 
                                                    
478 Soto, ibid.: ‘Patet ergo discrimen quid epieikeia non est subditum per licentiam eximere casu quo teneretur, sed explicare 
quod in illo casu non tenebatur: dispensatio autem est licentiam concedere. [...] Sed arguis contra: si Praelatus non potest 
sine causa dispensare, sit ut dispensatio nihil aliud sit quam declaratio causae ob quam ratio legis in tali casu deficit. [...] Nam 
etsi ratio legis in hac persona deficiat, non ideo protinus a vinculo legis enodatur. Aliud enim est quod observatio humanae 
legis rationi sit contraria, ubi epieikeia locum habet: aliud vero quod ratio legis in hac persona deficiat, ubi nihilominus 
necessaria est dispensatio’. 
479 Soto, ibid.: ‘Exempla sunto. Si carnes dievetita non comedere caussa mihi esset ut fame perirem, possum epieikeia usus 
comedere.  Tamen licet ego castigatione carnis non indigerem, ob quam ieiunium indictum est, imo abstinentia et inedia 
aliquod mihi esset impedimentum studii, non ideo liber a lege fio, sed est causa ut mecum Praelatus dispenset.’ 
480 Soto, ibid.: ‘Item dum vetaret lex ignobiles homines et infames equos ascendere, si occurreret eorum cuipiam casus, ut 
nisi se equo eriperet, in manus hostium incideret, tunc epieikeia eum docet lege se illo casu non obligari At vero etsi 
contingeret quempiam illius classis hominem utilem esse bello, non subinde equo liceret uti, sed tamen ratio dispensationis 
emergeret.’ 
481 But this acknowledgment itself may be the product of humanistic influence. See n. 487 below. 
482 Soto, ibid.: ‘Prohibet lex ne adulter filium spurium haeredem instituat: concedere ergo alteri haereditatem qui det filio, est 
verba legis, non autem mentem servare. Prohibet et altera lex ne sacerdos sacerdotium in favorem filii renuntiet: alter autem 
confert alterius filio, ut ille suo vices rependat.’ 
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3.3.1.2. Equity and interpretation in Soto 
However, in certain respects it may be possible to see the influence of the humanist concept of equity on 
Soto’s analysis. One way in which this influence seems to have manifested itself is in allowing Soto to 
assimilate epieikeia and interpretation, broadening the scope of equity beyond Cajetan’s narrow view.  
Throughout his exposition of the theory, Soto unproblematically describes the process of invoking 
epieikeia as one of interpretation, using expressions such as epieikeia interpretari, and interpretatio per epieikeiam. 
Both expressions are adopted in the course of distinguishing epieikeia from dispensation, when Soto also 
describes the former as involving an ‘interpretatio ex aequo et bono’,483  adopting the language that was 
growing more common among humanist-influenced jurists.484 This passage suggests that in his treatment 
of epieikeia, Soto was at least superficially familiar with the way in which equity was discussed by Salamonius, 
Connanus and Duarenus around the same time. 
Soto does not articulate this explicitly, but one aspect in which assimilating epieikeia and 
interpretation may have influenced his thought was to cause him to depart from Cajetan’s reconciliation of 
Aquinas’ quaestio 96 with quaestio 120 mentioned above. As mentioned earlier, Cajetan thought that only 
quaestio 120 applied to epieikeia proper, and that therefore there was only room for epieikeia in cases that were 
so certain as to require no interpretation.485 While Soto did recognise the inconsistency between quaestio 96 
and quaestio 120, he simply extended his doctrine of epieikeia to encompass Cajetan’s explanation of quaestio 
96, i.e. that where it is reasonably foreseeable (rationabile) that the application of the words of the law will 
result in an evil, the law can be avoided. Cajetan thought the latter a form of dispensation on account of 
necessity rather than epieikeia, precisely because it involved some degree of interpretation. Soto instead had 
no problem regarding quaestio 96 as covering an aspect of epieikeia itself, notwithstanding the fact that 
Aquinas described it as an instance of interpretation. Thus, for Soto, there are two situations where a subject 
may have recourse to epieikeia, (i) those cases where it is certain that an evil would follow the application of 
the law,  and in those cases one may depart from the law even if there is time to have recourse to a superior, 
and (ii) those cases where it is only probable that injustice (i.e. a breach of higher law, or public good, or 
private death) will follow, and in those cases one may only have recourse to epieikeia where a superior cannot 
be consulted on account of a subitum periculum.486 As we shall see, Soto’s extension of equity to cover cases 
of probability as falling within the scope of epieikeia would be followed by all later writers. 
Finally, another consequence of the greater assimilation of epieikeia and interpretation seems to be 
the acknowledgment that the strict adherence to the words of a rule disregarding its purpose – a case, as 
                                                    
483 Soto, Iustitia et Iure, Vol. 1, q. 7, art. 3: ‘Quo haec autem lucidiora fiant, nonnulla hic sunt consideranda. Insinuat se enim 
hic primum omnium fallacia quae nonnullos devincit. Nempe idem esse dispensationem, quod est epieikeia: eo qua 
dispensator nihil eis aliud videtur efficere, quam legem in tali casu ex aequo et bono interpretari. At vero secus res habet. 
Differunt enim significato [...] epieikeia interpretari et dispensare. [...] Interpretari autem per epieikeiam est ipsam declarare, 
in tali casu locum non habere. At vero dispensare est quempiam subditorum a lege excipere: concessa illi licentia et facultate, 
sine qua legi esset obnoxius.’ 
484 See [2.5.2] above. 
485 See n.471 above. 
486 Soto, De Iustitia et Iure Vol. 1, q. 6, art. 8: ‘Si [...] medio modo se habeat, ita ut neque certus omnino sit, neque prorsus 
ambiguus, sed in illam partem propendeat, quod potest facere contra legem. Itaque illius partis opinionem habet cum 
formidine alterius: tunc si mora datur qua possit magistratum consulere, id facere tenetur: sin vero per subitaneum periculum 
id non licet:tuto facere potest contra legem. Atque hic est casus tertiae conclusionis’. 
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we said, often mentioned by humanist jurists as paradigmatic of epieikeia, would for Soto, if not fall within 
the scope of epieikeia itself, certainly be an interpretive attitude the polar opposite to interpretation by 
equity.487 
 
3.3.1.3. Soto and the sixteenth-century theological concept of equity 
All in all, Soto’s discussion of epieikeia remained faithful to that of Cajetan in substance. The intention of 
the legislator or the ratio legis have little to do with the reason for the intervention of epieikeia, which remained 
inextricably linked to the power of human law. As Soto puts it, epieikeia merely serves as an explanation of 
why a law has no power to bind in a certain set of circumstances.488 Soto’s doctrine did not engage 
substantively with either the doctrine of equity of medieval legists and canonists or that which was emerging 
among humanist jurists. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the influence of the latter may have been responsible 
for the assimilation of epieikeia and interpretation in his analysis – thus broadening the scope of epieikeia - 
as well as the identification of the polar opposite of epieikeia with fastidious adherence to the words of the 
law at the expense of its intention. 
Soto’s approach soon became popular among early modern theologians engaged in commentaries 
over Aquinas’ work. Juan De Salas (d. 1612), writing in the 1580s, provided an account very close to that 
of Soto,489 even repeating word for word the latter’s comments about the opposition between epieikeia and 
fraudulent adherence to the words of the law.490   Bartholomaeus de Medina (d. 1580) in his Expositio on 
IaIIae q. 96 art. 6 of 1580 and Gabriel Vasquez (d. 1604) writing a  commentary on the same work a decade 
later both followed Soto in substance as well as in his association of epieikeia with the language of 
interpretation.491 A similar approach can be seen in Petrus de Aragon (d. c. 1592),492 who followed Soto’s 
and Cajetan’s doctrine without any reference to its medieval or early modern legal concept.493 
Soto’s writings on equity clearly had a very profound impact on theologians and remained the most 
authoritative work on the point until the publication of Franciscus Suarez’s own analysis in De Legibus. 
However, not all early modern theologians followed Soto’s approach in this period. As we shall see in the 
next section, especially among jurist-theologians writing works of a more clearly legal nature, the approach 
                                                    
487 See above n. 481. Cf with the attidue of humanist jurists with particular reference to calumniosa interpertatio at nn. 151, 183 
and 220. 
488 See n.483 above. 
489 Juan De Salas, Tractatus De Legibus (1611), p. 269. 
490 Like Soto, Salas refrained from finding a specific role for epieikeia in remedying those cases, simply referring to this as a 
prevaricatio legis. De Salas, ibid., p. 270: ‘[An violet legem qui servando verba eius in cortice, contra eius mentem et intentionem 
facit]. Respondeo talem esse legis prevaricatorem.  [...] et haec iniquitas est opposita epieikeiae, nam epieikeia servata mente 
legis contra eius verba, seu corticem tantum facit : et qui sic operatur, non peccat’. Compare with Soto n.481 above. 
491 Bartolomé de Medina, Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis (1580), pp. 533-4: ‘Dicit lex quod 
depositum reddatur: exposcit quis depositum ad destruendam rempublicam; ex aequi et iusti interpretatione non teneor reddere.’ 
(my emphasis). See also Gabriel Vázquez, Commentariorum Ac Disputationum in Primam Secundae S. Thomae Tomus Secundus 
(1605), disp. 176, art. 2, p. 296: ‘si alicui immineret periculum hostium, si domum exiret ad audiendam missam diebus sestis, 
non deberet exire, sed legem posset ex aequitate interpretari’ (my emphasis). There are some minor differences from Soto’s 
account in Vasquez, on which see Riley, Epikeia, p. 65, but the main features, including that a simple failure of the ratio legis 
will not suffice to justify epieikeia, are all present. 
492 Theodore Tack, Pedro de Aragón. His Life, Works and Doctrine on Restitution (1957). 
493 See Pedro de Aragón, In Secundam Secundae (1597), p. 18. 
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of contemporary jurists was much more influential and accounts of equity differed greatly from those 
examined above. 
 
3.3.2. The impact of the legal concept of equity on theologians writing legal works 
As we have seen, there were important differences between the theological approach to epieikeia led by Soto 
and Cajetan and that of humanist jurists explored in the previous chapter. However, in striking contrast to 
this, the legal writers we shall examine below – Azpilcueta, Covarrubias, Molina and Salon – either ignored 
or openly challenged the theological orthodoxy on equity when writing works of a legal nature, adopting 
instead the humanist approach to epieikeia as aequum et bonum. 
  
3.3.2.1. Martin de Azpilcueta (d. 1586) 
Martin de Azpilcueta was the first of the early modern Thomists to clearly attempt to bring in line the 
theological learning on aequitas as epieikeia with the humanist concept of equity. His most thorough 
discussion of epieikeia is found in his commentary on the decretals at X.2.1.494 There, Azpilcueta engages 
with equity in the course of a discussion of how judgments may be distinguished from one another.495 One 
distinction, is that between a judgment which is just (iustum) and one which is unjust (iniustum), according 
to whether it is given pursuant to a just law or an unjust law.496 In this context, Azpilcueta explains that one 
does not give an unjust judgment simply when one does not follow the words of the law, as long as one 
judges according to the mens legislatoris. Immediately after making this point, Azpilcueta brings together 
passages from Aquinas’ Summa, passages in the Accursian gloss about interpretation, sources of Roman 
law, and Budaeus’ own theory of equity to substantiate his point.497 Azpilcueta seems to have been aware 
that identifying epieikeia with an interpretation according to the mens legislatoris was at odds with the narrower 
theories of theologians such as Soto and Cajetan. As a result, he needed to address the points in the theories 
of these other authors that most obviously clashed with the humanist approach to epieikeia. 
The first point, as mentioned earlier, was that an interpretation of the law according to the mens 
legislatoris would not seem to be confined to cases of restrictive interpretation in the way that a theory of 
equity focussed on the power of human law would be. Azpilcueta therefore objected to the view, shared by 
Cajetan, Soto and their followers, that epieikeia should only be used to restrict the application of broadly 
framed rules. In order to make the argument that it should not be so confined, he read Aquinas’ and 
                                                    
494 Martin de Azpilcueta, Commentarius Utilis in Rubricam de Iudiciis (1585), pp. 48-54. 
495 See Azpilcueta, ibid., p. 45. 
496 Azpilcueta, ibid., p. 48: ‘Decimoctavum principale, quod iudicium, prout sumitur pro actu iudicandi, tertio dividitur in 
iudicium iustum et iniustum. Iustum est quod secundum leges iustas fertur, iniustum autem, quod non secundum leges iustas 
fertur, intelligendo per leges tam humanas, et consuetudines praescriptas, quam divinas et naturales iuxta [X.1.4.11] et 
[C.8.52.3.].’ 
497 Ibid.: ‘Advertendum tamen, quod qui iudicat secundum mentem legislatoris, et ut ille iudicaret, si ab eo quaesitum fuisset, 
aliter quam verba legis sonant, non iudicat iniuste, nec peccat, ut egregie ait [Aquinas, IIaIIae, quaestio 60, art. 5] glossa recepta 
et reputata in [D.2.14.40.3 ad ‘per exceptionem’] in haec verba: ‘id est de iure servandum, licet non sit statutum, quod 
verisimile est statutum fuisse, si hoc quaesitum fuisset’, ut [C.3.29.5, D.45.1.138.1?] haec illa quod ipsum docet [Aquinas, 
IIaIIae, quaestio 120, art. 1] dicens, id fieri per aequipeiam [sic], vel rectius epiiciam, que latinis est aequitas, ut probat [C.1.14.1] 
et [C.3.1.8] et appellatur etiam bonum et aequum in [D.1.1.1pr] imo bonum aequum, et aequum bonum ut late docet Budaeus 
ibi post [Aristotle, Ethics, lib. 5]’. 
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Cajetan’s theological arguments about epieikeia alongside the writings of medieval canonists and legists on 
issues of interpretation. He puts it so clearly it is helpful to quote the passage in full: ‘An autem aequitas 
sive bonum et aequum duplex sit: altera limitans, qua excluduntur casus inclusi: altera extendens, qua 
includuntur casus non inclusi, quaestio pulchra est: cuius partem affirmantem quidam recentiores haud 
vulgari eruditione […]. Contra quae tamen facit quod [Aristotle, Ethics, lib. 5, cap.  10], solum ponit epiiciam 
ad dirigendam legem deficientem propter universale, et nil meminit de deficiente propter particulare: nec 
[Aquinas, Summa IIaIIae, q. 120] nec alibi id videtur meminisse, quem tamen cum primis fuisse Aristotelis 
studiosum nemo ignorat. Caietanus item vir maxime Aristotelicus definiens aequitatem ait, quod est directio 
legis, ubi deficit propter universale’. 
Azpilcueta did note that none of the medieval discussions of cases of extensive interpretation in 
the medieval sources mentioned equity or epieikeia as part of their reasoning, justifying the cases instead as 
extensions of the same ratio from one case to another: ‘[n]ec obstat quod leges et Doctores multi 
frequentissime exendunt legem particularem de uno casu ad alium similem, iuxta [D.1.3.12] quia nulla est 
lex quae dicat illam extensionem fieri ex aequitate, sive epiicia, sed ex rationis identitate. Non obstat etiam 
dicta lex [D.2.1.7.2] quia dici potest quod illa suppletio non fit per epiiciam, sive aequitatem, sed ex rationis 
identitate, iuxta [Dominicus de Sancto Geminiano (d. 1424), ad ‘italiae’ in VI.9.1.]’498 Despite that, 
Azpilcueta put forward a number of arguments to defend the view that epieikeia also covers extensive 
emendations of the law.499 His main focus was on D.2.1.7.2, a rule stating that whoever should damage the 
Praetor’s Edict will suffer a punishment.  This passage was often used as an example of interpretatio extensiva 
by ius commune writers as the Roman jurist Pomponius extended the rule in question to cover cases where 
one damaged the Edict before it was exposed, despite the fact that that case would not fall within the words 
of the rule.500 
First, Azpilcueta argued that the medieval sources supported his analysis. Despite the fact that 
medieval jurists justified extensions of the law as cases of eadem ratio, some were better explained as 
interventions of equity, that is, as he understood it, as interpretations of the mens legislatoris. Referring back 
to D.2.1.7.2, Azpilcueta made the point that that was a case better explained by looking to the intentions 
of the Praetor rather than the ratio of the rule.501 Later, he also identified a specific passage in the Liber Extra 
where – albeit on a strained reading of the passage - an extension of a rule was justified on account of 
eiusdem aequitas.502  
Secondly, he addressed the confinement by Cajetan and Aquinas of equity to an emendation on 
account of universality. Even if one were to agree with Aquinas and Cajetan that epieikeia only effects a 
directio or emendatio propter universale, this does not necessarily confine the doctrine to restrictive emendations 
                                                    
498 Azpilcueta, Commentarius, p. 50. 
499 See n.503 below 
500 See e.g. n.559, 602 below. 
501 Azpilcueta, ibid.: ‘dici potest quod illa suppletio [i.e. ad D.2.1.7.2.] non fit per epiiciam, sive aequitatem, sed ex rationis 
identitate, iuxta [Dominicus de Sancto Geminiano, ad ‘italiae’, VI.9.1.] [...] [sed] responderi potest ad [D.2.1.7.2] quod 
rationem de rumpente edictum iam fixum ad rumpentem illud, cum figitur, non esse quod eadem ratio militat in utroque 
casu; sed quod verisimiliter creditur mentem Praetoris illud figere iubentis fuisse, ut in utroque casu esset locus edicto.’ 
502 See below at n.506. 
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of the law, Azpilcueta puts forward the novissima view that both can be seen as correcting rules propter 
universale, ‘altera quidem quae excludit inclusum in sensu directo verborum; altera vero, quae includit exclusa 
in sensu contrario verborum.’503 Coming again to D.2.1.7.2. Azpilcueta makes the point that this passage 
can be interpreted as a correction of the law because of a defect of universality, even though it is an extensive 
interpretation of it, because ‘Praetor ponens certam poenam corrumpenti edictum in albo propositum, 
videtur a contrario sensu statuisse, ne illa imponatur aliis, et ita emendatio illa per extensionem, quod 
imponatur corrumpenti, cum proponeretur, vel antequam proponatur, potest dici emendatio legis peccantis 
per universale’.504  
Thirdly, Azpilcueta argued that in any case, the medieval sources from legists and canonists made 
it clear that a defect of universality is not the only type of defect remediable by equity.  Once more he 
turned to medieval statements about interpretation. Shortly put, his argument is that there are passages 
throughout civil and canon law sources  saying that not only rules, but also exceptions to rules, can be 
extended to similar cases where the legislator so intended.505 In these cases the defect in the exception to 
the rule that the extension is remedying is due to the exception’s particularity, not to its universality.506 
Crucially, Azpilcueta noted that the main source for this type of extension in the Liber Extra, X.2.30.4, 
describes it as an extension by similitude of equity (aequitatis similitudine);507 this led him to make the point 
that references to aequitas in this passage were to be understood as references to epieikeia, and that the 
extension was being justified by the Aristotelian doctrine.508 
The other aspect of epieikeia that Azpilcueta had to address was that which confined its application 
to cases where the law would fail ‘obliquely’ if it were applied.509 This second limitation, while perfectly 
sensible if the scope of epieikeia is limited to cases where an application of the law would fall outside the 
legislator’s power, fits oddly within a theory centred on giving effect to the legislator’s will. Once more, 
Azpilcueta saw epieikeia as closely linked to doctrines of legal interpretation, and drew from civil law and 
canon law medieval sources in order to make the point that epieikeia should not be confined in this way. 
                                                    
503 Azipilcueta, ibid.: Sed ultra ea urget primo, quod subtiliter et novissime dici possit, quod utraque emendatio fiat propter 
universale’. 
504 Azpilcueta, ibid, p. 51. 
505 Azpilcueta, ibid.. Azpilceuta refers to Panormitanus ad X.2.30.4 (1547), f. 178rb and Decius ad X.2.19.6 (1551), f. 214ra. 
506 Azpilcueta, ibid.: ‘[Decius ad X.2.19.6] et alia citata ibi per Decium probant casum exceptum a regula extendi ad alium 
similem per aequitatem, sive epiiciam: et palam est, per illam extensionem non emendari legem deficientem per universale, 
sed deficientem per particulare.’  
507 Specifically, X.2.30.4 is a source where the Pope extends a civil law rule (about the fact that witnesses may exceptionally 
be allowed to provide evidence before litis contestatio on account of old age) to a case where an ecclesiastical privilege written 
on papyrus had to be confirmed ahead of proceedings contesting its validity: ‘Nos igitur attendentes, quod iure sit civili 
statutum, ut quando periculum testium formidatur, ne veritas occultetur, et probandi copia fortuitis casibus subtrahatur, 
etiam lite non contestata testes valetudinarii et alii de quibus ex aliqua rationabili causa timetur, ad testimonium admittantur: 
eiusdem aequitatis similitudine provocati, praedicta, praedicta privilegia quasi iam nimia vetustate consumpta cum fuerint non in 
pergameno, sed in papyro conscripta, duximus innovanda.’ (my emphasis). This use of aequitas is typical of the medieval 
occurences of the concept, where equity is a quality of a rule rather than a process of interpretation, though Azpilcueta 
chooses to adopt a strained reading of this passage to make his point. 
508 Azpilcueta, Commentarius, p. 51.: ‘[regula] qua statuitur quod testes de quorum morte timetur, possint accipi lite non 
contestata […] relatum in [X.2.19.6] extendi [per X.2.30.4] ad renovationem privilegiorum nimia vetustate consumptorum, 
idque fieri iusdem aequitatis similitudine, et ita per epiiciam, cum epiicia et aequitas sint idem, ut praefatum est. […] ergo 
epiicia, sive aequitas invenitur in emendatio legis deficientis per particulare, sicut in emendatio legis deficientis per universale.’ 
509 See n.467 above 
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The main point Azpilcueta made was that a number of medieval sources made it clear that in cases where 
the ratio of the law is missing, then a law should no longer apply,510 and he found that many of these cases 
involved no cases of ‘oblique’ failure of the law at all. He points, for instance, to D.37.14.6.2, where the 
rule preventing a patron from forcing a freedman to swear not to have children does not apply if the slave 
being manumitted has been castrated. Azpilcueta argues that in this case the absence of the ratio 
(encouraging the conception of children) is enough for the jurists to disapply the rule, even though it would 
be perfectly possible to enforce it without causing any injustice or sin. 
That these are cases of interpretation by epieikeia is clear to Azpilcueta because, in his view, ‘ratio 
legis videtur causa finalis, cur eam facit legislator. Ergo intentio eius non est comprehendere casum, in quo 
illa cessat; etiamsi absque peccato in eo servari possit’.511 With these points in mind, Azpilcueta concludes 
that, whenever the entirety of the reason why the legislator has passed a law is missing in a single case, then 
the law should no longer apply, because the legislator could not have intended it to apply to such a case.512 
Azpilcueta’s discussion is an interesting example of the impact that the humanist development of 
epieikeia along the lines of interpretation could have on the development of that doctrine. Azpilcueta 
thoroughly treats equity as going hand in hand with doctrines of interpretation and is quick to assimilate 
instances both of extensions of the ratio legis from one case to another and cases where the ratio is missing, 
to instances of epieikeia on account of the fact that the true matter at stake is the mens legislatoris. Passages 
from medieval authors where equity is never mentioned are unproblematically treated by Azpilcueta as 
relevant to it, an indication of the great impact that the humanistic transformation of that concept had had 
by the second half of the sixteenth century. Epieikeia in Azpilcueta had little to do with the avoidance of sin 
or the limits of human law and to be entirely centered on the intentions of the legislator and the purposive 
interpretation of the law.  
Azpilcueta was not always entirely consistent with the statements above, especially in works of a 
different nature. In his Enchiridion, a manual for confessors (and thus of a straightforwardly theological 
nature), Azpilcueta also briefly addressed the issue of whether a law would cease to be binding when its 
ratio failed. There, Azpilcueta’s answer was less straightforward and he made a distinction between a law 
that is passed to address a number of evils, which would cease to be binding when the evils are no longer 
a threat, and a law that was passed to pursue a good, which would not cease to be binding simply because 
the good can be achieved in another way.513 Later authors read this statement as consistent with the view 
                                                    
510 Azpilcueta, Commentarius, pp. 51-2.: ‘insignis et utilis quaestio est, an aequitas, sive bonum [sic] excludat a lege generaliter 
statuente omnes casus, in quibus deficit ratio legis? Ad quam respondet Caiet[anus ad Summa IIaIIae, q. 120] quod non, quem 
sequitur Sotus [...] nisi quando non potest servari illa absque alio peccato. […] Contra quos tamen facit, quod ratio legis est 
anima legis secundum [Dinus Mugellanus ad VI. 5. De Regulis Iuris, regula 88] cui tribuunt hoc [Baldus ad C.6.2.20], quos 
refert et sequitur [Sandeus ad X.2.24.11] […]. At anima animalis deficiente, deficit animal. Ergo ratione legis deficiente, 
deficit lex.’ 
511 Azpilcueta, Commentarius, p. 52. 
512 Azpilcueta, Commentarius, p. 53. 
513 See Martin de Azpilcueta, Enchiridion (1579), lib. 1, cap. 16, n. 36, p. 271: ‘aliud esse dicere, quod lex praecipiens aliquid 
ob aliqua inconvenientia, illis cessantibus, non obligat [...] et aliud dicere id, quod in aliquem bonum finem praecipitur, 
cessare, si finis ille alia via habeatur, quod [Cajetan ad IIaIIae q. 120 and q. 186, art. 3] et nos etiam [consilium super X.3.5.13?] 
tradidimus.’ He claimed to have backed this view in another of his legal works, a commentary on X.3.5.13, but I have not 
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of Soto and Cajetan that a simple failure of the ratio legis would not be enough for epieikeia to step in,514 and 
indeed it seems to be inconsistent with the one expressed by Azpilcueta in his commentary on the Decretals. 
It is possible that Azpilcueta was, in this context, drawing on different sources because of the different 
nature of his work. However, it is also possible that he saw the two statements as compatible. One has to 
remember that the focus of the humanist concept of equity Azpilcueta implemented in his commentary 
was not on the ratio legis, but rather on the mens legislatoris, and it may have been implicit that the failure of 
one would not always imply a failure of the other. Azpilcueta did specify in his commentary that the entirety 
of the ratio legis should cease before epieikeia could intervene,515 and perhaps the Enchiridion could simply be 
read as a development of this statement, saying that the entirety of the ratio would only fail in cases where 
a law had been introduced to respond to an evil, and that in other circumstances one would not be entitled 
to infer that the legislator no longer wished the law to apply. Though it is not clear how this reading could 
be reconciled with Azpilcueta’s application of epieikeia to the case of the manumitted castrated slave, where 
the rule seems to have been introduced to further a good, rather than the avoidance of any particular evil.516  
Azpilcueta does not provide us with sufficient analysis to speculate further than that. 
Another inconsistency can be found in one of his Consilia, where the concept, when mentioned 
simply adopts the medieval distinction of written and unwritten equity.517 The case was about whether the 
Camera Apostholica or the successor of a bishop morientem extra suas ecclesias should inherit the deceased’s 
property in circumstances where the bishop left without a licence to do so, but where he had a good reason 
for not obtaining such a licence. While a specific rule held that a bishop dying in these circumstances should 
pass his property to the Camera Apostholica, it was argued, inter alia, that there is a rule of written equity, 
namely regula 88 in the added title de regulis iuris of the Liber Sextus, to the effect that the justice of a case 
should not depend on writing, but on the reason why some act is done.518 Azpilcueta’s dismissal of the 
applicability of the latter rule as an aequitas scripta in genere is a textbook example of application of the 
medieval approach to equity, plainly inconsistent with a view of aequitas as epieikeia, whether theological or 
humanistic. 
 
3.3.2.2. Didacus de Covarrubias (d. 1577)  
Didacus de Covarrubias, Azpilcueta’s pupil, does not provide us with a detailed discussion of epieikeia in his 
writings and, unlike Azpilcueta, does not seem to acknowledge any discrepancy between the humanist and 
                                                    
been able to find it. Arguably, Azpilcueta’s view in the Enchiridion does not lend any clear support the more blunt statements 
in Soto and Cajetan about ‘negative’ failures of the ratio, but later authors seemed to think the two reconcilable. 
514 Most of the later authors listed at [3.3.1.3] above cited Azpilcueta’s Enchiridion alongside Soto and Cajetan. See also n.667 
below. 
515 See n.512 above. 
516 See n.510 above. 
517 Martin de Azpilcueta, Consiliorum sive Responsionorum, Vol. 1 (1602), cons. 22 at pp. 447-450: ‘Sexto non obstat etiam 
quartum; quia quando aequitas non est scripta et rigor sic, ille est praeferendus [D.40.9.12.1]. Quando item aequitas est 
scripta in genere, rigor autem in specie, rigor praefertur aequitati, secundum resolutionem communem [C.3.1.8] [...] et in 
nostro casu rigor est scriptus in specie, et aequitas nullatenus, vel in genere tantum.’ 
518 The link between the said regula, which is merely a restatement of C.1.14.5, and the point in the case about obtaining a 
written licence, seems rather tenuous. 
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theological concepts of equity. The only discussion of equity to be found throughout his works is in his 
commentary on a regula from the title de regulis iuris519 of the Liber Sextus – a work, therefore, of a distinctly 
legal focus. In the course of an exposition on the concept of bona fides, Covarrubias moves into a description 
of epieikeia that is perfectly aligned with that of humanist jurists, drawing from Budaeus, Oldendorpus and 
other humanist jurists as well as sources from Roman law and rhetoric.520 He explains that, sometimes bona 
fides in legal sources is used not to refer to the honest mental state of an individual, but rather to equity and 
justice opposed to rigour. Epieikeia or aequum et bonum is a benign and humane interpretation of the law, one 
that departs from the surface of the words on account of the circumstances of a particular case. Covarrubias 
does not go into much greater detail about the nature of epieikeia, but both the substance of his argument 
and the sources he refers to make it clear he does not have in mind the narrower theological theory of 
equity examined above – indeed, Covarrubias does not make a single reference to other early modern 
theologians in the course of his discussion of equity.521 
It is not altogether surprising that Azpilcueta and Covarrubias favoured the humanist approach to 
equity. As well as a theologian, Azpilcueta had read law in Toulouse from 1516, where he came into contact 
with legal humanism, and later taught canon law in Salamanca and Coimbra – he would have been 
particularly interested in the humanistic concept of equity and the diffusion it was enjoying among civil 
lawyers. Covarrubias, who studied under Azpilcueta at Salamanca, was also a well known jurist and equally 
hard to place; to cite Wim Decock, Covarrubias ‘quoted as easily from the classical authors, the theologians, 
and the humanists, as he did from the civilians’.522 The approach of Azpilcueta and Covarrubias therefore 
may only reflect their peculiarly legal and humanistic background, as much as the nature of the works in 
which they were engaged. They were not, however, isolated examples and other scholastic theologians 
writing before Suarez can be found similarly disregarding the theological concept of equity in favour of the 
juridical-humanistic one and not necessarily within works of a particularly legal nature. 
 
                                                    
519 That is VI. de reg. iur., reg. 2: ‘possessor malae fidei ullo tempore non praescribit’.  
520 Didacus de Covarrubias, Relectio Regulae, Possessor Malae Fidei. De Regulis Iuris, Liber Sextus (1558) in Didacus de Covarrubias 
y Leyva, Opera Omnia (1627), p. 425: ‘strictum ius esse, quod stricte et proprie ad corticem literae absque ulla benignitate et 
humanitate est intelligendum atque interpretandum, et ideo opponitur aequitati, ac bono et aequo, a quo benigna et humana 
deducitur interpretatio [D.29.2.86pr; D.28.2.13; D.38.17.1.6; D.40.5.41.10; D.46.1.51.1] omnium latissime [Andreas 
Tiraquellus, Utroque Retractu (1618), pp. 497-504]. [...] Hinc [...] ab Aristotele deducitur [Ethics, lib. 5, cap. 10] ex nostris praeter 
alios id anotarunt [Budaeus ad D.1.1.1pr] [...]. Sic et Quintilianus [Institutes, 7.7.] [...]. Sic constat aequitatem esse admirabile 
quoddam temperamentem [sic], quod ex perfecta ratione omnia operatur [D.4.1.7; D.28.5.85(84)] explicat et [Ioannes 
Corasius, Miscellanea Iuris Civilis (1598, pp. 135-139), lib. 2, cap. 18].’ 
521 While later authors such as Suárez occasionally use Covarrubias as a source in support of their understanding of equity, 
the passages they quote are from sections of Covarrubias’ Epitome in quartum decretalium where he does not discuss epieikeia, 
but rather dispensation. I have found no discussion of equity anywhere else in that work. See n.668 below. 
522 Decock classifies the approach of Azpilcueta and Covarrubias as ‘humanist scholastic canon law’. See Decock, Theologians 
and Contract Law, [2.1.3.]. 
108 
 
3.3.2.3. Later examples – Luis de Molina (d. 1600) and Miguel Bartolomé Salon (d. 1621) 
Luis de Molina was a Spanish Jesuit well known for his writings in political theory, theology and 
philosophy.523 As a part of his De Iustitia et Iure written in the 1590s, Molina included a discussion of 
contracts (de contractibus), and in there he briefly mentioned epieikeia.  
Molina’s treatment of epieikeia is very brief, but provides a hint that his views on equity were 
inspired by the writings of contemporary jurists rather than theologians. Molina, like Covarrubias, discusses 
epieikeia in the context of distinguishing it from the meaning of equity used in the context of bona fides – this 
time, in the context of bonae fidei contracts. Molina talks about bona fides as the aequitas arbitrio iudicis which 
takes place in contracts bonae fidei. Equity in the latter meaning, for Molina, had nothing to do with epieikeia 
and merely refers to the discretion of the judge to rule according to what is equitable. Instead, according to 
Molina, epieikeia refers to that aspect of equity where we are concerned with interpreting laws according to 
what the legislator would have said if he had foreseen their application to the present case. Interestingly, he 
says that the application to contracts would work in a slightly different way than its application to law. 
Where a contract is involved, the exercise of epieikeia involves interpreting it as it ought to have been worded 
if neither party had fraud and dishonesty (fraus et dolus) in mind when entering into it. Molina explained this 
process of interpretation by reference to the maxim summum ius summa iniuria, commonly referred to by 
humanist jurists when developing their theories of equity.524 Molina seems, at least when describing the role 
of equity in interpreting legal rules, to have in mind the equity of humanists; the description of its application 
to contracts seems also to be derived from those principles, and certainly would not make much sense 
within the theological or medieval concept of equity.  If this is right, a theologian like Molina, engaging, like 
Soto, on a commentary De Iustitia et Iure, originally centred on Aquinas’ Summa, could by the end of the 
sixteenth century, in the course of a rather technical discussion of civil law (in this case concerned with the 
distinction of bonae fidei contracts and stricti iuris ones) think about equity drawing entirely from the legal-
humanistic tradition, rather than referring to its theological sources. 
An even later example of the adoption of epieikeia in its humanistic sense by a theologian is found 
in Miguel Bartolomé Salon, a Valencian theologian.525 In his Commentariorum in disputationem de iustitia, 
published in the 1590s, Salon mentions aequum et bonum in the course of an explanation of the meaning of 
ius referring to D.1.1.1pr, where the latter is described as ars boni et aequi, and straightforwardly adopts the 
humanistic account of aequum et bonum as a synonym of epieikeia as an interpretation of the law in accordance 
                                                    
523 Alexander Aichele and Mathias Kaufmann, ‘Introduction’ in Alexander Aichele and Mathias Kaufmann (eds), A 
Companion to Luis de Molina (2013). 
524 Luis de Molina, Disputationes de Contractibus (1607), p. 15: ‘Bonam fidem, seu aequitatem arbitrio iudicis, quod locum habet 
in bonae fidei contractibus, non item in contractibus stricti iuris, non idem esse quod Epicheiam, qua, sicut in legibus 
iudicamus, quod eventus non censeantur eis comprehensi, eo quod, si de illis in particulari interrogaretur legislator quando 
legem condebat, respondisset suam mentem non esse, ut compraehenderentur, ita in contractibus iudicemus neutrius 
contrahentium mentem fuisse, ut censerentur comprehensi, nisi in eorum altero fuisset fraus, et dolus, quod ei non debent 
patrocinari. [...] Atque de eius modi iudicio intelligitur tritum illud sermone proverbium: Summum ius, summa iniuria.’ For 
summum ius summa iniuria see n.152 above. 
525 Gonzalo Díaz Díaz, ‘Salon, Miguel Bartolomé’, Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española, Volume 7 (2003). 
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with the wishes of the legislator. The references to humanists are rather clear in Salon, and his discussion 
even includes Budaeus’ criticism of the Accursian gloss at D.1.1.1pr526 
 
3.3.2.4. Salamonius’ equity and theologians 
As we have seen, certain theologians, perhaps on account of their peculiar background and training, as may 
be the case with Azpilcueta and Covarrubias, or on account of the subject matter of their discussion, such 
as the definition of bonae fidei contracts and ius in Molina and Salon respectively, adopted the concept of 
equity that was growing in popularity among humanist-influenced jurists. This is consistent with the 
argument made earlier, which showed that Salamonius’ idea of epieikeia as an interpretation of the law in 
accordance with the intention of the legislator was, from the 1550s onwards, the most successful among 
the theories devised by legal humanists following the introduction of epieikeia in legal scholarship by 
Budaeus. 
Returning to the theological concept of equity, there are two important points to be made. The 
first point is that, with the spread of epieikeia in legal scholarship, the theory of equity of theologians and 
that of those lawyers were much closer – so close, in fact, that the description of equity as an exercise in 
interpretatio ex aequo et bono travelled across from the writings of lawyers to those of theologians. So close, 
too, as to encourage writers like Azpilcueta to deal with the two branches – the theological and the legal – 
as though they were dealing with the same issues.  
The second point to be made follows from the first one. Though they were brought closer together, 
the theological and the legal concept of equity were not obviously compatible. Azpilcueta is a good example 
of a jurist/theologian being influenced by the approach to equity of civil lawyers, but he seems to have 
simply favoured the latter approach over the theologian’s equity. He did not make any particular effort to 
find a way of reconciling the two. If one were to attempt a reconciliation, it would be important to explain 
how interpreting the intention of the legislator related to (i) remedying a defect of universality – and not 
one of particularity – and (ii) depriving the law of binding power in cases of injustice. 
These two points apply most conspicuously to the authors treated in the next chapter. The three 
central figures are Albertus Bolognetus, Hugo Donellus and Franciscus Suarez. All three sought to draw 
from both the legal and theological to further refine their approach to equity and find a more specific space 
for a doctrine of equity within the legal system. Not all appreciated fully (or at least explicitly) the tension 
between the theological and legal concept of equity. The most explicit recognition and resolution of the 
tension between the two is found in the approach to equity of Franciscus Suarez, himself a theologian,  who 
would himself remain the most important source for the theological concept of equity from the seventeenth 
century onwards.  
 
 
                                                    
526Miguel Bartolomé Salon, Commentariorum in Disputationem de Iustitia, Vol. 1 (1591), coll. 5-6: ‘In hoc sensu vocatur ius, id est 
iurisprudentia a Celso in [D.1.1.1pr] ars boni et aequi. Ex quo licet inferre primo non esse idem legem, et artem boni et 
aequi, ut iudicavit Accursius.’ 
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Chapter 4 – The place of equity within doctrines of interpretation 
4.1. Introduction 
We have dealt in the two previous chapters with two revivals of equity as epieikeia in the early modern 
period, one among lawyers, sparked by the writings of legal humanists, the other among early modern 
Thomists, starting with Cajetan’s comment on Aquinas. This chapter’s main focus – which brings this thesis 
to a close – is on the efforts by later civil lawyers to find a specific place for equitable interpretation alongside 
other exercises in interpretation, including interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva. An important argument that 
runs through this chapter is that the writings of theologians were valuable sources for later writers in order 
to identify the place of equitable interpretation. Indeed, the barrier that had kept separated theological and 
legal writings on equity up until early modern times, had – following these two revivals – been broken 
down. In articulating their theories, the authors examined in this chapters sought to rely on both traditions, 
theological and legal, to refine their understanding of the role of equity. 
A point should be made clear. A number of authors among the sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
civil lawyers and canon lawyers mentioned in the second chapter had already started to rely on theological 
sources from the later sixteenth century onwards. It is, however, hard to tell for the majority of them 
whether and how theological sources influenced their approach to equity. The reason for this is that most 
authors mentioning equity only dealt with it in extremely general terms, and did little more than echo the 
theory of equity/epieikeia as interpretation as put forward by Salamonius.527 As already mentioned, in 
authors that so relied on the writings of earlier humanist jurists, the idea of equity as interpretation remained 
generally underdeveloped; they shared the view that equity in the hands of judges would only allow for the 
interpretation of the law in line with the intention of the legislator,528 but what that interpretation would 
entail and how it would differ from other kinds of interpretation known since the Middle Ages was 
expressed only in rather vague terms. What is perhaps even more striking is that this rather great problem 
went for the most part unacknowledged. Questions that remained unanswered were therefore, what does 
it mean to interpret the intention of the legislator by equity? How does that differ from interpreting a rule 
restrictively or extensively as medieval lawyers would have done? What kind of evidence should one be 
allowed to adduce when labouring to show that the intention of the legislator, or of the law, is such as to 
allow a judge to depart from its words? As we saw, these was also true of the approaches to equity found 
in the later seventeenth and eighteenth century.529  
Some of these questions were, as we saw in the previous chapter, answered by scholastic 
theologians.530 The authors I examine in this section are, instead, among the few that dealt with equity in 
enough detail to give us an idea of what purpose theological sources served when cited alongside the civil 
law orthodoxy on equity, and of how they influenced the way in which these authors conceptualised the 
                                                    
527 See [2.3.5], [2.5.2] above. 
528 We saw some, including Connanus, refer to this idea as ‘civil’ equity, but the way in which this concept was developed 
was not consistent, see e.g. in Duarenus. See [2.3.4.2]. 
529 See [2.5.5] above 
530 See [3.2.1], [3.3.1] above. 
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role of equitable interpretation within the legal system. The scope of equity in theologians from Cajetan 
onwards was narrower, confined to cases where the words of the law suffered from a defect of generality. 
That defect was also narrowly defined, the rule would have to do wrong, sin, or otherwise exceed the power 
of human law. They considered the probability that such a sin or injustice would take place, and this would 
inform the subject or judge on whether it was safe to use epieikeia or whether they ought to refer the matter 
to a superior. These questions, and the arguments put forward to answer them had little in common with 
those brought up in matters of interpretation within legal doctrine, in medieval or in early modern times. 
At the same time, however, the influence of the legal concept of equity on writers from Soto onwards 
brought the language used by theologians when dealing with these problems closer to that of lawyers. They 
began discussing epieikeia as a process of restrictive interpretation of the law that would allow one to avoid 
the application of a rule where it would cause injustice. That process of equitable interpretation would have 
been recognisable to lawyers as fitting their own description of the concept of equity, but also have been 
easily distinguishable from other processes of interpretation in that it performed an entirely different 
function. The theological sources would therefore from that time onwards have the potential to attract legal 
writers seeking to carve a more specific role for equity within the legal system – distinct from existing 
doctrines of interpretation.  
In this chapter we therefore focus on the authors who took the opportunity to do precisely that: 
bring together the works of theologians and civil lawyers on equity in order to develop substantively the 
doctrine of equity as interpretation.  
 
 
4.2. The development of the concept of equity in later civil law 
4.2.1. Bringing together medieval interpretation, humanist equity, and late-scholastic theology. 
As mentioned above, we will in this chapter deal with these writers who drew on theological and legal 
accounts of equity as epieikeia as belonging to the same branch of scholarship, in order to better define the 
role of equity within the legal system. What they had in common, and what distinguishes them from the 
writers merely drawing on the theory of equity of Salamonius and his followers, is that they explicitly 
juxtaposed interpretatio ex aequo et bono – as filtered through legal and theological writings – and other 
exercises in interpretation, including interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva, trying to find a way to either 
assimilate them with equitable interpretation or distinguish it from them. 
These exercises gave, through the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, rise to broadly three 
approaches, and for each of these I have identified an author exposing it most explicitly and extensively. 
The three central figures discussed in this chapter are therefore Albertus Bolognetus, Hugo Donellus and, 
the author functioning as a convenient end-point for our study, Franciscus Suarez, who wrote perhaps one 
of the best known and most celebrated accounts of equity as epieikeia available. It is useful to briefly describe 
each approach in turn.   
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Albertus Bolognetus was the author who took the broadest approach to equity, and was also 
perhaps the one departing the least from the more general accounts of equity relying on earlier humanists. 
Indeed, Bolognetus made explicit what was in all probability implicit in the theories of Salamonius and his 
followers – he explicitly assimilated entirely interpretatio ex aequo et bono with all other types of interpretation, 
and did so relying on both scholastic and legal sources. Bolognetus’ is thus perhaps the most unsatisfactory 
approach to equitable interpretation in terms of identifying its substantive content. In Bolognetus, equity is 
not so much a doctrine as a justification for existing doctrines of interpretation.  
The second approach to equity seems to have originated around the 1570s with writers like 
Ferdinandus a Mendoza. These authors borrowed heavily from the writings of scholastic theologians to 
narrow down the scope of equitable interpretation, distinguishing it from other types of interpretation. The 
specific role of equity in these writers was that of restricting general rules (it was thus an aspect of interpretatio 
restrictiva) in cases where the injustice which their application would cause allows the judge to presume that 
the legislator would not have wanted them to apply. The most complete and influential restatement of these 
theories would be found in the writings of Donellus – who sought to reconcile this product of legal 
humanism and scholastic theology with tradition, assimilating it with some of the approaches to interpretatio 
restrictiva we have observed in the first chapter.   
The third approach, and probably the most complex one, was that of Franciscus Suarez. Suarez 
was a theologian and therefore engaged to a greater extent with the approach to equity of his predecessors, 
like Soto and Cajetan. He acknowledged the contribution of the legal concept of equity by dividing equity 
in two functions – one concerned, in traditional theological fashion, with taking a rule outside the power 
of the legislator, the other – in line with the legal learning – with taking it out of the will of the legislator. 
Further, like Donellus, Suarez saw equity as only applicable to a restrictive interpretation of the law and he 
also sought to distinguish it from other exercises in interpretation. However, and rather unlike Donellus, 
he did not assimilate epieikeia with interpretatio restrictiva, seeing the two as entirely separate exercises. Suarez’s 
view is therefore slightly more complex. It is not altogether clear from his account how interpreting a rule 
to take it out of the will of the legislator in cases where the words are of broader application than the 
legislator intended them to be is going to differ from the more traditional doctrine of interpretatio restrictiva. 
I put forward the view that Suarez meant equitable interpretation to cover a range of cases where the words 
of the law would not be able to bear any possible restrictive meaning that would avoid the application of 
the law, so that equity has to intervene to deprive it of its power. In this sense, Suarez more satisfactorily 
distinguished the more traditional doctrines of interpretatio as concerned with working out the meaning of 
the words of the law, from equitable interpretation, which was – in his view – concerned with whether the 
law would in a case be able to bind. 
To conclude, I consider briefly the impact of these theories on later writers. As mentioned earlier, 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full account of the development of equity beyond the early 
seventeenth century, but it seems that the broader approach of Bolognetus and the more restrictive reading 
of equity provided by Donellus influenced different clusters of scholars, and that Suarez had an impact at 
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least as far as concerns the doctrine of equity developed by theologians in the later seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century. 
 
4.2.2. Linking equity and interpretation I: Albertus Bolognetus – interpretatio ex aequo et bono as a 
general category of interpretation beyond the letter 
Let us first examine the approaches to equity that sought to explicitly construe it as a broad doctrine of 
interpretation of the law beyond the letter, acting as an explanation for and within which to fit existing 
medieval doctrines of interpretation of law. These doctrines were at odds with the doctrine of equity put 
forward by scholastic theologians, but we shall see these theologians referred to by authors adopting them 
to substantiate their points – a testament to their influence and popularity among legal writers engaging 
with equity in this period. 
The most complete and explicit statement of a doctrine of equity in this sense is that produced by 
Albertus Bolognetus (d. 1585) in his De Lege, Iure et Aequitate published in 1570.531 Bolognetus was a 
professor of civil law in Bologna from 1565 until 1574 when he abandoned his legal career to start working 
as protonotary apostolic for his distant relative Pope Gregory XIII (d. 1585).532  Like most writers on equity 
in this period, Bolognetus took the theories of Salamonius and his followers as his starting point to define 
equity: he cites Budaeus for his understanding of aequum et bonum, refers to the intervention of equity as 
concerned with aligning the law with the intention of the legislator, specifies its aim is not necessarily to 
make the law meeker, and adopts the distinction of civil and natural equity that was current among those 
writer, drawing from Duarenus – we return to that latter aspect below, as Bolognetus dealt with it in greater 
detail.533  He occasionally also refers to some of the points from legal dialectics that can be found among 
earlier humanist jurists, discussing the role of equity in terms of legal issues (constitutio legitima) and as a type 
of argument ‘ex scripto et sententia’.534  
 
4.2.2.1. Equitable intervention in Bolognetus 
We now turn to how Bolognetus exposes his theory of equity after these more general statements. Unlike 
the civil law writers we have previously encountered, Bolognetus made an effort to deal more specifically 
with the role of equity and relate it to other exercises of interpretation departing from the words in favour 
of the intention of the legislator.  
Bolognetus starts by explaining that there are two roles that equity is meant to perform through 
emendation or direction. In doing this, he sticks quite closely to the text of Aristotle and argues that laws 
can suffer from two types of defect, one is produced by the legislator knowingly, the other unknowingly. 
                                                    
531 Bolognetus, De Lege, Iure et Aequitate Disputationes (1570). 
532 For more on the life of Bolognetus see Gaspare De Caro, ‘Bolognetus, Alberto’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 2 
(1969): conveniently available at http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alberto-Bolognetus_(Dizionario-Biografico) (last 
accessed on 19-07-2017). 
533 Bolognetus, De Lege, cap. 28, para. 10-1 (natural and civil equity), 12-14 (interpretation not making the law meeker); cap. 
29, para. 1-2 (Budaeus and aequum et bonum). 
534 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 29, para. 17. Citing ad Herennium 1.19. For the role of rhetoric see [2.3.6] above. 
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The former happens when the legislator defines a law generally, having regard to what happens most 
frequently, knowing that he cannot provide for all particular circumstances. This is the defect, for 
Bolognetus, that D.1.3.4 and D.1.3.5 refer to, acknowledging that the legislator will be perfectly aware his 
laws are only suited for the majority of cases.535 The second defect, however, ‘non volentibus, sed invitis 
legumlatoribus contingit’ on account of some oversight, ‘[q]uare sicut primum illud legis p eccatum positum 
est in eo, quod plura, quam oporteat legis scriptura fuerint comprehensa, ita hoc secundum in eo consistit, 
quod fuerit aliquid praetermissum. Ac sicut ibi verba legis coangustanda sunt, ita hic suppleri, ac dilatari 
debent’ - that, for Bolognetus, is what D.1.3.12 refers to.536 Both can be remedied by the intervention of 
equity. While all interpretation of the law is aimed at identifying the intentions of the legislator, equitable 
emendation is that which is aimed at resolving these defects in particular.   
The second point Bolognetus makes is that interventions of equity are distinct from those which 
explain the meaning of the words of the law, or those by which we decide which law or custom is supposed 
to govern a case. Insofar as a law or custom governs a case specifically, equity plays no role in the process 
which leads to the selection of that law or custom.537  An interpretation is only properly equitable if it seeks 
to apply a rule to a case, in circumstances where the letter of the rule is not suited to resolve the case, and 
one must rely on the intention of the legislator to go beyond the letter. When faced with this problem, there 
are two ways to find the intention of the legislator. One way is to draw on other, existing civil law, and that 
is the first kind of equitable interpretation identified by Bolognetus. As he puts it ‘si non illud idem 
reperiertur esse decisum, recte posset aequitatis nomen usurpari: quamvis vel in supplendis iis, quae lege 
praetermissa essent, vel iis coangustandis, quae nimis generatim fuissent tradita, alis aliquas potius civiles 
leges, quam naturalia praecepta prae oculis haberemus. [...] Hoc vero cum facimus [...] tunc vere dicuntur 
uti aequitate, et ex aequo bonoque interpretari’.’538 However, we are not told by Bolognetus how these laws 
are meant to be used in order to arrive at the intention of the legislator. The second kind of interpretatio ex 
aequo et bono for Bolognetus is that through which a defect of generality or particularity in the law is resolved 
by reference to natural precepts. Bolognetus explains the role of natural law in interpreting civil law on the 
basis of the strong links between the two - ‘potissimum de causa conditae fuerunt leges civiles, ut iuri 
naturali praesidio essent’, Bolognetus says, ‘[q]uapropter cum leges civiles a iusto naturali quasi vitam et 
spiritum assumant, contraque et iam totis viribus in naturae conservationem inclinent, nihil tam rationi 
consentaneum est, quam ut quoties illae aliqua in re peccant, a iusto naturali emendentur’.539 In this latter 
case, the intention of the legislator is assumed to coincide with natural law, but, as we shall see below, clear 
                                                    
535 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 29, paras. 9-12.  
536 Bolognetus, ibid, cap. 29, paras. 13-4. 
537 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 30, para. 1: ‘Possumus generatim hic concludere, hanc suppletionem et restrictionem ex ipsius 
legislatoris mente desumi, ut saepe inculcat Arist[oteles]  [...]. Sed quia haec mens varie coniici potest, ut magis distincte 
loquamur, dicamus tria esse, ex quibus sumi potest recta legis expositio [...] sive suppletione, sive restrictione lex indigeat. 
Primo sumi potest ex iis, quae in eadem lege vel praecedunt, vel sequuntur [D.30.50.3]. Et tunc crediderim non recte 
aequitatis nomen usurpari posse. Nam aequitas praeter legem scriptam est, ut recte docet Arist[oteles]. At quod ex iis, quae 
eadem in lege scripta sunt, saltem per interpretationem desumitur, non potest videri praeter legem esse, imo recte legitimum 
appellatur, perinde ac si expressim lege illa cautum esset’. 
538 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 30, para. 4. 
539 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 30, para. 8. 
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evidence from other sources that the legislator’s intention are to depart from natural law, will be 
conclusive.540 The former, Bolognetus calls, an interpretation by civil equity, and the latter an interpretation 
by natural equity – following loosely Duarenus’ definition of it.541 
4.2.2.2  The scope of equity - C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1 
Broadly put, therefore, Bolognetus’ equity is a doctrine not dissimilar from that of other humanists before 
him. One which extends or restricts written rules where their letter is at odds with the intention of the 
legislator, which intention is gathered by inference from other available (but inapplicable) rules of civil law, 
written and unwritten, or by – necessarily unwritten – principles of natural law. The only difference seems 
to be that, unlike Connanus and Salamonius, Bolognetus does not see equity as encompassing also 
corrections of the law by the legislator. The legislator may, of course, interpret himself the law ex bono et 
aequo, but the focus of Bolognetus’ discussion is the use of equity by judges and subjects of the law.542 
Insofar as equity is a doctrine concerned with the intentions of the legislator, Bolognetus makes 
clear that it will have no application where such intentions are wholly unclear. This was already argued by 
Bolognetus’ predecessors, and, like them, Bolognetus uses this distinction to explain the tension between 
C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1.543 Thus, in a case where a rule is so unclear that no evidence at all can be gathered of 
the intention of the legislator, there will not be any room for equity.  Bolognetus refers to his predecessors 
from Salamonius onwards in holding that C.1.14.1 is aimed at preventing the application of equity in cases 
of this kind, i.e. where both letter and intention of the law cannot be discerned.544 Interestingly, Bolognetus 
relates this statement also to theological writings and believes it supported by Aquinas’ own use of C.1.14.1 
in the Summa.545  
On the other hand, there are cases where the letter of the law is altogether unclear, but the intention 
is certain from other sources. These cases are unproblematic, and one must follow the intention of the 
legislator.546 Insofar as these are cases where one follows the intention of the law, interpertations of this 
kind are referred to by Bolognetus as cases of interpretatio ex aequo et bono.  
Finally, there are cases where the letter leaves room for no ambiguity as to its meaning, but is in 
conflict with the intention of the legislator. Bolognetus links these cases to rhetorical legal issues ex scripto 
                                                    
540 See n.551 below. 
541 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 31, para. 10: ‘Distinctionem ergo illam, cuius supra meminimus, naturalis et civilis aequitatis, ex 
iusto quod emendatur desumere non poterimus, cum illud semper vel legitimum sit, vel ut legitimum consideretur. Recte 
autem illam desumemus ex eo iusto quod ad alterum emendandum adhibetur. Id enim si civile est, civilem, si naturale, 
naturalem aequitatem constitutit’. 
542 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 33, para. 6. 
543 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 33. See e.g. n.195, 313 above. 
544 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 33, para. 2. Similar considerations are repeated in Bolognetus, De Lege, cap. 35, though Bolognetus 
concludes that this explanation of C.1.14.1, while sound, is not historically accurate. He argues instead that Constantine 
meant originally to refer to interpretations of the law which are of general application. 
545 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 33, para. 2: ‘Quod attinet ad primum, cum scilicet verba ita dubia sunt, ut dubiam quoque, ac plane 
incertam sententiam reddant, constanter hic puto posse nos affirmare, interpretationi ex aequo et bono locum non esse. Ac 
nobiscum hac in re sentit Divus Thomas in [IaIIae, q. 96, art. 6, IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1]. Quibus in locis ita interpretatur verba 
Constantini in [C.1.14.1]’. For Aquinas see [3.2.1] above, note that Aquinas’ reference to ambiguity does not 
straightforwardly refer to legislative intention. 
546 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, paras. 4-7. 
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et sententia.547 They are the ones that are most problematic, because they require the interpreter in some way 
to read a provision in a way that departs from the sense that is conveyed from the plain reading of its words. 
Both the second and third category of cases suppose that one is able to identify the intention of 
the legislator independently from the letter of the law. Bolognetus does not provide us with much 
information regarding what evidence the interpreter may use to do that. Furthermore, his focus is only on 
how to deal with cases of the third kind, which he finds more problematic precisely because in these cases 
the applicability of the intention of the legislator, however gathered, depends whether the direction found 
in the letter of the law is specific to the case at hand or not. We move on to the solutions of those conflicts 
in the next pargraph – but returning to the issue of where the intentions of the legislator might be gathered, 
it is clear from Bolognetus’ later arguments that the intention of the legislator will be presumed to be aligned 
with justice and right reason.548 Reading this alongside Bolognetus’ earlier argument that an interpretatio ex 
aequo et bono may refer to both natural and civil law, one can presume that the identification of injustice or 
irrationality could be arrived at by reference not only to natural law, but also to the other rules within the 
legal system, but Bolognetus does not say much else about the process of gathering the intentions of the 
legislator. 
 
4.2.2.3. Ius commune rules of interpretation as interpretatio ex aequo et bono 
As mentioned above, Bolognetus is mostly concerned with resolving cases of the third kind – those 
where the intention of the legislator is at odds with a clearly expressed rule of law. To resolve these cases, 
he mostly relies on ius commune sources dealing with the doctrines of interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva. 
However, these doctrines were not governed by a unified theory in medieval and early modern works of 
interpretation, but rather articulated around a series of particular rules centred on specific Roman law 
sources. This means that Bolognetus’ arguments, rather than identifying general principles, restate the 
medieval particular rules and, which rules can vary considerably depending on whether he is restating 
doctrines pertaining to the extensive or restrictive interpretation of the law.  
Bolognetus distinguishes three distinct types of cases where letter of the law and intention of the 
legislator are at odds – the case in which the letter deals expressly with the case at hand, that in which the 
letter says nothing, and, finally, that in which the case is treated by the letter only generally. ‘Primo enim 
aperta sunt verba, cum illud ipsum de quo agitur, expressim determinant, ac decidunt. Secundo cum prorsus 
illud omittunt. Tertio et ultimo cum neque prorsus omittunt, neque etiam speciatim decidunt, sed 
generalibus id tantum verbis complectuntur.’549  Throughout his discussion in this section, Bolognetus 
                                                    
547 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 1: ‘denique verba nulla ex parte dubia sunt, sed undequaque apertissima, ita ut quod in ea 
lege ambiguitatis inest, id non ex verbis oriatur, sed ex eo tantum, quia aperta legis scriptura a verisimili legislatoris mente 
videatur abhorrere. Unde ea inducitur causae constitutio, quam Rhetores legitimam appellant ex scripto et sententia.’ See n. 
548 below. 
548 See n. 547 above and in particular Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 8: ‘Tertium et ultimum erat caput nostre distinctionis, 
cum verba plane aperta sunt, ac per se nihil obscuritatis habet, quamvis eo modo, quo sonant, non prorsus rationi et iustitiae 
congruere videantur.’   
549 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 9. 
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juxtaposes passages relevant to interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva from medieval commentators to statements 
of late scholastic theologians.  
Let us first deal with his arguments relating to the first and third cases. Both involved a legal rule 
broadly framed, covering a particular case where the application of the rule would appear to fall outside the 
intention of the legislator.550 In the first case, that of a law dealing openly with a case, the rule for Bolognetus 
is that one cannot interpret a law ex aequo et bono if that would lead to a defective reading of its words (sine 
vitio scripturae inflecti non possint).551 For Bolognetus, such an interpretation of the law would not be an exercise 
in interpretatio ex aequo et bono but rather in clementia, which is the prerogative of the Prince. It is not clear 
what Bolognetus exactly means by vitio here, and he makes no effort to relate this to the medieval doctrines 
of proper and improper meaning of the words of the law.552  This he relates to D.40.9.12.1 or the lex 
Prospexit – often referred to in medieval and early modern writings on interpretation as determining the 
outer boundaries of interpretatio restrictiva, since it involved a case where the Roman jurists refused to narrow 
the general scope of the words of a rule despite the harshness which would follow from following them.553 
The lex Prospexit had been, since the Middle Ages, explained in a number of ways by commentators and 
legal writers in the course of their analysis of interpretatio restrictiva – which approaches Bolognetus dismisses 
as incorrect. His justification for the result in the lex prospexit is different from that of medieval 
commentaries, but he engages with those writings and clearly sees this exercise in equitable interpretation 
as simply coinciding with the application of interpretatio restrictiva. 554  
The situation is different where, as in the third category of cases, the words of the law capture the 
particular case clearly, but not explicitly, so that it merely falls within a broader category of cases governed 
by it. This is a case where interpretatio ex aequo et bono may sometime play a role, so that one may moderate 
or narrow down the general statement of the letter. In this case, to identify exactly the cases where a 
restrictive interpretation may take place, Bolognetus seems to be aware of the great resemblance between 
those cases and those discussed by late-scholastic theologians in writings on epieikeia, and he therefore 
proceeds to weave together the thoughts of theologians, in particular those of Soto, on epieikeia and legal 
writings on interpretatio restrictiva. He borrows Soto’s example of a law forbidding a man to bear arms at night 
so as to avoid violence, asking whether it would apply to one who is too frail to inflict damage on anyone. 
Bolognetus aligns Soto’s argument with those made in medieval legal writings on interpretatio restrictiva, which 
said that the failure of a minor ratio would not be enough to allow the judge to presume the legislator would 
                                                    
550 See n.538 above. 
551 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 9: ‘Primo casu, cum verba legis illud ipsum tam aperte decidunt, de quo disceptatio est, ut 
sine vitio scripturae inflecti non possint, tunc nulla interpretatione, nullaque aequitate evitari poterunt, aud ad eum sensum 
contorqueri, qui prorsus a verbis alienus sit, nam cum ad legis sententiam interpretatio omnis, quae sit ex aequo et bono, 
referenda sit, non poterit videri ea fuisse legislatoris sententia quae verbis perspicuis adversatur [D.33.10.7.2]’. 
552 These are discussed at [1.1.4.1] above, and [4.2.4.1.4] below. 
553 D.40.9.12pr: ‘Prospexit legis lator, ne mancipia per manumissionem quaestioni subducantur, idcircoque prohibuit ea 
manumitti certumque diem praestituit, intra quem manumittere non liceat. [D.40.9.12.1] Ipsa igitur quae divertit omnes 
omnimodo servos suos manumittere vel alienare prohibetur, quia ita verba faciunt, ut ne eum quidem servum, qui extra 
ministerium eius mulieris fuit vel in agro vel in provincia, possit manumittere vel alienare: quod quidem perquam durum est, 
sed ita lex scripta est.’ 
554 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34 para. 9-16. Confront Bolognetus’ approach with that of Andreas Tiraquellus, Tractatus Cessante 
Causa Cessat Effectus (1552), pp. 91-2, as well as those of various other jurists referred to at [1.1.4.1].  
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not have wanted it to apply.555 In general, Bolognetus seems to treat late scholastic arguments about epieikeia 
as dealing with the same issues that were dealt with by medieval jurists on interpretatio restrictiva. Within a few 
paragraphs, he juxtaposes the arguments of medieval legists and canonists about the fact that the legislator 
is presumed not to intend outcomes that are absurd or incompatible with a ratio he has expressly stated,556 
with Soto’s argument that a law does not bind where its application would cause one to incur the risk of 
death, reading those statements as part of one corpus of writings on interpretatio restrictiva and therefore on 
interpretatio ex aequo et bono.557 
The final category to be dealt with is one easily identifiable with interpretatio extensiva. That is, one 
where the words of the law clearly omit the case at hand, but it is presumed from the irrationality or injustice 
that would follow that the legislator intended that rule to apply. In such a case an interpretatio ex aequo et bono 
can intervene to extend the rule to cases the letter does not include. Bolognetus draws on a number of 
Digest passages to make the point,558 but, most importantly, borrows the rules from medieval approaches 
to interpretatio extensiva to better define the limits of such extensions.559 For instance, extensions will not be 
available where the rule in question was introduced to bestow a privilege on a group or if it contains a 
matter of strict law (stricti iuris materiam contineret).560 The discussion also includes other technical rules of 
extensive interpretation, such as that a law that is corrective (lex correctoria) will need to have the ratio legis 
expressly stated by the legislator in order to be extended.561 It is clear that Bolognetus sees interpretations 
by equity to overlap with interpretatio extensiva, but he does not enter into a detailed analysis of all the rules, 
explaining that ‘[v]erum non id nobis hoc tempore propositum est, ut casus omnes enumeraremus, in 
                                                    
555 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 22-25: ‘non semper cum legis ratio cessare videtur, temere a legis praecepto recedere 
possumus; ut si, gratia exempli, lex municipalis puniat eum, qui noctu arma tulerit, non debemus illico senem liberare [...]. 
Et ita recte concludit [Soto, Iustitia et Iure, q. 6, art. 8]. [...] Quod vero aliquo casu minor subsit ratio, non sati causae est, ut 
propterea a generali legis regula recedere debeamus, ut docet Socin[us ad. D.45.1.2.2.] Alciat[us, De Verborum Significatione, 
Vol. I], late Doct[ores] ferme omnes in [C.2.1.1].’ Technically, the argument from Bartholomaeus Socinus (d. 1507) – ‘non 
sit extensio de casu ad casum in quo videbatur minor ratio decisionis’ - is an argument relating to interpretatio extensiva, but 
Bolognetus evidently thinks it applicable to restrictive interpretations. It is also unclear what doctores Bolognetus has in mind 
commenting on C.2.1.1. 
556 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 26, 30: ‘Sed tamen duo mihi praecipua videntur esse, ex quibus legis restrictio recte 
desumatur. Primum est, cum videmus non posse legem generatim accipi, quin absurdum aliquod sequatur: tunc enim eius 
vitandi gratia legis dispositio coarctari omnino debet, ut recte tradit Rainer[ius (Raniero da Perugia? d. c. 1245) [ad D.1.1.9] 
cui hac in re consentit Bart[olus ad D.39.4.15]. Qua de re minime mihi dubitandum videtur, cum nihil sit quod nobis 
iurisconsulti crebrius inculcent, quam verba ita esse accipienda, ne absurdum ex iis aliquod oriatur. [...] ‘Alterum est, cum 
perspicuum est legislatorem spectasse rationem aliquam quam constet non vigere in ea facti specie, quam volumus a generali 
legis regula eximere, sed recte utrunque ex his constare, vel planum fieri necesse est, ut hoc nomine restrictio fieri possit.’ 
557 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 29: ‘Exemplum etiam illud hanc rem maxime apertam facit, quod affert Doming[us] Sotus 
[De Iustitia et iure, lib. 1, quaest. 7, art. 3.] Lex est, quae infames, vel obscuris parentibus ortos prohibet equos conscendere. 
Latrones in eum locum impetum faciunt, in quo eiusmodi homines multi degunt; isti cum videant se non alia ratione 
latronum manus effugere posse, vitae suae praesidium quaerentes equos ascendunt, ac citatis cursibus sese illis subducunt. 
Dubium non est, quin a poena legis immunes esse debeant.’  For Soto see n.480 above. 
558 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 16: ‘Secundus casus erat ille, cum id de quo disceptatio est, in lege prorsus omissum fuit. 
Et tunc clarum est aequitati locum esse posse, cum videamus saepe iurisconsultos, supplere ea, quae legibus fuerant 
praetermissa ut [D.38.17.2.5, D.2.1.7pr-2, D.14.6.14].’ 
559 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, paras. 16-7.  
560 Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 18: ‘Tunc  enim ad casum omissum lex non [...] extenderetur, si forte lex illa de cuius 
interpretatione agitur, privilegium aliquod induceret, iuxta [D.29.1.21] aut alio quocunque modo stricti iuris materiam 
contineret.’ The same points are made by Bartolus, ad D.1.1.9, n. 60.  
561 See Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 34, para. 20: ‘Idque posse fieri etiam in correctoriis frequentius admittunt nostri interpretes, 
dummodo ratio sit expressa, ex qua extensionem sumere volumus. Ita concludit glo[ssa ad ‘eligatur’, Clem.1.3.1] quam caeteri 
passim sequuntur’. He goes on to cite Baldus, Butrius, Decius, and Socinus. 
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quibus vel possent, vel non possent leges extendi; tantum enim quaerimus in praesentia, an aequitati locus 
tunc esse possit, cum casus de quo agitur a legislatore plane omissus est’.562 Thus, the fact that doctrines of 
interpretatio extensiva permit the extension of rules in these cases is a sign for Bolognetus that equitable 
interpretation has a place. Again, the overlap between the two is unambiguous. Bolognetus does not make 
any particular effort in criticising or adapting medieval rules of interpretatio extensiva – it seems he sees these 
cases as one aspect of interpretatio ex aequo et bono, but the latter seems to perform nothing but a different 
justification for the old rules. 
 
4.2.2.4. The influence of epieikeia theory in Bolognetus 
What appears clearly from Bolognetus’ analysis of interpretatio ex aequo et bono above is that, for Bolognetus, 
it is a genus of interpretation to which other, more specific types of interpretation belong – specifically 
interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva. However, equity seems to play no significant operative or substantial 
function in determining how the rules and principles of the doctrines of interpretation it contains are to be 
articulated. Bolognetus does not seek to change much in the medieval rules by reference to epieikeia or 
equity, and seems simply to use the latter to provide a conceptual basis for their existence 
This is most clear when one assesses the impact of scholastic theology on his treatise. Throughout 
his work, Bolognetus refers several times to the writings of theologians, with particular reference to 
Aquinas, Cajetan and Soto. Their arguments are adopted, for instance, in the passages where Bolognetus 
discusses whether natural law can be amended by equity,563 or where he discusses the difference between 
equity and dispensation.564 However, Bolognetus seems only to refer to those authors in order to ground 
the medieval learning on interpretation in further authority, rather than to affect its development. This is 
most clear from Bolognetus’ unproblematic extension of the role of equity to interpretatio extensiva and to his 
argument that, even if the letter of the law causes plain injustice, specific words of the legislator applicable 
to a particular case will have to be followed. Both of these cases are unambiguously rejected in the doctrine 
of theologians, but Bolognetus fails to address the problem entirely – his focus is instead on laying down 
and giving effect to the medieval doctrines of interpretation. Take for example Bolognetus’ reference to 
Soto’s distinction between interpretation by equity and dispensation. Bolognetus cites Soto’s example of a 
rule forbidding a man to bear arms at night.565 If it is plain that the law was introduced to avoid violence, 
may one who is not in a position to inflict violence avoid the rule? For Soto, the answer is clear, epieikeia 
only avoids the application of rules when they would violate natural law or put one at the risk of death or 
otherwise cause injustice – the fact that the ratio of the law does not apply to the case is irrelevant. 
Bolognetus adopts that example, but to make a different point – a ratio cessans will be enough to avoid the 
                                                    
562 Bolognetus, cap. 34, para. 19. 
563 See Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 31, para. 5. 
564 See n.554 above. 
565 See n.555 above. Bolognetus, ibid., cap. 31, para. 24: ‘At si forte eveniret, ut tu non posses a carnibus abstinere, quin fame 
perires, licite illis absque ulla dispensatione uti posses [...]. Neque enim exceptio illa praeter verisimilem Pontificum mentem 
esse iudicari debet. Verum ut tibi facere id liceret, causa illa non satis esset, quod carnis forsan coercione non indigeres, ob 
tantum dispnsensationi locus esset, ut recte ex Divi Thomae, aliorumque sententia concludit Domin[icus] Sotus [De Iustitia 
et Iure, q. 7, art. 3].’ 
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application of a rule and, for Bolognetus, Soto is merely showing an example where the ratio is missing only 
in part.  Bolognetus does this throughout his treatise, reworking the texts of the scholastic theologians to 
explain medieval doctrines of interpretation. 
 
4.2.3. Linking equity and interpretation II:  the influence of scholastic theology - interpretatio ex 
aequo et bono as a correction or interpretation of the law to avoid injustice 
4.2.3.1. Introduction 
The second way of linking equity and interpretation that emerged from the later sixteenth century onwards 
was one that owed much more to the theological writings of Cajetan and Soto on epieikeia. Doctrines of 
this kind, far from assimilating interventions of equity with all kinds of interpretations of the law ‘beyond 
the letter’, sought to find a narrow scope for equity, consistent with that found for it in theological writings. 
Not all the authors we shall examine in this section did this in the same way, and not all of them 
acknowledged the scholastic roots of their theories with the same enthusiasm, but they broadly had in 
common two elements. First, they limited interventions of equity to cases where broad rules had to be 
restricted, and thus denied that equity had any role to play in the extension of rules. Secondly, they centred 
interventions of equity on the avoidance of injustice – which means they distinguished equitable 
interpretations from mere applications of the ratio legis or of other indicators of legislative intention. The 
third element that these doctrines seem to have had in common, and in which they were distinct from those 
of theologians, is that, on closer analysis, they do not seem to have developed equity as a standalone 
doctrine, disapplying rules irrespective of the intentions of the legislator in all cases of injustice. On the 
contrary, they inscribed interpretatio ex aequo et bono within a broader doctrine of interpretation seeking to 
interpret the intentions of the legislator, and saw its application as providing a presumption of legislative 
intention. All the scholars discussed in this section, with perhaps the only exception of Hugo Grotius, seem 
to have agreed that it was not the business of the judge to use equitable interpretion to avoid a rule it if it 
was clear that the legislator meant to apply it to a certain case, regardless of any injustice that might follow. 
Theologians would instead have viewed such a case as central to the intervention of epieikeia, insofar as it 
would take the law outside of the legislator’s power.  
The authors developing theories of equity of this kind are the civil lawyer and canonist Ferdinandus 
a Mendoza (fl. ca. 1586), perhaps the earliest author to publish a treatise developing equity in this sense, 
followed by the civil lawyers Alexander Turaminus (d. 1605), Hugo Donellus (d. 1591) and Hugo Grotius 
(d. 1645). 
4.2.3.2. Mendoza and Turaminus – Equity as a restrictive correction of the law 
We shall here first approach the two earlier authors developing equity as a restriction of the law. 
The reason they should be considered together, however, is not simply chronological. They also shared the 
important theoretical foundation of not considering equity as a doctrine of interpretation – but rather as 
one of emendation of the law. As we have seen in the preceding sections, this was not a common approach 
to equity – even theologians, whose starting point from Aquinas and Cajetan had been that equity and 
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interpretation had nothing in common, had begun by the 1550s to refer to equitable interventions as 
interpretatio ex aequo et bono.566  
Ferdinandus a Mendoza and Alexander Turaminus were among the earliest authors, together with 
Bolognetus, to notice parallels between the theory of equity put forward by earlier legal humanists like 
Salamonius and that of contemporary scholastic theologians.   However, unlike Bolognetus, they saw much 
greater substantive potential in the concept of epieikeia as developed by theologians to generate a doctrine 
of equitable intervention distinct from other doctrines of interpretation and did not hesitate to draw on 
those theories to inform their own views. 
 
4.2.3.2.1. Ferdinandus a Mendoza– the need for a formalis et vera ratio aequitatis 
Only very little is known about Ferdinandus a Mendoza, but he seems to have been a canonist, and operated 
in the second half of the sixteenth century – he produced a comment on the Synod of Elvira published in 
1594.567 However, his concept of equity as articulated in his commentary on the Digest title De Pactis (D.2.14), 
seemingly first published in 1586, was the earliest work seriously attempting to align doctrines of 
interpretation from the medieval ius commune with both humanistic and theological learning on epieikeia.  
Mendoza took as his starting point the rather general points made by earlier humanists, and then used the 
doctrine of theologians to fill the gaps. Mendoza’s discussion of equity is focussed, as the title suggests, on 
the title De Pactis of Justinian’s Digest. Like other authors before him commenting on the same passage,568 
Mendoza’s discussion of equity is prompted by the introductory passage where Ulpian states that the 
Praetor’s Edict on pacts ‘has natural equity, for what is more consonant with human faith than to require 
men to abide by what they have agreed with one another?’569 Mendoza thus proceeds to explain what is 
meant by equity here and what the role of equity is in civil law. 
After adopting the views of Budaeus and Salamonius which associated equity with aequum et bonum 
and epieikeia,570 and rejecting the medieval approach to aequitas scripta,571  Mendoza went on to explain that, 
in his view, an intervention of equity would require a clear and certain (unwritten) equity on one side (aequitas 
certa et clara) and the rigour of the law on the other, or, as he calls it in a different passage, a ‘formalis et vera 
ratio clarae aequitatis’.572  By this, he did not merely mean a clear intention of the legislator, but drawing on 
the writings of Cajetan, Soto and other contemporary theologians, he meant a case where the law would 
suffer from (i) a defect of generality where (ii) an application of the words of the law would cause the ratio 
                                                    
566 See [3.3.1.2] above. 
567 Mendoza is referred to as a ‘celebrated canonist’, and his treatise is also referred to in Alexander Croke, A Report of the 
Case of Horner aginst Liddiard (1800), p. 112-3, n. 2. 
568 See e.g. Duarenus at [2.3.4.2] above. 
569 D.2.14.1pr: ‘Huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. Quid enim tam congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos 
placuerunt servare?’ My translation is taken from Watson’s edition of the Digest of Justinian (1985). 
570 Ferdinandus a Mendoza, Liber Primus Disputationum Iuris Civilis in Difficiliores Leges ff. de Pactis (1586), cap. 3, para. 2. 
571 See above, cap. 2. 
572 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 9: ‘in omnibus vetustis codicibus [...] verbum id (scriptae) abesse testatur [...] Franciscus 
Duarenus.’ See n. 573 below for formalis et vera ratio clarae aequitatis. 
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legis to fail contrarily.573 He discusses the requirement of a defect of universality throughout in terms similar 
to those used by Cajetan.574 Mendoza’s statements about the fact that a mere negative failure of the ratio 
legis will be sufficient is also consistent with the views of theologians,575  and his discussion of a contrary 
failure of the ratio legis bears great resemblance to that of Soto, even when it comes to the examples adopted 
to make his points.576 An example Mendoza gives is that of a law which says that the children of prostitutes 
are to be excluded from holding public office purporting to include the case of a child born at a time when 
the mother was not a prostitute, though she later became one. For Mendoza there is nothing equity can do 
to avoid the application of the rule to such a child, because applying the words does not result in a contrary 
failure of the law.577  Mendoza also mentions that a law asking the city walls to remain shut in all 
circumstances may be disapplied in a case where it would upset the public good,578 and a variation on Soto’s 
example of a law forbidding a citizen from ascending a horse, which can be disapplied if that would be 
necessary to save the individual’s life.579 
His only open disagreement with the statements of theologians concerns cases of probability – as 
we saw in the previous chapter, theologians from Soto onwards accepted that epieikeia could intervene also 
in cases where, though it was not certain that following the words of the law would result in a contrary 
failure of the law, it was nevertheless probable and there was no time to consult a superior.580 Mendoza 
objects to this view, arguing that such a distinction is not supported by the civil law.581 He points to 
Modestinus at D.49.16.3.15-16, where it is said that one who disobeys an order in times of war should be 
beaten with rods or transferred in deteriorem militiam whatever his motivations for so acting, and regardless 
therefore of whether he thought it probable that the commander would have given a different order in the 
circumstances. The example is not the most satisfactory,582 but leads Mendoza to provide a further, more 
                                                    
573 Mendoza, De Pactis cap. 3, paras. 15-6 ‘Quod modo nobis reliquum est [...] explicare in quo consistat formalis et vera ratio 
clarae aequitatis, quam diximus inferiores iudices spreto verborum legis rigore sequi posse [...] quod ad constituendam 
formalem rationem aequitatis [...] duo copullative requiruntur, quorum si aliquod desit, aequitas vera non erit, primum est ut 
lex quae deficit, deficiat claro propter universalitatem seu generalitatem [...]. Secundum autem est quod ratio legis deficiat 
non pure negative, sed contrarie.’ 
574 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 15. 
575 He discusses the lex Prospexit (see n.553 above) as a case where the ratio legis is simply failing negatively, which is not 
enough to depart from the rule. See Mendoza, Pactis, cap. 3, paras. 16-7. On the lex Prospexit see n.553 above. 
576 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 16: ‘Secundum autem est, quod ratio legis, deficiat non pure negative, sed contrarie.’ See also 
Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 15: ‘[puta legem] quod equites non vehantur mulabus [...]. Ponas equitem circundatum peditis 
hostibus, aliter periculum mortis, vel servitutis, vel aliud quodcumque grave, evitare non posse, si mulam non ascendat [...], 
certe in his casibus lex propter universale claro deficit, et sic servanda non erit in casu occurrenti.’ Compare with Soto, Iustitia 
et Iure Vol. 1, q. 6, art. 8. 
577 Mendoza seems, like some other of his contemporaries, to have sought to link issues of equity to rhetorical issues arising 
ex scripto et sententia. The example of the prostitute appears as one such example in Quintilian, The Orator’s Education (2002), 
7.6.3-4: ‘‘Ex meretrice natus ne contenetur: quae filium habebat prostare coepit: prohibetur adulescens contione.’ Nam de 
eius filio quae ante partum meretrix fuit certum est: an eadem huius causa dubium est, quamquam ex hac natus est, et haec 
metretrix est.’ This example can also be found in other Greek authors on rhetoric, including Hermogenes, see Quintilian, 
The Orator’s Education, Vol. 3: Books 6-8 (2014), p. 267, n. 2. 
578 See Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 24. 
579 See above n. 576. 
580 Cajetan agrees with this view too, but it was not – in my view – part of his doctrine of epieikeia. See [3.2.1.] above. 
581 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 24: ‘Quare non possum non improbare Caietani ac Soti opinionem [...] existimantium cuilibet 
privato fore licitum agere contra legem, etiam si certus non sit de voluntate legislatoris’. 
582 Modestinus’ statement seems to prove too much. The soldier would be punished regardless of his motivations, which 
must mean that even if he was certain, as required by Mendoza’s epieikeia, that the superior would have acted in a certain 
way that would not have been enough to discharge him of liability under the rule. 
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pertinent example – what of a case where there is a rule that says the doors of the city are not to be opened 
if the enemy is advancing towards the city and the situation is such that the enemy is approaching the city 
in pursuit of a number of good citizens, familiar to the Prince himself, who are good and useful members 
of the community. Should the doors be opened? This is a question where it is in doubt whether the public 
good will be furthered best by keeping the enemies out while sacrificing the citizens, or by attempting to 
rescue the pursued and opening the doors to the enemy. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the 
inferior judge or private citizen thinks it more probable that the public good will be furthered by disobeying 
the law. Insofar as it is not certain, and there is no time to ask the Prince for his opinion, the words of the 
law should be attended.583  
Thus, for Mendoza, a judge can only make use of equity to depart from the words of the law where 
(a) the rule suffers from a defect of universality, and (b) it is certain that following the words would cause 
the ratio legis to fail contrarily. On the surface this statement is quite nicely aligned with the theological 
tradition and finds a self-standing and clear role for equity within the legal system. Looking at the doctrine 
in greater detail, however, reveals the uneasiness Mendoza found in sticking consistently with the statements 
of theologians and separating his doctrine from the medieval doctrines of interpretation. We return to this 
in the final section. 
 
4.2.3.2.2. Alexander Turaminus – equity as a correction of the law propter defectu ob universale 
Alexander Turaminus was a jurist from Siena who sat as an auditor on the Rota Fiorentina, a relatively new 
institution established as the highest court in the Florentine republic in the early sixteenth century, and 
which survived into the Duchy of Florence and then in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.584 He published a 
comment to D.1.3 in 1590.585 It is in the third chapter of his commentary that Turaminus  argues that no 
laws can be written so perfectly as not to need any emendation, and it is in this context that he discusses 
aequitas and its relation to epieikeia. Turaminus’ views about equity are closely in line with those of Mendoza, 
                                                    
583 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 24-5, 28: ‘Ponas legem, quae praecipit portas civitatis obsidione ab hostibus imminenti, nulli 
aperiendas, et casum, quo hostes insequantur egressos a liquos cives  reipublicae utilissimos et Principi amicos et familiares: 
dubitatur tamen, an qui eos persequuntur, ingressi civitatem, damnum aequale, vel aliquantulum minus inferant, quam 
proficiferetur ex absentia vel morte civium, certe quicquid ipsi dicam, mihi videtur nullo pacto posse, civitatis custodes, 
portas aperire, et si periculum eorum civium moram non patiatur, quia melius et praestantius erit, illos cives mori, observata 
lege et remoto periculo, etsi minori, quod ex insequentibus timebatur, quam eosdem conservando, sine Principis 
interpretatione agere contra legem scriptam, et periculo alterius incommodi se exponeere. [...] Nec obstat si dicas [...] 
voluntatem etiam esse verosimilem legislatoris, ut aperrirentur portae civitatis civibus sibi amicis, et reipublicae utilibus, nam 
respondeo eam non adeo esse certam et claram, sicut hanc, sed imo cum periculum aequale vel parum minus esset 
suspectum, dubia erat et ambigua, et dato quod legislator, certo voluisset portas aperiri, non tamen voluit aperiri simpliciter, 
et sine eius licentia, sed eo iubente, nec in dubio cum non adest expressa Imperatoris declaratio praesumi debet contrarium’. 
The argument is not the easiest to follow, as Mendoza later seems to blend the two questions of whether – in principle – 
probability of harm should allow judges to depart from the words of the law with whether it is in fact more probable that 
harm would follow. Another question would be whether only certitude of greater harm will provide the certitude of the 
legislator’s intention or whether some other device can provide such certitude, the mention that the legislator can indicate 
otherwise seems to suggest some kinds of evidence of legislative intent will allow such a conclusion and it also seems that 
in these cases this would be enough to depart from the words of the law, which seems inconsistent with Mendoza’s earlier 
statement that a mere negative failure of the ratio legis will not do. 
584 Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (1968), p. 126. See also ‘Turamini, Alessandro’ , Treccani - 
Enciclopedie On Line available on http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/alessandro-turamini (last accessed 09-04-2018). 
585 Alessandro Turaminus, Ad Rubricam Pandectarum de Legibus Libri Tres (1590). 
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but he develops them with greater analytical care and detail. It is not clear that Mendoza had a direct 
influence on Turaminus and no explicit reference to Mendoza can be found – however, their approaches 
have sufficient elements in common to look at them side by side. 
Like Mendoza, Turaminus began by dealing with the usual theoretical section assimilating equity 
and epieikeia,586 and then moved on to explain that equity could only operate to restrict rules framed too 
generally. He did not explain this by reference to the need for a ‘clear equity’ however, as Mendoza had, 
but simply by reference to the approach of Aristotle. The argument is that equity is meant to correct the 
words of the law. In cases of extension, when the letter of the law is not broad enough to include a case 
which the legislator meant to cover, the words themselves are doing nothing wrong, there is no defect to 
correct, the defect lies in the legislator’s omission. He targets Bolognetus explicitly, saying this is an error 
‘in quem visus est incidere eruditissimus Albertus Bolognetus [de lege, iure et aequitate disputatione, cap.  29, n. 
11, cap.  30] per totum, ut existimaverit aequitatem non tantum legem emendare diminuendo, et 
moderando, sed etiam addendo et supplendo.’587 
Further, for Turaminus as for Mendoza the words of the law would only be defective in a particular 
case if they resulted in injustice. However, he develops this idea specifying that he does not, like other 
humanist jurists before him, view equity as being capable of both making laws more lenient or harsher 
depending on the intention of the legislator. Turaminus comes to this conclusion by reading Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric,588 where Aristotle, taking a broader view of equity, also described its role as pardoning human 
weaknesses (rebus humanis ad ignoscendum commoveri). This, for Turaminus, was the aspect of equity which 
medieval canon lawyers had in mind when they described equity as ‘iustitia dulcore misericordiae 
temperata’,589 though he disagreed with the views of those that thought equity and misericordia (which he 
saw as a synonym of clementia) were the same thing.590 He therefore explicitly rejects the arguments of 
Bolognetus and others that equity could be used to cause a law to apply more harshly than its words would 
have it, even if it were shown to be the intention of the legislator that it be so applied.591  
The examples that Turaminus provides to illustrate interventions of equity are drawn from 
problems falling squarely within what medieval legists and canonists called interpretatio restrictiva.  For 
instance, with Bartolus’ comments about the application of the Bolognese statute forbidding that blood be 
shed in the royal palace to a barber spilling blood while working in the castle. The issue, a thorny one for 
Bartolus and other commentators, would not have caused much controversy if they had understood aequum 
                                                    
586 Turaminus, ibid., p. 147. It is also interesting to note that, as late as 1590, Turaminus’ treatise still contains a fully argued 
dismissal of the medieval distinction between written and unwritten equity, Turaminus, ibid., p. 157. 
587 Turaminus, ibid., pp. 149-50. It should be mentioned that Turaminus’ language later in the passage is reminiscent of that 
of theologians, as he uses the terminology defectus ob universale. 
588 Turaminus clearly relies on Trapezuntius’ translation as his source. Georgius Trapezuntius, Aristoteles Rhetoricorum Libri III 
(1523), f 117r-v. 
589 See [1.1.3.1] above. As we have seen, that definition owed nothing to Aristotle’s writings. Turaminus, ibid., p. 159. 
590  Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 159: ‘[After citing the relevant passage from Aristotle’s Rhetoric] Quibusdam vero persuasum est 
huius loci authoritate posse defendi nostrorum opinionem maxime Saly[cetus ad C.3.1.8] et Ias[on de Maino, ad C.3.1.8] 
quod aequitas in quadam clementia ac benignitate posita foret tanquam iuris rigori, ac severitati opponeretur. Sed quod inquit 
Arist[oteles] ‘aequum esse ad ignoscendum commoveri’ non ad hanc clementiam referendum est.’ 
591 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 162: ‘De aequitate igitur diffinita minus recte Albertum pronunciasse existimo quod in supergressione, 
ac severitate consistere possit.’ 
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et bonum, Turaminus tells us.592 Unlike Mendoza, however, Turaminus engaged directly with the literature 
on equity which was incompatible with his claims, with most of his arguments – as we saw above - 
specifically aimed at Bolognetus’ De Lege Iure et Aequitate.593  
 
4.2.3.2.3. Natural and Civil Equity in Turaminus 
A final note should be made of Turaminus’ distinction between civil and natural equity, not found in 
Mendoza. The distinction is developed by Turaminus instrumentally to explain away all the Digest passages 
in which equity is discussed in the context of making rules harsher – passages such as D.2.10.1pr. 
Turaminus’ argument is that his explanation of equity as epieikeia, as amending written law restrictively, only 
covers that facet of equity known as civil equity. Instead, all passages such as D.2.10.1pr are concerned with 
the broader notion of natural equity. We have already seen that this distinction posed a challenge for a 
number of jurists before Turaminus, and the view he takes of the distinction does not fall far from the one 
that had been adopted by Connanus in his works. Natural equity, for Turaminus, bears no relation to what 
the judge must do when amending laws, or to what Aristotle discusses in both Ethic and Rhetoric. Instead, it 
relates to the powers to make new rules for the parties, unbound by existing law written or unwritten – 
powers such as that of the Emperor or the arbiter. In passages where Roman jurists linked equity with 
making rules harsher, they were referring, in Turaminus’ view, to the Praetor’s power to simply produce 
new rules – in the exercise of this power the latter could, of course, choose to produce a rule as harsh as he 
liked.594  
Defining natural equity as the exercise of judicial (or indeed legislative) power unbound by rules, 
Turaminus makes room within his theory for all the medieval references to judging by equity or ex aequo et 
bono – which would have fitted epieikeia only awkwardly.595 One who has the power to act by natural equity 
is not confined in any way to following either the words or indeed the sententia of the law, but can rather 
draw whatever solution seems fair. This Turaminus identifies with the power by which the Praetor 
introduced all his actions within Roman law.596 In more abstract terms, Turaminus sees natural equity as 
perfect justice, natural law from which all law ought to be derived, and civil equity as one aspect of it which 
                                                    
592 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 148: ‘Simile exemplum est quod tradit Bartolus [ad D.1.1.9, q. 6, n. 55]. Statutum Bononiae capite 
punit, qui fecerit sanguinem in palatio. Barbitonsor aegro e vena medici praescripto sanguinem misit. Scribit Bartolus post 
magnam contentionem fuisse absolutum, ne verba legis captarentur [...]. Neque profecto diu contendendum fuerat inter eos, 
qui se boni et aequi magistros profiterentur.’ 
593 See n. 587 and [4.2.2] above. 
594 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 162: ‘Sed hic locus [i.e. D.2.10.1pr] quod et alii admonuerunt, distinguit inter naturalem et civilem 
aequitatem. [...] [A]t quod aequitas sit emendatio legitimi iuris, naturali aequitati convenire non potest, tum quia naturalis 
aequitas et ius naturale idem sunt [D.1.1.11]. [...] Aristotelem de sola civili aequitate, quae iuris civilis emendatio est loquutum 
esse non est ambigendum. [...] Ex iis intelligi poterit cur praetor ad naturalem, non ad civilem se referat aequitatem, ut in 
[D.2.14.1pr].’ 
595 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 163: ‘Tum statuta quae disponunt procedi ex bono et aequo ad naturalem aequitatem referenda sunt 
[...]. Amplius ex predictis illa nostrorum assortio rectissime iustificatur quod coram mercatore, vel arbitro, el quocunque 
iudice apud quem bonum aequum praevaleat, ille reiicietur, qui allegabit ex pacto non dari actionem, quemadmodum 
[Bartolus ad D.17.1.48; Baldus ad C.4.35.10, n. 14; Salycetus ad C.3.1.8; Iason de Maino ad D.2.14.7.4] scribunt. [...] Nam ad 
aequitatem naturalem boni et aequi mentio referenda est; quod respectu civilis aequitatis superflua illa adiectio foret, neque 
hunc effectum operaretur.’ 
596 Turaminus, ibid.,, pp. 163-4. 
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judges have to exercise in order to moderate the words of written law when they depart from the intention 
of the legislator.  
In short, Turaminus is another author finding a way of distinguishing equity from interpretation as 
a standalone doctrine. He clearly drew on humanist jurists a distinction between a civil equity addressed to 
judges and a more general natural equity identified with justice and natural law. He also most probably 
(though perhaps not directly) drew from theologians to further confine equity to the restrictive emendation 
of statutes. 
 
4.2.3.2.4. Equity and interpretation in Mendoza and Turaminus 
The argument that equity could only operate to restrict rules suffering from a defect of universality seems 
to have led Mendoza and Turaminus to another conclusion, namely, that equitable interventions should 
not be seen as involving a process of interpretation at all. Mendoza did not address this issue head on – 
though he consistently referred to the process of doing equity as one of amendment or tempering, without 
ever mentioning interpretation.597 In Turaminus we find instead a more detailed explanation behind this 
choice, though a rather peculiar one. Turaminus argued that only exercises in extending rules could properly 
be regarded as exercises in interpretation, as their work is to add to the rule. Instead, the point of equity 
was, as explained in the previous section, that of restricting rules, i.e. amending them or correcting them 
when their words caused them to be defective in particular cases. In doing so, Turaminus takes exception 
to the approach of Bolognetus explicitly, referring to his views and criticising them directly.598 His argument 
is that equity performs the role not of interpreting or understanding the sententia legis, but of correcting a 
law where the use of written words made it defective.599  
The approach of Mendoza did not distinguish as neatly exercises of correction from those of 
interpretation of the law.  And there are passages in Mendoza which seem to emphasise the role of equity 
in explaining what the words of the law should be taken to mean. In an example that Mendoza borrows 
from Cicero, he refers to a law that states ‘should a prostitute wear a crown, let [it/she] be made public 
property’ (publica esto). Mendoza uses epieikeia here to determine whether the crown or the prostitute should 
be made public property. As one of the two interpretations would lead to sin, epieikeia allows us to prefer 
the interpretation that applies the law to the crown. This is plainly a case where the meaning of words is 
being interpreted, rather than one dealing with unambiguous words to be disapplied.600 There is the 
                                                    
597 There do not seem to be references to interpretatio aequitatis, per epieikeiam or ex aequo et bono throughout the text – equitable 
interventions are instead described as processes of correction, amendment or tempering. 
598 Turaminus, ibid.,, pp. 151-2: ‘Alber[tus Bolognetus, de lege, iure et aequitate, cap. 30, para. 2] dum ait, quod ‘per 
interpretationem desumitur non potest videri praeter legem esse, imo recte legitimum appellatur etc.’, et paullo supra fatetur 
non recte aequitatis nomen usurpari. Verum non de omni interpretatione tunc loquutus est, sed de ea, quae sumitur ex 
praecedentibus, vel sequentibus argumentis. [...] Ego vero absolute pronuncio emendationem ab interpretatione distare, ac 
ideo interpretationi nullo casu nomen aequitatis convenire’.  
599 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 151: ‘Hoc autem interest inter [aequitatem] et  [interpretationem], quod interpretatio vim legis aperit, 
et ex lege est, et secundum legem [D.1.3.17], [I.1.17], [D.50.16.6.1] ibi: ‘verbum ex legibus sic accipiendum est, tam ex legum 
sententia, quam ex verbis’, et ideo quantum interpretatio distat ab emendatione, tantum distat ab aequitate, quae emendatio 
est, sive correctio.’ 
600 See also Mendoza, De Pactis, cap. 3, para. 19 where he cites D.1.3.19, which is a passage clearly concerned with the 
interpretation of the words of the law. 
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possibility that Mendoza referred to those examples not as examples of epieikeia but of more general 
principles of interpretation that he saw as consonant with epieikeia, however, no such explicit distinction is 
drawn in his text.601  
The approach of Turaminus is much more consistent with the principle he stated. Turaminus 
explicitly links his view of equity as not involving any interpretation with the view – which he shared with 
theologians as well as Mendoza – that equity could not apply to cases of interpretatio extensiva. For Turaminus 
the latter would not be an exercise in amendment of the words, but in their interpretation. From this it 
followed that Digest passages such as D.2.1.7 had nothing to do with equity because they did not involve an 
emendation (emendatio, correctio) of the words, but their extension (extensio, porrectio).602 Perhaps the most 
unusual distinction found by Turaminus between the extension and restriction of the words of the law is 
that he sees the exercise of interpreting (i.e. of interpreting extensively) as ‘good, but not equitable’ – a 
distinction harking back to the medieval line drawn between rigor and aequitas as the two facets of bonitas 
(what is necessary to preserve the public good, though perhaps harsh in the circumstances) and aequitas 
(justice in the circumstances), and which had been rejected among humanist jurists from Budaeus 
onwards.603 Turaminus does not develop this distinction much beyond this, and it is unclear whether he 
thought it performed any particular substantive role. 
 
4.2.3.2.5. The influence of scholastic theology and the role of the intentions of the legislator 
If on the surface Mendoza’s and Turaminus’ theories seem quite well aligned with those of early modern 
Thomists, a closer look at their doctrines shows that, both – and in similar respects – held views that were 
incompatible with those of late-scholastic writers. As we shall see, this was probably caused by the 
increasing association of the role of equitable intervention with giving effect to the intentions of the 
legislator among civil and canon lawyers around this time. As we saw in the third chapter, the focus of 
scholastic theologians until the mid-sixteenth century was on the power of the legislator or of human law 
itself. The point was, essentially, that in cases where following the words of the law would cause injustice, 
it would be beyond the power of the legislator or of human law to bind the subject. That would, in turn, 
be the reason why a subject is entitled to disobey the words of the law by virtue of epieikeia. What we can 
gather from the writings of theologians is that an application of the words of the law would not be causing 
                                                    
601 There is no direct reference in the passage about the prostitute and crown to the fact that equity is required for such an 
interpretation to take place, but it is contrasted with other cases where one cannot be certain enough of the intention of the 
legislator for equity to intervene. Mendoza, ibid.,, cap. 3, paras. 9-10. 
602 Turaminus, ibid.,, pp. 150-1: ‘Neque contrarium recte probari contendit [D.2.1.7] [...] Nulla enim verborum emendatio 
est, sed extensio eorumdem ex sententia legis; quod si non corriguntur verba, sed porriguntur, aequitas correctio est, non 
porrectio, vel productio verborum.’ 
603 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 151: ‘interpretatione supplere [...] autem bonum est, non tamen aequum [D.1.3.13]’ By saying this 
Turamini seems to mean that the circumstances justifying interpretation would be different from the circumstances justifying 
a correction of the law by equity. Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 152: ‘Tum vero quocunque te vertas interpretatio secundum hanc, vel 
illam legem est; et aequum et bonum, ut Arist[oteles] inquit non secundum legem est, sed legitimi iuris correctio; et ideo in 
[D.1.3.13], suppletio fit eiusdem utilitatis caussa, quoniam eadem utilitas sit in uno, et altero casu emendatio aequitatis officio 
sit damni potius, aut iniusti cuiusdam evitandi gratia.’ 
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injustice or sinning unless (a) it violated natural law, (b) it went against the public good or (c) it endangered 
the life of a private individual.604  
Both the idea that equity focusses on the amendment of the law on account of a defect of 
universality (a phrase adopted by Mendoza and Turaminus themselves), and that it only operates to restrict 
the law in cases of injustice (or of ‘contrary failure’), were consistent with the way theologians were adapting 
equity as epieikeia in their writings. However, it seems that, ultimately, the view of Mendoza and Turaminus 
put much more emphasis on the intention of the legislator than the theories of theologians would have 
permitted.  
First of all, and despite the two limitations mentioned above, both authors ultimately viewed the 
role of equity as that of aligning the words of the law with the intention of the legislator. This is most clear 
in Turaminus.605 The account in Mendoza is less easy to determine, but one can find many references 
suggesting that clear evidence of the intention of the legislator will be conclusive regarding the solution to 
which an application of epieikeia should lead. Indeed in some passages it looks like, for Mendoza, sin, private 
harm, and upsetting the public good, are simply indicators of legislative intent, rather than themselves the 
trigger for epieikeia.606  In the example cited above, where Mendoza discusses a case where a subject of the 
law cannot determine whether following the words of the law would harm the public good, he seems to 
hint again at the possibility that if there is clear evidence that the legislator would have preferred the rule 
not to be followed in the case at hand, that should be enough for epieikeia to intervene.607 It is possible that 
in this last passage Mendoza meant nothing more than that the legislator is to be regarded as the best person 
to assess the public good, and that therefore indications of his will are to be taken as the best evidence of 
what will further the public good,608 but they can also be read together to say that the intentions of the 
legislator are the trigger for epieikeia and the other requirements merely evidence to establish it.  Conversely, 
in yet another passage, Mendoza seems to suggest that a contrary failure of the law will include a case where 
the application of the words of the law results in a set of affairs that is contrary to that which the legislator 
intended when passing the rule. Again, such a case would not necessarily be one where applying the words 
would cause injustice, sin or death, and once more it seems that Mendoza is more concerned with linking 
equity with the intentions of the legislator rather than his power.609 Finally, Mendoza often mentions that 
                                                    
604 See [3.3.1] above. 
605 Turaminus, ibid.,, p. 156: ‘quoniam scripturae peccatum emendatur constat errorem in verbis esse non in sententia legis 
quatenus ea non ex verbis sed ex ratione ac mente legislatoris colligitur quod perspicuae probat Arist[oteles, Ethics, lib. 5, 
cap. 10] ibi absoluteque ac simpliciter loquendo peccavit et paullo post id quod legislator ipse si adesset dixisset et si servisset 
ita praescribentem legem statuisset. [...] [E]t hoc videtur esse officium aequitatis, ut verba legis minuendo maxime legislatoris 
mentem observet.’ 
606 Though this is inconsistent with Mendoza’s own statements about the reason why a mere negative failure of the ratio legis 
will not be enough See n.573 above. For an example where Mendoza suggests the intentions of the legislator can be sufficient 
for epieikeia to intervene see n. 601 above, and n.577 above where he contrasts the example of the children of a prostitute 
born before prostitution with the case of prostitute and crown on the basis that in the former case the absence of sin or 
turpitude was not enough to conclusively identify legislative intent. 
607 Mendoza, ibid.,, cap. 3, para. 29. See n. 583 above. 
608 Mendoza repeatedly makes the point that in all cases where one doubts what the public good requires, it shall be for the 
superior to determine. Mendoza, ibid.,, cap. 3, para. 25: ‘Teneas ergo memoria distinctionem nostram, de certitudine et 
ambiguitate, ut in primo casu liceat agere contra verba, in secundo autem non sic, alioquin tolles perfectam polliticae 
gubernationis rationem, dispositionem et ordinem intervertendo operationes et officia superiorum, cum inferioribus.’ 
609 Mendoza, ibid.,, cap. 3, para. 18.  He interprets this as the meaning of the lex non dubium at D.1.3.14-15. 
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an example of contrary failure of the ratio legis would also include an application of the law resulting in 
absurdity - epieikeia would therefore have a role in avoiding the application of the words of the law in these 
cases too.610 However, this is not necessarily true in the doctrine of early modern Thomists.611 Absurdity 
may provide a hint that the legislative intention was not that the law should bind, and was indeed used 
within medieval doctrines of interpretation to establish such an intention, as we saw earlier, for instance, in 
Bolognetus.612 However, just like a negative failure of the ratio legis, it does not necessarily mean that 
following the law will lead to injustice in the narrow sense identified by theologians. 
 
4.2.3.3. Hugo Donellus – equity’s place in the structure of interpretation 
Donellus was a pupil of Duarenus and was one of the most influential legal humanists of early modern 
times. Donellus discussed equity in his Commentarii de iure civili, a work he started around 1565, and which 
sought to systematise the Corpus Iuris Civilis under an institutional framework, but which Donellus never 
completed or published in its entirety.613  Like the other authors examined in this chapter, Donellus draws 
on sources from scholastic theology, the medieval learning on interpretation, and the recent opinions of 
legal humanists, to fit the concept of equity as epieikeia within the broader medieval learning on 
interpretation. Donellus seems to have been much less concerned with the formal acknowledgment of 
theological sources than with their substantive meaning for the development of a specific doctrine of 
interpretatio ex aequo et bono, distinct from other kinds of interpretation. What this means is that, on the one 
hand, Donellus is rather reluctant to explicitly refer to and acknowledge the sources from scholastic 
theology that were influencing his thought. On the other hand, even unacknowledged, these sources 
influenced Donellus’ understanding of equity as epieikeia and of its doctrinal place in substance, defining the 
way in which it ought to operate.  
Donellus shared the humanist background analysis of the central sources relating to equity with 
the other authors examined – he rejected the opposition between C.3.1.8 and C.1.14.1 based on aequitas 
scripta, reading C.1.14.1 as applying where the sententia is unclear or the law is tota iniqua.614 His account 
differs from that of Turaminus and Mendoza - Donellus was interested in identifying equity with a doctrine 
of interpretation, and therefore discussed it alongside other theories of interpretation. Unlike, Bolognetus, 
however, Donellus did not merely use the concept of epieikeia as a broad and inoperative justification for 
the operation of doctrines of interpretation ‘beyond the letter’ generally. In Donellus, the theories of equity 
of theologians play a substantive role in finding a place for equity among theories of interpretation – a place, 
that is, specific enough to be distinguished from other doctrines of interpretation.  
 
                                                    
610 Mendoza, ibid., cap. 3, para. 23. 
611 Though we do find it mentioned in Soto, see n.474 above. 
612 See n.557 above. 
613 L Pfister, ‘Hughes Doneau’ in Patrick Arabeyre, Jean-Louis Halpérin and Jacques Krynen (eds), Dictionnaire historique des 
juristes français XIIe - XXe siècle (2015). 
614 Hugo Donellus, Commentariorum de Iure Civili Libri Viginti Octo, Vol. 1, (1610), p. 34. 
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4.2.3.3.1. Equity’s place among theories of interpretation  
Donellus confronts the problem directly, and the structure he adopts is very clear. In the part of 
his work dedicated to interpretation, he dedicates a chapter to the broader category of interpretations of 
the law that depart from its words in order to apply its spirit, meaning or intention (sententia).615 Echoing 
Bolognetus, and clearly influenced by medieval doctrines of interpretation, Donellus explains that there are 
two ways in which the meaning of the law may differ from the content of its words - it may either be 
broader, or narrower. When the meaning is narrower, one will require an interpretatio restrictiva. If broader, 
an interpretatio extensiva. For Donellus, however, interpretatio ex aequo et bono does not correspond to all such 
exercises of a sententia contra scriptum – it instead merely relates to a specific category of interpretation of this 
kind.  More specifically, Donellus fits equitable interpretation within this structure as one of the ways of 
performing an interpretatio restrictiva.  
Donellus’ structure goes like this - since an interpretatio restrictiva is a kind of interpretation that looks 
at the narrower intention of the law, one will need a series of rules to guide the legislator in finding such a 
narrower intention, so as to depart from the words. There are, for Donellus, four ways of establishing the 
intention of the law, namely (i) looking to other parts of the law which are meant to narrow it down, (ii) to 
the ratio legis, (iii) to equity and (iv) to other laws suggesting the present rule should be of narrower 
application.616 Equity is therefore but one way of achieving an interpretatio restrictiva in the sense that it can 
lead the judge to find that the intention of the law is narrower than its words.617 This approach, of listing 
‘equity’ as one of the ways of interpreting a law restrictively, is one we have encountered before in the 
context of Medieval doctrines of interpretation.618 This is probably no coincidence – Donellus may have 
been aware of the strong parallel between the use of equity within that context and epieikeia and sought to 
relate it to the theories of equity of civil lawyers and theologians. 
Donellus seems to intend the various approaches to interpretatio restrictiva to be adopted in logical 
order. First one will seek to understand the sententia of the law by reference to words in other sections of 
the law, operating on its meaning, and, if the words do not help, one would then look at the ratio legis. 
Donellus does not refer to the medieval doctrines of interpretation in detail in this section, for instance, 
there is no discussion of the rules relating to when a ratio legis will permit an interpretatio restrictiva in various 
kinds of rules - Donellus simply provides examples from various parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis to make the 
point that, when the ratio legis can be found, one ought to presume it is the legislator’s intention not to apply 
the rule in cases where it fails. Nor is there any discussion of  whether, upon finding a discrepant intention 
of the law, one may simply do away with the words of the law, or keep within their possible constructions 
(albeit improper). Those were important matters for the medieval doctrine of interpretatio restrictiva, but 
                                                    
615 This choice of wording may have been inspired by the rhetorical legal issue a sententia contra scriptum. See [2.3.6] above. 
616  Vol. 1, Commentariorum Vol. 1, p. 31, n. 51: ‘Deprehenditur sententia angustior seu lex plus scripsisse, minus sensisse 
quatuor ex rebus [...]: ex aliis partibus eiusdem legis; ex ratione legis; ex aequitate: ex aliis legibus. Quae omnia cum ad 
sententiam et vim legis cognoscendam pertineant, diligenter in omnibus legibus quaerenda et spectanda sunt. 
617 Schröder has noted, however, that in some passages Donellus suggests an equivalence of the ratio legis, with the mens 
legislatoris, which would make his approach confusing. See Schröder, ‘The Concept and Means of Legal Interpretation in the 
18th Century’, p. 97. 
618 Schröder, ‘The Concept and Means of Legal Interpretation’, pp. 92-4, 96-9. See also [1.1.4.1] above. 
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Donellus does not aim to provide a detailed restatement of the rules.619 Equitable interpretation will instead 
intervene when the words of the law are unhelpful in identifying the sententia, and the ratio legis is uncertain. 
 
4.2.3.3.2. Interpreting by equity in Donellus 
The way in which equitable interpretation allows one to arrive at the sententia of the law and to 
depart from its words is, for Donellus, through the presumption that it is not the legislator’s intention to 
reach a harsh or unjust result (iniquitas).620 He sees this kind of interpretation as analogous to that which 
occurs when we prefer the ratio legis to the words of the law, for there too the words are being departed 
from, rather than construed (as in the case where one looks for words elsewhere in the law).621 Donellus 
relies on a number of citations from the Corpus Iuris Civilis to make the point that, where the ratio cannot be 
found, the legislator’s intention can be presumed to be that of avoiding injustice. Aside from the usual 
references to D.50.17.90, D.1.3.18, C.6.61.5pr, C.3.1.8,622 and D.1.1.1,623 he also refers to a number of more 
substantive passages, for instance D.5.3.40, where Roman jurists appear to depart form the words of the 
law simply on account of the fact that the outcome would be unjust, without reference to the ratio legis.624 
Donellus’ approach to the role of equity therefore draws on the medieval tradition of regarding 
equity as aequitas, itself as a synonym of justice – in this sense, this is an interpretation ‘by equity’ because 
one looks at the equity or justice of the result, rather than to the words of the law or the ratio legis, we have 
already observed earlier that in certain medieval accounts of interpretation the judge would be allowed to 
depart from the proper words of the law in cases where the proper sense would result in injustice.625 
Donellus therefore adopts the medieval understanding of equity as justice in order to provide the content 
of what an equitable interpretation will refer to when assessing the intentions of the legislator and be 
distinguished from other kinds of interpretation.  
Some aspects of Donellus’ approach may be reminiscent of that of theologians, especially insofar 
as it limits its operation to the restriction of general rules and to cases where the application of the law 
would be unjust, and I return to this in the next section. One should bear in mind, however, that unlike 
theologians, Donellus does not deal with equity in isolation – it will not be able, on its own, to determine 
whether a rule should or not apply to a case. This is because Donellus inscribes equitable interpretation 
within a broader approach to finding the law’s sententia. The point for Donellus is not, as it was for 
                                                    
619 Donellus, Commentariorum,Vol. 1, p. 52. 
620 Donellus, ibid.,, p. 53: ‘Deprehenditur et ex aequitate sententia legis angustior, seu minus voluisse lex, plus scripsisse, cum 
quod generaliter et indistincte scriptum est, quibusdam in caussis eiusdem generis iniquum videtur.’ 
621 Donellus, ibid.,, p. 53: ‘quoties id contingit, eadem hic interpretationis regula recepta est, quod in ratione legis, ut lex in iis 
casibus, in quibus iniqua videatur, aequitatis regula temperetur, id est, in iis verba sint, at lex cesset propter sententiam, et 
quod idem est, excipiantur hi casus ex lege repugnantibus quidem verbis: at maxime suffragante, et ita postulante sententia 
ac voluntate legis.’ 
622 Donellus, ibid.,, pp. 53-4. 
623 Donellus, ibid.,, p. 34: ‘Voluntas haec ex fine iuris colligitur. Ius est ars aequi et boni, est ars ad iustitiam ferens, [D.1.1.1pr]. 
Hinc intelligimus omnem legislatorem aut hoc ipsum aequum et iustum sibi propositum habere, aut si de rebus utilibus 
constituendis agitur, tamen hactenus ius constitutum probare, ne contra aequum et bonum in quibusdam caussis recipiatur.’ 
Here clearly aequum et bonum, like equity, is not taken in the sense of epieikeia, but in the sense of justice. 
624 Donellus, ibid.,, p. 33-4.  
625 See [1.1.4.1] above. 
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theologians, that the law would lose its binding power if it led to injustice, but that injustice, in the absence 
of all other elements, may be a safe guide to the intention of the legislator. First of all, if one arrives at the 
sententia legis from either the prior step of referring to other written parts of the law, or by following the 
ratio legis, whether the rule does injustice will not even come into consideration. But Donellus goes even 
further, making it clear that even in a case where the ratio is unavailable, if it does appear for any reason that 
the legislator intended the rule to apply harshly or unjustly to a certain case, this would be sufficient to rebut 
the presumption that a more just or benign solution would reflect the sententia legis. This, for Donellus is the 
effect of the lex prospexit at D.40.9.12.1, which he refers to in a sense similar to that used by Bolognetus.626 
Donellus argues that the reason the Roman jurist would not depart from the law despite its obvious harsh 
application in the case at hand is that the legislator had made it clear that his law would apply to all slaves, 
wheresoever they might be found. The addition of words to the effect that the rule is to apply in all cases 
encompassed by it will rebut any presumption that the unjust result was not intended by the legislator.627 
This is true regardless of whether one can gather the law’s ratio - Donellus draws on D.1.3.20 to argue that 
where a law is clearly intended by the legislator to apply to a case, and the ratio legis is not apparent, one 
should always presume that it nevertheless exists and is justified, and that the judge or subject is simply 
unable at present to grasp it. 628  In these cases, only the legislator has the power to amend the rule, as it 
would require abrogating it altogether. This is the meaning that Donellus attributes to C.1.14.1, if there is 
no room to find an equitable application of the law in the case at hand, C.1.14.1 reserves the power of 
removing the law altogether to the legislator.629 This approach is consistent with the overall aim of 
interpretatio restrictiva to find the law’s sententia. 
To summarise, equitable interpretation is a way in which a judge may construe restrictively the 
sententia of a rule by reference to the injustice that would ensue if the rule were applied. In order to achieve 
such a restrictive interpretation one should, beside looking for evidence of legislative intent in other written 
sources such as parts of the law or other laws, (i) look for the ratio legis and restrict the law in accordance 
with it if it can be gathered, if not (ii) check whether the law explicitly encompasses the case within its 
words, if so, presume that the legislator meant it to apply, and that the ratio is ultimately justified, but if the 
rule does not cover the particular case explicitly with its wording (iii) presume that the legislator meant to 
achieve justice, and restrict the rule by interpretatio ex aequo et bono if it would lead to an unjust result. 
 
                                                    
626 See n.553 above. 
627 Thus, Donellus justifies the result at D.40.9.12.1 by reference to the words of the law. Donellus, ibid.,, p. 35: ‘legem 
Ulpianus aliter accipere non potuit, quia quomodo aperte scripta est [...] ut declarat [...] his verbis: Ipsa igitur, quae divertit, 
omnes omnimodo servos suos manumittere prohibetur.’  
628 Donnellus, ibid.,, p. 35: ‘non semper eam rationem, quam movit legislatorem, nobis esse cognitam. Qua ex re fiat, ut 
quamvis optima fuerit, tamen a nobis reddi non possit. Itaque in proposito exemplo [legem] prospexit dicemus, etsi nobis 
durum et iniquum videtur, quod in ea specie constitutum est, tamen nec durum nec iniquum esse. Lex enim suam rationem 
habuit, neque eo minus habuit, quia ratio nobis ignota est.’ 
629 Donellus, ibid.,, p. 34: ‘At ubi totum ius iniquum dicimus, idque agitur, ut totum tollatur; hoc vero modo interpretari, 
atque hoc facere privato cuiquam non licet, sed soli principi, optima ratione? Sic. Enim ius vetus interpretando sit, ut et prius 
id mutemus et simul constituamus novum, quod soli principi facere concessum est, [C.1.14.12.1]. Hanc sententiam esse 
[C.1.14.1] verba declarabunt.’.  
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4.2.3.3.3. The influence of early modern scholasticism 
Donellus does not acknowledge any scholastic authors in his text explicitly, but there is evidence that he 
was influenced by their writings. At a general level, the influence of theologians may be seen in that, 
throughout his account of equity, Donellus thinks of it as applying to cases where an application of the law 
would be unjust. He does align himself with previous authors on interpretation from the ius commune or 
early modern writers on equity by seeing the ultimate purpose of interpretation as that of finding out the 
intention of the legislator, but he only ever defines an interpretation as properly equitable if the evidence 
on which it bases its presumption that the case falls outside the intention of the legislator is the unjust result 
to which it would lead. The same argument had been made by theologians, who thought that the role of 
equity, properly understood, was that of limiting the power of the law in cases of injustice – this was 
inconsistent with Donellus’ ultimate focus on legislative intention, but may nevertheless explain Donellus’ 
choice in grounding the defining characteristic of equitable interpretation in avoiding injustice. This 
argument is far from conclusive, however, for it should be pointed out that the approach of seeing an 
interpretation ‘by equity’ in cases where the unjust outcome provides evidence of the intention of the 
legislator can also be found in certain medieval accounts, and Donellus could plausibly have been drawing 
from those instead. However, there are two reasons to argue that the more specific influence of theological 
writings, or at least of the writings of other civil lawyers influenced by theologians was present. 
 The first and most important one is that Donellus confines the role of equity to interpreting laws 
restrictively. In the section of his treatise dealing with interpretatio extensiva, Donellus does not mention equity 
as a doctrine of interpretation.630 The argument that epieikeia should only have the power to restrict rules 
had been made only by theologians from Cajetan onwards before, and was applied in this sense by Mendoza 
and Turaminus.  Secondly, while medieval theories of interpretation were focussed on the sense to be 
attributed to words – so that cases of injustice could lead the judge to read the words improperly - Donellus 
did not refer to equity when, later in his treatise, he dealt with cases of ambiguous words. When confronted 
with uncertain words or syntactical constructions, Donellus does argue that one ought to resort to the 
interpretation of those words which is less harsh or which leads to justice in the case at hand. However, he 
does not say that in such cases the law is being interpreted according to equity – he rather talks of benigna 
interpretatio. This may be due to the fact that, as theologians had explained, equity is not concerned with 
cases where the words or their syntactical construction are ambiguous, it is not – in other words - concerned 
with cases where the letter of the law is uncertain, but rather with cases where the letter is certain, but the 
outcome is certainly unjust.631 
 
4.2.3.4. Hugo Grotius’ de Aequitate, Indulgentia et Facilitate – an entirely theological account of equity 
Donellus’ argument that the role of equity should be subsumed within the traditional doctrine of interpretatio 
restrictiva provided an easy way to reconcile theological and legal writings on equity. However, the tradition 
                                                    
630 Donellus, ibid.,, pp. 37-42: ‘Colligitur sententia latior, seu lex amplius velle, et sentire, quam scriptum est, ex his quatuor: 
ex aliis partibus rursum legis; ex contrariis; ex consequentibus; ex ratione latiore legis.’ 
631 See Donellus, ibid.,, pp. 43-7. 
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started by Turaminus and Mendoza of drawing unequivocally and substantively on theological writings to 
found the legal doctrine of equity had not run its course. This is easily illustrated by turning to Hugo Grotius’ 
(d. 1645) approach to equity. Grotius discussed his concept of equity in a short treatise called de Aequitate, 
Indulgentia et Facilitate, first published posthumously in 1656. This work has been the object of studies in the 
past, but it is worth returning to it in some as it provides a useful example of the continuing relevance of 
theological sources on epieikeia for civil law writings on equity.632  
In his treatise, Grotius sought to explain how one ought to distinguish three concepts usually 
opposed to law - that is, equity, indulgence (indulgentia) and facility (facilitas).633 Grotius aligns himself with 
the scholarship of his time, associating aequitas and epieikeia. The treatise makes it clear that Grotius was 
influenced by the late scholastic theologians in his thinking about equity. This is unsurprising, and it has 
been long recognised that Grotius was heavily influenced by early modern scholastic thought in the 
development of his doctrine.634 In his manuscript Grotius expressly acknowledges as sources Aristotle, 
Quintilian, the Corpus Iuris Civilis, Franciscus Connanus, Petrus Faber, Thomas Aquinas, Domingo de Soto, 
and Vasquez.635 
Grotius defines equity, drawing on the language of theologians: ‘aequitas est virtus voluntatis, 
correctrix ejus in quo lex propter universalitatem deficit [...]. Aequum autem est id ipsum, quo lex 
corrigitur’.636 Like scholastic theologians, Grotius also juxtaposes references to the intention of the legislator 
with references to natural law, blurring the line between the two.637  
For Grotius, equity is the virtue that allows one to disapply a legal obligation, whether arising from 
a statute, contract, or will, or other source of rules, whenever it arises from words that are universally framed 
and fail in a particular case.638 There are passages where Grotius seems to display some awareness of the 
distinction between excluding a case from the will of the legislator and from his power: in a passage he 
points out that equity can intervene either by giving force to the presumed intention of the legislator (or 
other rule-giver), or, when these intentions are expressed (and, presumably, expressly inequitable), by giving 
effect to a superior rule, drawn from higher law.639 This would be an important step towards explicitly 
                                                    
632 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres... Cum Annotatis Auctoris, Ejusdemque Dissertatione de Mari Libero, Ac Libello 
Singulari de Aequitate, Indulgentia et Facilitate (1735), pp. 37-43 (the pagination starts over in the third part of this work dedicated 
to the Libello Singulari de Aequitate, Indulgentia et Facilitate). For a discussion of its production and transmission see JE Scholtens 
and R Feenstra, ‘Hugo de Groot’s De Aequitate - Tekstuitgave En Tekstgeschiedenis Met Bijdragen over Nicolaas 
Blanckaert En over de Vorrede Tot de Inleidinge’ (1974) 42 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, pp. 201-42. 
633 Grotius, de Aequitate, p. 37 
634 The scholarship on this point is vast. But see most recently Joe Sampson, The Historical Foundations of Grotius’ Analysis of 
Delict (2017). 
635 See Feenstra, ‘Hugo de Groot’, p. 228. 
636 Grotius, ibid., p. 37. He also draws on the theologians’ stock example of the deposited knife to be returned to a madman. 
See ibid., p. 38 and n.235 above. 
637 Grotius, ibid., p. 38: ‘multa saepe occurrere, quibus illae regulae non satis congruerent. In quibus oportuit non regulam, 
sed eius qui regulam dedisset mentem aeque propositum sequi, id quod erat omnia dirigere ex principiis naturae;  unde ad 
ipsa naturae principia recurrendum fuit, ut ita ex infinito suppleretur, quod finito deerat’. 
638 Grotius, ibid., p. 38: ‘prima natura principia et quae leges virtutem ponunt, nihil nisi vitium tollunt, aequitatem non 
recipiunt [...]. Caeterum et ad leges inferiorum potestatum, et ad patrum, maritorum, dominorum imperia, ad vota etiam, 
pacta, et testamenta aequitas pertinet.’ 
639 Grotius, ibid., p. 38: ‘aequitas pertinet [...] dupliciter, aut enim verba atque conceptus jubentium, voventium, paciscentium, 
testantium, corrigit, prout casus ex ipsorum praesumta mente poscit: aut etiam cum mens expressa est, legem ipsam, qua 
iussa, vota pacta, testamenta servari jubentur, restringit ex superioribus.’ 
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distinguishing the juridical from the theological role of equity – and one that, by the time Grotius was 
writing, had been taken by Suarez -640  but, on closer inspection, it seems clear that Grotius did not draw 
the distinction consistently or clearly. Indeed, we find Grotius elsewhere referring to the intervention of 
equity as limited to cases where there is a ‘contrary’ failure of the law. He follows the arguments of Soto 
and Vasquez to the effect that, in cases where the intention of the legislator fails, but no injustice is caused, 
epieikeia may not intervene. The focus is therefore not on interpreting the law in accordance with the mens 
legislatoris - only the law-giver will be able to intervene in the latter case, through a dispensatio.641 Grotius also 
re-iterates Soto’s points about the degree of certitude necessary to employ epieikeia. He argues that in cases 
where it is clear that injustice would follow, then equity can be used by anyone, including a subject or a 
judge. If, however, it is doubtful whether an exception is appropriate, ‘quia ambiguum est, utrum aequius 
utrumve publico utilius sit, legis verba sequi, aut non sequi’ one must distinguish ‘aut enim res moram 
patitur aut non: si non patitur moram, faciet privatus id, quod in re dubia recte ratiocinando aequius et 
melius inveniet: ita tamen, ut si dubius maneat, nec se recte explicare possit, legis verba sequatur.’642  
There are, however, some indications that the intention of the legislator played a greater role in 
Grotius’ theory of equity than it did in theological accounts of it – perhaps on account of the influence of 
contemporary civil law theories. The first sign is that, when theologians from Cajetan to Soto wrote about 
a contrary failure of the law, they generally referred to the ratio legis failing contrarily, something they 
identified with the law violating natural law or threatening human lives. Grotius’ focus is instead slightly 
different. He refers to a contrary failure, not of the ratio legis , but of the mens legislatoris. The argument cannot 
be taken much further - the example Grotius provides of a law failing contrarily is the rather unhelpful one 
of a law governing the punishment for homicide, which demands that one be struck with a blade. For 
Grotius, equity would prevent the application of such a rule to a person who acted in self-defence because 
the killer is innocent, and ‘innocentem autem puniri pugnat cum iustitia et cum mente legislatoris’.643  No 
conclusive role of the intention of the legislator can be derived from this statement. 
Another clue in this sense may, however, be derived from a difficult passage in Grotius, where he 
talks about what would occur in a case where a law is simply intended by the legislator to be at odds with 
natural law. In that example he explains that it would not be the job of equity to deal with it, because there 
would not be a defect of universality in a particular case, but rather the law as a whole would be defective.  
He then moves on to refer to the lex Prospexit to explain that one would in these cases have to follow the 
law anyway.644 His explanation for that rule is that in matters of doubt (in dubio), the authority of the law 
prevails.  The problem with this analysis is that the starting point for Grotius’ discussion was that the 
                                                    
640 See [4.2.4.1.1] below. 
641 Grotius, ibid., p. 41. 
642 Grotius, ibid., p. 40. It seems here that Grotius is unaware of, or does not wish to follow, Suarez’s distinction between 
taking a case out of the power of the legislator, in which case the availability of a superior to decide the issue would be 
irrelevant, and cases falling outside the intention of the legislator, where the matter would ultimately be resolved by referring 
the matter to the legislator. See n.676 below. 
643 Grotius, ibid., p. 41: ‘sciendum est mentem legislatoris dupliciter posse cessare in casu speciali cadente sub verba legis: aut 
enim cessat ita ut simul pugnet cum casu, aut sine pugna cessat; subtiliter loquentes illud vocant cessare contrarie, hoc 
negative. [...] In priore locum habet aequitas, in posteriore dispensatio’ 
644 On the lex Prospexit see n.553 above. 
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intention of the law would unambiguously be to violate natural law, in which case it is not clear what doubt 
Grotius is postulating. Even more confusingly, Grotius moves on to say that ‘[c]ontra has enim, cum vim 
obligandi non habeant, aequitatis remedio opus non est’, suggesting that the laws would not have to be 
followed. He concludes this difficult paragraph by explaining that ‘ostendimus praeterea eorum, quae in 
lege obscure dicta sunt, interpretationem aut productionem legis ad casus similes’.645 There are no other 
passages in this text which clarify Grotius’ position.  
That said, and despite writing a treatise dedicated (at least in part) to the topic, the interest of 
Grotius in equity was limited, and he clearly did not think it had great explanatory power to be related back 
to doctrines of civil law. Grotius did not discuss equity in his other writings, even when dealing with matters 
of interpretation. In his Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence (Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid) first 
published in 1631 but written in 1620,646 Grotius dealt with the question of whether laws might not bind 
on account of particular circumstances.647 However, he explained the disapplication of legal rules purely by 
reference to the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa.  What is most surprising, however, is that, while not 
mentioning epieikeia at all in that passage, Grotius adapted the doctrine of cessante ratione to his approach to 
equity, finding that only cases of ‘contrary failure’, as opposed to ‘negative failure’ of the ratio legis would 
allow a rule to be disapplied.648 He also relied on examples from Soto and Aquinas’ comments on equity  
to illustrate this point,649 but, even in that context, made no mention of epieikeia.650 Similarly, in his De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis, Grotius does not mention equity at al in his chapter on the interpretation of the law, despite 
referring to principles recognisably borrowed from the treatment of equity by scholastic theologians.651  
Grotius’ reluctance to mention equity in writings other than those dedicated to that topic, even as 
it exercised an influence on his way of thinking about the law, may be a sign that the concept had not quite 
found an uncontroversial place within civil law works – a point to which we return below.652 That was 
despite the fact that it was almost universally recognised, by the early seventeenth century, that equity’s role, 
if any, would have to be one related to the interpretation or amendment of the law. 
 
                                                    
645 Grotius, ibid., p. 39.  
646 Hugo Grotius, Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence (AFS Maasdorp ed, 1903), p. ix. 
647 Hugo Grotius, Inleiding Tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleertheid (1631), f. 3. 
648 The marginal lemma to this paragraph reads in Latin cessatio per contrarietatem, as opposed to cessatio negativa, which 
introduces the next paragraph, and which does not suffice to disapply a rule. See Grotius, Inleiding, f. 3. 
649 Specifically, to Aquinas’ example about climbing the city walls and Soto’s example of a law forbidding citizens to bear 
arms at night. See [3.2.1] above. 
650 Grotius, Inleiding, f. 3: ‘Maer indien de wet niet in ‘t algemeen op en houd, zo moet gelet werden of de oeffening vande 
wet in de voorgevallen gelegentheid opentlick soude strijden met de wille des wet-gevers, in welcken ghevalle de wet noch 
uiterlick noch innerlick en verbind: als by voor-beeld: de wet verbied alle burghers by nacht op de wal te komen: een borgher 
woonende by de wal hoort by nacht dat den viand de wal beklimt: Indien hy alsdan t’huis bleeff ende niet sijn best en deede 
om den viand af te keeren, hy soude wel doen nae de woorden van de wet, maer niet nae de zin van den wetgever die voor 
al betracht moet werden. Maer indien de oeffening sodanigen opentlicken strijd met wet-gevers meeninge niet meede en 
brengt, zo moet noch ghezien zijn, of de wet nae‘t recht-snoer des voorzichtigheids ziet op een alghemeen ghevaer, of dat 
de wet iet houd als zeeckerlick gedaen ‘t welck niet en is gedaen. [...] Over-sulcks de wet verbiedende dat iemand die de 
wacht niet en heeft by nacht sal gaen langers straet met wapenen, verbind oock de gheschickte luiden, die niet quaeds in de 
zin en hebben om dat het gevaer daer de wet op ziet plaets heeft of kan hebben.’ 
651 Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, lib. 2, cap. 16, in particular compare para. 27 with Suarez at n.663 below. 
652 See [4.3.1.1] below. 
137 
 
4.2.4. Linking equity and interpretation III: Suarez and the seventeenth-century development of 
theological epieikeia as interpretation 
4.2.4.1. Franciscus Suarez (d. 1617) 
Suarez is often acknowledged as the writer who contributed the most to the theological development of 
epieikeia.653 He did so in his Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore, published in 1612.654 As we shall see, we owe 
to Suarez the most sophisticated attempt by a theologian to bring together the two approaches to equity by 
the authors who had preceded him, namely, on the one hand, that of Soto, Medina, Vasquez and the like, 
who followed Cajetan and Aquinas’ line very closely, and of those of civil lawyers, also adopted by fellow-
theologians such as Azpilcueta and Molina. His greater attention devoted to the doctrine of equity among 
lawyers allowed him to distinguish the function of limiting the power of human law from that of identifying 
the wishes of the legislator, a line that had been blurred in previous accounts of the theological concept of 
equity.655  
In his attempt to bring together the two approaches to equity, Suarez did not engage explicitly with 
the writings of humanist-jurists on aequum et bonum, but he did pay a great deal of attention to the medieval 
sources from legists and canonists on equity and interpretation. Suarez’s account was the most elaborate 
attempt to bring in line the legal and theological approach to equity even considering civil law writings more 
generally, and had a lasting impact on determining both the theological and juridical view on the place of 
epieikeia within legal doctrine as a theory of restrictive interpretation of the law.656 
4.2.4.1.1. Two aspects of epieikeia 
In De Legibus Suarez engages at the outset with the question that his predecessors failed to address. What 
exactly is the relationship between the limits of human law and the intention or presumed intention of the 
legislator? While the approach of civil lawyers was entirely focussed on the latter, Soto and his followers 
blended the two as though they answered the same question. 
By the times of Suarez, the connection between interpretation and equity that had been finding its 
way in theological writings since the time of Soto was entirely uncontroversial.657 In the sixth chapter of the 
second book of De Legibus, while dealing with the issue of whether natural law could be subjected to epieikeia, 
Suarez explained that epieikeia is a species of legal interpretation or, as he puts it, ‘: omnis enim epiikia est 
legis interpretatio; non vero e converso omnis interpretatio legis est epiikia'.658  In telling us what kind of 
interpretation epieikeia involves, Suarez followed Cajetan’s explanation: it is the kind of legal interpretation 
that finds a law to be deficient on account of a defect of universality.659 However, unlike any author before 
him, Suarez spelled out clearly that that interpretation may take place in two entirely different cases. One 
                                                    
653 See e.g. Riley, Epikeia, p. 67: ‘No theologian treats so comprehensively the concept of epikeia as does Suárez.’ 
654 Franciscus Suárez, Tractatus De Legibus Ac Deo Legislatore (1613). 
655 See [3.2-3] above. 
656 See [4.3.2] below. 
657 See [3.3.1.2] above. 
658 Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 2, cap. 16, p. 118.  
659 Suárez, ibid., lib. 2, cap. 16, p. 118: ‘non tamen omnem huiusmodi interpretationem esse epiikiam, sed illam solum, per 
quam interpretamur, legem deficere in aliquo modo particulari propter universalem, id est, quia lex universaliter lata est, et 
in aliquot particulari ita deficit, ut iuste in illo servari non possit.’ 
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case was traditionally Thomist, that is, where it would exceed the legislator’s power to bind. Suarez thought 
this would occur in two sub-sets of circumstances: where the law – if applied - would sin, and where it 
would bind too harshly. However, epieikeia would also take place in a second case, one where, even though 
the legislator would have the power to bind the subject, it is clear that he had no intention to do so.660  
 
4.2.4.1.2. The first limb: Epieikeia and the power of the legislator 
Suarez’s explanation of the first limb of epieikeia bears the hallmarks of its development by Cajetan and 
Soto, but Suarez was able to develop the doctrine with greater consistency, having separated it from the 
intentions of the legislator. Suarez recognised two separate instances where the legislator would be unable 
to bind a subject. 
The first should by now sound rather familiar. It concerned cases where the application of the law 
would violate divine or natural law or otherwise result in injustice.661 However, Suarez found that confining 
cases where the law loses its binding power to situations where it would positively lead to sin or commit an 
injustice would be too narrow. Building on Soto,662 Suarez extended the scope of epieikeia beyond these 
cases, to those where it would prove very onerous for the subjects to follow the words of the law, i.e. where 
the law would cause a subject to suffer some unjust loss.663 In seeking to determine what kind of prospective 
harm might justify a subject in not following the law Suarez looked to civil law sources on interpretation, 
and specifically to Bartolus and Tiraquellus. He cites passages by the two where they discuss the applicability 
of the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa.664 While they had argued that only an ensuing damnum emergens 
(a direct loss as opposed to a loss of future opportunity to make a gain, or lucrum cessans) could justify a 
                                                    
660 Suárez, ibid., lib. 6, cap. 7, p. 439: ‘Et ita tres modi, vel rationes utendi epiikia distingui possunt, ut unus sit propter 
cavendum aliquid iniquum, alius propter vitandam acerbam et iniustam obligationem, tertius propter coniectatam legislatoris 
voluntatem, non obstante potestate.’ 
661 Ibid.,: ‘in primo modo praecipue considerandum [est], an in eo casu occurrat aliud praeceptum, praesertim iuris divini et 
naturalis, cui repugnet executio legis humanae secundum verba eius, et consequenter, an actus tunc habeat iniustitiam, vel 
malitiam inseparabilem, vel saltem contra praeceptum gravius et magis obligans, et iuxta haec principia debet fieri iudicium. 
[…]. [In secundo modo iudicandum est] de modo obligandis legis humanae, et uxta illa iudicandum erit an hoc factum 
particulare cum his circunstantiis excedat potestatem legis humanae.’ 
662 See Soto’s extension of epieikeia to cases of private death at [3.3.1.1] above. 
663 Suarez, ibid., pp. 437-40: ‘Caiet[anus dixit] epiikiam esse directionem legis, qui peccat propter universale, solum autem peccare 
posset, si obligaret ad actum iniquum […]. Videtur tamen haec sententia nimis rigida et limitata, quia saepe potest homo 
excusari ab observantia legis generaliter loquentis, etiamsi posset licite actum per illam praeceptum facere [...] nec refragatur 
Divus Thomas, nam licet in dicto [IaIIae q. 96, art. 6] loquatur de detrimento communis boni, sub illo comprehendit 
detrimentum particularium civium.’  
664 Neither Tiraquellus nor Bartolus mention epieikeia in this context, these are rather commentaries ancillary to the discussion 
of the cessante ratione maxim and the various ways of applying this rule of interpretation. See Bartolus ad C.1.14.5, ff 32v-33v 
and Andreas Tiraquellus, Tractatus Cessante Causa Cessat Effectus (1552), pp. 91-2. Stated simply, the question was whether, 
once it is established that the ratio legis in a certain case is missing, this automatically means that the law will not apply. Certain 
commentators saw the lex prospexit (D.40.9.12.1) as contradicting this, because it was a case where the ratio of the law was 
missing, but the law applied nonetheless. Bartolus argued that the theory behind this was that in a case like the lex prospexit, 
although the ratio of the law was missing, all that would ensue was a lucrum cessans, in that case, the law could be applied 
despite the missing ratio. On the other hand, if the application of the law had involved a damnum emergens, it should not have 
been applied if the reason went missing. In his own writings on interpretation (which he distinguished from equity, see 
[4.2.4.1.4] below), Suárez adopted a different solution.  
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subject in not following a rule, Suarez thought the better view to be that any ensuing loss, as long as it was 
substantial, could form the basis of an interpretation by epieikeia.665  
The difficulty here in Suarez’s discussion lies in identifying exactly in what circumstances the loss 
that the application of a rule will cause to one party will be such as to cause the rule to bind too harshly. It 
is beyond doubt that perfectly just rules may require abiding parties to suffer a loss, even a substantial loss. 
This is not addressed by Suarez straightforwardly. The medieval sources on which Suarez relies, all seemed 
to assume that the loss would have had to be of a kind that did not fall within the rule’s ratio.666 However, 
at the outset of his discussion, Suarez drew on the authority of Cajetan, Soto, Covarrubias, Ledesma,  
Medina and Azpilcueta’s Enchiridion, to make it clear that a negative failure of the ratio would not have 
anything to do with the intervention of epieikeia.667 The reason why the law in these cases is unable to bind, 
is the same as in the cases of sin – it is beyond the legislator’s power to do so.668 Therefore, even if the 
legislator had devised a rule with the precise ratio of binding in such a harsh way, epieikeia would still allow 
a subject to avoid applying that rule, because the legislator would have exceeded his power. The ratio is thus 
neither here nor there.669 The point is instead that a law or legislator may not inflict on a certain individual 
some grave harm when ‘nulla alia ratio communi boni obliget ad illud inferendum’.670 Unfortunately, we 
are not told much more by Suarez about this aspect of the doctrine, and it must remain unclear exactly how 
one should determine whether a loss inflicted by a rule is justifiable or not. It is rather curious that, in his 
analysis of the type of triggering loss examined above, Suarez felt free to relocate the writings of medieval 
legists and canonists on issues of interpretation of the law according to its ratio671 within a doctrine that 
bore seemingly no relation to it. As with previous writers, this may be due to the growing influence of those 
approaches to epieikeia among jurists that saw it closely related to those kinds of doctrines of interpretation. 
Having identified the two cases above, namely those of sin and of harshness, it is important to 
emphasise once more that Suarez was very clear in stating that in these circumstance the applicability of 
epieikeia bore no relation to the intentions of the legislator. The point is rather that, in these circumstances, 
the legislator would not be able to bind the subject even if he wanted to. This led Suarez to depart from 
Cajetan and Soto in one significant respect. The latter two thought that, in a case where a subject’s judgment 
about the detrimental effect of following the law were only probable, it would be better to refer to a superior 
                                                    
665 Suárez, ibid., p. 440: ‘Aliter limitant Iuristae dictam assertionem ut procedat, quando detrimentum vel proximi est in bonis 
acquisitis, non vero in acquirendis, nam ex hoc sumi non ptest sufficiens excusatio, quia illud non est verum detrimentum, 
seu damnum emergens, sed tantum lucrum cessans. […] Ita fere Bart[olus ad C.1.14.5], quos late refert Tiraqu[ellus, Tractatus 
Cessante Causa, n. 151]. Statim vero [Tiraquellus, Tractatus Cessante Causa, n. 152] refert Salicetus contradicentem et plura 
contra illam distinctionem congerit Felinus [Sandeus ad X.1.3.5]. Nobis ergo non servit distinctio, nam si damnum sit leve, 
licet sit in bonis acquisitis, potest non sufficere ad excusandum ad obligatione legis, si vero lucrum cessans sit iustum, et 
grave, saepe aequiparatur damno, moraliter loquendo, ut constat ex [C.7.47.1.2]. 
666 See n.664 above. 
667 Suárez, ibid.,, lib. 6, cap. 7, p. 437. 
668 See e.g. Suárez, ibid., p. 439: ‘non solum esse alienum a prudenti legislatore iniqua praecipere, sed etiam inhumana, et 
gravior quam humana conditio patiatur, vel quam ratio communis boni postulet.’ 
669 That is, despite the fact that Suárez follows Cajetan’s confusing language in calling cases exceeding the power of human 
law as cases where the ratio legis fails obliquely.  
670 Suárez, ibid., p. 439. 
671 See n.664 above. 
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if time allowed one to do so.672 Suarez saw in this a clear inconsistency – in cases where it is not within the 
power of the superior or legislator to bind the subject, what benefit could one possibly derive from asking 
his opinion Suarez says that in this matters one has to distinguish ‘duos modos epiikiae supra tactos, scilicet, 
vel excipiendo casum a potestate legislatoris, vel a sola voluntates. Et in priori […] posse subditum ex 
probabili iudicio, quod talis casus non comprehendatur sub potestate legis, excusari a legis observatione; 
nulla expectata interpretatione superioris, non solum in casu subito et urgente, sed etiam in quolibet alio. 
Probatur quiatunc non agitur de interpretanda superioris voluntate, sed de potestate quam non tenemur 
interpretari ex iudicio ipsius Principis quando ipse illam non declaravit, sed ex principiis Theologiae aut 
iuris.’ 673 For Suarez, the recourse to a superior was clearly important in cases of the second type to which 
epieikeia applied, those where the will of the legislator was in issue, but it seemed to be of no help where it 
was his power, rather than his will, that was in doubt. 
4.2.4.1.3. The second limb: Epieikeia and the intentions of the legislator 
As we have seen, Suarez was more precise in his analysis of the first limb of epieikeia, connecting it more 
clearly with the power – as opposed to the will – of the legislator. This left Suarez to discuss the precise 
relation between the intentions of the legislator and epieikeia, which was central to the understanding of 
equity spreading among jurists by the end of the sixteenth century, but seemed entirely redundant in the 
accounts of epieikeia of Cajetan and Soto.  
Suarez explained that a general law may apply to a case where the legislator, while perfectly able to 
bind a subject because following the law would not cause any injustice, would not have intended the law to 
apply. In these circumstances, a subject would be entitled to rely on epieikeia not to follow the law if it is 
clear that it was not the intention of the legislator to bind – Suarez founded this aspect of epieikeia on 
Aristotle, without referring to any of the humanistic or legal literature on point.674 Suarez did not engage at 
any length with how this aspect of epieikeia would operate, and said little except that the kind of evidence 
one may make use of in determining the intention of the legislator would be conjectures derived from the 
circumstances of the case, the customs and ways of the ruler and of the manner of interpreting similar 
laws.675  
That said, Suarez saw a clear substantive distinction between this aspect of epieikeia, founded on 
the legislator’s will, and the previous one, based on its power, examined above. The most important 
difference was that, as mentioned above, while in cases involving the power of the legislator, recourse to a 
                                                    
672 See [3.2.1], [3.3] above. 
673 See Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 6, cap. 8, p. 441. Suarez did not refer to the opinion of Aquinas that a superior may be better 
placed to judge, See n.452 above. 
674 Suárez, De Legibus, lib., cap. 7, p. 439: ‘ulterius habere locum epiiciam in casu, in quo non deesset potestas in legislatore 
ad obligandum, sed ex circunstantiis iudicatur, non fuisse hanc mentem eius.  […] Et hunc certe modum videtur significasse 
Asristoteles cum dixit, epiikiam emendare legem, quod et ipse legislator, si adesset, hoc modo dixisset, id est, ita esset 
moderaturus, et interpretaturus legem suam.’ 
675 Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 6, cap. 7, p. 439 ‘Quia non semper Praelatus vult obligare cum toto rigore, et in omni eventu, in 
quo posset obligare. Ut verbi gratia [...] propter minorem debilitatem, qua non obstante potuisset Ecclesia obligare, sed 
nihilominus creditur ex benignitate noluisse, quae intentio legislatoris colligi potest ex aliis circunstantiis temporis, loci, et 
personarum, et ex ordinario modo praecipiendi cum illa moderatione subintellecta, licet non exprimatur. [… Et in hoc casu] 
magis est utendum coniecturis, ex circunstantiis desumptis, et praesertim ex usu, et modo regiminis, et ex more interpretandi 
similes leges.’  
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superior could be of no assistance, in cases where the will of the legislator was in issue, an opportunity to 
consult the legislator would have to be taken whenever his will was not certain.676 However, if recourse to 
a legislator could not be had, Suarez thought that a probable judgment that the legislator would not have 
wished it to be followed would justify the intervention of epieikeia, and that even though following the law 
would cause no sin or unjust harm.677 He justified this on the basis that it would be a very great limitation 
on epieikeia if it could only be used in cases where the interpretation of the will of the legislator were certain, 
for most human judgments are probable in nature.678 He also referred to the practice in matters of 
interpretation in the Church itself and by jurists, which he saw as being in line with his view.679 In cases 
where the intention of the legislator is wholly in doubt, Suarez finds, predictably, that one ought to simply 
follow what the words prescribe, and referred to a number of juristic sources to support that view.680 
Interestingly, perhaps in an attempt to deal with the medieval sources referring to equity, Suarez also added 
at the very end of his analysis that, in cases where equity cannot be followed without consulting the legislator 
on account of the uncertainty of his will, one may nevertheless follow a written equity – it is unclear how 
Suarez squared this with his own theory, or what he thought a written equity to be.681  
 
4.2.4.1.4. Epieikeia and interpretation in Suarez 
As we have seen, Suarez brought epieikeia more closely in line with that of contemporary jurists. Most 
importantly because he thought epieikeia had a role in situations where, though the legislator had the power 
to bind, it was at least probable that this would violate his intention. This led him to define very clearly 
epieikeia as a species of interpretation. However, one important respect in which Suarez’s doctrine of equity 
differed from that of jurists was that it more precisely distinguished equitable interpretation from the 
doctrines of restrictive and extensive interpretation,682 seeking to carve a special role for the first alongside 
the latter two. 
A few words need to be spent on Suarez’s approach to interpretation. Suarez derives most of his 
statements about interpretation from medieval legists and canonists, as well as their interpretation in early 
modern civil law works.683 For Suarez, interpretation is about giving effect to the mens legislatoris, for it is the 
                                                    
676 Suárez, De Legibus lib. 6, cap. 8, p. 441: ‘At vero in altero modo epiikiae, in quo casus excipitur a sola voluntate, et non a 
potestate legislatoris, ait haec opinio [i.e. that the superior has to be consulted], [...] esse recurrendum ad superiorem, quando 
fieri potest in casu probabili.’ 
677 Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 6, cap. 8, p. 441: ‘Nihilominus sententiam Caietani, et Soti censeo esse practice certam quoad hanc 
partem, ut quando non potest conveniri superior, liceat ex probabili sententia, aut iudicio epiikia uti, sive casus excipi 
iudicetur a potestate legislatoris, sive a sola voluntate.’ 
678 Suárez, ibid.: ‘imponeretur gravissimum onus hominibus, si nunquam liceret eis uti epiikia ex iudicio probabili, quando 
non patet aditus ad superiorem [...] cum nemo sit tam certus de sufficientia causae, quin dubitet, vel formidet.’ 
679 Suárez, ibid.: ‘Constat autem contrarium esse in usu totius Ecclesiae, et approbari ab omnibus Doctoribus.’ 
680 See Suárez, ibid, pp. 442-3 
681 Suárez, ibid, p. 443.: ‘in casu dubio […] non licet aequitatem sequi contra ius scriptum inconsulto Principe, nisi ipsamet 
aequitas scripta sit, ut dicitur in [C.3.1.8] iuxta vulgatam lectionem’. In this passage he cites the opinions of Bartolus, Baldus, 
Panormitanus and Cinus Pistoiensis. 
682 Suárez discusses those in chapters 1 to 5. See Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 6, cap. 2-5, pp. 421-435. 
683 Among the early modern works that seem to have influenced Suárez’s views on point are Constantius Rogerius, Tracatus 
de Iuris Interpretatione (1463); Andreas Tiraquellus, Commentarii in Lege Si Unquam Codice de Revocandis Donationibus (1581) and 
the latter’s Tractatus Cessante Causa, see nn.664-665 above. 
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latter that gives any law its binding power.684 To put it simply, Suarez goes through a number of ways – 
which seem to proceed in logical succession – in which one may seek to divine the intentions of the 
legislator. First, since the words of the law are the only way for the legislator to express his intention, one 
must presume that they are an accurate reflection of it. One will therefore start from taking the words in 
their proper meaning. The proper meaning of the word can either mean their natural meaning, as used in 
everyday language, or their ‘civil’ meaning.685 The foremost evidence to divine the mens legislatoris are 
therefore, quite sensibly, the words that he chose.686 There may be cases, however, where the latter do not 
reflect the intention of the legislator. But what evidence may one resort to in order to determine the latter?687 
Suarez’s answer is that one may refer to, (i) the subject matter of the law (materia legis), (ii)  the injustice or 
absurdity which following the words would lead to, (iii) other laws and their incompatibility with the 
meaning of the words in the  rule in question, and finally (iv) the ratio legis – though Suarez is rather sceptical 
about the latter, and warns interpreters not to equate it to the mens legislatoris, even when the legislator 
himself has expressed it in writing.688 In cases where any of these elements militate against a reading of the 
words of the law in their proper sense, one should stretch the meaning of the words to any improper sense 
which they may hold in order to satisfy the intention of the legislator.  
The exercise of interpreting words beyond their proper natural meaning, for Suarez, can be of two 
kinds – either extensive, if the words are given a meaning that is broader than their natural one, or restrictive 
                                                    
684 Suárez, De Legibus, lib. 6 , cap. 1, p. 418: ‘mens legislatoris est anima legis, unde sicut in vivente substantia, et operatio 
vitae ab anima maxime pendet, ita in lege a mente legislatoris. Illa est ergo vera interpretatio legis, per quam mentem, et 
voluntatem legislatoris assequimur, et ideo quacumque ratione de mente legislatoris constare possit, secundum illam maxime 
erit lex interpretanda.’ 
685 Suárez, ibid., pp. 418-21: ‘Circa verba dicendum est, in omni lege humana primum omnium expectandam esse verborum 
proprietatem, id est, propriam significationem, nam ex illa maxime sumenda est vera interpretatio legis, semperque est 
praeferenda nisi aliquid obstet. [...] Observandum est autem in hoc puncto in verbis iuris, seu legum, duplicem proprietatem 
solere distingui, unam naturalem vocant, aliam civilem. Prior non sic appellatur, quia significatio aliqua verborum legis sit a 
natura [...] sed quia quaedam significatio est ex simplici et primaeva verborum impositione, et in ea solent significari res prout 
vere, ac naturaliter sunt, sicut dictio mors significat nauturalem mortem. Significatio autem civilis dicitur, quae est per 
extensionem, parificationem, vel fictionem iuris, ut dictio Mors significare solet civilem, quasi sit per religiosam professionem 
et filius adoptatus dicitur filius et sic de aliis. [...] Item quia verba sunt, quae ex intentione legislatoris potissimum assumuntur 
ad declarandam voluntatem suam; ergo illa etiam primo, ac principaliter consuli debent ad eamdem voluntatem 
cognoscendam.’ 
686 Suárez, ibid., p. 419: ‘Priori ergo modo dicendum videtur, verba per se loquendo esse potissimum signum voluntatis 
legislatoris, et illo maxime utendum esse ad mentem legis perspiciendam’. 
687 Suárez, ibid., p. 418: ‘Quaeret vero aliquis qui possit fieri, ut mens praeter verba aliquid conferat ad legem interpretandam. 
Quia homines non possunt mentem alterius hominis percipere, nisi ex verbis eius.’ 
688 Suárez, ibid., p. 419: ‘Tandem vero interrogari potest, quibus modis, vel coniecturis utendum sit ad mentem legislatoris 
indagandam praeter nudam vim verborum. [...] Primo materia legis, [... s]ic etiam in [D.19.2.15.4], verbun Donationis per 
verbum transactionis exponitur, materia exigente. Secundo quoties verborum proprietas induceret iniustitiam, vel similem 
absurditatem circa mentem legislatoris, trahenda sunt verba ad sensum etiam improprium, in quo lex sit iusta et rationabilis, 
quia haec paresumitur esse mens legislatoris, ut multis iuribus declaratum est in tit. De Legibus [D.1.1] [...]. Tertio ex 
comparatione ad alia iura potest indagari mens legislatoris in aliqua lege [...]. Primo ex repugnantia, et contrarietate aliarum 
legum [...]. [Secundo]  per concordiam circumstantiis [nam si interpretatio] consentanea sit aliis iuribus, in quibus similia 
verba in illo sensu accipiuntur, vel aequiparantur, tunc enim valde probabilis sit talis interpretatio ex mente legislatoris, quia 
secundum ius loqui praesumitur. [...] Ultimo circa rationem legis [...]. Oportet tamen circa illam advertere, duplicem esse 
posse rationem legis, unam in lege non expressam, sed ab interpretibus excogitatam. Aliam in lege ipsa explicatam. Prior 
ergo ratio licet aliquid conferat ad assequendam legislatoris mentem, non est tamen certum indicium, sed probabilis tantum 
coniectura, tum quia saepe ratio non est certa [...]. At vero quando ratio legis in ipsa lege continetur, magnum indicium esse 
potest mentis legislatoris [...] non tamen ita infallibile, quin aliae etiam circunstantiae ponderandae sint, quia etiam ipsius 
rationis sensus potest esse ambiguus, et ex aliis circunstantiis certior redditur [...] et ideo ad plene cognoscendam legislatoris 




if it is narrower.689 The two are dealt with in a way that is consistent with the more general analysis above, 
adding more detail to the circumstances in which elements (i)-(iv) may be relied upon to infer the mens 
legislatoris.690 They are also clearly both distinguished from other interpretations, such as epieikeia, which are 
aimed at carving exceptions into rules, not at construing their meaning extensively or restrictively and no 
reference to equity or epieikeia is found in Suarez’s analysis of either.691  
When it comes to distinguishing the scope of epieikeia from interpretation, Suarez’s analysis is not 
always clear. There is no problem at all with the difference between construing the proper natural meaning 
of the words of the law, an exercise involving neither extension nor restriction, and the application of 
epieikeia. There seems also to be no problem distinguishing the extensive interpretation of the law from the 
application of epieikeia – Suarez is clear throughout his analysis, following Cajetan and Soto, that epieikeia 
will only serve to remedy defects of universality and, in any case, is a doctrine concerned with the cessation 
of the law’s binding power, which could hardly result in the extension of a rule. This leaves us with the 
distinction between epieikeia and interpretatio restrictiva. 
The two seem to have quite a lot in common, especially since Suarez extended epieikeia to cover 
cases where the legislator would not have wished a general rule to apply. They will both result in preventing 
a general rule from applying to a particular case where that would result in injustice,692 but, most 
importantly, they will also do that where there is other evidence that the mens legislatoris is that the rule should 
not apply. However, the directions the two doctrines give about the kind of evidence which may be relied 
upon to make a probable judgment of the intention of the legislator do not match perfectly. The rules of 
interpretatio restrictiva are quite detailed, referring to all the rules of interpretation mentioned in the more 
general discussion, as well as going into greater detail regarding how the ratio legis may, in certain 
circumstances, work as evidence of the mens legislatoris. The rules of epieikeia are much briefer, simply making 
vague reference to the circumstances of the case, the ways of the ruler and the way in which similar laws 
would be applied. It is not clear whether Suarez implied that one should seek guidance from rules of 
interpretatio restrictiva when seeking to discover the mens legislatoris for the purpose of epieikeia. It is also not 
clear whether the rules expressed in epieikeia about the need to consult a superior when the legislator’s 
intention is in doubt would also apply to cases of interpretatio restrictiva. Finally, it is not easy to demarcate 
exactly what cases would fall within the domain of interpretatio restrictiva and what in epieikeia. It seems, reading 
                                                    
689 Suárez, ibid., p. 421: ‘Legis interpretatio, si praecise, ac secundum vocis rigorem sumatur solum consistit in declaratione 
et intelligentia proprii, et (ut sic dicam) immediati sensus ipsius legis, sistendo tantum in usitata et propria significatione 
verborum, et in sensu legis ex illis sic intellectis resultante [...] nobis vero nihil de illa dicendum superest. [...] Alio ergo modo 
sumitur interpretatio prout aliquid specialiter operatur circa legem. Quae multiplex est secundum varios effectus, unus est 
correctio vel abrogatio legis [...] quia specialiter sit, per unal legem circa alias, vel per posteriores circa praecedentes; alii vero 
sunt, qui in unaquaque lege secundum se spectari possunt, ut sunt extentio, restrictio, exceptio [i.e. epieikeia (see n. 684 
below)] vel excusatio [i.e. dispensatio], seu cessatio obligationis legis’. 
690 See Suárez, ibid., pp. 421-35. 
691 Suárez later makes it clear that his reference to exceptio is a reference to epieikeia. Suárez, De Legibus, p. 435: ‘in particulari 
eventu propter circunstantias occurentes cesset obligatio legis circa talem actum [...] et haec exceptio est emendatio legis, 
quae per epiikiam fieri dicitur’. 
692 In his discussion of interpretatio restrictiva, Suárez extends his understanding of injustice to harm to private individual, as 
he did in epieikeia, though without going in as much detail regarding lucrum cessans and damnum emergens. See Suárez, De Legibus, 
p. 433: ‘dispositionem legis indistincte loquentis, ita esse restringendam, ut non cedat in praeiudicium innocentis, nam inferre 
innocenti nocumentum, alienum esse praesumitur ab intentione legislatoris, quia iniustitiam involvit.' 
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Suarez’s general comments about interpretation and his discussion of interpretatio restrictiva, that an exercise 
of interpretation would be confined to interpreting the words of the law, and thus that it should always find 
some sense, if improper, that the words could plausibly assume.693 Under this view, epieikeia would be 
confined to a scenario where the words of the law may in no sense, proper or improper, be construed in 
accordance with the intention of the legislator, or in a way that will avoid injustice. The only difficulty with 
this argument seems to be Suarez’s view that, certainly in cases of interpretatio extensiva, it may be possible to 
move beyond any meaning that the words could acquire, and disregard them altogether in favour of the 
mens legislatoris.694 Curiously, Suarez seems to think that one will only be able to do this by reference to the 
ratio legis, rather than the other evidence listed earlier which may allow one to guess the intention of the 
legislator,695 and he seems to imply at the outset of his discussion of interpretatio restrictiva, that the same 
should be possible there.696 Suarez does not return to this point, and gives no example of a restriction 
beyond any reading of the words. However, if he did envisage interpretatio restrictiva to also cover those types 
of cases, then a distinction from epieikeia would probably be impossible to draw. This would be particularly 
problematic in light of the lack of clarity in Suarez as to how the various rules governing the evidence of 
mens legislatoris and recourse to a superior in epieikeia and interpretatio restrictiva should interact. It is perhaps 
this ambiguity that would lead some later authors relying on Suarez, such as Paul Laymann, to merge 
interpretatio restrictiva and epieikeia entirely.697 
In conclusion, Suarez’s account of equity provides a detailed and serious attempt to meaningfully 
engage with the relationship between epieikeia and interpretation, though it does not resolve the distinction 
between the two entirely unproblematically. In his attempt to align his account of equity with the theological 
tradition on the point, Suarez maintained a distinction between traditional doctrines of interpretation and 
equity, restricted equity to restrictions of general rules, and – while finding a more direct link between the 
intention of the legislator and the intervention of equity – avoided all references to humanistic writings 
about aequum et bonum discussing that link at greater length. Suarez’s theory would have a lasting impact for 
later theologians writing on equity, and, as shall be shown later, it is probably also due to his influence that 
canonists are found, by the eighteenth century to have assimilated aspects of the theological concept of 
epieikeia in their accounts of aequitas. 
4.2.4.2. The influence of Suarez on later theologians 
This last section provides an overview of the later development of the concept of equity among theologians 
in the seventeenth century. We shall first look at Lessius’ rather peculiar approach to epieikeia, very much 
                                                    
693 See Suárez’s general comments at n.685-689 above where he always refers to construing words according to an improper 
(as opposed to natural or civil) meaning. In his discussion of interpretatio restrictiva, Suárez always mentions restrictive 
interpretation as being contra proprietate verborum, but never more. 
694 Suárez, ibid., p. 421, 432: ‘Quarto potest cogitari extensio ultra omnem significationem verborum etiam impropriam, 
solum propter rerum, vel casum similitudinem, aut identitatem formalem in ratione legis.’ 
695 See n.694 above.  
696 Suárez ibid., p. 421, 432: ‘Restrictio ergo, sicut extensio, accipi solet, vel per comparationem ad verba iuxta varias eorum 
significationes supra positas, scilicet aut propriam naturalem, aut propriam civilem, aut impropriam, vel per comparationem 
ad rationem legis’. It seems from this passage that the comparationem ad rationem legis could allow one to move beyond a 
comparationem ad verba iuxta eorum impropriam significationem. 
697 See [4.2.5.2] below. 
145 
 
entrenched in its theological, rather than legal, aspect. We will then move on to those authors who adhered 
more closely to Suarez’s theory and developed it alongside legal concepts of interpretation. The latter would 
provide the hallmark for the development of epieikeia among both theologians and canonists in the centuries 
to follow. 
4.2.4.2.1. Leonardus Lessius  
In the first chapter of his De Iustitia et Iure, Leonardus Lessius (Lenaert Leys, d. 1623) identified epieikeia 
with aequum et bonum (as well as aequitas) and defined it as a benignam sententiam that goes against the words 
of the law, but in accordance with the wishes of the legislator.698 These initial references to aequum et bonum 
and benignam sententiam suggest that Lessius was familiar with the language that humanists had introduced in 
legal discourse in matters of epieikeia. This approach would perhaps also be expected, in light of the fact 
that Lessius has often been recognised in recent scholarship as one of the theologians who was most 
concerned with reconciling theological doctrine and law.699  However, and perhaps surprisingly, Lessius’ 
account of epieikeia turns out to be entirely detached from that of contemporary jurists, reverting to a more 
orthodox understanding of epieikeia as being concerned with excluding the application of rules in cases 
where the law or the legislator would have no power to bind. 
Lessius argued that the benignam sententiam involved when exercising epieikeia was the same that 
Thomas described in his Summa as gnome, i.e. the capacity to judge according to considerations other than 
the words of the law.700  But, in his description of these considerations, it soon becomes clear that the 
intentions of the legislator play but a marginal role. Lessius mentions at the outset that the relevant 
considerations are what the common good or a reason of virtue may require.701 The reference to the 
common good is similar to that found in all previous authors – in such a case, epieikeia intervenes because 
the law has no power to bind, the legislator could not pass a law that would harm the public good. As we 
have seen, however, previous authors including Soto and Suarez had found this limitation alone to be rather 
narrow. Soto had then extended it to cases involving the death of an individual.702 Suarez, even more 
broadly, extended it to those where following the law would cause some form of unjust loss.703 Lessius 
instead, grounds his understanding of epieikeia even more firmly in theology. Where no harm to the public 
good would follow from the application of the law, epieikeia will apply where the application of the words 
of the law would offend a virtue. Lessius makes it clear that, properly understood, epieikeia applies to those 
                                                    
698 Leonardus Lessius, De Iustitia et Iure (1612), lib. 1, cap. 2, dub. 3; p. 9: ‘Aequum et bonum (quod Graecis dicitur [to epieikes)], 
est quod cum sit contra verba legis (etsi non contra mentem Legislatoris)[…]. Universales enim Regulae in rebus practicis 
patiuntur multas exceptiones, hae exceptiones quia verbis legum comprehendi non poterant, relictae sunt iudicio prudentum, 
et vocantur [to epieikes], id est, aequum et bonum. […] Iudicium vero quo de [aequo et bono] iudicatur, vocatur Gnome, 
quod Latine benignam sententiam possumus nominare, hoc autem peti debet ex altiori consideratione, ob quam verba legis 
non sunt servanda.’  
699 Works that have recently made this point include Decock, Theologians and Contract Law and Sampson, Grotius’ Analysis of 
Delict. 
700 See Lessius, Iustitia et Iure, lib. 2, cap. 47, dub. 9, p. 687: ‘Iudicium, quo dirigitur [epieikeiam], vocatur gnome, sicut iudicium, 
quo diriguntur ea, quae sunt secundum verba legis, vocatur synesis.’  
701 See Lessius, ibid.,: ‘Epieikeia est quando aliquid agitur contra verba legis, eo quod bonum comune, vel ratio virtutis id 
postulet.’ 
702 See [3.3.1.1] above. 
703 See [4.2.4.1.2] above. 
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cases and not necessarily to cases of following the intention of the legislator.704 Elsewhere, Lessius once 
more explains that epieikeia will apply when matters that have greater weight than that which the legislator 
intended by passing his law intervene.705   Nevertheless, Lessius does at times refer to the exercise of epieikeia 
as giving effect to the intentions of the legislator. He often mentions it as an alternative motive to explain 
the intervention of epieikeia, where epieikeia remedies the offence of a virtue.706  In this way, Lessius seems 
to revert to the ambiguity we previously observed in Soto and other authors, blurring the line between the 
power of human law and the presumed intentions of the legislator. It is clear that the emphasis of Lessius’ 
analysis of epieikeia is on the former rather than the latter, taking it rather far away from its humanistic 
meaning. There is also, of course, no indication in Lessius that epieikeia could serve the purpose of extending 
a narrow rule, or that a lack of ratio legis could justify its intervention.  
As an aside, one peculiarity of Lessius’ theory of equity, and a consequence of his focus on equating 
epieikeia with the exercise of gnome, is that it seems to apply a further limitation to cases where epieikeia may 
take place. Gnome is an exercise of the virtue of prudentia which, for Lessius, would allow one to see whether 
there is indeed a clash between the words of the law and a higher virtue that would be violated by following 
them. It is therefore an essential requirement for the intervention of epieikeia that there should be the 
required exercise of prudentia to guide the judgment of whoever should depart from the words of the law,707 
whenever it is missing, either on account of the difficulties of the case, or on account of one’s poverty of 
judgement, one should refrain from using epieikeia.708 It is not clear whether Lessius envisaged this standard 
to be different in substance from the more orthodox one covering the distinction between certain, probable 
and doubtful judgment about whether the application of the words of the law would result in injustice. 
 
4.2.4.2.2. Later theologians and Paul Laymann 
While Lessius adopted a rather different line from that of Suarez, the latter’s doctrine seems to have 
dominated the later development of epieikeia by seventeenth-century theologians. Martinus Bonacina (d. 
1631) in his De Legibus, cites Suarez as the main source for his analysis, but seems to focus rather on the 
                                                    
704 Lessius, ibid., pp. 687-8: ‘quando lex propter suam generalitatem offensura esset aliquam virtutem, nobis eius verba 
sequentibus; illa virus [i.e. epieikeia] sufficiens est ut contra verba legis honeste agamus […].  Fatendum tamen est, quando 
aequitatem utimur, et a verbis legis recidimus intuitu altioris considerationis, nos id non facere principaliter ut nos menti 
legislatoris accommodemus (quamvis eo motivo uti possimus) sed ne aliam virtutem offendamus. Unde supra dixi, praetor 
virtutes particulares non esse distinctam virtutem (quae vocetur [epieikeia] seu aequitas) necessariam, sed quamvis necessaria 
non sit, est tamen utilis, ut quis etiam illo motivo operetur.’  As hinted at the end of this passage, this peculiar analysis of 
epieikeia is part of the reason why Lessius comes to the conclusion that equity is not a single separate virtue, but rather a 
reason for the operation of other virtues. 
705 Lessius, ibid.: ‘[exampli gratia] si ieiunium graviter laederet valetudinem, gnome ex altioris principii consideratione iudicat 
verba legis non esse hic servanda, sed esse comendum; nempe ex eo, quod laedere valetudinem sit contra charitatem sui, et 
impediat obsequium Dei vel proximi; quae cum sint maioris momenti, quam id, quod legislator in sua lege intendebat, cessat obligatio 
verborum legis’. (my emphasis) 
706 See the reference to quamvis eo motivo (i.e. mens legislatoris) uti possimus at n.704 above. See also the reference to the intentions 
of the legislator alongside aequum et bonum at n.698 above. 
707 Lessius, ibid., 687: ‘illa virtus sufficiens est ut contra verba legis honeste agamus, modo prudentia adsit, quae dirigat’. 
708 Lessius, ibid,: ‘ergo non est opus ad hoc aliqua peculiari virtute appetitus; sed solum prudentia, quae ostendat legis verba 
in hoc casu huic vel illi virtuti adversari; ac proinde tali modo et fine contra agendum ; quae prudentia multis deest, vel ob 
scrupolos, quibus impliciti, verbis legis ita praestringuuntur, ut rationes altiores ob quas in hoc vel illo eventu sequenda non 
sint, expendere nequeant ; vel ob iudicii tenuitatem.’ 
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aspects of Suarez’s doctrine dealing with the limits to the legislator’s power, rather than his will, referring 
only to the presumed intention of the legislator as that which is relevant.709 Johannes Malderus (d. 1633) 
instead followed Suarez’s approach entirely accurately, distinguishing cases where the application of the law 
follows outside of the legislator’s power from those where it falls outside his will.710 
That said, the most original elaboration on Suarez’s teachings is found in the account from the last 
theologian to consider epieikeia in our period, Paul Laymann (d. 1635).  In his Theologia Moralis published in 
1625, Laymann endeavoured to reconcile Suarez’s approach to epieikeia even more clearly with both the 
medieval legal accounts of interpretation and the novel, humanist approach to epieikeia as aequum et bonum.711 
As we saw above, an important limitation of Suarez’s account of epieikeia was that it left the distinction 
between interpretatio restrictiva and epieikeia unclear712. Laymann sought a different arrangement. First of all, 
like Suarez, Laymann did not see a perfect equivalence between epieikeia and interpretation – for instance, 
extensive interpretation would have nothing in common with epieikeia, which remained essentially confined 
to restrictions of universal rules.713 Secondly, Laymann determined more clearly what the relationship was 
between epieikeia and interpretatio restrictiva. Probably under the influence of contemporary accounts of equity, 
Laymann relabelled interpretatio restrictiva as restrictio legis secundum bonum et aequum. Not every restrictio secundum 
bonum et aequum would be an instance of epieikeia, however. Epieikeia is defined more precisely by Laymann 
as standing to aequum et bonum not in a relationship of equivalence but in one of species to genus. This allowed 
Laymann to both make sense (i) of the accounts of aequum et bonum coming from humanist jurists, entirely 
focussed on the intentions of the legislator, and (ii) of the accounts of epieikeia by theologians like Cajetan 
and Soto, focussed on the power of human law.714 In Laymann’s account, when a case is brought outside 
the scope of a rule because the legislator would not have wished the law to apply to that case, that is a 
restriction according to bonum et aequum, but not one involving epieikeia. Instead, in a case where, regardless 
of the will of the legislator, the law would not be able to bind because it would exceed its power – either by 
                                                    
709 Martinus Bonacina, Opera Omnia (1628), II, pp. 47-8: ‘Cessante causa motiva, seu finali legis in totum, et respectu totius 
Communitatis, cessat obligatio legis, etiamsi non adsit aliud decretum […]. Tum quia lex non obligat ultra mentem, et 
voluntatem legislatoris, legislator autem non praesumitur velle obligare cessante in totum causa finali legis. […] Dixi, respectu 
totius Communitatis, ut adverterem obligationem legis non cessare, si causa cesset tantummodo respectu particularis personae 
[…]. Hoc tamen intelligendum est, modo lex seu motivum legis cesset in casu particulari solum negative, non vero si cesset 
contrarie, ut bene docet Caiet[anus ad IIaIIae, q. 120, art. 1] […] et tunc certum est legem non obligare, cum Superioris 
praeceptum non obliget ad iniquitatem’. 
710 Johannes Malderus, In Primam Secundae D. Thomae Commentaria (1623), p. 423 : ‘ut epieikeia uti subditus possit [...] unum ex 
tribus sufficit, ut vel observata Lex haberet aliquid illiciti, puta propter concursum Legis naturae versantis hic, et nunc propter 
mutatas circumstantias illud fieri quod Lex iubet : vel ut cederet in magnum gravamen observantis, quomodo iniustum esset 
velle obligare subditum, cum Lex humana debeat esse moralis facilitatis : vel denique, ut prudenter iudicare possis, noluisse 
hunc casum Legislatorem comprehendere. In quo tertio modo, maiori cautela est procedentum, consulendaeque 
circumstantiae, et praesertim usus, modus regiminis et mos interpretandi similes Leges, ut bene observavit Suárez lib. 6, cap. 
7.’ 
711 Paul Laymann, Theologia Moralis (1677), p. 82: ‘Aequum et bonum opponitur juri stricto, verborum proprietati tenaciter 
adhaerenti: de quo sermo est [C.3.1.8] et [VI.5.de reg. iur., reg. 90]. Hinc illud enatum; Summum jus, summa injuria.’  
712 See n.692 above. 
713 Compare Laymann, ibid.,, cap. 18 (on interpretation generally) with cap. 19 (on equity). 
714 Laymann, ibid.,, p. 82: ‘Duplex est restrictio secundum aequum et bonum: I. per quam iudicatur, lege, voluntate testatoris 
etc. quamvis generalibus verbis posita, certum genus rerum, personarum omnino non comprehendi quia materia legis, 
alteriusve dispositionis; vel ratio eius adequata et intrinseca ad illud se minime extendit. [...] Altera restrictio secundum 
aequum et bonum dicitur epikeia, quae definiri solet; Benigna interpretatio, casum aliquem particularem, ob suas 
circumstantias, lege universaliter lata non esse comprehensum.’ 
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violating natural or divine law, upsetting the public good, or subjecting a subject to excessive harshness– 
then this would be a case of restriction by aequum et bonum involving the exercise of epieikeia.715  
Unfortunately, Laymann’s account of epieikeia is rather short, and he provides little more information beside 
this distinction. He remarks briefly that epieikeia is to be applicable mostly to cases where the law seeks to 
oblige one to do something (legibus obligantibus) rather than those that render a legal act (such as a contract, 
will, or marriage) invalid (legis infirmantibus).716 He also provides greater detail as to when the application of 
epieikeia to the part of a law or a matter ancillary to it, may allow one to disregard the legal rule altogether.717 
Laymann’s account of epieikeia is mostly valuable for finding a simple model incorporating the humanist 
and theological account of equity, his references to aequum et bonum and benigna interpretatio show that he was 
familiar with the language adopted by humanist jurists and the writers who followed them, and the place 
Laymann found for epieikeia within restrictions by aequum et bonum carved a satisfactory pocket for its 
intervention within the broader scope of equity in interpreting legal rules restrictively. 
That said, and despite variations on it, Suarez’s theory remained an influential source for 
theologians for a very long time. To provide an example from a very well known theologian, we can find 
Suarez’s theory adopted, well into the eighteenth century, by Alphonsus Maria de’ Liguori (d. 1783) in his 
Theologia Moralis.718 
 
4.3. Legacy – a specific role for equitable interpretation? 
As we have seen in this chapter, several attempts were made by theologians and lawyers of the later sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century to find a more precise role for equitable interpretation. These included the 
simpler approach of Bolognetus, which assimilated equitable interpretation with all interpretations a sententia 
contra scriptum available since the Middle Ages, the approach of Donellus and his followers who sought to 
subsume equity within already available medieval doctrines of interpretation, and the more complex 
approach of Suarez and later theologians, either adapting interpretatio restrictiva to fulfil the theological role 
of epieikeia, or carving a role for the latter distinct from interpretatio restrictiva altogether. 
I have argued above that, while the majority of civil lawyers converged – by the end of the sixteenth 
century – towards the view of equity as interpretation put forward by Salamonius, most civil and canon law 
works dealing with equity throughout the period do so too briefly or vaguely to give us a clear idea of what 
role they thought equity should perform and whether it was distinct from other doctrines of  interpretation. 
One of the main difficulties with assessing the success of the approaches identified in this chapter is 
                                                    
715 Laymann, ibid., p. 83: ‘Ad quem pertineat legem secundum epieikeiam interpretari? Respondeo et dico [quod si] 
manifestum sit, particularem casu generali legis sententia non comprehendi, sed aequitatis ratione excipi deberi; 
interpretationem hanc a quovis etiam privato secundum prudentiae legem fieri posse […]. Erit autem id manifestum primo; 
si lex servari non possit nisi violando aliam graviorem legem, puta naturalem, aut divinam: de quo regula traditur [...]. 
Secundo, si legis obsevatio a majore bono altioris virtutis impediat [...]. Tertio, si observatio legis, [e.g.] de jejunio, in aliquo 
casu nimis difficilis sit; ut certo constet Legislatorem non potuisse, vel saltem noluisse tanta severitate obligare’. 
716 Laymann, ibid. It is not entirely clear whether leges infirmantes is a synonym for leges irritantes, but it seems to be used in a 
similar context. 
717 Laymann, ibid., pp. 83-4, nn. 5-7. 
718 Alphonsus Maria De’ Liguori, Theologia Moralis (1849), p. 141 
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therefore that it is very often unclear which of them, if any, was influencing contemporary and later writers 
who mentioned equity in their commentaries. That said, insofar as the three main approaches identified 
here had rather different assumptions at their core, I have collected in this section the evidence I have 
found of their influence on later scholars. From the available evidence, it seems that the theories of 
Bolognetus and Donellus had a greater impact among civil lawyers, the latter in particular among treatise 
writers on interpretation, whereas the approach of Suarez and later theologians was more influential over 
canon-law writers, among whom it was felt well into the eighteenth century. 
 
4.3.1. Later civil lawyers 
4.3.1.1. General civil law commentaries 
Among the more detailed treatments of equity identified earlier in this chapter, Bolognetus produced the 
only one wherein exercises of equity could both extend and restrict rules – the reason was rather trivial, 
Bolognetus thought equity simply provided a justification for the doctrines already recognised within the 
ius commune, one of which was that of interpretatio extensiva.  Bolognetus’ approach was therefore easier to 
reconcile with the earlier writings of Connanus and Duarenus, which had explicitly stated that extensions 
and restrictions of the law both constituted exercises of equitable interpretation.719 There were a number 
among the later authors who dealt with equity as part of their broader civil law commentaries who agreed 
with these earlier statements by Connanus and Duarenus that equity should perform this role. Clear 
examples of this can be found in the Paduan jurist Angelus Matthaeacius (d. 1600), but also in Vinnius and 
Lyncker, both of whom we mentioned earlier.720 Vinnius and Matthaeacius both explicitly maintained that 
equity performed both extensions and restrictions of the law, and Lyncker went so far as to mention 
interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva explicitly as exercises of equitable interpretation.721 This view of the role 
of equity seems to have survived long enough to make it in some of the general late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth-century compendia of the Usus Modernus, like the 1670 Jurisprudentia Romano-Germanica by Struve 
and the Introductio in Ius Digestum of Justus Henning Böhmer (d. 1749), first published in 1704. Böhmer is 
very explicit in his account and tells us, after explaining the nature of interpretatio restrictiva and extensiva, that 
‘[u]trumque sit ex aequitate, unde utraque dici potest interpretatio per aequitatem’.722 These authors did not 
go in enough detail to specify whether associating doctrines of interpretation with exercises of equity was 
in any way to alter the way in which they ought to perform their function or whether, like Bolognetus, they 
thought equity ought merely to work as a justification for existing rules, without affecting their substance. 
                                                    
719 See [2.5.2-3] above. 
720 For Paduan humanism and Matthaeacius’ role within it see Michele Pifferi, Generalia Delictorum: Il «Tractatus Criminalis» Di 
Tiberio Deciani E La «Parte Generale» Di Diritto Penale (2006), cap. 1.  
721 See also Angelus Matthaeacius, De Via et Ratione Artificiosa Iuris Universi (1591), f. 26v: ‘Reliquum est, ut aequitatis utilitatem 
et effectus consideremus. Primus est, ut in legibus ex aequo et bono interpretandis, [epieikeia] utamur, illas rectae rationi 
accommodantes. Secundus eandem ad leges ampliandas, et ad similes species extendendas, quae legibus non contineantur, 
summopere exigit. Tertius cogit nos, ut in his, quae neque ex verbis, neque ex sententia legis colligi possunt, id sequamur, 
quod aequitas suggerit, etiam si iure scripto destituamur. Quartus, ut contra verba legis non contra mentem eius aliquid 
interpretemur.’ Vinnius and Lyncker are referred to at n.432 and 434 above respectively. 
722 Georg Adam Struve, Jurisprudentia Romano-Germanica (1694), bl. 1, tit. 2, nn. 18-9. Justus Henning Böhmer, Introductio in 
Ius Digestum (1741). p. 5. 
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What can be said with some more certitude about these accounts of equity is that they were not convinced 
by the arguments of those legal writers who, influenced by scholastic theology, had limited the operation 
of equity to the restriction of rules.723  
That said, it is clear that Bolognetus’ account was to a certain extent directly influential for later 
writers, and authors can be found making their reliance on him explicit. One example is Friedrich Martinus 
(fl. ca. 1576-1592). Martinus had first published in 1576 a philosophical treatise on Aristotle’s epieikeia as 
found in the Ethics, while he was a professor of philosophy in Ingolstadt; he then in 1596 published a 
similar, this time juridical treatise, based on a disputatio of theses on the same topic when he became a 
professor of law in Frankfurt. The philosophical work and the juridical one are closely aligned in the 
message they convey about equity, but in the later treatise, Martinus cites Bolognetus explicitly, and like the 
latter also draws on scholastic theologians like Azpilcueta and Covarrubias, to arrive at the conclusion that 
the recognised ius commune doctrines of interpretatio extensiva and restrictiva are equitable interpretations insofar 
as they interpret the law in accordance with the intention of the legislator.724 Bolognetus’ view was therefore 
one that, at least as far as my survey of later civil law commentaries is concerned, was often consistent with, 
and sometimes cited explicitly as a source in the theories of equity found in later civil law commentaries. 
The accounts of equity in later civil law commentaries just mentioned were clearly at odds with the 
more limited role recognised by the other authors examined in this chapter for equity, as meant. However, 
one should not forget that equity remained throughout the early modern period a contested legal concept, 
and no single view earned universal approval. Indeed, as dealt with in the second chapter, some views 
expressed about equity by later authors are hard to square with any of the existing traditions we have dealt 
with.725 Consistently with this, it is possible to find some later civil law commentaries adopting a more 
limited view of equity, inconsistent with the account of it provided by Bolognetus. I have found two 
examples works that excluded a role for equity in extending rules explicitly, and in that respect they seem 
particularly well aligned with the arguments of Donellus. An unambiguous source in this sense is the 
Disputatio Iuris Civilis of Leopoldus Hackelmann (d. 1619), published in 1593, in which we find Donellus’ 
view relied upon word for word.726 What is perhaps striking is that Hackelmann was a Lutheran jurist who 
relied heavily on the work of Oldendorpius for other aspects of his legal analysis, but the extensive writings 
of the latter on equity both in Latin and in vernacular went unmentioned when it came to equity.727  The 
second example are the writings of Samuel von Pufendorf (d. 1694), in particular his De Officio hominis et civis 
first published in 1673. Pufendorf discusses equity in his chapter De Interpretatione, where he seems to see it 
as a particular instantiation of interpretatio restrictiva. Pufendorf divides interpretatio restrictiva in cases where the 
intention of the legislator was missing from the time the law was created (ex defectu voluntatis originario) and 
cases where the intention to bind only ceased upon emergence of a particular case which is at odds with 
                                                    
723 See [4.2.3-4]. 
724 See for equity’s role in extending laws, Fredrich Martinus, De Summo Iure et Aequitate Theses Iuridicae (1623), th. 14, where 
he refers to Aristotle, Azpilcueta and Bolognetus. 
725 See [2.5.4] above. 
726 Leopoldus Hackelmann, Disputatio Iuris Civilis Prima De Principiis Iuris (1593), titt. 33-36. 
727 See for instance, Leopoldus Hackelmann, Theses Disputationis Tertiae Secundae Partis Pandectarum  (1594), titt. 33-5, 39-40.  
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the legislator’s will (ex casus emergentis cum voluntate repugnantia). Aside from the consistency of this distinction, 
he sub-divides the latter kind of cases in those where one can gather that the legislator’s intention is at odds 
with the case by natural reason (ex naturali ratione), or by some sign of the legislator’s will (ex aliquo signo 
voluntatis), specifying that the first case occurs if following the words of the law would lead one to depart 
from equity unless certain cases were exempted from its application. He also defines equity as a correction 
of that in which the law suffers from a defect of universality (ob universalitatem). Pufendorf may have been 
influenced by Donellus, but puts much more emphasis than the latter on the link between this kind of 
restrictive interpretation and the epieikeia of theologians, emphasising that ‘ad isthanc tamen aequitatem 
decurrere non licet, nisi sufficientia indicia subigant. Inter quae certissimum est, si adpareat, violatum iri 
legem naturalem, ubi presse quis literam legis humanae sequi velit. Proximum ad hoc, si non quidem 
illicitum sit verba legis sequi; sed tamen rem humaniter aestimanti id nimis videatur grave et intolerabile, 
sive in universum omnibus hominibus, sive certis personis’.728 In this way, Pufendorf may have sought to 
reconcile the great emphasis placed by Grotius – a known influence over his work729 – on the theological 
writings of Soto and Donellus’ attempt to fit equitable interpretation within readily recognisable cases of 
interpretatio restrictiva.  
 
4.3.1.2. The case of treatises on interpretation 
While its impact on general civil law commentaries was rather limited, it seems that Donellus’ theory 
enjoyed most success, at least in the short term, in influencing treatises focussed on legal interpretation. 
This is evidenced most clearly by looking at two treatises on interpretation published shortly after the 
publication of Donellus’ commentaries. One is the treatise De Interpretatione Iuris of Valentin Wilhelm 
Forster (d. 1620) published in 1613, and the other is the Tractatus de Authoritate et Interpretatione of Helfrich 
Ulrich Hunnius (d. 1635), published in 1615.730 Hunnius’ account is a better developed version of that 
found in Valentin Wilhelm Forster’s, and it is therefore more expedient to deal with Hunnius’ only.   
Hunnius’ account starts, rather conventionally, with reference to the role of equity as interpretation, 
related to cases of interpretation of the law beyond its letter and in favour of its sententia.731 Hunnius 
followed Donellus in reading equity as a sub-species of interpretation, and he categorised the kinds of 
interpretatio restrictiva available in a similar way. For Hunnius, there are seven ways in which one may interpret 
                                                    
728 Samuel Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis, (1758), pp. 379-81.  
729 See generally Gordley, The Jurists, ch. 5. 
730 Wilhelm Forster, Interpretes Sive De Interpretatione Iuris (1613), pp. 219-342. Helfrich Ulrich Hunnius, Tractatus de Authoritate 
et Interpretatione (1615).  
731 Hunnius, ibid., pp. 2-3: ‘Nam primo Constantinus Imperator in [C.3.1.8] [...]. Quae verba ad iudices dirigi, vel ex eo 
colligitur, quod lex illa postia est sub eo titulo, qui de iudiciis inscribitur: Competit itaque iudicibus potestas ex aequitate ius 
interpretandi, et propter aequitatem a scripto et stricto iure recedendi. [...] Et sane comprobant id ipsum omnes etiam Regulae 
iuris, quibus docetur, qualiter una lex ex altera explicari, restringi, vel extendi debeat. [...] Nec tamen ita his iura interpretari 
permissum existimari debet, ut quovis modo, ac pro lubitu suo, iura flectere et ex suo arbitrio proprioque cerebro interpretari 
valeant; sed ut ex ratione, sententia et regulis iuris rectaque ratione, id quod in legibus obscurum est, explanent. [...] Neque 
huic sententiae quicquam refragatur quod Constantinus [in C.1.14.1 ait]. Sicut nec illud quod Valentinus ac Marcianus 
scribunt in [C.1.14.9] et quod Leo Imperator ait in [C.1.14.10]. Quodque Justinianus prolixa oratione testatur in [C.1.14.12.2]. 
Et denique quo Ulpianus in [D.40.9.12.2] aperte profiteatur.’ 
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a law restrictively, and, just like in Donellus, equity is but one of them.732 The other six are (i) to find that 
the ratio legis is narrower than its words, (ii) to find inconsistencies with preceding or following parts of the 
same law, (iii) to deduce it from another law, or (iv) from the subject matter, or (v) on account of an absurd 
result and, finally, (vi) from the proper reading of the words. Hunnius agreed with Donellus that equity is 
a sub-kind of interpretation concerned with avoiding the application of rules in circumstances where they 
would cause injustice.733  The reasoning is straightforward for Hunnius, C.5.14.8 and D.1.3.18 are evidence 
that Emperors always intend their laws to achieve justice and to be benign. The reasoning is the same as in 
Donellus – equity as epieikeia is merged with its medieval concept as justice and mercy and its role is confined 
to the amendment of law beyond its words (the epieikeia element) on account of the injustice or harshness 
that applying the rule would cause (the medieval aequitas element).734  
Further, just like Donellus, Hunnius argues that equity operates always subject to the intentions of 
the legislator. If doing equity would be contradicting the clear meaning of the words of the law or an 
expressly stated ratio legis, the law will have to be followed regardless of the unjust result that would follow. 
Interestingly, in explaining how the words of the law may indicate the clear intention of the legislator, 
Hunnius draws on the writings of Bolognetus – borrowing the latter’s argument that equity will not be 
available if the letter would have to be vitiated in order to accommodate the equitable result.735 In all cases 
where an equitable interpretation is not available for these reasons, one will need another kind of 
interpretation which simply roots out the law as altogether inequitable, performed by the legislator.736  
There is another respect in which the writings of Hunnius may have been influenced by 
Bolognetus. The real development Hunnius applied to Donellus’ theory, was in arguing that interpretations 
of equity would also apply in cases of interpretatio extensiva – thus taking a further step away from the doctrine 
of theologians, without however assimilating equity with all interpretations beyond the letter.737 The 
argument is not developed deeply enough to clarify exactly how Hunnius thinks equity would operate – the 
idea that the application of a broad rule to a particular case may cause injustice is relatively straightforward, 
but a law causing injustice by failing to cover a case is not. The conceptual difficulty underlying equity’s 
capacity to cause injustice by omission was precisely what held late scholastic theologians back from 
                                                    
732 Hunnius, ibid., p. 9: ‘porro quaeritur, quibus modis deprehendatur legis sententia angustior verbis? Et quamvis sint qui id 
nulla ratione aut regula certo definiri posse existiment: Tamen putarim id ex sequentibus circiter caussis diiudicari posse.’ 
733 Hunnius, ibid., pp. 14-5. In the 1630 edition of this work, references are added for this statement to Johannes de Castillo 
(Juan Bautista  del Castillo y Sotomayor, fl. 1617-28), Tractatus de coniecturis, Vol. 4, cap. 3, n. 71 (this reference is inexact and 
I have not found the section of this work which Hunnius had in mind),  Hartmann Pistoris, Quaestionum Iuris Tam Romani 
Quam Saxonici (1584), quaest. 44, p. 694 (Pistoris simply mentions that contracts have to be read ex bono et aequo which means 
to read their words narrowly, even improperly) and, predictably, Donellus’ Commentarius Iuris Civilis, 1.13. 
734 Hunnius, ibid., p. 15: ‘Id autem sensisse et voluisse intelligitur, quod aequum, quod benignum, quod quae humanum est: 
siquidem praecipientibus Theodosio et Valentiniano Imperatoribus in [C.5.14.8]. Conditores legum aequitatis convenit esse 
fautores: Indeque Celsus Iurisconsultus benignius ait leges interpretandas esse, quo voluntas illarum conservetur [D.1.3.18]. [...] 
Unde colligitur officium aequitatis, in eo consistere, ut id, quod scriptum est, laxet, remittat, restringat, vel distinguat, prout 
caussae vel circumstantiae postulant.’ 
735 Hunnius, ibid., p. 19. Confront with Bolognetus, n.551 above. The argument in Hunnius is supported by reference to 
D.33.10.7. 
736 Hunnius, ibid., pp. 4-5. 
737 Hunnius, ibid., pp. 67-8. 
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thinking that epieikeia could be used to extend rules.738 There are two ways in which Hunnius sees equity as 
applying in this case. In a sense, where justice would not be served if a rule did not cover a certain case, 
then the appropriate rule can be extended to it – this would presumably be a case not governed by any 
other rule. In the second sense, a rule may be extended to another case by equitable interpretation in cases 
where the ‘same equity’ applies. While the second argument would have potential for further development, 
Hunnius does not explain what he means by a law’s equity, and how it would differ from – most 
problematically - an extension of the law’s ratio.739 In fact, the example adduced by Hunnius at the end of 
this paragraph, drawn from D.9.2.32, seems to be entirely explainable in terms of extending one rule’s ratio 
to a case covered by it, but not by the letter. The reasoning is as follows. There was in Roman law a rule 
that, where a group of slaves belonging to the same master joined up as a gang of thieves to steal something 
from another, the master’s liability would be capped at the amount which would have been owed if one 
slave alone had committed the theft. In D.9.2.32 that rule is extended to a case where a gang of slaves 
damages another’s property – according to Gaius, ‘the reasoning in the action for theft is that the owner of 
the slaves should not lose his whole household because of one delict; and the same reasoning being similarly 
applied to a case of wrongful damage, it follows that the same assessment of damages should be made, 
especially as this form of delict is often less serious’.740 Gaius seems specifically to be extending the ratio of 
the rule for theft to the case of wrongful damage, and it is not clear where Hunnius sees a difference.741 
One possibility is that, since the original rule for theft excluded the application of the normal assessment 
of damages on account of ‘equity’ (in the sense of justice), Hunnius was tempted to view the extension of 
such an exclusion as an extension of the ‘equity’ on account of which the first rule was introduced. The 
reasoning is not illuminated further. Hunnius also adopts Duarenus’ view of the distinction between natural 
and civil equity as relating to the source of justice, Hunnius specifically distinguishes the two depending on 
whether one should look to justice (or injustice) by reference to natural law, or by reference to public 
utility.742  
The adoption of Donellus’ approach in treatise such as that of Hunnius and Forster may have been 
encouraged by the fact that Donellus’ views fitted very neatly existing approaches to interpretation – indeed, 
as we have seen it was very close to certain statements about interpretatio restrictiva made by certain medieval 
                                                    
738 Though it is worth noting that some theologians, like Azpilcueta, rejected that view and explicitly denied that using 
epieikeia to extend rules posed conceptual difficulties. See [3.3.2.1] above. 
739 Hunnius, ibid., p. 67: ‘Videamus nunc quemadmodum stricta legis verba ex aequitate ad alios casus et personas porrigantur. 
Qua de re hiuismodi regula traditur: Legem de certa specie, casu, caussa et persona scriptam extendi ad alias, cum id fieri 
aequitas postulat. Cum enim in toto iure aequitas dominetur ac principem locum obtineat [C.3.1.8, D.50.17.90] [...] certe 
consequens est, ut id omne leges praecipere, permittere ac prohibere credantur quod aequitas dictat, licet verbis in lege non 
reperiantur expressa. Ac proinde si aequitas latius se diffundat quam verba legis, tum facienda est extensio legis, stricte 
loquentis ad alias personal vel casus, in quibus par aequitas militat’. 
740 D.9.2.32. Translation from Watson’s Digest. 
741 Hunnius, ibid., p. 68: ‘Qua propter cum ex furto, ab alicuius familia admisso, non in singulis servis daretur poenae 
persecutio; sed sufficeret id praestari, quod praestandum foret, si id furtum unus liber fecisset: eo quod aequum et humanum 
videretur, ex uno delicto tota familiam dominum non privari: Eademque aequitatis ratio in delicto quoque damni iniuriam 
dati obtineret, concludig Iurisconsultus Gaius id quod ex aequitate in furto observatur, idem quoque in damni a familia, 
iniuriam dato ob parem aequitatem recipiendum [D.9.2.32].’ 
742 Hunnius, ibid., p. 18. 
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commentators.743 It has already been noted that treatises on interpretation from early modern times 
onwards generally featured – when dealing with interpretations that sought to contrast the words of the law 
with the intention of the legislator – a list of the available evidence from which to derive such an intention, 
and simply adding equity in Donellus’ sense as such an evidentiary source to the list would have seemed 
relatively straightforward.744 The argument is necessarily speculative, but the other sources explored above 
seem less likely candidates to provide a place for equity within treatises on interpretation. That of 
Bolognetus would not have contributed much in terms of substantive content, merely providing a label for 
existing arguments and doctrines of interpretation. That of authors seeking to align their theories with 
scholastic theology to a greater extent, such as Suarez or Laymann, would have required an overhaul of the 
orthodox treatment of restrictive and extensive interpretation. 
However, it is not clear that Donellus’ view maintained its hold on treatises of this sort for very 
long. My analysis has been confined to examining the main works of this sort for the later seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, and a more thorough analysis will be needed to corroborate this point further. If one 
looks at later treatises on interpretation, it appears that the attempts explored above to find a convincing 
role for equity alongside other theories of interpretation was not extremely successful. The Tractatus de 
Scientia Interpretandi of Johann von Felden (d. 1668), for instance, discusses equity in no place – not in 
relation to interpretatio restrictiva or to any other kind of interpretation.745 The same can be said for the De 
principiis interpretationis legum adaequatis, published in the 1730s by Johann Holderrieder (d. 1794).746 More 
research on the later development of equity is required to clarify this point, but this does not seem related 
to a change in treatises on equity specifically which, as late as the 1740s, continued to deal with equity as a 
concept of legal interpretation.747  
 
4.3.2. Later canon lawyers 
I deal separately with later canon law sources. The reason for this is that canon law accounts of equity were 
influenced by theological sources – and in particular by the writings of Suarez and later theologians – to a 
much greater extent than those of civil lawyers. Indeed, while we have seen in the previous sections that 
most later seventeenth and eighteenth-century civil law works were dealing with equity following the 
imprimatur of either Donellus or Bolognetus,748 the commentaries on canon law of the later seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, became very clearly reliant on the writings of theologians to support their accounts 
of equity. These authors seem to have been influenced by those later theologians who had sought to 
distinguish epieikeia from other types of interpretation, or who, like Laymann, had sought to carve a more 
specific role for theological epieikeia within existing doctrine. 
                                                    
743 Compare Donellus’ approach with that of Baldus at [1.1.4.2] above. 
744 See Schröder, ‘The Concept and Means of Legal Interpretation’, pp. 92-4, 96-9. 
745 See e.g. the chapter on interpretatio restrictiva at Johann von Felden, Tractatus de Scientia Interpretandi (1689), pp. 961-8.  
746 Johann Holderrieder, De Principiis Interpretationis Legum Adaequatis (1736), p. 33.  
747 See e.g. Leonard Carlier, Dissertatio Inauguralis Juridica de Aequitate (1743), pp. 6-10. 
748 See [4.3.1.1] above. One exception in this sense may be Pufendorf – and this may be attributable to the influence of 
Grotius. See n.728 above. 
155 
 
One of the earliest works in this sense is the Summa Iuris Canonici of Johannes Streinius (d. 1662), 
published in 1658.749 Streinius refers almost exclusively to theologians in his account under the title de 
aequitate iuris, and, though he refers to equity as a benigna interpretatio of the law, his discussion of it is entirely 
consistent and derived from that of Suarez – sub-dividing, as Suarez does, between taking laws outside of 
the power of the legislator, or of his will, and not mentioning interpretatio restrictiva at all. Streinius tells us 
that ‘omnis enim interpretatio aequitas est sed non omnis interpretatio aequitas, seu epyeikia [...]. Igitur non 
secundum verba legis, sed aequitatem seu [epieikeiam] iudicandum est in his quinque casibus. Primus est 
quando lex, aut simpliciter aut secundum aliquid ratione loci, temporis aut personae redditur iniqua. 
Secundus, quando observatio legis obesset bono communi. Tertius cum praesumere prudenter licet, ipsum 
legislatorem, si adesset, contra tenorem legis suae acturum, vel quod petitur, concessurum esse. Quartus, 
cum apparet, aliam exitisse auctoris mentem. Quintus denique quando de dispensatione Principis 
constat.’750 
Another similar source is the Franciscan theologian and canon lawyer Anaklet Reiffenstuel (Johann 
Georg Reiffenstuel d. 1703), who, in his Ius Canonicum Universum published at the turn of the century 
identified epieikeia as a benigna interpretatio, but defined it entirely by reference to the Suarezian approach to 
equity.751 Reiffenstuel puts it as follows:  ‘Epicheia differt ab interpretatione legis potissimum in hoc, quia 
per hanc interpretamur verba legis, quando sunt obscura, seu ambiguum sensum reddunt: per Epicheiam 
vero interpretamur mentem Legislatoris, ubi constat de universali verborum sensu, dubitatur autem de 
mente Legislatoris, utrum nempe is talem casum particularem ob certas circumstantias voluerit, vel potuerit 
comprehendere sub generali locutione legis.’752 The distinction from interpretation, and the identification 
of the two branches of epieikeia relating to the power and the will of the legislator, are unmistakably similar 
to Suarez’s theory.  
Some canon lawyers seem to have followed Suarez more loosely, perhaps seeking to find some 
consistency with Donellus’ theory of equity.  One example is the Jesuit canon lawyer Francis Xavier 
Schmalzgrueber (d. 1735). In his Ius Ecclesiasticum Universum, Schmalzgrueber identified epieikeia with a type 
of interpretatio restrictiva, but used Suarez’s approach to equity to define its content. He said that an 
‘interpretatio restrictiva legum per Epiikiam’ can be had ‘in his tribus casibus. 1. Si alioquin in casu particulari 
Lex evaderet iniqua, et praeciperet aliquid illicitum [...]. 2. Si lex in casu particulari praeciperet aliquid nimis 
arduum, et supra potestatem humanae Legis [...]. 3. si prudenter credi possit, quod Legislator in hoc, vel illo 
                                                    
749 See Ioannes Streinius, Summa Iuris Canonici Prolegomena (1659), pp. 45-8: ‘Aequitas, seu [epieikeia] vocatur moderatio iuris, 
mitigatio legum, ius temperatum [...]. Laxare dico, non per dispensationem, sed benignam interpretationem, a [Iodocus 
Damhouderius, Praxis Rerum Criminalium (1555) cap. ult.] ita definitur, “Aequitas est temperata iustitia cum dulcedine et 
misericordia facta consideratione diligenti, et discretione circumstantiarum” [...] 
750 Streinius, Summa Iuris Canonici Prolegomena, pp. 46-8. 
751 The distinction, for Reiffenstuel (and probably Suárez too) seems to have been centred on the fact that interpretatio restrictiva 
sought a plausible construction for the words of the law, whereas epieikeia simply dealt with their binding power, regardless 
of their meaning. See Anaklet Reiffenstuel, Jus Canonicum Universum (1700), p. 156.  
752 Reiffenstuel, Jus Canonicum, p. 156: ‘Epicheia differt ab interpretatione legis potissimum in hoc, quia per hanc 
interpretamur verba legis, quando sunt obscura, seu ambiguum sensum reddunt: per Epicheiam vero interpretamur mentem 
Legislatoris, ubi constat de universali verborum sensu, dubitatur autem de mente Legislatoris, utrum nempe is talem casum 
particularem ob certas circumstantias voluerit, vel potuerit comprehendere sub generali locutione legis’ (my emphasis). 
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casu Lege sua non voluerit obligare.’753 The distinction between an intervention of epieikeia that takes a case 
outside of the power of the legislator and one that takes it outside of the will of the legislator is clearly there 
and derived from Suarez’s theory, but Schmalzgrueber does not distinguish it from interpretatio restrictiva. 
Like Donellus, he seems to identify it as a species of restrictive interpretation, though he clearly thought 
that the writings of theologians formed a better basis on which to ground that doctrine. Schmalzgrueber’s 
approach of merging to some extent interpretations by equity and interpretatio restrictiva is sensible if we recall 
that the distinction Suarez posed between interpretatio restrictiva and epieikeia was but a tenuous one.754 Indeed 
we have seen that Suarez’s successor Laymann had already rejected the distinction, and it is possible that 
the latter was himself an influence over Schmalzgrueber for his decision to do the same.755 
This final part of my study only scratches the surface of later seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
writings on equity by canon lawyers. I have mentioned in the second chapter that canon lawyers can be 
found in this period simply adopting the position set out by humanist jurists earlier, without expanding on 
the role of equitable interpretation or epieikeia.756 And indeed, at least two of the authors quoted in this 
section borrowed the identification of epieikeia with benigna interpretatio from earlier humanist accounts of 
equity. Further research will be needed to determine how far the theories of Suarez, or of other legal writers 
juxtaposing scholastic theological and civil law accounts of equity, influenced canon law Summae and 
commentaries in the later period. However, the available evidence suggests a strong link between the more 

















                                                    
753 See Franz Xavier Schmalzgrueber, Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum Tomus Primus (1738), p. 68.  
754 See n.692 above. 
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In his work on legal scholarship in the age of Erasmus, Guido Kisch suggested that equity may have been 
one of the concepts most deeply affected by the innovations of legal humanism. It is possible to say with 
confidence, at the end of our excursus, that his inkling was well founded. From the publication of Budaeus’ 
Annotationes in Pandectas onwards the concept of equity became for the first time the object of detailed study 
in legal treatises and commentaries. As we have seen throughout this thesis, this was caused by the 
association of aequitas and epieikeia. The introduction of this equation by legal humanists triggered a change 
in the way equity was perceived by civil and canon lawyers that was as radical in its break with the past as 
it was swift in its spread among legal writers around Europe. 
 I have examined above both the cause for this change and the consequences of it. The cause, I 
have argued, was the eagerness of humanist jurists to align their legal commentaries with the work of fellow 
scholars in the field of humanistic philology, drawing in particular from those early modern Latin editions 
of Aristotle that translated references to epieikeia with the binomial pair aequum et bonum. The arguments of 
humanist jurists implied that the medieval ius commune tradition on aequitas was based on a misunderstanding 
of the meaning and nature of equity. By the mid-seventeenth century, the view that aequitas and epieikeia 
were closely related, or indeed synonymous, terms was almost unanimously accepted among civil and canon 
lawyers.757 The main consequence of this was that early modern jurists had to find a new role for aequitas as 
a legal doctrine. The first generation of writers on the topic was provided with a clean slate to do so, for it 
could find but little guidance in the medieval legal tradition on the topic. However, while it undermined the 
legacy of medieval legal scholarship on aequitas, the assimilation of equity and epieikeia opened the door to 
interactions with another branch of learning, that of the writings of scholastic theologians on epieikeia. A 
second consequence of the conceptual change examined in this thesis was therefore the breakdown of the 
barrier that had separated lawyers and theologians on the subject of equity. Contact between those two 
groups of scholars was neither constant nor consistent - not all legal writers seized the opportunity to refer 
to the writings of scholastic theologians to cast light on the nature of equity and those that did not use them 
for the same purposes. The same is true of theologians drawing on lawyers. However, a number of lawyers 
and theologians could, by the end of the sixteenth century, refer to both traditions as belonging to one 
branch of scholarship - borrowing elements from either in the construction of their theories of equity.758 
The effects of the early modern association of aequitas with epieikeia were arguably permanent, certainly 
long-lasting. Well into the eighteenth century, legal writers can be found drawing on the theories of equity 
examined in this thesis, and treating theological and legal scholarship of equity as one branch of learning.759 
I have argued that the many lawyers and theologians came to agree, by the end of the seventeenth 
century, that the operative role of equity, most of the time interchangeably referred to as aequitas, aequum et 
bonum or epieikeia, was that of a doctrine of interpretation of the law beyond the letter. When it came to find 
                                                    
757 See [2.4.1] above. 
758 See [3.3.2] and generally chapter 4 above. 
759 See [2.4.1], [4.3] above. 
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a definition of exactly what circumstances would warrant the intervention of equity, views differed. Lawyers 
tended, as we have seen, to emphasise the role of the intention of the legislator. Theologians emphasised 
instead the limits of the power of human law. However, we have seen theologians like Azpilcueta, 
Covarrubias and Molina favouring the approach of lawyers, and vice versa authors like Mendoza, 
Turaminus and Grotius preferring the views of theologians. As the two traditions merged together, some 
writers chose to adopt a hybrid approach – Donellus sought to fit the approach to epieikeia of theologians 
within the bounds of the traditional ius commune doctrine of interpretatio restrictiva. Suarez on the other hand 
sought to carve a space for the aequitas of lawyers within theological theories of epieikeia. It does not seem 
that, at least by the early eighteenth century, a single approach had gained universal approval. Some clusters 
of scholars can be found favouring one or the other, or indeed none at all.  Eighteenth-century canon 
lawyers were attracted by the approach of Suarez. civil law treatise-writers on interpretation to Donellus. 
Other legal writers like Domat could instead put forward theories of equity based on no previously 
recognised role or theory.760 What emerges from this analysis is that, while from later sixteenth century 
onwards an understanding had emerged among the majority of legal and juridico-theological writings about 
the role of equity at a rather high level of generality, the details of its nature, role and application remained 
contested for the entirety of the early modern period, and probably beyond. 
In conclusion, I will deal briefly with what this research implies for broader scholarship 
encountering the concept of equity, and with the questions which this thesis has left unanswered. 
Regarding broader scholarship dealing with equity, as anticipated earlier in the introduction to this 
thesis, the main flag raised by this research is that it is important for early modernists to bear in mind the 
great divide that existed between the analysis of equity by legal scholars before and after the sixteenth 
century. The dividing line moves forwards or backwards in time depending on the circles of scholars 
concerned. The majority of civil lawyers had turned their back to the medieval learning on equity by the 
second half of the sixteenth century. Canon lawyers, with the exception of those canon lawyers who were 
also theologians, seem to have taken about a century longer to adopt epieikeia as their model for equity.761 
It would therefore be a mistake for scholars to treat the two periods, medieval and early modern, as enjoying 
some kind of scholarly continuity when it comes to aequitas or epieikeia. It would also be a mistake to assume 
that early modern lawyers all spoke of equity as part of a common discourse and understood it in exactly 
the same way - different authors could easily understand equity extremely differently depending on whether 
they were influenced by the early humanistic writings on equity, by the writings of theologians, by both or 
indeed by neither.  
To provide an example of the relevance of this point, it may be useful to engage in a short 
digression and refer to the contemporary research being carried out on the adoption of the concept of 
equity as epieikeia in English early modern legal scholarship.  In England as in Europe, equity enjoyed a 
revival through the early modern period, when it came to be used by legal scholars to explain the jurisdiction 
                                                    
760 Cf [2.5.2], [2.5.3], [2.5.4], [4.3.1.1], [4.3.1.2] and [4.3.2] above. 
761 See [2.5.2] and [2.5.3] above. 
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of courts of equity or exercises of statutory interpretation. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, 
David Ibbetson has shown in recent research that English legal writers relied heavily on contemporary ius 
commune sources to construct their theories of equity.762 Part of his argument is that these authors never 
succeeded in developing a consistent theory of equity – it was a contested concept across early modern 
England to start with, and ‘the incorporation of foreign fragments into English texts served only to add to 
the confusion.’763 One of the sources Ibbetson refers to in the course of his study is an anonymous 
manuscript which ‘giv[es] express citations to Duarenus, Oldendorp, Covarruvias, Baldus and Zasius’ as 
references to for its theory of equity’.764 Based on our excursus throughout this thesis, it is clear that these 
are all authors who would have understood equity rather differently: Covarruvias and Duarenus as an 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the intention of the legislator;765 Zasius and Baldus in the more 
traditional, medieval sense of justice;766 Oldendorpius as the provision of justice in accordance with the 
circumstances of a particular case, whether or not amending and interpreting a written rule.767 Was the 
anonymous author aware he was drawing on theories that were inconsistent with each other? Did he engage 
with them meaningfully? These questions are impossible to answer without referring back to the context 
of early modern ius commune scholarship on equity. 
Coming now to matters for further research, there are a number of issues that this thesis raises, 
but which went beyond its scope and remain unanswered.  
First is the question of whether the sixteenth-century assimilation of equity and epieikeia had any 
impact in practice. One way to answer this question is to ask whether authors who dealt with equity at 
length in their writings put their theories into practice in their consilia. This alone went beyond the scope of 
this work, but it would in any case give only part of the answer – a fuller account can only be sought by 
asking whether courts more generally in the jurisdictions examined made any meaningful substantive use 
of equity as epieikeia. It should be noted that, in general, studies on the practical uses of equity have not 
been forthcoming. Indeed, despite the detailed coverage of the ius commune development of medieval 
approaches to equity,768 little is known of its use in practice.769 For the early modern period, an interesting 
attempt to trace uses of equity among sixteenth and seventeenth-century German-speaking sources is that 
of Schröder. Results from his sample show uses of equity to have been few and rather superficial, but it 
should be noted that Schröder did not acknowledge as the basis of his study that the main role of equity 
would in this time have been one of interpretation, and he – for instance – dismisses a source without 
further analysis because ‘es handelt sich also nicht um eine Entscheidung contra oder praeter legem, 
                                                    
762 See n.9 above. 
763 Ibbetson, ‘A House Built on Sand’, p.77. 
764 See Ibbetson, ibid., p. 68. 
765 See [2.3.4] and [3.3.2.2] above. 
766 See [1.1.2] and [2.4.3.1] above. 
767 See [2.3.3.2] above. 
768 See nn.15-16 above. 
769 One of the few attempts to trace uses of medieval equity in practice is found in Sarah B White, ‘Procedure and Legal 
Arguments in the Court of Canterbury, C. 1193-1300’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, St Andrews, Dec 2017. White found no 
meaningful uses of equity in her sources. 
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sondern nur um eine [...] ‘billige’ Vertragauslegung’.770 One cannot therefore rule out that further, better 
focussed research on early modern uses of equity as a doctrine of interpretation might yield more interesting 
results. 
Secondly, a question related but not identical to the previous one concerns the use of equity in the 
context of courts, processes and judgments ‘by equity’. We have dealt in the first chapter with the role that 
equity played in explaining judgments ex aequo et bono in the medieval period. What seems striking about 
uses of equity throughout early modern treatises and commentaries is the lack of any reference to this aspect 
of it. The reason may be straightforward. Once equity is understood as a doctrine of interpretation of the 
law beyond the letter, and as one to be exercised by any judge and in whatever court, then the idea of courts 
or judgments ‘of equity’ becomes either untenable or redundant. We have encountered one such argument 
being put forward explicitly by Turaminus, who argued that the association of equity as epieikeia was of no 
relevance to judgments ex aequo et bono.771 I have not, however, in the course of my own research dealt 
specifically with such courts or jurisdictions – a study of a different nature would be required in order to 
do this thoroughly. 
It should be noted that the little insight one can have on the matter suggests that the impact, if any, 
was not great. First, I have referred above to Charles Donahue’s work on Stracca’s De Mercatura – an early 
modern author dealing with courts of merchants, often referred to as courts of equity.  Donahue shows 
that Stracca does refer to the early modern development of equity as epieikeia by humanist jurists, but then 
reverted to the medieval treatment of courts of equity by Bartolus and Baldus when it came to deal with 
substantive doctrine. As he puts it, ‘the humanistic material contributes only at a rather high level of 
generality.’772 Secondly, I have in the course of my own research encountered one author engaging with the 
early modern scholarship on equity as epieikeia in the context of proceedings by equity.  The source in 
question was a consilium by Jacobus Menochius (d. 1607).773 The matter Menochius advised on concerned a 
compromissum seemingly referring a dispute to arbitration, specifying that the matter should be adjudicated 
ex aequo et bono.774 Menochius referred to Joannis Baptista Perusinus’ (d. 1483) Tractatus de Arbitris, where 
Perusinus discusses the effect of adding the words ‘quod secundum aequitatem, vel de aequitate procedatur’ 
to a compromissum appointing an arbiter.775 Menochius then proceeded to refer to the early modern 
scholarship linking equity/aequum et bonum/epieikeia and interpretation of the law according with the wishes 
                                                    
770 Schröder, ‘Aequitas’, pp. 279-80.  
771 See n.595 above 
772 See Donahue, ‘Courts of Merchants’, p. 5. 
773 Jacobus Menochius, Consiliorum Sive Responsorum Liber Tertius (1625), cons. 120. 
774 See, Menochius, ibid., 102: ‘Cum gravissimae iam diu agitatae causae inter Illustrissimus Comites Corrigienses iudicium 
sit tandem pro bono et aequo diffiniendum a Caesarea Maiestate [...] ex compromisso in Maiestatem Caesaream facto, ut 
pro bono et aequo causam hanc diffiniat’. For a history of the development of the compromissum and its role in arbitration 
awards ‘ex aequo et bono’ in the ius commune see Rheinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (1996), pp. 526-30 and 
Helmut Coing, ‘Zur Entwicklung Des Schiedsvertrags Im Ius Commune - Die Amicabilis Compositio Und Der 
Schiedsspruch Ex Aequo et Bono’, Festschrift für Heinz Hübner zum 70. Geburtstag am 7. November 1984 (1984), pp. 35-7.. 
775 Joannes Baptista Perusinus, ‘Tractatus Egregius de Arbitris et Comrpomissis in Libros 13 Divisus’, Tractatus Universi Iuris 
(1584), ff. 224v-294v, 280r-280. 
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of the legislator.776 Menochius seems to unproblematically follow authors from different early modern 
traditions, thus juxtaposing in the course of his analysis the definitions of equity of Duarenus and 
Oldendorpius – he therefore defines equity both as a benigna interpretatio which moves beyond the words of 
the law to follow the intention of the legislator, and as a judgment that accommodates the circumstances 
of a particular case.777  It is not clear what link Menochius saw between proceedings ex aequo et bono and the 
early modern understanding of equity, and indeed the latter seems to play no substantive role in either 
explaining the jurisdiction ex aequo et bono of the arbiter -Menochius ultimately solves the case before him 
by applying rules from the ius commune.  It should be pointed out that Menochius did not discuss equity in 
any detail in his other works, and in another of his consilia we find him referring to the medieval notions of 
aequitas scripta and non scripta, without acknowledging any early modern sources at all.778  Nevertheless, read 
alongside Donahue’s analysis of Stracca mentioned earlier, the theory of equity of early modern lawyers does 
not seem to have been easy to square with proceedings by equity, and references to early modern 
scholarship on equity in both Stracca and Menochius are merely cosmetic. Whether further research can 
unveil anything more significant remains to be seen. 
I conclude with a third avenue for further research, no doubt the broadest. The point made in this 
thesis that equity became a contested concept in the early modern period seems to be well aligned with 
findings by Mark Fortier regarding equity in early modern England. Fortier, though geographically 
confining his study to England, went far beyond the scope of this thesis by examining the concept of equity 
as encountered in contexts beyond the legal one – its use in poetry, sermons, theatre and politics to name 
but a few. There are signs that Fortier’s findings for England may well hold true for the rest of Western 
Europe. One of the few writers whose writings on equity in a context other than legal have been studied in 
detail is Jean Bodin (d. 1596).  Bodin wrote in the context of political theory rather than law. Interestingly, 
the approach of Bodin seems to have little in common with those we have found in the works explored in 
this thesis. Research by Ian Williams and Adolfo Giuliani shows that Bodin dealt with equity by adopting a 
musical metaphor. As Giuliani puts it: ‘Bodin pictured equity with a mathematical formula, an algorithm 
which indicated perfect musical consonance and, for the jurist, the middle way between strict law and 
judicial discretion.’779 For Bodin, the ‘equity of the Prince’, the jurisdiction of courts able to judge unbound 
                                                    
776 Menochius, ibid., p.20: ‘Disseramus nunc, quid sit hoc bonum et aequum, quod alii aequum bonum, alii aequitatem 
appellant. Et vero cum multorum sint hac de re interpretationes, tum maxime recentiorum, nempe Budaei, Alciati, Salamonii, 
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Iason [de Maino ad C.3.1.8]. Quo in casu nos non versamur. Non enim extat nostro in casu aliquis rigor scriptus.’ 
779 Adolfo Giuliani, ‘Metaphors of Justice. A Mathematical-Musical Image in Jean Bodin’, unpublished paper presented at 
the 2009 British Legal History Conference.  See also Ian Williams, ‘Developing a Prerogative Theory for the Authority of 
the Chancery: The French Connection’ in Law and Authority in British Legal History, 1200-1900 (2016), pp. 22-4. Though it 
should be noted that, in places and on a more general level, Bodin discusses equity in a way consistent with how it is 
examined in this thesis. See e.g. Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (1961), lib. 6, cap. 6, p. 1023. 
162 
 
by laws, is a necessary ingredient within a well-ordered legal system to provide what he defined as ‘harmonic 
justice.780  Bodin thus presents us with an unfamiliar metaphor and a different meaning for equity, despite 
writing at the height of the influence of equity as a theory of interpretation of the law in accordance with 
the wishes of the legislator. My project was not so ambitious as to explore the degree of variation that uses 
of equity enjoyed across different fields and spheres of learning, but is likely to prove a fertile avenue of 
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